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PREFACE
My purpose in this research was to discover what role the Conservative Party played 
in the extreme-right’s failure after the Second World War. Readers will make moral 
judgements about individuals and groups mentioned, but I do not. This is partly 
because views that society now rejects were once commonplace and accepted. 
Moreover, individuals who once held these views may now repudiate them, and I see 
no point in criticising them now. The historian’s task is to explain. Judgement is a 
matter for society.
Many institutions have helped me to conduct this research. Cardiff University was 
very accommodating in allowing me to study for a PhD, particularly so long after 
graduating. I found a very warm welcome at Cardiff University and am saddened that 
my active association with it seems to be ending. The Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC) provided a full doctoral award. This was a life-changing event. 
Without it, I doubt that I would have completed my research. The AHRC also granted 
a scholarship for a substantial period of study at the John W. Kluge Centre in the 
Library of Congress, Washington DC. I am grateful to the financial and cultural 
opportunities afforded by the AHRC’s generosity. Other institutions also contributed 
financially. The Institute of Historical Research granted an award that allowed me 
more time to rummage through archives in London. The Royal Historical Society and 
Cardiff University provided funds so that I could attend overseas conferences.
I am indebted to many individuals, and apologise if I have inadvertently omitted 
someone from my thanks. The archival staff at the universities of Hull, Sheffield, 
Birmingham, and at the LSE were very helpful. So, too, were the employees of the 
British Library in London, and the staff at the Working Class Movement Library in 
Salford. The people at the Colindale newspaper library were remarkable in meeting 
my requests. I am especially grateful to Colin Harris, Jeremy Mcllwhaine and their 
colleagues at the Bodleian Library. They provided an exemplary service and a warm 
welcome. I also want to thank Mary Lou Reiker at the Kluge Center for her kindness, 
and staff at the Library of Congress for their help and perseverance. Former members
of the Monday Club were also generous in giving their time and thoughts, and in 
allowing me to include their comments in the thesis and any subsequent publications.
I am grateful for the care of the medical profession over more than two decades, 
particularly Dr. J. S. Broxton, Mr. Geoffrey Ingram, Professor Sir Miles Irving and 
Mr. Iain Anderson. My friends Peter Hully and John Kerr have helped keep me sane 
over many years, including the course of the research, not least by being as rubbish on 
the golf course as I am. Peter also frequently offered financial assistance, which I will 
never forget. Dr. Garthine Walker was incredibly tolerant in accommodating me when 
necessary, which I appreciate very much. All research students are indebted to their 
supervisors. This is particularly so in my case. Dr. Keir Waddington acted as my 
second supervisor and provided cogent comments that assisted in focusing my efforts. 
My connection with Dr. Kevin Passmore goes back to the early 1990s when I was one 
of his undergraduates. He was exemplary then, and as a PhD supervisor, and I 
consider him a friend. His only flaw is a deluded belief that someday Cardiff Blues 
will win the Heineken Cup.
I wish to end with comments about my family. During the course of this research, my 
brother, Michael Pitchford, confirmed what I have long thought about him. On a 
number of occasions, he made substantial journeys to bring me home when I was 
having problems. He is the best of brothers. As for our parents, Neville and Mary 
Pitchford, I will never be able to repay their love and kindness. Without their practical 
assistance and moral support, I would not have completed this research. They are 
excellent role models, both as parents and grandparents. As in so much of my life, 
however, four people have made what I do worthwhile, my wife Joanne, and our 
children Christopher, Edward and Amy. They have lived with the consequences of my 
medical condition with love and without complaint. It is to them that I dedicate this 
work.
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Introduction
The Conservative Party is a political phenomenon. A ‘Tory’ party has existed for over 
three hundred years. It survived changes resulting from industrialisation, adapted to 
the Great Reform Act of 1832 and even introduced its own progressive electoral 
reforms under Disraeli. A party o f landowners, property and privilege, the 
Conservative Party not only weathered the century when full democracy emerged but 
dominated it. It won nineteen off the twenty-six general elections between 1900 and 
1997, eleven of them outright. Even in those lost it gained over 40% of the vote. 
Perhaps most startling is the Conservative Party’s domination of politics in the 
‘hungry thirties’, albeit within a National Government, when other western 
democracies were threatened by, and some succumbed to, authoritarian and extremist 
government. Until 1997, only one Conservative Party leader in the twentieth century 
failed to become Prime Minister: Austen Chamberlain. It was a period of consistent 
success largely explained by the Conservative Party’s ability to adapt to new 
circumstances such as an increased franchise, imperialism and nationalism, as Pugh 
demonstrated.1 Fierce opposition to change frequently became muted acceptance and 
party policy. Wheatcroffc stated that the Conservative Party co-opted, and then 
absorbed, Peelites, Liberal Unionists, Coalition Liberals and National Liberals.2 The 
result is a broad-based electoral monolith. Therefore, it is easy to attribute the extreme 
right’s conspicuous and longstanding electoral failure to the Conservative Party’s 
ability to attract many voters.3
Yet the extreme right was a persistent feature of twentieth century Britain. Prior to the 
Great War, the Tariff Reform League propounded mass populism, autarky and Anglo- 
Saxon alliance. The National Maritime League, The Navy League and The National 
Service League emphasised defence in reaction to a perception that a liberal
1 M. Pugh, ‘Popular Conservatism in Britain: Continuity and Change 1880-1987’, The Journal 
of British Studies, 27, 3 (Jul., 1988), 254-282.
2 G. Wheatcroft, The Strange Death of Tory England, Penguin, London (2005), 21.
3 For this, and other factors, See R. Griffin, ‘British Fascism: The Ugly Duckling’, in M. Cronin 
(ed), The Failure of British Fascism, Macmillan, London (1996), 141-165, and R. Eatwell, 
Fascism: A History, Pimlico, London (2003), 327-335.
consensus that was antithetical to the demands of empire dominated British politics. 
Xenophobia and anti-Semitism existed in the British Brother’s League, National 
League for Clean Government, Parliamentary Alien Immigration Committee, the 
London League and the Immigration Reform Association. Victory in 1918 arguably 
deprived the extreme right of fertile soil, but fear of Communism and Socialism 
provided an impetus for the National Party to win two seats in the 1918 General 
Election. Fear of the Left, Jews and aliens resulted in the formation of interwar 
movements such as the British Empire Union, National Citizens Union and Middle 
Class Union. After Mussolini formed the first fascist government in Italy in 1922, a 
welter of mimetic indigenous movements appeared in Britain. Nazi groups emerged 
after Hitler came to power in 1933. The Second World War associated the extreme 
right in the public mind with racism, authoritarianism and extermination. However, it 
did not eradicate it. In the period 1945-87, over two hundred embryonic extreme-right 
movements materialised.4
Prior to 1939, the Conservative Party did not deny this connexion. Some 
Conservatives openly flaunted it. Future Conservative MP Patrick Hannon sat on the 
British Fascisti’s Grand Council.5 Pugh described Conservative membership of the 
British Fascisti as a calculated attempt to alter the party’s ‘limp-wristed attitude 
towards the left’.6 Its relations with the Conservative Party were deliberate and open. 
The Fascisti acted as stewards at Conservative meetings and Conservative local 
associations rented rooms to the Fascisti.7 Conservative MPs made no secret of their 
sympathies for extreme-right governments, whilst others betrayed their views when 
they supported restrictive measures on ‘aliens’ who sought sanctuary from such
o
regimes. Support for extreme-right views appeared in Conservative publications such 
as the English Review, Saturday Review, the National Review and Truth. The 
Conservative Party was especially associated with Truth via its connection with
4 C. O Maolain, The Radical Right: A World Directory, Longman, Essex (1987), 293-335.
5 T. Linehan, British Fascism 1919-39: Parties, Ideology and Culture, MUP, Manchester 
£2000), 43.
M. Pugh, ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts!’ Fascists and Fascism in Britain Between the Wars, 
Pimlico, London (2006), 61.
7 Pugh, Hurrah, 61-62
8 For example, Lt. Com. Peter Agnew, MP for Camborne from 1931 and a PPS 1935-39, and 
Col. Harold P. Mitchell, MP for Brentwood and Chiswick from 1931. See The Daily Telegraph, 
29 August 1980, obituary, and R. Griffiths, Patriotism Perverted: Captain Ramsay, The Right 
Club and British Anti-Semitism, Constable, London (1998), 154-158.
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Neville Chamberlain, but so were Oswald Mosley, and former BUF member and 
subsequent founder of the National Front, A. K. Chesterton, whom it employed.9 The 
English Review attempted to influence Conservative Party policy in a campaign 
orchestrated by its editor, the BUF sympathiser Douglas Jerrold, and Lord Lloyd, a 
Conservative MP until 1925.10 The proprietor o f Saturday Review sided with Mosley 
against the Conservative Party that it supposedly supported.11 Many Conservatives 
were also members of the January Club, which was a British Union of Fascists front 
organisation.12 The mainstream Conservative newspaper, the Daily Mail, supported 
Mosley.13 One Conservative MP stated that there were ‘no fundamental differences of 
outlook between Blackshirts and their parents, the Conservatives’.14 Individual 
Conservatives funded Mosley.15 Some, such as the Duke of Northumberland, financed 
extreme-right publications that attracted contributions from Conservative MPs and 
fascists.16 Others formed their own extremist movements. For example, Edward 
Doran, Conservative MP for Tottenham North, announced in 1933 that he had formed 
The Liberators, a private Nazi army.17 Lord Lymington, Conservative MP for 
Basingstoke (1929-34), founded English Array, a group that harked back to England’s 
rural golden age, and consorted with known fascists who attempted to form the 
extreme right into a viable movement.18 R. Dorman-Smith, Unionist MP for 
Petersfield (1935-41), Minister of Agriculture (1939-40) and Governor o f Burma 
(1941-46), joined Lymington’s English Array.19
9 F. Beckett John Beckett: The Rebel Who Lost His Cause, London House, London (1999), 
161. Griffiths, Patriotism, 31-32. R. B. Cockett, ‘Ball, Chamberlain and Truth’, The Historical 
Journal, 33, 1 (March, 1990), 131-142.
10 S. Dorril, Blackshirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British Fascism, Penguin/Viking, London 
(2006), 237-268.
11 M. Pugh, Hurrah, 140-151
12 R. Griffiths, Patriotism, 133-139 and passim. See also Lionel S. Rose, British Fascism: 
Factual Survey No. 1 and British Fascism: Factual Survey No. 2, London (1948).
13 ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts!’ Daily Mail, 15 January 1934.
14 Sir Thomas Moore, MP for Ayr Burghs; quoted in D. Renton, Fascism, Anti-Fascism and 
Britain in the 1940s, Macmillan, Basingstoke (2000), 56.
15 Significant sums came from the future Conservative peer and minister Wyndham Portal, 
Henry Drummond Wolff MP and W. E. Allen MP. Dorril, Blackshirt, 278.
16 Griffiths, Patriotism, 50 & 134-5.
17 O Maolain, Radical Right, 325.
18 D. Stone, ‘The Far Right Movement and the Back-to-the land Movement, in J. V. Gottlieb 
and T. P. Linehan, The Culture of Fascism: Visions of the Far Right in Britain, Tauris, London 
(2004), 182-198. G. Wallop, Earl of Portsmouth, A Knot of Roots: An Autobiography by the 
Eari of Portsmouth, Geoffrey Bles, London (1965), 126ff.
19 A. Sykes, The Radical Right in Britain: Social Imperialism to the BNP, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke (2005),188ff. Griffiths, Patriotism, 52-3.
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Conservatives and extreme-right figures were members of the same organisations. 
Dorril described the National Citizens Union as ‘dominated by Conservative diehards
<\A
and aristocratic closet Fascists’. More noteworthy, given the possibility of conflict, 
was the proliferation in the 1930s of pro-Nazi, pro-peace groups. The Anglo-German 
Fellowship contained peers, Conservative MPs, ministers of the Crown, and extreme- 
right individuals like the subsequently interned Barry Domvile.21 The Link was a 
populist pro-Nazi organisation that sought to attract all classes. It included, amongst 
others, Conservative MP Sir Lambert Ward, described as an ‘inveterate supporter’ of 
Nazi Germany,22 and the Duke of Westminster.23 Westminster joined The Link on the 
advice of Henry Newnham, editor of Truth.24 During the war, Westminster headed 
moves to secure peace with Nazi Germany. At a meeting at his own home, 
Westminster presented a paper written by Henry Drummond Wolff, the Conservative 
MP who was secretly funding Mosley’s BUF.26 MI5 monitored Westminster’s 
meetings and Conservative Cabinet members were aware of them.27 Most intriguing 
was the secretive Right Club. It was a combination of extremists and Conservatives, 
and it provided the only interned Conservative MP, Captain Archibald Maule 
Ramsay.
During the Second World War, Conservative MPs spoke up for extreme-right
AO #
individuals whom the government had detained as potential traitors, whilst Fascist 
sympathisers sought respectability within the Conservative Party. Sir Charles Petrie, 
the Literary Editor of the New English Review, was a fellow traveller who argued 
subsequently that if Mosley had identified the BUF more closely with the
• 29 ..Conservative Party he would not have attracted as much opprobrium. These 
examples supported Stanley Baldwin’s earlier comment that fascism was
20 S. Dorril, Blackshirt, 424. Dorril also identified Conservative friends of Mosley as well as a 
host of others connected via the January Club.
21 Griffiths, Patriotism, 35ff.
22 Griffiths, Patriotism, 40.
23 Griffiths, Patriotism, passim. See also Dorill, Blackshirt, 424.
24 Dorril, Blackshirt, 465.
25 Dorril, Blackshirt, 470.
26 Dorril, Blackshirt, 470.
27 Dorril, Blackshirt, 470.
28 The Times, 4 November 1941, in Oswald Mosley Deposit, University of Birmingham, GB 
150 OMNB/3/3.
29 Sir Charles Petrie, Chapters of Life, Eyre and Spotiswoode, London (1950).
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'ultramontane Conservatism’. One fascist put it more prosaically when he described 
the whole of the extreme right as simply, ‘Conservatism with knobs on’.31 However, 
the Second World War was the extreme-right’s watershed. It brought images of 
genocide that were indelibly associated with right-wing extremism, especially 
Nazism. Henceforth, no British extreme-right movement used the epithet ‘fascist’, 
and it was not until 1962 that an extreme-right party called itself ‘National Socialist’.
The Conservative Party’s main objective after the Second World was the same as it 
was before it: to achieve and maintain power. Labour’s victory at the 1945 General 
Election presented the Conservative Party with the new paradigm of a Labour 
government able to implement its radical socialist programme. This meant increased 
state interventionism, governmental planning and controls, a corporate response to 
industrial relations, the construction of the Welfare State and nationalisation. 
Conservatives had opposed a greater role for the state, and the philosophy that shaped 
it. However, the size of Labour’s majority meant that there was little the Conservative 
Party could do stop the government. It also showed that the electorate wanted 
Labour’s policies, especially as they had emphatically ditched Britain’s war-leader. 
Therefore, the Conservative Party adapted, just as it had in the nineteenth century. It 
accepted much of Labour’s programme when in opposition and in government. 
Hoffman described how the Conservative Opposition of 1945-51 formulated a 
position that was similar to that o f the Labour Government. Robert Blake implicitly 
accepted Hoffman’s interpretation when he portrayed the post-1945 Conservative 
Party as one that adapted to changed circumstances.33 Peter Clarke was more explicit 
when he described the Conservative Opposition as ‘content to acquiesce’ in its 
opponents’ political agenda.34 Samuel Beer, a contemporary political scientist, 
thought that by the time that the Conservative Party regained office in 1951, its 
membership had accepted the substance of Labour’s social revolution. Another,
30 The Sunday Times, 17 June 1934. See also R. Benewick, The Fascist Movement in Britain, 
Allen Lane, London (1972), 174.
31 Respectively, The Sunday Times, 17 June 1934, and A. Leese, leader of the Imperial 
Fascist League, quoted in Eatwell, Fascism, 225.
32 J. D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition, 1945-51, MacGibbon & Kee Ltd., 
London (1964).
33 R. Blake, The Conservative Party: from Peel to Major, Heinemann, London (1997).
34 P. Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000, Penguin, London (2004), 255.
35 S. Beer, The Conservative Party of Great Britain’, The Journal of Politics, 14, 1 (Feb., 
1952), 41-71, esp. 58.
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Leon Epstein, showed how Churchill’s governments put this into practice.36 
Historians subsequently described how, in the period from 1945-75, the Conservative 
Party maintained this consensual approach. Charmley described this period as one in 
which the Conservative Party accepted the essential framework of this consensus. 
Alan Clark portrayed it as one on which the Conservative leadership consistently 
pursued policies that were more than just a simple nod in the direction of socialism. 
Morgan evinced a picture of a cautious Conservative leadership that accepted the 
collectivist consensus.39 Historians have even described the period between 1967-72, 
when the Conservative Party under Heath appeared to turn rightwards and formulate a 
more right-wing programme, as little more than a cosmetic reaction whose orientation 
is often misunderstood.40
This is not to say that historians have accepted this generalisation without question. 
Gilmour and Garnett thought that Conservative policy documents re-stated earlier 
Conservative beliefs.41 Kynaston argued that these documents consistently
AT)championed private enterprise and individualism over collectivism. Ramsden also 
identified similarities between pre and post-1945 Conservative policies, and pointed 
to differences between the Conservative and Labour Party over issues such as the 
nationalisation of certain industries that suggested that the notion of consensus was 
overstated.43 Some historians have analysed how far consensus existed in narrow 
areas. Rollings argued that historians have exaggerated the notion that a consensus 
between the parties existed in economic policy.44 Phillips investigated unrest in the 
Docks to argue that clear differences between the parties existed in industrial policy.45 
Others have tried to place the notion of consensus within a wider purview. Marquand,
36 Leon D. Epstein, ‘Politics of British Conservatism’, The American Political Science Review, 
48, 1 (Mar., 1964), 27^8, esp. 32-40.
37 J. Charmley, A History of Conservative Politics, Macmillan, London (1996).
38 A. Clark, The Tories: Conservatives and the Nation State 1922-1997, Phoenix, London 
(1999), 319-467.
K. O. Morgan, Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace, OUP, Oxford (2001).
40 J. Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975, Longman, London 
(1996), 243ff. I. Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories: The 
Conservatives Since 1945, Fourth Estate, London (1997), 228-244.
41 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 35.
42 D. Kynaston, Austerity Britain 1945-51, Bloomsbury, London (2007), 239.
43 J. Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957, Longman, London (1996).
44 N. Rollings, ‘Poor Mr Butskell: A Short Life, Wrecked by Schizophrenia?’ Twentieth Century 
British History, 5, 2 (1994), 183-205.
45 J. Phillips, The Postwar Political Consensus and Industrial Unrest in the Docks, 1944-55’, 
Twentieth Century British History, 6, 3 (1995), 302-319.
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for example, identified the Conservative Party’s actions as an adaptation to the 
dynamics of democracy as it unfolded in Britain after 1918.46 Yet, none denied that 
areas of agreement existed, whilst many agreed that a broad framework of consensus 
existed.47 Nor have any historians challenged the view that the Conservative Party 
reacted to Britain’s new paradigm after 1945.
These investigations identified similarities and differences between the two main 
political parties. In doing so, they helped this research to highlight differences 
between the Conservative Party and those groups and individuals that operated at its 
extreme-right edge. However, no matter what these investigations concluded, the real 
issue at stake was not whether a consensus existed, but what the extreme right 
perceived the situation to be. This was unambiguous. After 1945, the extreme right 
thought that the Conservative Party aped the Labour Party both in opposition and in 
government, and consistently criticised it for failing to implement ‘true Conservative’ 
policies. The right attacked the Conservative Opposition of 1945-51 for appeasing the 
Labour Government and meekly accepting its policies. It persistently assailed 
Conservative governments from 1951. When the Conservative Party returned to 
opposition in 1964, it faced an increased internal extreme-right challenge from the 
Monday Club, and an external extreme-right threat that soon coalesced to form the 
National Front in 1967. Unexpected victory in the 1970 General Election did not 
remove this threat. The extreme right viewed the policy U-turns by the Conservative 
Government of 1970-74 as surrender to the left’s militant forces. This provided 
impetus to the extreme right. The Monday Club appeared capable of dominating the 
Conservative Party, or forming its own party. By the mid-1970s, the National Front 
was Britain’s fourth political party, and hoped to overtake the Liberals. Connections 
between the National Front and Monday Club magnified the extreme-right’s threat. 
Yet, the threat from the Monday Club and National Front was over by the mid- 
Seventies. The Party bureaucracy forced the Monday Club to purge its extremists. 
Margaret Thatcher, Conservative leader from 1975, made an obvious appeal to 
potential National Front’s voters that contributed to its vote crumbling in the 1979
46 D. Marquand, Britain Since 1918: The Strange Career of British Democracy, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London (2008).
47 See, D. Kavanagh and P. Moms, Consensus Politics from Attlee to Major, Blackwell, 
Oxford (1994).
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General Election. Thereafter, the extreme right fragmented. The Conservative Party, 
on the other hand, governed for the next eighteen years.
These extreme right organisations were but a few that the Conservative Party faced in 
the post-war period. Conservative Central Office kept a careful watch on many 
external and internal extremists. The Conservative Party’s success in gaining power, 
and the extreme-right’s failure to attain it, was the most obvious manifestation of its 
role as a barrier to the extreme right in Britain. Yet this apparent relationship remains 
unexplored. In contrast, there exists extensive work on many aspects of the 
Conservative Party and the extreme right individually. These are usually parallel lines 
of study that either fail to investigate this relationship or do so inadequately. Blake, 
for example, provided an excellent narrative, but mentioned the party’s extreme right
iO
only tangentially and external movements hardly at all. John Ramsden mentioned 
internal and external extreme-right groups, but did not elaborate on the Conservative 
Party’s role in their fortunes.49 Davies mentioned extreme-right dissidents within the 
Conservative Party and investigated the party’s links with other organisations and the 
intelligence services, but does not go beyond drawing attention to connections.50 
Charmley explained criticism of the party from the right, but remained firmly within 
the bounds of the Conservative Party.51 Writing also from a right-wing perspective, 
Clark omitted virtually all reference to external extreme-right groups, save for the 
odd, tantalising approbation.52 From the left of the Conservative Party, Gilmour 
countered right-wing arguments, but also remained within party confines. 
Biographies rarely, of necessity, go beyond their subject matter, although some 
provided information pertinent to a study of the Conservative Party’s role in the 
extreme-right’s fortunes.54
48 R. Blake, Conservative Party.
48 J. Ramsden, Churchill and Eden and Winds.
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Studies of extreme-right groups often provide little more than an outline of the 
Conservative Party’s relationship with them. They are usually little more than 
highlights of personnel antecedents that rarely explore causal relationship.55 The 
continuing interest in Mosley, especially his post-war fortunes and impact, provided 
fascinating evidence of continuities, but again did not assess the role of the 
Conservative Party, and barely touched upon other extreme-right groups.56 Links 
between the National Front and the Conservative Party made by Taylor, Fielding, 
Nugent and Walker et al, provided excellent examples of individual connections, but 
were limited in scope, depth and, in one instance, by poor attribution. Articles on the 
National Front are mainly limited to the causes, and nature, of its support. A book 
section that assessed the Conservative Party’s relationship with the extreme right 
relied on evidence that was too limited to support its arguments.59 Even articles that 
focused on the Monday Club, a movement that straddled the nebulous border between 
the Conservative Party and the extreme right, did not use this movement as a potential 
vehicle for deeper study.60 Moreover, investigations that either utilised theoretical 
concepts, or focused on cultural representations, were limited by an understandable 
emphasis on the interwar period, or by too narrow a definition of their subject, which
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only served to remove from the study potentially important groups that could provide 
a clearer understanding of the Conservative Party’s role.61 Why, then, have historians 
ignored the Conservative Party’s role in the failure of the extreme right?
The nature of many extreme-right groups is one possible reason. Most extreme-right 
groups are little more than ‘mushroom’ organisations that emerged quickly in the dark 
and just as quickly collapsed. Many amounted to little more than the actions of one 
person who ran the ‘party’ from their home. Some of them were of dubious character. 
Others believed in conspiracy theory. These characteristics further limited their 
already slim chances of success. Those that attracted some members were 
endemically fractious and attracted poor calibre leaders. Very few survived intact for 
long. The result was that numerous groups that were in a perpetual state of fracture 
and merger populated the extreme-right. These factors make it difficult for historians 
to ascertain empirical data and literature on these groups. The lack of any central 
repository of such material exacerbates this situation. So, too, does the contemporary 
nature of these events. Some people involved in these events are still alive and do not 
necessarily wish to discuss them. As private papers become available, any research 
will quickly face reappraisal. These factors make examination of the Conservative 
Party’s relationship with the extreme right less attractive than investigation of other 
areas that do not suffer from such frustrations.
However, in one sense the question is inaccurate. Historians have not so much 
ignored this relationship and its effect as accepted it. References to connections 
between the Conservative Party and the extreme right are abundant. However, the 
relationship is at best stated or implied, but not explored. This is probably a 
consequence of the extreme-right’s poor electoral performance. Between 1945 and 
1975, the extreme-right did not win a single parliamentary seat. It frequently lost 
deposits. The highest vote secured by any extreme-right party in a parliamentary 
election was sixteen percent in a 1973 by-election. At the General Election in
61 See R. Eatwell, Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 
4, 2 (1992), 161-194, and, R. Griffin, The Concept that Came Out of the Cold: the 
Progressive Historicization of Generic Fascism and its New Relevance to Teaching Twentieth 
Century History’, History Compass, (2003), 1-41, and Julie V. Gottlieb and Thomas P. 
Linehan, The Culture of Fascism: Visions of the Far Right in Britain, I. B. Tauris, London 
(2004).
xiii
February 1974, the same individual stood in the same constituency and gained less 
than half that figure. Nor did the voters elect any extreme-right councillors in this 
period. These figures proved that the extreme right was as electorally insignificant 
after the Second World War as before it when its appeal was at its highest and 
untainted by genocide. Poor electoral performance is probably the most important 
reason why historians have not investigated the relationship between the extreme right 
and the Conservative Party fully.
However, subsequent events indicated that the extreme right was politically 
significant in Britain. In 1976, the National Party gained two council seats in 
Blackburn. During the Thatcher governments of 1979-90, extreme-right parties 
performed poorly. The National Front disintegrated. The Conservative Party’s 
performance declined after 1990. John Major headed a weak and frequently attacked 
government until 1997. Thereafter, three Conservative leaders failed to stop Labour 
gaining power, which has resulted in the Conservative Party’s longest period of 
opposition since the First World War. In contrast, the extreme right revived. The 
British National Party gained a council seat in 1993. It has won over fifty council 
seats and a place on the London Assembly since 1997. Nor is the extreme-right’s 
success limited to those groups easily associated with the neo-Nazi groups of the 
1970s. Former right-wing Conservatives dominate in the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), which euro-sceptics formed in 1993 to assail John 
Major’s government. UKIP occupies space to the right of the Conservative Party as an 
economically liberal, libertarian nationalist party. It has gained twelve European 
Parliament members, one member of the House of Commons and two members of the 
House of Lords. It is a reminder that challenges to the Conservative Party from the 
right do not come solely from fascists and neo-Nazis. These events, which suggested 
that there was at least a superficial link between the extreme-right’s fortunes and 
those of the Conservative Party after 1975, support the idea that there is a need for an 
examination of the Conservative Party’s relationship with the extreme right.
However, to do so presents two distinct problems. The first problem concerns 
definition. Primarily, what exactly was the ‘extreme right’? This is a difficult
62 M. Daniel, Cranks and gadflies: the story of UKIP, Timewell, London (2006), passim.
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question. Accusations of being ‘extreme’, ‘right-wing’ and ‘fascist’ have been so 
overused as to result in confusion rather than clarity. Webber understood this and 
opted to refer to dissident Conservatives and Fascists collectively as the ‘British
fkXRight’ rather than identify its different strands. In a similar vein, Blinkhom argued 
that ‘the definitions, typologies and taxonomies beloved of social scientists tend to fit 
uncomfortably the intractable realities which are the raw material of the historian.’64 
Blinkhom was introducing a study of interwar Fascists and Conservatives, a period 
when the extreme right was more prominent and recognisable. His comments are, 
therefore, particularly apposite for a study of the extreme right after 1945 when many 
people associated ‘extreme right’ with the horrors of the Second World War and the 
extreme right was, consequently, more circumspect and defensive about its 
antecedents. Additionally, those whom historians and social and political scientists 
describe as extreme right do not accept this description. Instead, they often see 
themselves as holding reasonable, even centrist positions. The term ‘extreme’ is also a 
subjective one that reflects the views of those that use it to describe groups they 
passionately disagree with. Yet, an understanding of what constitutes the extreme 
right is necessary if we are to understand its failure generally and the Conservative 
Party’s reaction to it in particular.
In one sense, however, the answer to the question is simple: the extreme right was that 
which was vehemently anti-left, to the extent that it demanded either of the 
Conservative Party, or itself, strong and concerted action against it. Even simpler, the 
‘extreme-right’ was that which stood further to the right of the Conservative Party. 
Though simplistic, this approach nevertheless allows for recognition and investigation 
of any ideological shifts by the Conservative Party along a traditionally accepted 
linear spectrum. It also avoids the anachronistic error of assuming that today’s 
extreme-right corresponds exactly with that o f previous years. This, however, is 
insufficient as a number of distinct strands ran within the extreme right. There was, 
for example, a ‘Conservative’ extreme right, which was authoritarian, supported the 
institutions of Church, monarchy and parliament, but desired the dictatorship of social 
elites. The ‘Radical’ extreme right, likewise, sought an authoritarian dictatorship, but
63 G. C. Webber, The Ideology of the British Right, Croom Helm, London (1986), 2-4.
64 M. Blinkhom (ed), Fascists and Conservatives: The radical right and the establishment in 
twentieth-century Europe, Unwin Hyman, London (1990), 2.
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a populist one drawn allegedly from the people, which it delineated whilst criticising 
existing elites and their institutions. More difficult to determine were groups that can 
be termed the ‘Freedom Right’, difficulty resting on their sub-divisions into those that 
espoused economic liberty and those advocated institutional liberty. In a sense, they 
were ‘liberal’, but they were also on the extreme right in the sense that in our period 
implementation of their programme required hard measures against the unions and 
welfare state. Finally, there was the ‘fascist’ and ‘neo-Nazi’ extreme right that 
encompassed elements of both the conservative and radical extremes, though not 
necessarily the ‘Freedom Right’. Crucially, this element of the extreme right 
expressed its views and objectives violently and often had paramilitary organisations. 
Unlike the conservative and radical right, it was prepared to use violence, be it 
physical or verbal. These differentiating characteristics, together with shared beliefs 
such as nationalism and a weak Conservative leadership that failed to reverse a 
deteriorating and decadent society caused by advancing socialism, formed the 
parameters that determined the inclusion of particular groups or individuals within the 
‘extreme right’. These parameters avoid the narrowness associated with attempts to 
identify a ‘fascist minimum’, which are theoretical concepts that, if used 
proscriptively and exclusively, would deny revealing comparisons of the Conservative 
Party’s attitude towards different extreme-right groups. They also allowed for the 
identification of extreme-right individuals within the Conservative Party itself, a 
crucial element in assessing the Conservative Party’s refractory role towards the 
extreme right.
These descriptions may be useful in helping to identify different extreme right groups, 
and therefore the Conservative Party’s reaction to them. However, in one important 
respect arguments about extreme right taxonomy in this period is almost redundant. 
For, it is important when examining the Conservative Party’s relationship with the 
extreme right in this period not to focus on what we consider extreme, but on what the 
Conservative Party thought was. It is only by acting thus that we can begin to 
understand the varying attitudes that the Conservative Party displayed to different 
groups, and minimise our own understandably subjective opinions of groups whose 
views clash with our own. Put another way, this research examines the relationship 
between the Conservative Party and those that it believed were right-wing extremists, 
and not those that we think were extreme right. It is for this reason that there is
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frequent reference to Central Office’s identification of groups or individuals as 
‘extreme’ or ‘extreme-right’ in the text. Notwithstanding this consideration, however, 
using the parameters outlined within a chronological framework allowed an 
exploration of any similarities and differences of the Conservative Party’s attitude 
towards the extreme right based on being in either opposition or government. It 
allowed investigation of the political space occupied by the Conservative Party and 
the extreme right, via examination of policy statements and objectives, political 
pronouncements and activities, ideological discourse, electoral fortunes, social 
connexions and language employed therein at national, regional and local level. 
Membership of various extreme organisations by specific individuals became 
apparent. Moreover, it facilitated answers to questions fundamental to an analysis that 
attempted to prove a negative: the Conservative Party’s role in an eventuality, 
extreme-right success, which failed to materialise. It assisted to place in context, and 
evaluate, the evidence of this role, whether policies, objectives, personnel, literature 
or electoral performance. It allowed an assessment of the extent and impact of the 
nexus between Conservatism and the extreme right and its continuity after the Second 
World War, and revealed the Conservative Party’s dual blocking role. Firstly, how 
disillusion with the Conservative Party forced extreme-right individuals into actions 
that were outside the confines and support of this successful, mainstream political 
leviathan, and thus spawned a number of extreme-right wing groups and parties. 
Secondly, the existence and role of a reporting mechanism throughout this period run 
by Conservative Central Office that monitored extreme-right wing activity, and 
allowed Central Office to block the extreme right effectively.
The second problem in an examination of the Conservative Party’s relationship with 
the extreme right concerns sources. What sources were available and what were their 
strengths and weaknesses? Films and literature helped to contextualise the research 
and provided an indication of contemporary perception, especially that of the right. 
However, they seldom investigated causality and never assessed the relationship 
between the extreme right and the Conservative Party. Some Television programmes 
addressed the causality of events, but similarly said nothing about the relationship. A 
radio programme confirmed that an extreme-right individual assisted Franco, but was 
limited to one event. Newspapers provided much more information. Their political 
orientation warranted careful handling but often proved valuable because of it.
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Colindale Newspaper Library’s extensive collection provided local and regional 
examples of wider themes. Political memoirs and biographies gave their subjects’ 
viewpoints. Some provided little more than political context. Those of Edward Heath 
and Donald Johnson addressed the Conservative Party’s opinion of the extreme right. 
However, both did so only minimally, and focused mainly on justifying their own 
actions or interpretation of events. John Bean’s autobiography provided valuable 
insights into the activities of Britain’s post-war extreme right, but did so from the 
perspective of a prominent extreme-right political activist. Individual’s private papers 
facilitated better analysis. The papers of Oswald and Diana Mosley were perhaps the 
least effective, in that they only sporadically revealed Mosley’s opinion of the 
Conservative Party and some extreme-right individuals and figures. In contrast, the 
papers of leading Monday Club member Patrick Wall provided substantial material on 
the Club’s activities, opinions and the image that it wished to project. They included 
the often dry but detailed minutes of Monday Club meetings as well as Wall’s 
correspondence. Wall’s papers explicitly revealed the Monday Club’s opinion of the 
Conservative Party, but only implicitly showed what the Conservative Party thought 
of the Monday Club. The real weakness in using private papers was not so much in 
those used in the research, but in those not yet released.
Archival material on extreme-right groups brought similar considerations. The 
material held on fascist groups at the Working Class Movement Library reinforced the 
idea that the Second World War was a watershed for the extreme right. Its collection 
of Searchlight magazine was useful in that it highlighted connections between the 
extreme right and the Conservative Party, but it did not analyse the effect of this 
relationship. Various groups’ election material helped to explain the Conservative 
Party’s attitude towards them, but not its impact on them. The John Beckett 
Collection at Sheffield University allowed investigation of the British People’s Party 
and the similarity of its views with that of some Conservatives in the years 
immediately after the Second World War. Other group’s more extensive publications 
did show the Conservative Party’s impact on them, albeit again sometimes implicitly. 
The publications of the League of Empire Loyalists and those of the groups associated 
with Edward Martell were in this category. The League of Empire Loyalists’ 
publications provided examples of the Conservative Party’s counter-measures against 
individuals as well as the group. However, their author’s obvious belief in conspiracy
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theory limited their utility and increased the need for corroboration. Edward Martell’s 
publications provided evidence of the corporate impact of the Conservative Party and 
its changing political orientation. They also spanned three decades, which allowed 
assessment of the Conservative Party’s impact on a specific group and individuals 
over a substantial period. However, they also suggested that Martell was personally 
ambitious, which necessitated discussion of this characteristic on the Conservative 
Party’s attitude toward Martell’s groups. The British Library’s collection of 
documents published by radical right groups allowed comparison of the Conservative 
Party’s position with the opinions of some obscure groups. However, the lack of any 
substantial information such as the size of these groups, save for a brief 
accompanying booklet, made assessment of the relationship between them and the 
Conservative Party difficult. The same applied to the collection of extreme-right 
parties’ pamphlets at the London School of Economics. However, the LSE’s 
possession of the Tory Reform Group archive assisted in contrasting the Conservative 
Party’s positive attitude between it and its forerunner, the Pressure for Economic and 
Social Toryism, and its negative attitude towards the Monday Club. Assessment of 
Monday Club material was problematic due to the lack of a central archive. However, 
most of it was available in private and institutional papers both in Britain and in 
America at the Library of Congress. An Arts and Humanities Research Council’s 
Library of Congress scholarship ensured the investigation of all significant Monday 
Club documents, as well as the documents of other extreme-right groups. It also 
provided another avenue for discussion in that the Library of Congress’s material 
included a neo-Conservative group’s perception that the Conservative Party 
discriminated against extremists within it. The National Front’s papers at Warwick 
University disappointed. Their statements were often superficial and the material not 
extensive. However, they did reveal that the National Front held the Conservative 
Party responsible for its own demise. Taped interviews with former Monday Club 
members reinforced this opinion. Subjectivity affects their recollections. These 
individuals were closely involved with views that modem society has firmly rejected 
as odious. Nevertheless, their willingness to discuss these events revealed valuable 
insights into the Conservative Party’s relationship with the extreme right.
The Conservative Party Archive at the Bodleian Library provided the most extensive 
material. The scope of the archive allowed wide ranging investigation, which included
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party manifestoes, by-election campaigns, constituency affairs and the views of 
Conservative Party members and supporters. These allowed assessment of individual 
cases and consideration of specific themes. However, the files of Conservative 
Central Office within the archive proved the most valuable source. This is because 
Central Office reflected the party leadership’s wishes, and was the pinnacle of the 
party Organization.65 The party leader nominated its head, the Party Chairman. A 
number of Vice-Chairmen acted in an executive capacity, often overseeing specific 
aspects of the party’s work, which varied. They were often retired senior and 
respected Central Office staff. Responsibility for the daily management of Central 
Office attracted a number of titles. In the period 1945-75, the General Director 
occupied this role of ‘chief of staff* until 1966 when Central office devolved the 
position. Central Office acted as a conduit between the party leader and membership 
via its various departments and its regional network. Central Office contained many 
and varied departments, including the national offices of organisations that 
represented various sections of the party, such as the Young Conservatives. Some of 
these departments disappeared whilst others emerged to meet changed demands. 
However, some existed throughout the period of research and provided the main 
framework of it. This included the files that revealed investigations based on the work 
of Central Office’s regional network. This network was extensive and pervasive 
throughout the wider Conservative Party. Central Office maintained Regional, or Area 
Offices. The party leadership greatly increased their size after 1945. Central Office 
employed Area Agents within these regional Offices. Although these local 
associations were autonomous, Central Office’s Area Agents exercised considerable 
influence on them and their MPs, and formed part of the bureaucratic machinery of 
decision making within their regions. Amongst Area Agents’ functions was the 
gathering of intelligence on other organisations and the forwarding of information and 
material on them to Central Office. These files revealed the Conservative Party’s 
attitudes towards various extreme-right groups and individuals, and often the reasons 
for them. The files of one political party can produce an unbalanced picture that 
reveals only what that particular party wants to convey. In this instance, a number of 
considerations argued against this. Central Office’s agents regularly forwarded the
65 The following is based on S. Ball, The National and Regional Party Structure’, in A. Seldon 
and S. Ball (eds), Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900, OUP, Oxford, 
(1994), 169-220.
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critical comments of the Conservative Party’s right-wing opponents as well their 
literature containing the views and objectives that differentiated them from it. These 
files were usually internal correspondence and often confidential, which meant that 
those involved revealed views that they would not necessarily state openly. Most 
importantly, these files reveal which groups or individuals that Central Office thought 
were extreme-right wing, and thus warrant inclusion in this study. Today’s Central 
Office restricts access to some of these files. These files do not always show the 
Conservative Party in a positive light. Central Office’s eventual decision to grant 
permission to view them supported the impression reached from investigating those 
that have no such restrictions. Consequently, Central Office’s files were a 
comprehensive resource that answered many questions posed by this research. These 
questions included, why did the Conservative Party view a particular group as 
extreme-right, what action did it take against these groups, what determined these 
actions, did the Conservative Party differentiate between extreme-right groups, did the 
Conservative Party’s attitude change over time, and what evidence was there of a 
consistent approach?
The answers to these questions commence with a description in chapter one of a 
stunned Conservative Party shocked by Labour’s landslide election victory in 1945 
that thereafter adapted to the new paradigm this had created. It investigates the 
Conservative Party’s varied reaction to those right-wing groups that emerged in 
opposition to this new paradigm from 1945-51, and reveals how the Conservative 
Party explicitly charged one of the departments within Central Office to investigate of 
these outside organisations. How the Conservative Party dealt with the extreme right 
after Churchill regained office in 1951 is the theme of chapter two. It confirms that 
Central Office based its different actions on its perception of the nature of a group or 
individual’s extremism, and the usefulness of such a group to the Conservative Party. 
Chapter Three discusses the impact of Conservative governments’ domestic and 
imperial policy on an increasingly alienated and vociferous extreme right. It shows 
how the Conservative Party alienated and attracted the extreme right whilst 
maintaining opposition to any groups or individuals that possessed fascist antecedents 
or characteristics. Chapter Four examines the Conservative Party’s relationship with 
the extreme right after the party returned to opposition in 1964. It describes how the 
Conservative Party responded to the challenge presented when the external extreme
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right coalesced for the first time since 1945 into a viable political party. It also reveals 
how the extreme right within the Conservative Party posed an even greater threat, and 
the action taken against it. Chapter Five investigates the climacteric in the 
Conservative Party’s relationship with the extreme right after 1945. It shows how 
Central Office dealt with the possible incursion of the external extreme right into the 
Conservative Party.
These chapters show that the Conservative Party leadership and bureaucracy did limit 
the extreme-right’s chances of success. Sometimes, this could include the absorption 
of some of the extreme-right’s themes. It regularly included attempts to deter party 
members from joining extreme-right groups, which was difficult as some parts of the 
Conservative Party were sympathetic to these groups’ views. The chapters also show 
that the extent of the Conservative Party’s opposition to extreme-right groups and 
individuals varied. The Party leadership and bureaucracy consistently blocked those 
who extremism involved connections with fascism or Nazism. In contrast, they often 
used those whose extremism amounted to little more than political inexpediency or 
went beyond the consensual image that the Conservative Party wished to portray. 
When the Conservative Party’s stance moved towards these groups after 1964, their 
‘extremism’ diminished. After 1975, they were absorbed during Margaret Thatcher’s 
leadership. Overall, however, this research depicts a Conservative Party that after 
1945 constantly investigated extreme-right groups and individuals, and took action 
against them. Its reveals a Conservative Party that kept all o f the extreme right at arms 
length until events reduced some of these groups’ extremism, whilst consistently 
limiting the chances of that part of the extreme right that the Second World War had 
condemned to pariah status.
Chapter 1: The Shock of Opposition, 1945-1951
A Right Response to Defeat?
The Conservative Party entered the 1945 General Election suspicious of its leaders 
and split over social policy.1 The direction of Party policy was uncertain, as the Tory 
Reform Group, Progress Trust, Imperial Group and numerous smaller bodies fought 
for predominance of a Party with a ‘moribund and bankrupt’ machine.2 The 
progressive Tory Reform Committee had already welcomed publication of the 
Beveridge Report, advocating extensive social reform, but right wing Conservatives 
had attacked it, noticeably in publications with prior extreme right connexions such as 
the National Review and Truth? The right of the Party relished the opportunity to end 
the wartime coalition with Labour. Sir Herbert Williams MP spoke at the March 1945 
Party Conference of being ‘free of its chains’.4 Churchill’s Conference address, on the 
other hand, suggested a desire to maintain it, even of including in government MPs 
who had defeated Conservative candidates.5 Nevertheless, there was a genuine 
expectation of victory. Conservative MP Christopher Hollis, writing in the New 
English Review, wrote that, ‘nobody seriously thinks that the Labour Party have any 
chance of gaining a clear majority at the election’.6 Victorious wartime Prime 
Ministers had won in 1900 and 1918. On polling day, the Daily Express announced, 
‘we are winning’, and some regional Conservative supporting papers stated belief in a 
three-figure majority.7 However, the Labour Party won such a majority. The 
Conservative Party was profoundly shocked not only over the electorate’s rejection of 
it, but at the scale of defeat and the size of Britain’s first majority Labour 
administration. Conservatives even feared permanent loss of office. Inability to take a
1 Leo Amery’s view was that the wartime Cabinet did not possess a single real Conservative, 
whilst Anthony Eden, speaking also for Churchill, said of the Party: 'how little we liked it and 
how little it liked us.’ J. Chanmley, Conservative Politics, 110-112.
2 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 5.
3 National Review, Jan. 1943, 19-20; March 1943, 177-178; Jan. 1944, 17; March 1944, 194. 
Truth, 15 October 1943.
4 Onlooker, (London), April 1945.
5 P. Addison, Churchill on the Home Front, 1900-1955, Pimlico (1993), 381
6 C. Hollis, ‘The Conservative Opportunity*, New English Review, XI (June 1945), 109.
7 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 1. The Daily Express 5 July 1945 and the Liverpool Post.
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single seat in by-elections during the period 1945-50, despite fuel and sterling crises 
and continuing rationing, appeared to support this fear.8
There were a number of reasons for Labour’s stunning victory. After the First World 
War, the government had promised a land ‘fit for heroes’. The Depression of the later 
1920s and 1930s meant that this promise remained unfulfilled. The Labour Party 
offered a coherent programme to implement this promise and the electorate voted for 
it in 1945. That they did so was due to the Labour leadership’s positive image. The 
Labour leadership had made a significant contribution to the war effort. This was 
especially so in domestic affairs, where Labour leaders had implemented state 
controls to ensure that the domestic economy endured and funded the massive 
demands of the war effort. These actions meant that the Labour Party’s opponents 
could not portray it as an inexperienced, unpatriotic party that was unfit for 
government. Churchill found this out to his cost when his comparison of the Labour 
Party to the Gestapo during the 1945 General Election brought widespread 
condemnation. Instead, the electorate saw in the Labour Party the possibility of a 
better future.
In contrast, the electorate in 1945 viewed the Conservative Party’s actions before the 
Second World War negatively. Economic depression blighted the interwar period. 
High unemployment affected many electors and their families. A doctrinaire 
adherence to the prevailing policy of laissez-faire exacerbated the hardship many 
electors suffered. This policy ruled out state intervention in favour of free trade, and 
meant that the government was prepared to accept high unemployment until market 
forces had readjusted the economy. Associating this policy with the Conservative 
Party was arguably unfair. Although there was a strand within Conservatism that 
advocated laissez-faire, the most prominent exponent of it during Ramsay 
MacDonald’s National Government was the Labour Chancellor Phillip Snowden. 
However, three factors ensured that the electorate associated their economic hardship 
with the Conservative Party. Firstly, the Conservative Party governed for much of the 
interwar period, either in administrations that were wholly Conservative or in 
coalitions that they dominated. Secondly, in 1931 the Conservative Neville
8 Hoffman, Opposition, 185ff.
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Chamberlain replaced Snowden as Chancellor and moved away from strict laissez- 
faire. His equally doctrinaire adherence to balanced budgets meant that he was 
prepared to accept the existing high levels of unemployment rather than reduce it by 
deficit financing. Thirdly, and more understandable to the electorate, was 
Chamberlain’s introduction of the ‘Means Test’ in 1931. This policy 
disproportionately harmed the poorest. As Ramsden stated, it resulted in the electorate 
viewing the Conservatives as the hard-faced men of the inter-war slump, callously 
disregarding their hardship and prepared to see individuals face the iniquity of 
National Assistance interviews rather than provide adequate social security.9 Also 
negatively affecting the electorate’s image of the Conservative Party in 1945 was the 
party’s association with the policy of appeasement. Chamberlain had signed the 
Munich Agreement in 1938 with Hitler that abandoned Czechoslovakia in return for a 
promise of peace between Germany and Britain. Leading Conservatives fully 
supported Chamberlain. Dissidents like Churchill were very much in the minority 
within the Conservative Party. People joyfully welcomed Chamberlain’s 
announcement that the Munich Agreement meant ‘peace in our time’. However, the 
Second World War ended this positive image of Chamberlain and the Conservative 
leadership. By 1945, people viewed Chamberlain as Hitler’s dupe, and possibly even 
someone who was prepared to pander to fascism.
Therefore, the 1945 General Election also proved that the electorate rejected a 
Conservative Party that it associated with indifference to economic hardship and 
appeasement of the country’s enemies. The former was a charge of callousness. This 
meant that it would be difficult for the Conservative Party leadership to advocate 
policies that could lead to high unemployment, no matter how many Conservatives 
favoured it. The latter was a charge that bordered on treachery. This charge was 
particularly difficult for the Conservative Party in 1945. As Charmley stated, ‘In 
Europe, the right was associated with fascism.’10 The Conservative Party was 
Britain’s right-wing party. It also had clear connections with the extreme right and 
even fascism before the Second World War. These connections were no longer 
tolerable. No Conservative leader could take Baldwin’s sanguine attitude to
9 A. Seldon and J. Ramsden, The Influence of Ideas on the Modem Conservative Party, 
Contemporary British History, 10, 1 (Spring, 1966), 168-186.
10 Charmley, Conservative Politics, 120.
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connections that were now embarrassing. Consequently, the Conservative leadership 
took action to adapt to the new circumstances. Even before the Second World War 
ended, there is evidence that the Conservative leadership understood the need to adapt 
and counter the party’s interwar image. It set up the Post-War Problems Central 
Committee (PWPCC). It was to the PWPCC that the Tory Reform Committee and 
Tory Reform Group advocated state interventionism. Central Office tasked one of its 
existing bodies with investigating outside organisations. After the war, the 
Conservative leadership openly implemented a policy review that moved significantly 
away from its interwar stance and accepted much of the Labour programme. Behind 
the scenes, the leadership strengthened the party bureaucracy. This bureaucracy 
investigated those extreme-right groups and individuals that could damage the 
leadership’s objective of regaining power. In the period 1945-51, the party 
bureaucracy monitored the extreme-right and took whatever action it saw fit. It 
countered vigorously those that it associated in any way with fascism. Those whose 
extremism amounted to inexpedient economic policies attracted measures that were 
less refractory.
Conservative Reaction to Attlee1s First Government and Re-emerging 
Fascism
The Conservative Party’s public response to the 1945 General Election defeat was a 
thorough policy review that culminated in the Industrial Charter and Maxwell-Fyfe 
Report. The Industrial Charter emphasised traditional Conservative themes, but also 
accepted some nationalisation and an increased role for the state. Many Conservatives 
welcomed the charter. The Conservative right, however, thought that it was too much 
of a step towards Socialism. Conservative publications ran articles under headlines 
such as ‘Under Which Flag’, ‘Has Anyone Heard of Capitalism?’ and ‘The Milk-and- 
Water Charter’.11 Right-wing Conservative journals such as Truth and National 
Review were prominent in this criticism.12 The Left claimed the charter would ‘split
11 Respectively, Daily Express, 12 May 1947; Recorder, 17 May 1947 and 30 August 1947.
12 For example, Truth, The Recipe as Before’, 16 May, 1947. A. Page, ‘Conservative 
Laodiceans’, National Review, CXXIX, September 1947, 102. See also Truth, 23 and 30 May, 
1947, 13 and 20 June 1947.
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the Tory Party as it has not been divided for half a century’.13 The Right agreed, 
describing the Conservatives as ‘split from top to bottom’.14 The grounds on which 
right-wing Conservative MPs attacked the charter on its presentation at the 1947 Party 
Conference is instructive. Sir Herbert Williams informed conference that the charter 
was a threat not only to the Conservative Party, but also to Great Britain, as it 
represented an inordinate concession to socialism at a time when Communism in the 
Soviet Union appeared the more vigorous ideology. The language he employed was 
unambiguous and emotive: ‘There can be no compromise with Socialism or 
Communism. You must not let the Conservative Party become infected with the 
Socialist bug. The Conservative Party must stick to its principles or perish.’15 Sir 
Waldron Smithers, whom Gilmour later regarded as ‘being on the lunatic fringe of the 
right’,16 told delegates to have no fear o f Central Office or the party platform, and to 
save the Conservative Party and England by rejecting the Charter.17 Williams and 
Smithers wished the Conservative Party to maintain its pre-war laissez faire stance.
1 ftOne commentator thought that at least half the conference supported these views. 
The Party’s right wing, however, suffered an overwhelming defeat at Conference. 
Hoffman, in describing this ‘rout of the right’, explained that this was because 
virtually nobody at conference wished to be associated with a doctrine that was 
associated with the pre-war period and that was now ‘out of keeping with the spirit of 
the times’.19
Nor was the Conservative Party’s conversion limited to domestic issues. Virtually 
nobody in Whitehall saw the imminent collapse of Empire in 1945. For many, there 
was little suggesting anything other than imperial continuance. The British Empire 
had proved its ability to endure. It had stood alone in 1940 and remained intact until 
the totalitarian powers collapsed. Thereafter, the number of civil servants that 
departed annually for the colonies trebled.20 Only Keynes foresaw the possible
13 Tribune, The Tories are Split”, 16 May, 1947.
14 City Press, 20 June, 1947.
15 Conference Report, 1947, 49.
16 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 33.
17 Conference Report, 1947, 49.
18 M. Edelman, ‘A Day with the Tories’, New Statesman and Nation, 11 October 1947, 284.
19 Hoffman, Opposition, 166. See also 161-166.
20 P. Hennessey, Never Again: Britain 1945-51, Penguin, London (2006), 225-227.
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consequences for the Empire of Britain’s severe economic problems.21 Nobody 
actually wanted the end of Empire, other than the anti-colonial Left. Instead, there 
were expectations of a new, reinvigorated empire. Indian independence was a 
foregone conclusion, but many, including Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, 
sought a viable replacement. Expectations focused on creating a revitalised oil and 
mineral-rich imperial dispensation stretching from Cape Town to Iraq, with Africa 
identified as the new jewel in the Crown.22 Academics described a fourth empire 
arising out of the debris of the third. It was collective political delusion. Britain was 
unable to withstand the wave of post-war nationalism because it was economically 
overstretched. Thus, the shock was great when Transjordan (1946), Burma (1948), 
Ceylon (1948) and Palestine (1948) accompanied Indian Independence, thereby 
revealing Britain’s impotence. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the 
Conservative Opposition’s response. Churchill, hero of the Boer War and a staunch 
imperialist who consistently opposed Indian Independence before the Second World 
War, did nothing to obstruct the Indian Independence Bill (1947).24 Right-wing 
Conservative MP Sir Herbert Williams complained about the Party’s failure to even 
vote against the bill, but could do little else.25 Conservative Associations protested, 
impotently calling on the party to do more to prevent the disintegration of the 
Empire 26 One young right-wing researcher at the Conservative Research Department
77later recalled feeling unable to do anything other than bury his head in his hands.
Shock at the size of the 1945 defeat only partly explained this picture of a lacklustre 
Conservative opposition. The Conservative Party under Lord Salisbury, facing the 
demands of extended suffrage in the late nineteenth century, had realigned itself to 
attract lower middle and working-class votes.28 Thereafter, imperialism remained at 
the heart of Conservatism, contributing to electoral success. Doubtless, there were 
many right-wing Conservative voters in 1945 who were disgusted at the result. 
Perhaps, therefore, imperialism could perform a similar role in the mid-twentieth
21 Hennessey, Never, 222-223.
22 Hennessey, Never, 239.
23 Hennessey, Never, 243.
24 Hennessey, Never, 235.
25 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 194.
26 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 195.
27 Hennessey, Never, 235.
28 J. Ramsden, An Appetite for Power, Harper Collins, London (1998), 130 ff.
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century to win the working class back from Labour. However, as Alan Clark 
highlighted, the impact of the 1945 General Election was not simply a matter of scale. 
Many right-wing Conservative MPs had lost their seats. Progressives now dominated 
the parliamentary party, determined to avoid connection with any embarrassments of 
the past. One progressive even advocated the Conservative Party changing its name to 
the ‘New Democratic Party’.29 What was left of the right wing of the parliamentary 
party was unable, therefore, to impose their views on their colleagues, hence 
lacklustre opposition. This explains why there were only a limited number of clashes 
within the parliamentary Conservative Party over decolonisation. Very few MPs, as 
Murphy explained, actually disagreed with it.30 Unlike domestic policy, therefore, this 
conversion would be more difficult to reverse. This was the real rout of the right.
Yet, this image of an ineffective right within a demoralised Conservative Party is not 
the whole picture. The right was sufficiently strong to propose resolutions at Party 
Conference that expressed its dissatisfaction at the lacklustre attack on the Labour 
Government. The chosen motion was heavily defeated, but it indicated that a 
repository for anti-left voters still existed.31 Individual Conservative MPs in the New 
English Review openly attacked their own party’s ineffective opposition. There were 
even instances of rebellion against the frontbench when the right thought a bill was 
‘bad socialist business which should be fought every inch of the way’.33 Moreover, 
the notion that the Charter’s acceptance signalled the complete collapse of the right 
was misleading. When expectations of victory at the 1949 Hammersmith South by- 
election were unfulfilled, the Conservatives issued a revised policy statement, The 
Right Road for Britain. The Daily Express, Spectator, and Truth carried articles 
attacking the policy statement for failing to move sufficiently rightwards.34 The 
Conservative Party was presenting a confusing message to those holding extreme- 
right views or antecedents, whether in the Conservative Party or not. On the one hand, 
the leadership and even some MPs appeared to be appeasing Socialism. One MP
29 Clark, Tories, 324.
30 P. Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation: The Conservative Party and British Policy in 
Tropical Africa, 1951-1964, OUP, Oxford (1995), 10.
31 Conference Minutes, 1946, 9.
32 W. W. Astor, The Conservative Party in Opposition’, New English Review, XIII (June 1946), 
348, and C. Hollis, 'Personalities in Parliament1, 567-568.
33 The Star, 22 January 1947, referring to a rebellion over the Statistics of Trade Bill vote, 21 
January 1947.
34 Hoffman, Opposition, 187-195.
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responsible for drawing up the charter, for example, believed government was 
impossible if trades unions were hostile. On the other, a body of opinion and 
representation existed within the Conservative Party that was fundamentally at odds 
with this position. Thus, extreme-right individuals and groups had to make a choice of 
whether to act within the Conservative Party or not. Some fought from within, whilst 
others formed outside pressure groups.
There is strong evidence that pre-war consanguinity between some Conservatives and 
erstwhile fascists continued. The circumstances in which a dissident BUF leader could 
claim that thirty MPs and twelve peers were ‘ready to pronounce themselves Fascist’ 
may have gone. Yet, former BUF member Arthur Winn revealed in the Daily 
Mirror that he intended to vote Conservative in the 1945 General Election. The reason 
Winn gave was that the Conservatives would allow him, and presumably those like
7^him, to ‘get away with more than we could with any other party’. The Daily Mirror 
reported that the first move of ex-BUF members had been to ‘throw themselves and 
their organisation on the side of the Tory Party’.38 One local paper reported its belief
'*Q ^
that Mosley’s organisation would re-form to ‘keep Toryism alive’. Thus, it appears 
that the connection between Conservatives and fascists remained. Dorril highlighted 
this by recounting Mosley’s interest in an ‘anti-alien’ campaign in Hampstead in 
1945,40 where the Conservative MP, Charles Challen, had organised a petition against 
aliens moving in to the area. Challen’s target was Jewish residents. Dorril also 
described Challen’s petition as owing much to an organisation called the Fighting 
Fund for Freedom (FFF). Leading the FFF was the Conservative MP Sir Waldron 
Smithers.41 Dorril described Challen’s campaign as intersecting with a similar, 
national campaign led by the Briton’s Vigilante Action League (BVAL), a movement 
funded by Lord Kemsley. Sir Henry Newnham, former editor of Truth, was an advisor
35 Untitled letter to Lord Woolton from Col. J. R. H. Hutchinson MP, 10 March 1949. CPA 
CCO 4/2/83, Literature -  Industrial Charter; correspondence on, 1949.
38 A. C. Mills, Mosley in Motley, (c.1937), 13. Mills had been the BUF Director of Industrial 
Propaganda and a Senior Propaganda Officer before resigning 24 February 1936. Details 
provided by Mills, especially the business connexions of the BUF, add credibility to his 
statement.
37 Daily Mirror, 28 June 1945.
38 Daily Mirror, 29 June, 1945.
38 Hastings Observer, 4 August 1945.
40 Dorril, Blackshirt, 549-550.
41 Dorril, Blackshirt, 549.
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to Kemsley. Dorril also identified Conservative parliamentary candidate Eleonora 
Tennant having meetings with Jeffrey Hamm during which they discussed their 
mutual anti-Semitism. Hamm was an ex-BUF internee and instrumental in Mosley’s 
return to politics at the head of Union Movement.44 It is also in 1945, according to 
Mosley, that friends tried to secure his return to the Conservative fold.45
The radical right, in the shape of the British People’s Party, also exhibited anti- 
Semitism and a fear of communism and support for Franco similar to Conservative 
MPs. The importance of the BPP lay partly in its survival of the war intact, despite the 
internment of its leading political figure, John Beckett. However, it also had a pre-war 
connexion with the Conservative Party. Beckett’s association with Lord Lymington in 
the British Council against European Commitments (BCAEC) linked the British 
Peoples Party with a number of other extreme-right groups that contained 
Conservatives.46 His membership of the British Council for a Christian Settlement in 
Europe also linked the British Peoples Party with the anti-war faction of the 
Conservative Party 47 Linking Beckett personally with the Conservative Party was his 
friendship with Henry Newnham, editor o f Truth.48 However, what revealed the 
concordance between the BPP and some Conservatives strongest was the BPP’s 
regular post-war publications, which were funded by the Duke of Bedford. Bedford 
employed euphemistic language in pamphlets that attacked ‘international finance’, 
which meant Jews.49 The BPP’s journal, the Fleet Street Preview, provided a mine of 
language that would not have been out of place coming from Sir Waldron Smithers, 
Charles Challen, Eleonora Tennant and many pre and post-war Conservatives. The 
journal lauded Franco for being correct in ‘exposing the true nature of the undeviating 
aims of Stalin and his coterie’, and compared the silence of others over Stalin’s
42 Dorril, Blackshirt, 549.
43 Dorril, Blackshirt, 549.
44 Hamm, Action.
45 Dorril, Blackshirt, 549.
48 F. Beckett, John Beckett, 153-155. Participating in the BCAEC were Beckett (BUF, BPP), 
Joyce (BUF, NSL), Leese (IFL), and members of the Anglo-German Brotherhood, Nordic 
League, White Knights of Britain, the Militant Christian Patriots, British Vigil, the Britons and 
English Array.
47 Dorril, Blackshirt, 471-486.
48 Beckett, John Beckett, 161.
49 Duke of Bedford, The Financiers Little Game: or, the Shape of Things to Come, Strickland 
Press, Glasgow (1945).
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actions to the outcry over Nazi atrocities.50 Descriptions of immigrants as a ‘foreign 
invasion’ coming from the ‘refuse of Europe’, and as ‘trash’, ‘alien’ and ‘poison’ 
frequently juxtaposed references to ‘true-born Englishmen’.51 These were similar to 
the comments raised by Conservative MPs after the disembarkation of the Empire 
Windrush brought New Commonwealth immigrants to Britain.52 The Fleet Street 
preview also believed unions were ‘holding the country to ransom with impunity’, and 
denounced their members as ‘oblivious to anybody’s welfare but their own’.53 These 
comments particularly resembled Save England, a booklet written by Sir Waldron 
Smithers that denounced the Conservative Party’s surrender to the left.54 There was 
also in the Fleet Street Preview implicit support for an individual Conservative MP 
who had proposed that a prospective parliamentary candidate disclose his place of 
birth,55 and criticism of the Conservative Party for failing to expose the Labour 
Government’s shortcomings sufficiently, and its poor performance at the 
Hammersmith South by-election.56
What can we conclude from this evidence? There is clear similarity of views between 
the extreme right and the right of the Conservative Party. It is also fair to state that 
this extended to connexions between a long-standing extreme-right Conservative 
publication, non-parliamentary groups and even pre-war fascists. It is also fair to say 
that those electors holding views similar to those expressed by former BUF members 
probably considered that the Conservative Party was the best place for their vote, at 
least until Mosley’s return to politics. This position also probably applied to British 
Peoples Party supporters, although the BPP did at least contest one by-election, at 
Combined English Universities in March 1946, where its candidate, G. S. Oddie, lost 
his deposit.57 Yet nothing substantially argues in favour of a witting role by the 
Conservative Party in these scenarios. Mosley’s claim seems barely credible, and
50 H. Alexander, ‘When Red is Black’, Fleet Street Preview, 24 April 1948, 1, 6, 2. See also H. 
Alexander, ‘Prophets Without Honour’, 15 May 1948, Fleet Street Preview, 1, 9,1.
51 H. Alexander, ‘Britain Importing Labour1, Fleet Street Preview, 8 May 1948,1,8,1.
52 Eatwell, Fascism, 332-333.
53 H. Alexander, ‘The Press Strike’, Fleet Street Preview, 14 August 1948,1, 22,1-2.
54 Quoted in Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 33. Sir Waldron Smithers and Sir Herbert 
Williams were noted right-wing Conservative dissident MPs, see 51 & 76.
55 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 33.
56 ‘Background News’, Fleet Street Preview, 18 September 1948, 1, 27, 2. H. Alexander, Fleet 
Street Preview, 5 March 1949,1, 51,1.
57 F. W. S. Craig, Minor Parties at British Parliamentary Elections 1885-1974, Macmillan, 
London (1975), 9.
10
possibly no more than exaggeration of casual comments by long-term, or delusional, 
friends. Mosley quickly attracted many erstwhile members of the BUF when he made 
his political comeback as head of Union Movement in February 1948. Left wing 
opponents, and organised Jewish movements such as the 43 Group, determined not to 
allow Mosley the opportunity of presenting his views unchallenged.58 These groups 
monitored and countered Union Movement activity, but failed to reveal any 
substantial connections with the Conservative Party. Nor should this be surprising 
given that, despite the comments of ex-BUF members like Arthur Winn, new recruits 
to Union Movement often joined for reasons of antipathy towards the Conservative 
Party similar to those expressed by members of the British Union of Fascists in the 
1930s. A 1950 recruit of Union Movement summed up his attitude towards the 
Conservative Party thus: ‘the party as a whole gave the impression of wandering 
aimlessly along, picking up discarded bits of Attlee brand Socialism as its main 
commitment to a post-war policy. To me they appeared a party of old-men, where 
youth and modem viewpoints were suppressed, especially if you did not wear the old 
school tie.’59 Therefore, the meeting of one obscure parliamentary candidate with a 
fascist does not stand on its own as evidence for all Conservatives generally, or the 
party machinery specifically, and definitely not for Union Movement members. The 
lack of material in the Conservative Party Archive relating to Union Movement 
suggests Conservatives avoided it. Thus, all we can conclude from these examples 
during this period of opposition is that the Conservative Party may have played an 
unwitting role as the repository for extreme-right votes with nowhere else to go. In 
addition, the views and actions of some Conservatives may have simply resonated 
with those possessing fascist antecedents. In contrast are the Conservative Party’s 
condemnatory comments towards extreme-right organisations. Central Office, for 
example, dismissed the known racist Britons Publishing Society in an interned memo 
to all Central Office Agents, and described its proprietor as a ‘notorious anti-Jew’.60
58 G. Macklin, Very Deeply Dyed in Black: Sir Oswald Mosley and the Resurrection of British 
Fascism after 1945,I. B. Tauris, London (2007), passim.
50 J. Bean, Many Shades of Black: Inside Britain’s Far-Right, New Millenium, London (1999), 
60.
60 Internal memo from Miss Maxse to all Central Office Agents, ‘Britons Publishing Society: 
“Free Britain"’, 4 November 1948, CPA CCO 4/3/209, Outside Societies, 1949-50. Founded 
before the war as part of the Britons Society, the Britons Publishing Society continued to 
distribute anti-Semitic and similar material until the 1960s. There is no record of a subsequent 
relationship with the Conservative Party. See also, O Maolain, Radical Right, 324.
11
The focus of these examples solely on Conservative links with any recrudescence of 
fascism partly explains these conclusions. However, they do not take into 
consideration adequately the markedly different post-war political context. It would 
be natural to assume that the electorate would express any fears it had about the 
Labour Government’s legislation through the Conservative Party. The Conservative 
Party, however, no longer dominated the political landscape. Fearful of permanent 
rejection by the electorate, the Conservative Party leadership had produced the 
Industrial Charter. Feelings of betrayal at this response to defeat had led to a siege 
mentality amongst Conservative activists and voters who did not necessarily trust the 
Conservative Party to combat socialism. These unusual times produced an unusual 
phenomenon, one that has remained within the extreme right thereafter. As Paul 
Martin identified, erstwhile respectable middle-class Conservative voters began to 
adopt street and platform cultures more usually associated with working-class and 
extremist politics.61 These voters attacked the state interference of the Attlee 
Government, and defended Conservative principles by invoking sentiments of mass 
Conservatism and adopting tactics o f popular protest. The result was a plethora of 
groups that denounced Socialism vociferously. Not all Conservatives adopted this 
stance. Some chose less obvious and extreme outlets to achieve their objectives. This 
is especially apparent, though not exclusively so, in those that championed individual 
liberty and economic liberalism. However, many did adopt a more vigorous stance. 
The Conservative Party’s response to these various groups revealed differing 
refractory attitudes that frequently, though not exclusively, depended on Central 
Office’s perception of their extremism.
Central Office’s Emerging Role
By 1945, the Conservative Party already contained a mechanism for monitoring 
outside organisations. On 20 April 1944, the inaugural meeting of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Relations with Outside Societies of the Central Women’s Advisory 
Committee noted that, ‘it had been appointed to consider all matters relating to
61 P. Martin, ‘Echoes in the Wilderness: British Popular Conservatism, 1945-51’, in S. Ball & I. 
Holliday, Mass Conservatism: The Conservatives and the Public Since the 1880s, Frank 
Cass, London (2002), 135. This is not to argue that there are no examples of such tactics 
beforehand, as the Tarrif Reform Campaign before the Great War proves. See Linehan, 
British Fascism, 18 & 43.
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Outside organisations’.62 After the war, the Maxwell Fyfe report re-invigorated the 
Conservative Party organisation, restoring its pre-war health. The Voluntary 
Organisations Section replaced the somewhat makeshift Committee on Relations with 
Outside Societies. It was located within the Organisation Department of Central 
Office. Its confidential terms of reference explicitly mandated an intelligence- 
gathering role that focused on extremist elements,63 which was perhaps not 
coincidental, given that this was a few months after Mosley’s political comeback. 
Although applicable to extremists of different political persuasions, there was a 
specific term of reference charging the Voluntary Organisations Section with 
investigation of ‘voluntary organisations who are definitely Conservative in outlook 
or sympathetic to Conservatism’.64 There was also the command to render regular 
reports and recommendations, including any need for ‘tactical action within these 
organisations’.65 Thus, there was a clear instruction to interfere in the activities of 
right-wing organisations, some of which would undoubtedly be extreme. Details on a 
number of extreme-right groups are indeed within the files of the Voluntary 
Organisations Section. Some of these groups would later cause the Conservative Party 
genuine concern. Central Office also already ran a bureaucracy to which local 
associations and Area Agents reported items deemed of interest regularly, which 
complemented the remit of the Voluntary Organisations Section. These reports 
included extreme-right activity. It is from correspondence involving Central Office 
and the Voluntary Organisations Section that we can understand the motives of these 
groups during the Attlee governments, and discern reasons for the Conservative 
Party’s varying attitude towards different right-wing groups.
62 CPA CCO, 170/1/3/1, Central Women’s Advisory Committee Ad Hoc Committee on 
Relations with Outside Organisations -  Minutes. Apr. 1944 -  May 1951.
63 The V. O. S. is an Intelligence Section which is concerned mainly with voluntary 
organisations (other then professional, trade and trade union and definitely party) operating 
within England and Wales, which owing to their constitution, membership or activities are 
capable of lending themselves to use or penetration by opposition or extremist elements 
(Socialist, Communist or Fascist) for political purposes.’ Term of Reference No. 1 of the 
Voluntary Organisations Section, CPA CCO 60/4/31, Outside Organisations 1948-1962, May 
1948.
64 Term of Reference No. 3 of the Voluntary Organisations Section, CPA CCO 60/4/31, 
Outside Organisations 1948-1962, May 1948.
65 Term of Reference No. 6 of the Voluntary Organisations Section, CPA CCO 60/4/31, 
Outside Organisations 1948-1962, May 1948.
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Compare, for example, Central Office’s attitude towards the National Democrats and 
The Right Party. The National Democrats’ manifesto called for reduced taxation, the 
restoration of individual rights, a return to free trade and the removal of governmental 
interference in business.66 The representative of the National Democrats who 
forwarded their manifesto claimed that the motive for the party’s creation was ‘to give 
expression to the views of a considerable body of industrialists’.67 Thus, the National 
Democrats were a sectional interest. The views expressed in the manifesto, however, 
were in line with many Conservatives’ thinking. In addition, there were no 
viewpoints, methods or obvious extreme personal antecedents likely to embarrass the 
Conservative Party. The lack of any evidence of further enquiry suggests Central 
Office did not see the National Democrats as a threat. Lord Woolton, the Chairman of 
the Party, even expressed willingness to meet the representative of the National 
Democrats.68 The agent who brought The Right Party to Central Office’s attention, a 
Mr. Hopkinson, was concerned at the ‘publicity it had received locally’.69 Hopkinson 
nonchalantly dismissed the Right Party as probably ‘quite unimportant’, but
•  70nevertheless requested information in case a constituent asked him to provide it. 
Central Office’s response mirrored this nonchalance. Vice-Chairman Maijorie Maxse 
replied with details of the founder o f the Right Party, Mr. A. C. Cann, and at the same 
time advised Hopkinson, ‘we do not need to take him too seriously’.71 Yet, Central 
Office was clearly sufficiently concerned to investigate Mr. Cann’s background. Mr. 
Cann had applied, in May 1946, to be a Prospective Parliamentary Candidate for the 
Conservative Party, and secured an interview with a Mr. Thomas. Maxse reported that 
it was after this interview that Cann created the Right Party, and only then that ‘we 
learnt that before the war he had been connected with Sir Oswald Mosley’.72 We can 
only surmise at what prompted Cann to create the Right Party. It is unlikely that Cann
66 Untitled letter from J. G. Jetley to Lord Woolton, 17 July 1946. CPA CCO 3/1/72, National 
Democrats 1947
67 Untitled letter from J. G. Jetley to Lord Woolton, 17 July 1946. CPA CCO 3/1/72, National 
Democrats 1947
68 Untitled letter to Lord Woolton, 17 July 1946. CPA CCO 3/1/72, National Democrats, 1947.
69 Untitled letter from Mr. Hopkinson to Miss Maxse, 29 December 1947. CPA CCO 3/1/81, 
The Right Party, 1948.
70 Untitled letter from Mr. Hopkinson to Miss Maxse, 29 December 1947. CPA CCO 3/1/81, 
The Right Party, 1948.
71 Letter from Miss Maxse, The Right Party’, to Mr. Hopkinson, 1 January 1948, CPA CCO, 
3/1/81, The Right Party, 1948.
72 Letter from Miss Maxse, The Right Party’, to Mr. Hopkinson, 1 January 1948, CPA CCO, 
3/1/81, The Right Party, 1948.
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would have done this if he felt that he had a realistic chance of gaining the 
Conservative Party nomination. However, Maxse’s version of events indicates that 
Central Office had been able to discover Cann’s dubious antecedents. This makes 
Central Office’s subsequent actions easier to interpret. Maxse removed Cann from 
Central Office’s lists of approved Conservative Party speakers, receivers of party 
literature and potential parliamentary candidates.73 Maxse had moved swiftly to 
terminate Cann’s connection with the Conservative Party on discovering his 
connections with Mosley. Maxse’s actions are in stark contrast to the attitude towards 
the National Democrats. They reveal a desire to avoid taint by association, and a 
blocking action forcing Cann to operate without Conservative Party support. This 
explanation also chimes with Hopkinson’s description of the Right Party as, ‘of the 
extreme right’,74 and is early evidence for seeing the post-war Conservative Party’s 
intent to be a barrier to extreme-right groups and individuals.
The Conservative Party’s perception of an organisation’s exact nature was not, 
however, always immediately apparent. This did not necessarily stop Central Office 
taking refractory action when it thought that it was required. The Society for 
Individual Freedom (SIF), for example, championed the cause of individual liberty 
above the State. Typical was the case of farmers in South Woodham, Essex. The 
Labour Government’s concern with unemployment, specifically its uneven 
geographical spread, had resulted in the introduction of ‘Development Areas’ and the 
Central Land Board in 1947.75 This appeared to provide state control of private 
property, which seemed believable as it came from a Socialist government currently 
nationalising industry. The South Woodham farmers had agreed to the State 
requisitioning their land during wartime, as they understood the measure to be 
temporary. Many of them had enlisted whilst the state utilised their property. The 
decision by Attlee’s government to confiscate the property using a compulsory 
purchase order, however, was a different matter. SIF became involved, and lobbied
73 Letter from Miss Maxse, The Right Party’, to Mr. Hopkinson, 1 January 1948, CPA CCO, 
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local MPs, the relevant ministry, and, securing no redress, Winston Churchill.76 
Regular SIF publications carried articles from individuals denouncing the 
government. Retired Royal Navy Commander Hyde C. Burton, for example, 
complained of ‘individualness’ being ‘sacrificed upon the hideous altar of the 
“Collective”’.77 SIF’s ‘News Bulletins’ talked about the undermining of free 
government, realm, religion and monarchy by saboteurs placed in Britain’s vital 
offices, factories, power plants, railway centres, laboratories and docks.78 These views 
certainly locate SIF to the right of a Conservative Opposition propounding the 
Industrial Charter. Nevertheless, Central Office included SIF members on its list of 
approved speakers. This had potential for embarrassment. A Deputy Central Office 
Area Agent reported the comments of a SIF member during the 1948 Hampstead 
Borough Council by-election.79 A Mr. Jack Norris had complained about the level of 
foreigners in the area affecting housing for indigenous residents. Norris spoke from a 
soapbox adorned with a Hampstead Conservatives’ poster, and brandished another 
poster of the Conservative candidate. At this stage, Central Office files make no 
comment about SIF’s nature. However, like the leader of the Right Party, Central 
Office removed Norris from its list of approved speakers.
There is also evidence that Central Office took a more subtle approach to minimise 
the impact of outside organisations. After Labour’s landslide victory in 1945, many in 
the Conservative Party realised the need to refocus its literature to attract more 
working-class voters. Prospective parliamentary candidate Edward Heath, speaking at 
the 1948 party conference, called for more publicity suitable for the workshop, factory 
and trade unions.80 Central Office was understandably interested, therefore, in 
Conservative organisations attempting to attract this particular electorate. The 
Workers Forum (WF), for example, prompted an inquiry to Central Office asking
76 CPA CCO, 3/1/85, Society of Individualists, 1948-49. See also, Marjorie L. Franklin to 
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77 The Individualist, 1950; CPA CCO, 3/1/85 Society of Individualists, 1948-49.
78 News Bulletin, the publication of The Society For Individual Freedom, incorporating The 
Society of Individualists and National League for Freedom, issue no. 21, September 1948, 1. 
CPA CCO, 3/1/85 Society of Individualists, 1948-49.
79 Miss Harris to Miss Dodd, 26 May 1948 & report by Miss Genet, ‘Society of Individualists: 
Mr. Jack Norris’, 25 May 1948. CPA CCO 3/1/85, Society of Individualists, 1948-49.
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whether it was ‘part of our Conservative Organisation’.81 Central Office denied any 
connection, and declared emphatically that it did not sponsor the WF.82 This was an 
interesting comment that indicated that Central Office supported some organisations. 
It is also evident that Central Office already possessed information on the WF, or that 
it gathered it once prompted. Having denied a connection with the WF, Central Office 
advised: ‘From what we know of its activities however it is strongly Conservative in 
outlook and appears to put forward Conservative propaganda.’83 Subsequent 
comments suggest that Central Office had not simply relied on its existing files. The 
inquiry had mentioned a Mr. Alnutt in connection with the WF. Miss Fletcher at 
Central Office revealed that the inquiry prompted her to speak to Alnutt, and that she 
had discovered that his connection was limited to providing a speech, at the WF’s
Qjj
behest, in 1947. Thereafter, Fletcher stated, Alnutt confined himself ‘entirely to 
work within the Conservative Party Organisations’.85 It is reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that Alnutt was a Conservative Party member, and that Fletcher warned him 
of the possible dangers of being a member of outside organisations, but that the WF’s 
work was acceptable.
Central Office seemed even less concerned with the activities of the Middle Class 
Union. This appears surprising as the MCU had the potential for a mass, populist 
appeal of the radical right. The MCU was anti-Socialist, but did not wish to support 
vested interest, tradition or anything reactionary. H. J. Chapman forwarded the 
MCU’s literature to Lord Woolton and asked for Conservative Party support, and 
warned him of the potential power of the neglected middle classes.86 Central Office’s 
intelligence report on the MCU explains why it was unconcerned. The report 
identified the MCU as a recurrence of a similarly titled inter-war movement that had
81 F. R. Fletcher to Mr. P. Acton, 21 November 1949. CPA CCO 4/3/209, Outside Societies, 
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included two Conservative MPs amongst its membership.87 The report noted the 
patriotism and anti-Communism of MCU members, and suggested Central Office 
respond by highlighting the merits of Conservative Party membership in combating a 
heightened post-war Communist threat.88 Subsequent correspondence from the MCU 
did not alter Central Office’s benign attitude. One reason for this is that, despite an 
implicit threat in Chapman’s letter, the MCU was not truly hostile to the Conservative 
Party. Indeed, MCU correspondence with Central Office revealed that its members 
saw it as a covert means of spreading Conservatism. A Mr. Louis Dickens, for 
example, advised Central Office that the MCU agenda was ‘powerfully Conservative 
without calling itself Conservative’, and that the MCU would ‘immeasurably 
strengthen Conservatism’ as its members were likely to vote Conservative anyway.89 
The MCU did not adopt an extremist posture, nor did it adopt populist activities 
despite threatening to do so. Consequently, Central Office stuck to the limited 
counter-measure of advising MCU’s members they would better achieve their 
objectives by joining the Conservative Party. Central Office’s advice to its Area 
Agents that the MCU did not include anyone of high standing in its leadership reveals
• onits lack of concern. There is even a tone of disdain. Marjorie Maxse recalled that 
apart from one piece of MCU correspondence from a Mr. D. Cobbett, the only other 
MCU person she remembered having anything to do with was Commander Hyde C. 
Burton, ‘who is definitely a crank’.91
The British Houswives League (BHL) likewise sought Conservative Party support. 
Unlike the MCU, however, the BHL definitely engaged in activities previously 
thought alien among Conservatives. The BHL emerged during a period of crises and 
austerity measures. Wartime rationing remained. The Labour Government introduced 
bread rationing in summer 1946 to avoid famine in Asia and Germany. In January 
1947, severe weather, and a fuel crisis caused partly by the Labour government’s
87 O. W. Stebbings to Mr. Grenville, The Middle Class Union’, 3 May 1949. CPA CCO 3/1/66, 
Middle Class Union, 1947-9.
88 O. W. Stebbings to Mr. Grenville, The Middle Class Union’, 3 May 1949. CPA CCO 3/1/66, 
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nationalisation of coal, combined to force the government to restrict energy 
consumption at work and home. The government banned cooking by electricity for 
three hours in the morning and two in the afternoon. The Conservative press produced 
the headline, ‘Shiver with Shinwell and starve with Strachey’, a reference to Labour 
Ministers involved.92 The British Housewives League, described by Hennessey as 
‘already becoming a thorn in ministerial flesh’,93 were thus part of a more widespread, 
general protest from a sorely pressed public. The British Housewives League 
spontaneously appeared in line with this dissatisfaction, and struck a chord with many 
British women. A Miss M. Parsons, writing on behalf of the BHL, expressed to the 
Minister of Food, J. Strachey, concern at possible further cuts in rations if a dock 
strike continued.94 Parson’s letter is typical of BHL complaints at conditions under a 
Labour government. The appearance of Conservative frontbencher David Maxwell 
Fyfe, MP as the main speaker at the BHL’s Albert Hall Rally of 6 June 1947, 
suggested the Conservative Party was aware of the BHL’s potential. Many Labour 
MPs, and others, even thought the BHL a Conservative front organisation. The 
Communist Party, for example, showered the Albert Hall Rally with leaflets 
imploring people not to fool themselves about the true nature of the BHL, focusing on 
Maxwell Fyfe’s presence at the meeting and that of the erstwhile Conservative MP, 
Mrs. Mavis Tate.95 Yet, the Conservative Party actually shunned the BHL, despite the 
BHL having the potential to spread an anti-government appeal to a mass audience. 
Central Office consistently rejected appeals from BHL representatives for official 
recognition and funding by the Conservative Party.96 Conservative Party Chairman, 
Lord Woolton, explicitly denied any connection with the BHL. Woolton stated in an 
address to the Conservative Women’s conference on 2 July 1947: ‘It might save a 
little of the time of our political opponents if I were to say publicly that the British 
Housewives League has no connection with nor is it financed by the Conservative 
Party.’97 Central Office rigorously adhered to this stance.
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There are a number of reasons for Central Office’s attitude. A prosaic theme, that will 
become consistent in examining the Conservative Party’s relationships with outside 
organisations, is that encouraging outside organisations risked damaging the 
Conservative Party’s membership numbers and thus funds. The Conservative Party 
owed its success with women at a local level mainly because women viewed 
Conservative Associations as social organisations, unlike the more masculine Labour
no
Party associations. Central Office, perhaps realising the importance of female 
support, had already accepted the suggestion in the Maxwell Fyfe Report that local 
Conservative Associations form housewives’ committees from among their members 
to provide co-ordinated criticism of Labour austerity. Membership of the BHL, 
therefore, could hamper this effort. Hence, Central Office’s commented to the wife of 
a Conservative prospective parliamentary candidate who sought advice on how to 
deal with the BHL, that, ‘Any association which tends to drain membership and funds 
from the local association is not furthering the interests of the party in any particular 
district.’99 The focus on membership and funds was particularly acute as Lord 
Woolton was at this time engaged in a drive to increase party membership. There is 
also the possibility that hostility towards the BHL resulted from a belief that it was the 
personal vehicle of its leading figure, Dorothy Crisp, who may have been attempting
to secure election to Parliament. Supporting this is a comment by Maxse that
innvoluntary organisations like the BHL were ‘used usually for personal motives’. 
Yet, Central Office’s consistently hostile attitude towards the BHL after Crisp 
resigned the Chairmanship limits this as an explanation. Crisp offered to write to all 
BHL members upon resigning and advise them all to vote Conservative. Lord 
Woolton rejected the offer.101 There was no thaw in relations.
Central Office’s perception of the BHL as an extreme-right organisation that could 
harm the Conservative Party by association more accurately explains the Conservative 
Party’s attitude. A comparison between the BHL and a similar organisation of the
98 G. E. Maguire, Conservative Women: A History of Women and the Conservative Party, 
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time, the National Federation of Women’s Institutes (NFWI), illustrates the BHL’s 
nature. Paul Martin showed that the NFWI sought to promote women’s traditional 
gender roles as part of a wider attempt to secure progressive legislation and 
recognition of women’s contribution to society.102 The BHL, on the other hand, 
Martin described as brandishing ‘traditional female domesticity as an exclusive 
weapon wrapped in heavy sentiment which it used to browbeat the Labour 
government from the right’.103 Progressive legislation was not part of the BHL’s 
platform. Thus, while the NFWI argued that the government’s omission of sick pay 
for housewives in the National Insurance scheme failed to acknowledge the traditional 
role of women sufficiently, the BHL remained silent. The NFWI’s demands for equal 
pay for women and a greater provision of school meals met the same response, or 
even hostility. The BHL’s targets, in contrast, included the welfare state. It attacked, 
for example, the provision of school meals as a state imposition.104 In addition, 
whereas the NFWI was, and is, apolitical, the BHL’s alliance with trade associations, 
Martin argued, suggested otherwise. Whether this identifies the BHL as an extreme- 
right organisation today is anachronistic. For, Central Office clearly viewed the BHL 
thus, and sought intelligence on it.
Miss Spencer’s report for Central Office on the BHL’s June 1947 Albert Hall rally 
mentioned the preponderance of Union Jacks and the singing of patriotic songs.105 
The following July, Miss Spencer reported on the BHL’s Trafalgar Square Rally and 
subsequent march to Hyde Park.106 These BHL activities were redolent of Oswald 
Mosley’s pre-war British Union of Fascists. Mosley’s Union Movement formed at 
the same time as the BHL’s 1948 rally, soon engaged in exactly the same activities. 
Central Office would have been aware of these public events. Spencer identified one 
known Conservative at the BHL rally.107 Otherwise, Spencer focused on the crowd’s 
reaction to the BHL, and noted hecklers’ interrupting with shouts of ‘Tories’ and
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•  108 _ .‘Fascists’. This was tantamount to admitting that these connections remained in the
public’s mind. The report on the BHL’s meeting of 21 June 1948, at the Kingsway
Hall, corroborated the perception that Central Office was gathering intelligence on an
extreme-right group.109 This report, composed by Katherine Wilmot, is more
comprehensive and indicated a more formalised approach to intelligence gathering.
This may be a consequence of the creation in May 1948 of the Voluntary
Organisations Section.110 Wilmot circulated the report to senior Central Office
officials. Its contents again included identification of Conservative individuals, most
notably Sir Waldron Smithers MP.111 It is, however, Wilmot’s impression of the
audience’s attitude that revealed the nature of Central Office’s concerns. Commenting
on the reception afforded various topics Wilmot stated that, ‘The more extreme right
110 •element was well received.’ By highlighting this feature of the BHL meeting 
Wilmot made it clear that a re-emerging Conservative Party, only recently armed with 
a much-changed political programme in the shape of the Industrial Charter, wished to 
avoid any connection with the BHL, because it drew attention to extreme-right views 
from which the post-war Conservative Party wished to dissociate.
Central Office’s relationship with the BHL is also a more enlightening example of 
how the Conservative Party blocked the extreme right. The relationship is more 
comprehensive than that with, for example, the Right Party, and reveals how the 
Conservative Party affected its blocking role. On the one hand, there is the obvious 
intelligence gathering. Equally obvious is the dissemination of Central Office’s 
disapproval of the BHL to other Conservatives. Lord Woolton, for example, wrote to 
Colonel A. Gomme-Duncan, MP, regarding an invitation to speak at a BHL meeting, 
stating that it had, ‘long been the policy of this office to dissociate itself from this 
organisation’.113 There is also a suggestion of underhand activities by the
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Conservative Party. Wilmot reported a remark made from the platform at Kingsway 
Hall that, ‘the Housewives League will carry on their fight for freedom in spite of the 
vast sums spent by the Opposition to wreck it’.114 Central Office vehemently denied 
the inference that it was acting thus.115 Frustratingly, neither the report nor the 
response it generated provides any details. Nevertheless, the more transparent refusal 
to grant official Conservative Party recognition, or to supply funds, did force the BHL 
to operate without the resources of a financially powerful institution, under its own 
auspices and therefore subject to full media scrutiny.
However, this political alienation was also the result of another aspect to the 
Conservative Party’s blocking role. Central Office’s intelligence material on the BHL 
reveals this. The Conservative Party’s apparent acceptance of Attlee’s programme 
opened political space on its right. The BHL, and others vehemently opposed to 
Socialism, occupied this vacated space. Thus, the BHL was indeed one of those 
Conservative groups Martin identified adopting an extreme political culture to attack 
Socialism and maintain traditional Conservatism. Continued adherence to its changed 
political stance revealed just how refractory the Conservative Party could be to groups 
like the BHL. The BHL, from offering to support it and seeking to gain its imprimatur 
or funds, quickly became critical of the Conservative Party Opposition. Wilmot’s 
report of the BHL’s June 1948 Kingsway Hall meeting mentions hostility towards the 
Conservative Party for the first time. Referring to the creation of the National Health 
Service and changes in National Insurance, the BHL castigated Shadow Chancellor R.
A. Butler for being ‘proud to be a sponsor’ of this ‘terrible infringement of 
freedom’.116 The following day Mary A. Parsons, on behalf of the BHL, forwarded to 
Churchill a resolution that denounced the Opposition for accepting ‘the imposition of 
the totalitarian Insurance and Health Service’.117 It was a particularly mordant 
criticism to level against an individual many saw as responsible for the defeat of 
fascist totalitarianism. It also indicated how the Conservative Party’s consistent stance
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forced the BHL into political isolation. The result was dwindling attendances at BHL 
meetings and, save for an isolated attempt at resurrection, political oblivion before the 
Conservative Party regained power in 1951.
The Conservative Party’s relationship with the Fighting Fund for Freedom (FFF) is 
more difficult to judge. During this period of Opposition, there is evidence of both co­
operation and attempts to distance the Conservative Party from the FFF. Sir Waldron 
Smithers’ leadership of the FFF placed this organisation within the Conservative 
Party’s orbit. Smithers had been the Conservative MP for Chislehurst since 1924, and 
remained a Conservative MP until retiring at the 1955 General Election. The FFF’s 
stated objective was to re-energise the Conservative Party by ‘linking the voters with 
the Conservative M.P.s and the prospective Conservative Candidates’.118 
Furthermore, the FFF’s demands for economic liberalism in the shape of 
denationalisation, whilst running counter to the ethos of the Industrial Charter, 
corresponded with the views of the many Conservatives opposing it. There is also 
clear evidence that Central Office co-operated with the FFF. In December 1945, 
Smithers, writing as chairman of the FFF, returned a list of Conservative candidates to 
Colonel S. Pierssene at Central Office.119 As the FFF had supported the anti-Semitic 
campaign of Conservative MP Charles Challen in Hampstead,120 we could interpret 
this as Central Office willingness to provide party material to a potentially extreme- 
right movement. On the other hand, these events occurred in the immediate aftermath 
of Labour’s stunning electoral victory and before the bureaucratic revival of the 
Conservative Party, which suggests an insufficiently aware, possibly reeling Central 
Office. Moreover, it is probable that Central Office gave Smithers the list before 
Challen’s anti-Semitic campaign began as it included prospective parliamentary 
candidates which, given the size of Labour’s victory in 1945, was not for an 
imminently expected election, indicating it pertained to the July 1945 General 
Election. The petition to remove aliens from Hampstead did not commence until 
October 1945, making it just possible to absolve Central Office from involvement 
with the extreme-right on the grounds of ignorance. Such an excuse thereafter,
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however, would not apply. Subsequent Central Office correspondence regarding the 
FFF is interesting in general in that it indicates how the Conservative Party’s actions 
helped to create extreme-right groups. More specifically, however, it reveals that 
although Central Office was willing to engage with the FFF, there was also an 
undercurrent of wariness and suspicion that degenerated into panic when Central 
Office feared the relationship was about to be discovered.
It is clear from its monthly reports that the FFF had come into existence because of a 
belief that the Conservative Party was not doing what the FFF expected of it. Two 
FFF organisers reported in June 1948 on their experiences within a constituency 
formerly held by the Conservatives. They found the local Conservative Association 
abandoned and neighbouring businesses, local people and even the police unable to 
state its new location. When the FFF organisers eventually discovered the correct 
address, they found a ‘private house without poster, plate or any indication to show
i t
that the Conservative Party operate from that centre’. The local Conservatives may 
have thought success unlikely in an area recently made solidly working class by 
council housing construction ordered by the leader of the Greater London Council, 
Herbert Morrison. It was also inertia. The FFF’s reporting of this situation, and 
determination to redress it, was a criticism of the Conservative leadership. In July 
1948, the FFF’s monthly report combined this lack of effective leadership with an 
absence of ‘true Conservatism.’ It demanded, for example, the updating of local 
Conservative Associations with the comment that local committees would ‘get 
nowhere if they are slack, self-satisfied or allow themselves to be dominated by the 
pale-pinks, the theorists or the half-informed’, and called for a rejuvenated grassroots 
to force the Conservative centre to ‘revitalise itse lf.122 These sentiments were a 
common feature of FFF literature. They indicated that the FFF was a coalescence of 
individuals whose views, compared to the political position adopted by the post-war 
Conservative Party in the Industrial Charter, were now on the extreme right. Their 
coalescence as a group was, therefore, a product of the changed nature of the 
Conservative Party.
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Central Office’s initial response came in a memo to all of its Area Agents of 24th 
June 1948. Maijorie Maxse, stating the memo was Central Office’s response to ‘so 
many enquiries about the attitude of the Party towards the Fighting Fund for 
Freedom’, denied the existence of any official association, described FFF visits to 
local Conservative Associations as not sanctioned, and dismissed FFF statements as 
unhelpful and its actions intended to undermine the Industrial Charter.123 Maxse 
concluded that there was no need for any MP, candidate or agent to assist the FFF. 
Yet by September 1948, this attitude appeared to have changed. In that month, Lord 
Woolton, Conservative Chairman and thus head of Central Office, arranged a 
luncheon meeting with a member of the FFF’s executive committee and officials, 
ostensibly to establish an acceptable relationship. In March 1949, Maxse wrote 
again to all Area Agents. The message was very different to that of nine months ago. 
Maxse now advised that, ‘various negotiations have taken place and the Chairman of 
the party has been in touch with the Chairman of the Fighting Fund for Freedom with 
a view to establishing more satisfactory relations between them and Central 
Office’.125 Instead of warning all Conservative Party officers and officials to avoid 
members of the FFF, Maxse advised that the FFF would be providing assistance in
10 Aconstituencies deemed most in need of their help. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this changed attitude. The FFF openly sought the return of a Conservative 
government: ‘we hope the government of our Country will be placed in the hands of 
the Conservative Party’.127 It was not, therefore, likely to provide an electoral 
alternative to the Conservative Party. At a time when the Conservative Party 
machinery was still recovering from wartime decay, the FFF had assisted at least one 
Conservative prospective parliamentary candidate,128 and openly offered this to any
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190other who wanted it. Moreover, the FFF claimed to have been more active, 
compared to the Conservative Party’s canvassers, in working-class areas and
1 mfactories. The FFF’s report also highlighted negative impact of the Labour 
Government’s legislation and the 1947 fuel crisis on the working class. These 
included difficulties in finding the weekly National Insurance contribution, the loss of 
an additional wage due to the increased school leaving age, and the rising cost of 
electricity.131 It is possible, therefore, that a badly shaken Conservative Party saw the 
FFF as a vehicle to influence a section of the electorate that had overwhelmingly 
contributed to the Labour landslide of 1945.
Nevertheless, we can detect a degree of disquiet over this relationship from Maxse’s 
comment that the FFF’s organisers in the constituencies would be ‘still ostensibly 
operating on behalf of the F.F.F.’,132 rather than the Conservative Party. Disquiet 
turned to panic, however, when Central Office realised that FFF leaflet No. 67 
exhorting the reader to vote Conservative was a potential breach of the Representation 
of the People Act (1948).133 Maxse’s concern can be seen in her admission to the 
General Director of Central Office that, ‘We are so near an election that I tremble to 
think of what might happen if a Socialist got hold of leaflet No. 67.’134 The notion of 
panic is evident in the pencilled-in note, presumably from the General Director, 
asking where the envelope and its contents, presumably a reference to the worrisome 
leaflet, had gone.135 Electoral impropriety is a sufficient reason for concern in Central 
Office. Yet, the desire to maintain distance predates panic over a possibly dubious 
leaflet. In addition, the removal of Sir Waldron Smithers from the FFF’s letterheads 
soon after 1945 ends the overt connection between the FFF and Conservative Party. 
What, then, accounts for Central Office wariness?
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A simple, but understandable, desire for institutional demarcation is possible, but
maybe insufficient as an explanation. On the other hand, the Conservative Party
presumably knew of the FFF’s anti-Semitism from the 1945 campaign of its own MP.
Even if Central Office was ignorant of this particularly damaging FFF association
from 1945, subsequent evidence made the FFF’s anti-Semitism a possible cause for
concern. For example, Central Office received a copy o f the FFF’s monthly report for
August 1948. Included in it was a call for a more active campaign in areas where
Labour authorities had built council houses in Conservative marginal constituencies.
Contained within this call was a clear anti-Semitic reference to a Labour leader,
1described as a ‘Russian Jewess’. Fear of association with anti-Semitism, therefore, 
could also underlie Central Office’s concern over the possible discovery of a close 
relationship with the FFF. Possessing strong anti-Semitic antecedents made Central 
Office concern about connection to the FFF understandable. It is consistent with 
Central Office’s attitude towards extreme-right groups, even those with less clear 
connections to the Conservative Party. Moreover, this concern could also explain the 
cryptic comment of Lord Woolton, when arranging his luncheon meeting with the 
Chairman of the FFF, that the latter was, in Woolton’s opinion, ‘the best person with 
whom to discuss a certain matter that is at present worrying my colleague and me’.137 
This is, admittedly, insufficient proof. There is no further clarification as to what this 
matter was, and it could easily be something mundane. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
ignore it as a factor in the relationship between Central Office and the FFF, especially 
considering the propinquity to, and context provided by, the Second World War. In 
addition, the timing of Woolton’s letter, soon after receipt of the FFF’s August 1948 
monthly report, adds weight to notion of concern over the FFF’s anti-Semitism. One 
possible conclusion is, therefore, that as the Conservative Party approached the 1950 
General Election, the relationship between Central Office and FFF had changed. From 
being distant, Central Office had created a working relationship that subsequently 
degenerated into deep concern, and that anti-Semitism is a feasible basis for that 
concern. All that we can conclude at this stage is that the FFF was an extreme-right
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group, and that although Central Office did not yet identify it as such, it took an 
interest in its activities.
Central Office and its Area Agents also showed interest in another organisation prior
to the 1950 General Election, The New British National Reform Party, or New
Reform Party (NRP). The NRP’s prospectus reinforced the notion that the
Conservative Party created extreme-right groups by sloughing off individuals whose
ideas no longer suited the Conservative leadership. In the prospectus, the NRP’s
leader, P. W. Petter, J.P., identified himself as a life-long Conservative who had
supported many Conservative candidates by speaking on their election platforms, and
as someone who enjoyed realistic prospects of becoming a Conservative
1 '111parliamentary candidate. Nevertheless, Petter made his disillusionment with the 
Conservative Party clear: ‘The Conservative policy of the last few years has been to 
run along behind the Socialist Party. Indeed they have presented the Socialists with 
many of the ideas which they have put in practice.’139 Petter excoriated the 
performance of the Conservative Opposition ffontbench. He described its 
performance over the introduction of the National Health Service as a ‘cowardly 
retreat’, and held it responsible for the loss of the 1949 Hammersmith South by- 
election.140 Conservative MPs fared no better. Petter criticised them for being lazy and 
poor attendees of the House of Commons. Petter concluded that the Conservative 
Party was unworthy of support, not to be trusted with Government, and ineffectual in 
halting the socialist ruination of the country.141 The only viable solution for the 
country’s ills, Petter stated, was a new party led by a strong man.142
It is easy to dismiss Petter as a crank. His views revealed an individual convinced of 
the existence of an international conspiracy involving the papacy and communism. 
Nevertheless, Central Office thought it worthwhile paying attention to Petter and his
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new party. The Central Office Agent who forwarded the NRP prospectus advised of 
its wide distribution, and the Central Office official who received it noted that, ‘We 
are keeping an eye open on the ambitious Mr. Petter.’143 An enquiry from a 
Conservative MP elicited the response that Petter was indeed a Conservative, and 
known to the Yeovil Conservative Association.144 Central Office circulated 
subsequent NRP literature to its General Director, Chief Political Officer and four 
other officials.145 This action indicated that Central Office saw Petter and his party as 
potentially harmful to the Conservative Party. Meanwhile, Central Office Agents 
continued requesting information on the NRP. A memo from Central Office’s Agent 
for the Home Counties South-East Area is typical in that it asked whether the NRP 
was ‘of importance and should be watched?’146 This is evidence that Central Office 
Agents knew part of their remit was to monitor groups potentially harmful to the 
Conservative Party. However, what harm could the politically miniscule Petter do to 
the Conservative Party? An internal memo to all Central Office Agents and local 
associations provided an answer. Attached to the memo was evidence of how 
seriously Central Office considered organisations like the NRP. This evidence was a 
four-page report by Central Office’s Mr. Stebbings. Stebbings argued that the NRP 
was a ‘mushroom organisation’ Central Office normally ignored, but for what he 
described as Petter’s specious argument that a vote for the NRP would not harm the 
Conservatives at the next General Election.147 Stebbings referred to the potential 
defection of Conservative voters to the NRP. Yet, how realistic was Stebbing’s 
description of Petter’s claim of speciousness? There was just over one year before the 
compulsory calling of the next General Election. This was not sufficient time for 
Petter to organise electorally. The most Petter could achieve realistically was a few 
NRP candidates, most of whom would probably lose their deposits. The experiences 
of Oswald Mosley, whose New Party and BUF candidates were soundly beaten,
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shows the likely outcome for a new party that attempted to make a mark on British 
politics. In addition, Petter, unlike Mosley, was an unknown who operated in a very 
different political climate to when the BUF did. Stebbings claim, therefore, is 
unrealistic, and the reason for it is probably no more than the typical response of any 
party keen to ward off all possible rivals. If, however, Stebbings’ claim was dubious, 
what other potential harm could Petter pose to the Conservative Party?
The NRP’s policies place it firmly on the right.148 It demanded reductions in 
extravagant spending, particularly on social services, limitations on nationalisation, 
and a call for economic autarky, especially on foodstuffs. Lightning strikes would be 
illegal and the Empire supported. More idiosyncratic is the call for the restoration of 
the Penny Post. The desire for the new party to be a youth party set the NRP at odds 
with the Conservative Party, and provided a more radical tone. Yet, this was not a 
political programme with the potential to damage the Conservative Party. Many 
policies either were in line with current Conservative thinking, or had some support 
within the Conservative Party. However, religious morality was at the heart of the 
NRP’s taxation and education policies, with Bible based teaching to be compulsory in 
state schools. This definitely was not prominent in Conservative policy. Stebbings 
also pointed out that the headquarters of the NRP was the same as the National Union 
of Protestants, an organisation responsible for disruption of High Church services, and 
that Petter was a former Governing Director of this organisation.149 Petter’s hard-line 
Protestantism was the philosophical basis of the NRP, which its prospectus revealed. 
In the prospectus, there was an acceptance of democracy and the institutions of 
Parliament and the Crown. However, should the NRP ever form a government it 
would ensure the exclusion from the institutions of the State those it deemed were not 
part of the nation.150 Roman Catholics and Communists could certainly expect 
restrictions. Central Office could not miss the implications of Petter’s views. They are 
ubiquitous in the NRP prospectus. Moreover, it is likely that the Conservative Party, 
with a strong Ulster Unionist element, realised there existed a connection between
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hard-line Protestantism, Ulster loyalists and the extreme right. The British Protestants
League, for example, spread virulent anti-democratic and anti-Semitic literature
before and after the Second World War.151 Central Office probably also knew that
public perception would link the Conservative Party with Ulster Unionism, without
necessarily distinguishing between its various forms. The Conservative Party had, for
example, a long connection with local Orange order movements such as the Liverpool
Protestant Party. Therefore, Central Office condemned Petter to all Conservative
constituencies.152 Dissociating the Conservative Party from any religious controversy
that placed restrictions on a large section of the electorate, Stebbings reported that the
Conservative Party would regard ‘as reactionary any attempt to fan sectarian feuds
particularly where these are calculated to promote political unrest and distract
1attention from the real issues of national politics’. To Central Office, Petter was an 
extreme-right religious bigot, and they wanted no connection with him.
Central Office’s concern not to be associated with extreme-right individuals leading 
up to the 1950 General Election is evident. Its treatment of one of its own 
parliamentary candidates, rather than a disgruntled individual on the periphery of the 
party, provided the clearest example of this. Andrew Fountaine fought for Franco in 
the Spanish Civil War and served in the Second World War.154 He became a leading 
Young Conservative in his constituency. His performance at the 1947 Conservative 
Party Conference, wherein he attacked the Attlee government’s policy towards Indian 
independence, earned a standing ovation. The Chorley Conservative Association 
adopted Fountaine in 1948 as its candidate in a constituency they expected to gain at 
the next election. However, Fountaine’s speech at the Llandudno Conservative Party 
Conference in 1948 betrayed sentiments from which the Conservative Party now 
wished to distance itself. Fountaine described Attlee’s Government as, ‘that group of 
national traitors, that hierarchy of semi-alien mongrels, and hermaphrodite 
Communists that have the impudence to call themselves that which they are not -  a
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British Government’,155 and thus revealed himself to be anti-Semitic, racist and 
possibly violently disposed. A nominated parliamentary candidate was not so easy to 
dismiss, however, as a mere party member. Nevertheless, Central Office made clear 
such sentiments were not acceptable. Lord Woolton released a statement that 
Fountaine’s viewpoint was, ‘completely at variance with the attitude of the 
Conservative party’.156 The Chorley Conservatives did not find an alternative 
candidate to replace Fountaine. This may reflect tension between Central Office, 
which had an approved list of candidates, and a local association guarding its 
autonomy, especially concerning selection and treatment of candidates. Alternatively, 
it may reflect views prevalent within Chorley Conservative Association. Central 
Office made it clear, however, that Fountaine no longer had official Conservative 
Party support. In the 1950 General Election, Fountaine polled 46.9% of the vote, and 
missed election by a mere 361 votes. His views could just as easily have secured votes 
as lost it. The closeness of the vote may simply parallel that of the overall result of the 
General Election. Yet, it is at least equally probable, and, arguably more so, that 
Fountaine’s failure to capture Chorley rested on having to stand as an Independent 
Conservative. Less contentiously, Central Office had acted against an individual it 
deemed potentially harmful to the Conservative Party, and was willing to lose a seat 
in a close-run election. It is an action consistent with Central Office’s attitude towards 
other extreme-right individuals before and after the 1950 General Election. Central 
Office removed all relevant papers from its Chorley constituency file to a private one 
with strict access conditions, perhaps wishing to limit details of any connection 
between Fountaine and the Conservative Party. The private file remains inaccessible. 
More personally, Fountaine’s wife, later portrayed as objecting greatly to his 
‘desertion of the Tory Party’, divorced him. As well as being the daughter of 
Norfolk’s Chief Constable, Mrs. Fountaine was a former Central Office worker.157
After the 1950 General Election.
The 1950 General Election alleviated Conservative fears that the party would never 
regain office. The Conservative Party attracted nearly three million more votes,
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gaining eighty-five more MPs. Labour’s impregnable one hundred and forty-five-seat 
majority became a precarious five. The result brought the Conservatives tantalisingly 
close to power. Thus, there was cause for Conservative optimism. Britain no longer 
had a mobilised electorate eager for the implementation of the welfare state. This 
favoured the Conservative Party. The Conservatives could also point to the fuel, food 
and sterling crises of the late 1940s as proof of the dangers of the Socialist’s policies. 
Hypothermia, rationing and devaluation were easily associated with Labour 
government. Labour’s manifesto held the prospect of more of the same policies. 
Moreover, the Labour Government’s desire to protect the newly nationalised coal 
industry from cheaper imports meant it was quickly in an invidious position when, in 
spring 1950, France surprisingly presented it with the terms of the European Coal and 
Steel Community. Refusal to enter looked as if the Labour government was putting 
ideology before the electorate’s comfort by turning its back on the cheaper imports 
that membership would bring. Furthermore, with nationalisation of steel still 
incomplete, the Labour manifesto had nevertheless marked out sugar, cement and 
industrial insurance as the next targets for state control. Sugar nationalisation 
particularly put a bitter taste in the electorate’s mouth. Tate and Lyle responded to 
Labour’s manifesto with its ‘Mr. Cube’ campaign, a pictorial representation of the 
perils of nationalisation on every sugar packet. Dogma was now affecting the British 
cup of tea adversely. Churchill, meanwhile, was still an asset for the Conservatives, 
having, for example, the right credentials should the military manoeuvres occurring 
between North and South Korea from 1949 escalate as many expected into global 
conflict. Moreover, his campaign comments showed that he now desired to face the 
Soviet Union with diplomacy, not bellicosity, and introduced in the process the word 
‘summit’ into the lexicon of diplomacy. Attlee, by contrast, seemed powerless to 
avoid the split that would occur within his government should the Korean situation 
and budget deficits either require increased defence spending or welfare cuts, or 
worse still, both.
Yet there was also cause for the Conservative Party to be concerned. Austerity was 
not the complete picture. The Marshall Plan had reversed the negative impact of the 
U.S.A.’s sudden end to wartime lend-lease. The positive effects of the 1949 
devaluation were yet to appear, but would undoubtedly result in an improved 
economy. For some, the post-war era was not one of unremitting gloom. Hennessy
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revealed the positive cultural milieu that alleviated the postscript of continuing 
wartime privations. Billy Butlin exploited provisions in the 1938 Holidays with Pay 
Act and created holiday camps that provided a safety valve for spending demands 
unrealised so long as rationing remained. Attendances at sports events mushroomed. 
Parisian fashions returned, albeit beyond the reach of many. The formation in 1948 of 
the National Film Production Council and the passage of the Film Act may not have 
helped the British film industry. Yet, Britain’s large cinema-going audiences enjoyed 
a resurgence of British films, such as David Lean’s adaptation of Great Expectations 
(1946), Orson Welles in The Third Man (1949), Alec Guinness in Kind Hearts and 
Coronets (1949), and Laurence Olivier in Hamlet (1948).158 Television, too, began to 
have an impact. In the four years between 1947 and 1950, the number of licences 
issued for television sets rocketed from 15,000 to 344,000, a trend that would 
continue.159 This phenomenon increased the potential for variety, but for the 
Conservative Party it also carried risks. In May 1951, the appearance of The Goon 
Show heralded an explosion of satire and influenced later shows lampooning stuffy, 
outdated politicians.160 The Conservative Party, a status-based and class-ridden party, 
faced the prospect of derision becoming a frequent feature of politics. Little wonder, 
then, that Labour’s vote had actually increased by over one million in 1950. This also 
indicated approval, rather than rejection, of Labour’s radical legislation. The 
acceptance of most of its legislation in the Conservative manifesto This is the Road, 
save for vague comments on halting or reversing the pace of nationalisation, 
implicitly acknowledged the electorate’s approval of Labour’s legislation. The 
Welfare State and governmental intervention were here to stay. This meant, however, 
that the tensions between the economically liberal and the more collectively minded 
of the Conservative Party were never far beneath the surface in the post-war years, as 
Cockett realised.161
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This situation had potentially negative consequences for the Conservative Party. 
Political space on the right of the Conservative Party had opened because of their 
failure to challenge the Labour government effectively and the formulation of the 
Industrial Charter. The manifesto’s confirmation that this would continue to be the 
Conservative Party’s position meant organisations to the right of the party would 
remain problematic. Central Office had worked assiduously to avoid post-war 
connections between the Conservative Party and the extreme right. It is unlikely, 
however, that the Conservative’s political opponents, let alone the electorate, forgot 
pre-war links between Conservatives and the extreme right. Two examples show that 
Conservative Central Office remained keen to minimise such negative associations. 
Firstly, correspondence between Central Office and the Conservative Research 
Department in March 1950 revealed concern at the association of the epithet 
‘Conservative’ with right-wing European parties by the B.B.C., the Labour Party and 
its publications.162 The Conservative Party of Great Britain wished to avoid 
association with European right-wing parties whose political alliances with fascism 
contributed to the worst excesses of fascism and Nazism. Secondly, Central Office 
continued to monitor the activities of the Fighting Fund for Freedom, and collected 
information on its general opposition to nationalisation and specific commitment to 
railway denationalisation.163 This revealed that the FFF appeared to be attempting the 
creation of a cell-structure within the Conservative Party to propagate its ideology.164 
Central Office responded by continuing to monitor FFF activity, and received reports 
from a number of constituencies.165 Yet, Central Office did not want knowledge of 
any association between the Conservative Party and the FFF to become widely 
known. Central Office’s desire to minimise outside knowledge of their monitoring 
came when, in July 1950, a Central Office employee released information about the 
Fighting Fund for Freedom without checking the file for the Conservative Party’s 
official position. Miss Maxse responded with a severe rebuke,166 which showed that
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Central Office was unwilling to acknowledge any possibility of connections with the 
extreme right, not even that it was monitoring it. Nevertheless, Central Office 
continued monitoring these external groups, and revealed in the process varying 
attitudes towards them.
Like the British Housewives League, Aims of Industry (AIMS) sought a positive 
relationship with the Conservative Party. Unlike the BHL, however, AIMS secured it. 
Central Office agreed to Conservative Associations using AIMS’ speakers during 
Attlee’s first administration.167 However, attempts to elicit an admission from AIMS 
of a close relationship with the Conservative Party were vigorously denied and a full 
report of the attempt forwarded by AIMS to Central Office.168 In doing so, AIMS 
acted as part of Central Office’s intelligence gathering mechanism. Central Office 
agreed to create a Liaison Officer between the Conservative Party and AIMS after the 
1950 General Election had reduced Labour’s majority, which AIMS made known to 
its Area Secretaries on a strictly confidential basis.169 There are a number of reasons 
for Central Office’s positive attitude towards AIMS. AIMS assisted Central Office in 
intelligence gathering, albeit marginally. More importantly, there was no evidence 
that AIMS promoted its objectives in a manner usually associated with extremists. 
Nor is there any evidence of overt hostility towards the Conservative Party. On the 
contrary, AIMS’ objectives complimented those of the Conservative Party. Increased 
support for Labour at the 1950 General Election may have meant that the 
Conservative’s could not promise whole-scale denationalisation. It did not mean, 
however, that Central Office could not co-operate with outside organisations that did. 
Indeed, such was the co-operation that Central Office accepted a financial relationship 
with AIMS. In October 1950, Central Office accepted 80,000 free copies of The Road 
Ahead.170 This publication chimed, in title and content, with the Conservative Party’s 
1949 policy document, The Right Road fo r Britain, and its 1950 General Election 
manifesto This is the Road. Central Office distributed The Road Ahead to all
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Conservative constituency agents.171 There is also evidence that Central Office 
distributed other AIMS publications, including British Industry at the Crossroads, 
attacking nationalisation in general, and No Appeasement, which, like ‘Mr. Cube’, 
fought the nationalisation of the sugar industry. AIMS, therefore, did not pose a threat 
due to embarrassing activities, nor was it likely to present an electoral alternative to 
the Conservative Party. Its ‘extremism’ amounted to no more than occupying political 
space the Conservative Party felt incapable, at the time, of occupying. The extent of 
Central Office’s refractory action against AIMS remained limited, therefore, to 
advising its Area Agents that it was ‘better not to over advertise the fact that they are 
assisting us’.172
Central Office’s relationship with AIMS contrasts starkly with is its attitude towards 
The New Crusade (TNC). Central Office’s March 1950 report on the TNC included 
the names of prominent, distinguished members.173 Amongst the names is Lady 
Rennell Rodd, widow of the Conservative and Unionist MP for St. Marylebone from 
1928-1933. Lord Rennell Rodd had also been a member of the pre-war Nazi- 
sympathising Anglo-German Fellowship. The Rodd’s third son, Peter, married Nancy 
Mitford. Although Nancy Mitford was not a fascist sympathiser, many of the Mitfords 
were. Her parents had supported Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. Sister Unity was 
a prominent Nazi who had resided in Germany before the Second World War and 
whom British intelligence services watched carefully. Most notable was Diana 
Mitford, the wife of Oswald Mosley. These were all well-known facts in Central 
Office. Therefore, it is not surprising that the report’s author, Miss Fletcher, informed 
Miss Maxse at Central Office that TNC was a ‘fascist organisation’ that was 
connected to ‘Nazi Youth Parties in Germany’.174 Fletcher also noted that Special 
Branch at Scotland Yard was investigating the TNC, which would have been 
especially worrying for a Central Office determined not to resurrect charges of 
Conservative links to right-wing extremism. Fletcher informed Maxse that a Special
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Aims of Industry, 1949-50.
173 Miss Fletcher to Miss Maxse, The New Crusade’, 22 March 1950. CPA CCO 4/3/209, 
Outside Societies  1949-50
174 Miss Fletcher to Miss Maxse, The New Crusade’, 22 March 1950. CPA CCO 4/3/209, 
Outside Societies, 1949-50.
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Branch officer had unsuccessfully attempted to meet the TNC’s Secretary, a Colonel
17^Miller, on a number of occasions on the pretext of seeking TNC literature. 
Thwarted, the Special Branch officer revealed to the property owner his identity, 
having previously claimed to be a Young Conservative.176 This was a reminder to 
Central Office, even if unnecessary, that others maintained a connection in their mind 
between the Conservative Party and the extreme right. Fletcher concluded to Maxse 
that TNC ‘should be investigated’.177
Central Office increased its refractory action when, soon after it decided to investigate 
The New Crusade, it once again encountered sectarian and anti-Semitic extremists, 
albeit ones who were not necessarily Nazi sympathisers. The Guild of Good 
Neighbours (TGGN) seemed typical of the Conservative activism Martin identified, 
in that it was anti-Socialist and wished to overthrow the Labour government.178 In 
April 1950, Central Office’s Miss Fletcher advised Miss Maxse of arrangements for 
gathering information on TGGN, and that more information would be forthcoming 
pending further enquiries.179 In the meantime, Fletcher identified a Mrs. Proctor as the 
TGGN’s Assistant Organiser, and noted that Proctor ‘wears a Conservative badge’
1 &Aand was ‘on the Committee of St. Marylebone’. This shows that Central Office was 
keen to note the involvement of Conservative Party members. Fletcher also advised 
Maxse that TGGN possessed a ‘chart’ outlining its views, which its leader, a Captain
i o i
John Hutchings, had forwarded to approximately eight hundred people. Fletcher 
subsequently informed Maxse of her inability to ‘ascertain to whom this has been 
sent’.182 Again, this revealed Central Office’s concern to monitor the activities of 
outside organisations. The information it gathered would allow Central Office to
175 Miss Fletcher to Miss Maxse, The New Crusade’, 22 March 1950. CPA CCO 4/3/209, 
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178 P. Martin, ‘Echoes’, 135.
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make its views known to any Conservative recipients of the ‘chart’, and thereby 
minimise any possible embarrassment by association and curtail TGGN’s chances of 
growth. Although further enquiries produced TGGN’s ‘chart’, Fletcher went 
personally to the TGGN’s headquarters as she decided that the information was 
insubstantial.
Fletcher’s second report, of June 1950, revealed TGGN had few members, sought 
wealthy donors, and although it claimed to be non-party political and open to all, 
Conservatives ran it.183 However, Fletcher also detected a ‘strong under-current of 
anti-Roman Catholic feeling, and also more strongly still, anti-Jewish’.184 At one 
juncture, Fletcher reported, ‘the idea was conveyed that the main troubles of the world 
sprang from the Jews’.185 Fletcher, in highlighting such views, revealed Central 
Office’s aim of identifying them. By also identifying Conservatives, Fletcher 
reinforced the notion that Central Office’s objectives were the curtailment and 
avoidance of associated guilt. Fletcher gave her private address when asked by 
Captain Hutchings to identify herself.186 Pressed as to whether she had any connection 
with some other organisation, Fletcher informed Maxse she was evasive.187 Only 
when Hutchings persisted did Fletcher reply, ‘that I interested myself mildly in 
various organisations, as I was generally interested in women, but had called purely 
out of interest, privately’.188 It was a disingenuous and opaque reply designed to hide 
the Conservative Party’s connection to the extreme-right. Why relate this to Maxse 
otherwise? The information Fletcher gleaned revealed much about Central Office’s 
objectives towards extreme-right organisations. In addition, Fletcher’s methods 
showed Central Office was careful not to make their intelligence gathering known.
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This supports the notion that Central Office knew that association with the extreme 
right could damage the Conservative Party.
We can also see Central Office’s desire to avoid embarrassing associations when its 
opinion of an organisation changed after discovering a connection with the 
Conservative Party. L. N. Tomlinson was a veteran of both world wars.189 He created 
Clan Briton, probably after the Conservative Party lost the February 1950 General
| QA
Election. His views, as revealed in correspondence bearing a Union Flag with a 
white crucifix superimposed, both with the Conservative Party and others, revealed an 
extreme-right individual. Anti-left sentiment is endemic in Tomlinson’s 
correspondence. In the Sunday Express Tomlinson stated his belief that the Labour 
Government was ‘devoted to the destruction of the Empire’.191 He also wrote to 
Churchill and demanded that it was more correct to refer to all Labour MPs as 
‘COMSOT (Communistic Socialist)’.192 Like Burton of the Society for Individual 
Freedom, Tomlinson thought Britain was under threat from Communist 
subversives.193 Tomlinson shared these views with the Society for Individual 
Freedom,194 and found reflection in the Boulting Brothers film, High Treason (1951), 
in which left-wing plotters including a Labour MP planned to take over Britain’s 
power stations at the same time as a Soviet invasion.195 Tomlinson probably saw the 
film as realistic, and made no distinction between the Labour Party of Great Britain 
and Communists.196 Racism and anti-Semitism was prevalent in his writings, 
sometimes mixed with anti-left comments and a belief in decadence. On 19 March 
1951, Labour MP Sidney Silverman read in the House of Commons a letter sent by 
Tomlinson to a Reverend Fielding Clarke. Tomlinson, after implying that Mr. 
Silverman as a Jew was unqualified to speak on matters concerning the Church of
189 Confidential internal memo from E. S. Adamson to Lady Maxwell Fyfe, “Clan Briton’ and 
Mr. L. N. Tomlinson’, 20 March 1951. CPA CCO 3/3/56, Clan Briton, 1950-2.
190 The first reference in CPA concerns Tomlinson’s letter to the Sunday Express of 27 
August 1950. CPA CCO 3/2/72, Clan Briton, 1949-50.
191 Letter from L. N. Tomlinson to the Editor, ‘First-rate, Mr. Shinwell’, Sunday Express, 27 
August 1950. CPA CCO 3/2/72, Clan Briton, 1949-50.
192 L. N. Tomlinson to Winston Churchill, The Other Side of the Gangway’, 19 March 1951.
CPA CCO 3/3/56, Clan Briton, 1950-52.
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England, castigated other Jewish Labour MPs for failing to serve in the recent war.197 
In an attached document was the statement: ‘Today our public life is impregnated 
with the breeders of greed, jealousy, corruption and self-glorification who are all too 
often non-Christian, of alien blood, interested only very superficially indeed in the 
well-being of Britain and Britons. Their loyalties are to themselves alone, and the 
parasite occupations which find them wealth at the expense of the British people who 
have given them sanctuary.’198 Tomlinson concluded by referring to the murder of 
British soldiers in Palestine by Jewish terrorists led by Menachim Begin, and 
castigated Attlee for placing control of the armed forces ‘in the hands of two blood- 
brothers of this murderer, i.e. Shinwell and Strauss’, who had ‘NEVER condemned 
the outrages committed’.199
Anti-internationalism entered the mix. In a number of letters addressing the issue of 
‘World Government’, Tomlinson argued that the United Nations was ‘an Anti- 
Christian Communist conception’ that would result in the Union Jack’s replacement 
by some ‘international rag’.200 Approbation of the ‘truly British’ and demands of 
‘Britain for the Britons’ ran alongside xenophobic references to ‘aliens’ and ‘anti- 
Christian Asiatics.’ All this resembled the ideas of the BUF and British People’s 
Party.201 There was also a clear desire to limit the electorate according to specific, 
exclusive criteria. Tomlinson argued that immigrants who were not ‘absorbed racially 
within the British family’ remained in Britain solely as guests, and had to accept ‘our 
Christian way of life’, and demanded the government of Britain had to be ‘100% in 
the hands of Christian British people’.202 Tomlinson indicated that disenfranchisement 
might not have been the limit of his aims in a letter to the Editor of Reynolds News:
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200 Open letter from L. N. Tomlinson, “World Govemmenf. An open letter addressed to Mr. R. 
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‘all foreigners in Britain should be deprived of their rights’.203 Finally, there was 
violence. Tomlinson likened Communists to mad dogs, and argued that, ‘as such they 
must be eliminated’.204 A journalist at Reynolds News voiced his belief that Clan 
Briton was ‘an organiser of planned hooliganism’.205 These are all characteristics of 
the extreme right, even of fascism. Expressing them was an individual who claimed 
that Clan Briton had a ‘County Branch Office’ and ‘members in most of the Counties 
of Britain’.206 He was also a member of the Conservative Party.
Central Office’s response to Tomlinson is enlightening. An internal party memo 
showed some knowledge of Tomlinson. It described him as ‘a rather decent fellow, 
obsessed with flag-waving, a violent patriot, with probably slight fascist 
tendencies’. However, the author also stated, ‘I never encourage the recruiting of 
this type of person because it tends to a confusion of ideas.’208 The description of an 
individual having ‘slight fascist tendencies’ as a ‘decent fellow’, is intriguing. It could 
betray fascist sympathies on the memo writer’s part, or a generosity of spirit based on 
Tomlinson being a double war veteran, or simply careless language. It does show, 
however, that the author believed violence and patriotism to be constituent parts of 
fascism. What is clear is that the author either did not realise Tomlinson was a 
Conservative Party member, or regretted it if he was. As there is no clear indication of 
membership, either in this letter, or in previous correspondence, the former is more 
probable. What is unarguable, however, is the view that individuals with such views 
should not be part of the Conservative Party. In this sense, the Conservative Party was 
keen to block extreme-right individuals, even if only for the expeditious desire to 
avoid ‘confusion of ideas.’ Compare this attitude, however, with the one displayed 
when Central Office became aware of Tomlinson’s Conservative Party membership.
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Central Office swung into action after Sidney Silverman’s expose of Tomlinson’s 
views in the House of Commons. The next day a confidential internal memo revealed 
Tomlinson was an ex-member of the Heston and Isleworth Conservative Association, 
where he was quite prominent as a member of a Ward Committee, but was now living 
in Lytham St. Annes.209 Tomlinson was also described as having a ‘distinct and bitter 
anti-semitic prejudice which gives the impression of Fascism, but I am told he is not 
Fascist’.210 Putting aside frustration at a lack of further elucidation of what Central 
Office thought fascism was, this correspondence leaves the impression of a less 
sanguine attitude, yet one that may also have been informed by a belief that as an ex- 
member of a local association, Tomlinson had left the Conservative Party. However, 
Central Office’s attitude markedly after Tomlinson subsequently advised that he was 
an ‘ardent Tory’ and a member of the Lytham Conservative Club, which he described 
as a ‘very respectable association of Britains’,211 Central Office’s responses became 
curter, and they quickly reached a decision not to respond to Tomlinson. Their
919comments had gone from sympathetic to dismissive in six months.
Relations between the Conservative Party and extreme right in the aftermath of the 
Second World War are not usually as clear as in the Tomlinson example. The extent 
and content of Central Office material on right-wing groups varies. Nonetheless, there 
was an identifiable point when Tomlinson became persona non grata as far as Central 
Office was concerned. However, we must exercise caution in taking this as proof of 
the Conservative Party’s blocking role in the fortunes of the extreme right. We do not 
know of action taken to remove Tomlinson’s party membership. Even if none 
occurred, the autonomous nature of local Conservative associations would limit it as 
evidence. Furthermore, Clan Briton was but one extreme-right organisation operating 
to the right of the Conservative Party. Other factors were also at work in these 
relationships. Many extreme-right groups were small, often no more than one-man- 
bands, and therefore not strictly speaking ‘groups’. It is, consequently, difficult to 
judge the extent of the support attracted or repelled by the Conservative Party’s
208 Confidential internal memo from E. S. Adamson to Lady Maxwell Fyfe, "Clan Briton’ and
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treatment of these extreme-right groups. Central Office correspondence revealed 
disdain for the size of these groups, and therefore we cannot discount this as a factor 
in the Conservative Party’s attitude. There is even an example where the attitude 
displayed towards an extreme right group rested on lines that are more obvious. The 
Conservative Christian League, for example, employed similar, if less violent, 
language as Clan Briton and aims that were in tune with other extreme-right groups. It 
even boasted the support of that ubiquitous right-wing Conservative MP, Sir Waldron 
Smithers.213 Central Office was interested enough to investigate, but its decision to 
have nothing to do with the Conservative Christian League resulted from discovering 
its leading figure’s criminal past, not any right-wing extremism.214
Nevertheless, there was a clear difference in the attitudes o f the Conservative Party 
towards specific external extreme-right groups. Perception of the extreme-right group 
as fascist or not was a determining factor. The fascist extreme right were clearly cut­
off. This attitude towards domestic groups of the fascist extreme right is also in line 
with the Party’s stated view of its position in relation to contemporary right-wing 
European Parties. The Conservative Party had no wish to be associated with any 
outside organisation whose stance could link it, in any way, with the sufferings caused 
by aggressive, racist right-wing extremism. Central Office also investigated non­
fascist extreme-right groups. It tolerated some and nipped others in the bud. It is 
reasonable to suggest, therefore, that individuals within groups amenable to the 
Conservative Party probably supported it electorally, and that those repelled sought 
other areas for their support. If so, then the Conservative Party had acted as a barrier 
to the development of some extreme-right groups almost by de facto incorporation. 
However, it had also sloughed off, or prevented association with, those it deemed 
anathema, forcing them to act without the assistance of the Conservative Party. This 
remained constant when the Conservative Party regained office and came under 
pressure from more highly organised and better supported extreme-right movements.
213 Letter from Philip Clifford to Colin Mann, 21 February 1949. CPA CCO 3/1/41, 
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Chapter 2. Consensus Conservatism and Extreme Right 
Revival, 1951-1957.
Defeat at the 1950 General Election went some way to exorcise the Conservative 
Party’s shock at the 1945 defeat, and held the promise that success was near. Labour’s 
one hundred and forty five-seat majority was now a mere five. A number of high 
calibre individuals among the 1950 intake of new MPs reinvigorated the Conservative 
parliamentary party. They quickly formed the One Nation Group, which was a 
modernizing organisation that Walsha argued played a pivotal role in reshaping 
Conservatism.1 Not that the Conservative leadership lacked advantages; Eden’s war- 
record meant he was the expected and accepted successor to Churchill. Thus, the 
Conservative Party leadership looked settled. This compared favourably to a tired 
Labour leadership damaged by the resignations of left wing Bevanites, and assailed 
by a concerted campaign by the Conservative Opposition to counter its political 
programme. A seemingly clearer stance of anti-Communism, commitment to 
competition and denationalisation in the 1951 General Election manifesto assuaged 
the right of the Conservative Party. Conservative Party machinery and organisation 
remained prepared for an expected General Election. Opinion polls in 1951 moved 
decidedly in favour of the Conservative Party. By-elections showed swings towards 
the Conservatives of 4% and there were many gains in local elections. The possibility 
of gaining a large number of Liberal votes increased the prospects of Conservative 
success. Compared to 1950, when 475 Liberal candidates stood, there were only 109 
Liberal candidates in the 1951 General Election. The result was still close. The 
Conservatives under Churchill won. Labour, however, actually polled more votes. 
Moreover, the Conservative majority of seventeen depended on the nineteen seats 
won by National Liberals allied to the Conservative Party by the Woolton-Teviot Pact 
of 1947. Nevertheless, the Conservative Party had regained office six years after a 
seemingly catastrophic defeat.
1 R. Walsha, The One Nation Group: A Tory Approach to Backbench Politics and 
Organization, 1950-55’, Twentieth Century British History, 11,2 (2000), 182-214.
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Churchill’s administration was the first overtly Conservative government since 1929. 
The less than convincing nature of its victory in 1951, however, meant that it was not 
a government suffused with confidence. As Labour had polled 1.2 million more votes 
than the Conservatives had, and 2 million more than in 1945, there was an obvious 
need to reach out to that part of the electorate that viewed the Labour Party as more 
likely to deliver its requirements. Churchill’s government therefore adopted a cautious 
approach. There was no wholesale reversal of Labour legislation, and virtually all 
nationalisation remained untouched. Cockett argued that any ideological drive to 
reverse Labour’s legislation foundered when it came ‘up against cold political logic’.2 
However, it is doubtful that right-wingers acknowledged the impact of political 
realities, and questioned instead just how ‘Conservative’ the new government was. 
Indeed, so similar were the policies of Chancellor Butler and his Labour predecessor, 
Gaitskell, that the New Statesman conflated the two to form ‘Mr. Butskell’.3 
Henceforth, ‘Butskellism’ became synonymous with consensus. Moreover, an ageing 
leader, whose interest in domestic issues paled besides foreign ones, gave the 
impression of lethargy. The 1952 Conservative Party conference reflected this 
situation, and contained many complaints of apathy and discontent, just one year after 
the election victory.4 Nevertheless, there were successes. The Chancellor’s 
introduction of emergency economic measures in late 1951 and early 1952 
ameliorated poor economic conditions. Consumer goods became more plentiful and 
diverse at the same time as a staged abolition of rationing. The national budget 
increased and thus so did the amount of public expenditure. House building was a 
great success. Harold Macmillan, the Housing Minister, proudly delivered on the 
election promise to build 300,000 new homes. By-elections contrasted favourably 
with the period of opposition. A general swing to the Conservatives meant no by- 
elections were lost, and one, Sunderland South, even gained from Labour in 1953. 
Consequently, when Anthony Eden succeeded Churchill in April 1955, the 
Conservative Party’s electoral prospects looked bright. The following month’s contest 
resulted in a sixty seat Conservative majority, the first time since 1841 that a party 
had improved its performance in three successive General Elections.
2 R. Cockett, Thinking, 98.
3 The Economist, 13 February 1954.
4 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 239-240. See also NUEC, 15 May 1952, Central Council 
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In less than two years, however, Eden had resigned. Gilmour described Eden’s 
premiership as a period of dithering.5 Without the kudos of Churchill, Eden proved 
incapable of a firm hand in cabinet appointments. The decision to promote quickly the 
most promising of the 1950 intake of Conservative MPs drew criticism from 
Conservative newspapers.6 Marking foreign policy was the initial stages of imperial 
decline, most obvious in the decision to withdraw British forces from east of Suez. It 
was, however, economic and industrial concerns that initially caused Eden’s 
popularity to decline. The necessity of higher and more widespread taxes in the 1955 
Autumn Budget, plus further deflationary measures the following year, combined 
with a number of strikes, most noticeably in the docks and railways, to reduce Eden’s 
popularity rating by 30% even before the fiasco of the Suez Crisis.7 An extreme-right 
protester at Bradford physically attacked the Prime Minister. Poor by-election results 
reflected declining popularity. In February 1956, the Liberals reduced the 
Conservative majority at Hereford by over three-quarters, whilst at Taunton Edward 
du Cann barely won with a majority of 657 votes. Walthamstow in March produced a 
7.5% swing to Labour. The Tonbridge by-election of June 1956, where a 
Conservative majority of 18,000 fell to 1,600, appeared to presage electoral disaster. 
Eden was widely criticised as an ineffective leader who caused the malaise pervading 
much of the Conservative Party. The only probable remedy, save an unlikely party 
coup, was a serious international crisis that enabled Eden to unite party and country 
behind him. Eden’s poor handling of such an eventuality when it occurred in the guise 
of the Suez Crisis was, therefore, the final straw.
The impression derived of this period of Conservative Government is one of steady 
success, built on a consensual approach, followed by acute leadership failure. Yet, 
underlying this was unease amongst the Conservative Party’s right wing about the 
party’s direction. Churchill, working with a small majority, had attempted on 
becoming Prime Minister to form a Conservative-Liberal government rather than a 
purely Conservative one.8 The government contained National-Liberals, although the
5 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 93.
6 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 289-92.
7 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 289-93.
8 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 245.
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Liberal Party leader refused a Cabinet post. The 1922 Committee of Conservative 
backbench MPs voiced suspicions at Churchill’s attempts to include even more 
Liberals in Cabinet.9 Churchill’s appointment of individuals to key ministries whose 
sympathies were in keeping with the spirit of the Industrial Charter reinforced these 
suspicions. Ramsden described R. A. Butler’s appointment as Chancellor, for 
example, as ‘a pledge to the nation that the spirit of the Industrial Charter would hold 
good in office’.10 The Conservative Right’s long-standing perception of Butler, with 
his acceptance of Keynesian economics, was that he was little better than a Socialist. 
They viewed ‘Butskellism’ as synonymous with socialism. Similarly, the appointment 
of Walter Monckton to the Ministry of Labour, a politician known to be on the left of 
the party and even to prefer to be above party description, would not have reassured 
the Right in their desire to counter trade unions. Likewise, the decision to entrust the 
Ministry of Housing to Harold Macmillan, a pre-war advocate of government controls 
and economic interference as seen in his book The Middle Way (1938), concerned 
those who equated increased government spending with socialism. Macmillan had 
proposed changing the Conservative Party name to ‘The National Democrats’.11 
Right-wingers were notably absent from Churchill’s government. Progressive groups 
that accepted the consensus, by contrast, attracted the approbation of the party 
machine. Formed in 1951, for example, the Bow Group became swiftly one of the 
most prominent progressive Conservative groups. By August 1952, Central Office 
viewed the Bow Group’s work as ‘an asset to the Party’.12 The Bow Group’s Annual 
Report for 1952 acknowledged Central Office assistance, and named the individuals 
concerned.13 Thereafter, Central Office entered into a ‘Memorandum of Agreement’ 
with the Bow Group, a legal document that outlined the financial and publishing 
terms under which it distributed Bow Group publications.14 Right-wingers may have 
been ignorant about the legal relationship between Central Office and the Bow Group,
9 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 245. 1922 Committee Minutes, 11 1952.
10 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 245.
11 See 7.
12 Miss B. L. Turner to Mr. H. V. Armstrong, The Bow Group’, 6 August 1952. CPA CCO 
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13 James Lemkin, ‘Bow Group Annual Report for the Year 1952’, 30 January 1953. CPA CCO 
3/4/32, Bow Group, 1952-56.
14 James Lemkin, ‘Memorandum of Agreement’, 31 July 1956. CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow Group, 
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but they can hardly have failed to notice distribution via official channels of material 
they viewed as too left wing.
Churchill’s reputation, seen as an electoral asset against Labour, probably muted the 
degree of right-wing criticism. However, it was never silent. As early as 1952, there 
were complaints that the government was not carrying out a ‘Conservative policy’. 
Monckton settled the 1953 railway dispute on terms favourable to the unions, which 
drew open criticism from Conservative MPs.15 Butler’s utilisation of the ‘peace 
dividend’ to produce tax cuts as well as increased spending avoided serious criticism 
from the right. Nevertheless, opposition from the right remained. Right-wing 
Conservative MPs opposed pension increases.16 New circumstances provided other 
avenues for the right to criticise the government. The docking of the Empire Windrush 
in 1948, which symbolised that Britain was no longer simply an exporter of people to 
the Empire, had introduced into British politics the issue of New Commonwealth, i.e. 
coloured, immigration. At the end of 1952, Churchill raised the issue of immigration 
in Cabinet. Gilmour revealed that the government was hamstrung by delusions of 
Empire and concerned not to disrupt the nascent Commonwealth, and contrasted the 
complacency of Conservative ministers over immigration with restiveness among 
Conservative supporters.17 Nor did a change of leader alleviate right-wing concerns. 
Ramsden highlighted continuing restiveness amongst Constituency Associations after 
Eden became Prime Minister. This included complaints that Eden’s government was 
not taking a strong enough line against trade unions, whilst the middle class 
increasingly bore the financial burdens of government.18 Stephen Pierssene, Central 
Office General Director, warned Eden of the possible consequences in the wake of the 
March 1956 West Walthamstow by-election. The middle-class, Pierssene warned, had 
not had a fair deal and ‘were looking for somewhere else to go’.19
Concerns existed in imperial and foreign policy also. Churchill’s staunch imperialism, 
known from his personal history, failed to stem criticism of imperial policy. His anti-
15 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 258-259.
16 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 266-267.
17 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 79.
18 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 294-295.
19 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 296. See also CPA CCO 120/2/41-5, General Director’s File 
-  By-Elections.
50
Communism, a matter of public record since his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech, failed to 
prevent criticism over foreign policy. Conservative local associations castigated the 
government for a perceived a lack of emphasis on the Empire and ‘Britishness’.20 The 
government, lacking support from the USA to maintain a military presence in the 
Middle East, commenced negotiations to withdraw British forces from east of Suez. 
This seemed to justify local associations’ complaints. The parliamentary right 
responded by forming the Suez Group in December 1953. Among its members was 
Enoch Powell, the dejected Conservative Research Department member who had
a i
buried his head at the granting of Indian Independence. In December 1953, forty- 
one Conservative MPs signed an Early Day Motion that rejected their own 
Government’s policy. Crossman’s comment that these MPs thought that the 
government propounded policies deemed ‘Bevanite by the right wing of the Labour 
Party only twelve months ago’, showed the anger they felt towards their own 
government.23 Ramsden identified this period as the ‘moment at which the 
Conservative right started to move away from the front bench’s international 
policy’,24 a fracture within the Conservative Party that would continue for the 
remainder of the century. More immediately, however, the number of Conservative 
rebels actually declined to twenty-eight when the bill proposing British withdrawal 
from Egypt appeared in the House of Commons in October 1954. Thus, right-wing 
Conservative MPs’ objective of halting this ignominy seemed remote when Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden, the individual most closely associated with withdrawal from 
East of Suez, succeeded Churchill in April 1955. To those outside the parliamentary 
party Imperial decline probably appeared the policy of collusive frontbenches.
Therefore, the Conservative Governments of 1951-1957 were not ones of 
Conservative reaction. They were centrist administrations that realised that the 
electorate approved of Labour’s post-war programme. This meant that there was little 
prospect of a substantial return to the Conservatism of the interwar years. They were 
also governments with a leadership apparently unable to deal with domestic and
20 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 262. East Midlands Area Council, 16 May 1953. NUEC 4, 
September 1952.
21 See 6.
22 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 264. J. Charmley, Descent to Suez: diaries 1951-1956, 
Wiedenfield and Nicolson, London (1986), 131.
23 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 264. Charmley, Descent, 131.
24 Ramsden, Appetite, 332.
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foreign affairs. This situation alienated the Conservative Party’s right wing, who 
joined groups that attacked the government from the right. Discontent over domestic 
policies led Conservatives to seek redress in movements that promised economic 
liberty. Die-hard imperialists occupied the space on the Conservative Party’s right 
flank as the government ‘scuttled’ from empire. The Conservative leadership’s 
objective, however, was to remain in power. Consequently, it adopted a consensual 
economic policy that did not alienate the electorate, and sought disentanglement from 
costly overseas commitments. They were difficult policies for a party that contained 
supporters of laissez-faire and imperialism, but essential for one that had decided to 
adapt to new circumstances. This also meant that the Conservative Party could not 
afford to let the extreme right succeed.
Central Office remained the leadership’s foremost agent in meeting its objective of 
limiting the extreme-right’s impact. It continued to collect information on groups that 
it had investigated whilst the Conservative Party was in opposition. Sometimes, this 
resulted in Central Office deciding that a group was ‘extreme’ rather than just right 
wing. New groups emerged. Those that had no pretensions to political representation 
did not attract Central Office condemnation. Some of these groups even enjoyed a 
positive relationship with Central Office. This was especially so if a group could 
assist the Conservative Party to disseminate views on economic policy that remained 
inexpedient for the government to endorse openly. In contrast, Central Office had a 
negative relationship with those groups that openly and vociferously sought to cajole 
the Conservative leadership into adopting economically liberal policies. Central 
Office commissioned reports on these groups and took measures to counter their 
impact.
However, Central Office saved its strongest counter-measures for those individuals or 
groups that it believed had fascist antecedents, or advocated policies that the 
Conservative Party’s opponents could portray as characteristics of fascism or Nazism. 
These individuals and groups could rekindle memories of the Conservative Party’s 
interwar association with the extreme right, especially if they exhibited the anti- 
Semitism or racism that was commonly associated with right-wing extremism. The 
emergence of skin colour as a phenomenon in British politics exacerbated these fears. 
Consequently, Central Office blocked the political career of at least one former
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member of Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. It strongly advised party officers and 
members not to join groups with connections to Nazism, no matter how tangential 
these connections were. Central Office also mobilised the party bureaucracy against 
these groups and sometimes openly accused them of fascism. This was an especially 
risky strategy as these groups contained Conservative Party members.
Existing concerns
Central Office correspondence made it clear that the Conservative Party’s desire to 
avoid association with the extreme right remained consistent, and overrode fears of 
alienating its own right wing. In February 1952, a Central Office Area Agent 
requested information on the Fighting Fund for Freedom. This desire for information 
could have been be due to ignorance on the Agent’s part. Alternatively, it may have 
reflected Central Office’s successful avoidance of too obvious an association with the 
FFF. The dissemination of incorrect information on the FFF had previously resulted 
in a rebuke.25 Central Office’s response to the Agent showed, however, that its 
opinion of the FFF had now hardened, and why. Mr. Watson at Central Office advised 
a colleague that he would not respond in writing to the Agent, as he would ‘prefer the 
matter to be dealt with verbally’, and thus revealed an unwillingness to acknowledge 
any connection with the FFF. This is a reminder that written comments were only one 
medium by which Central Office blocked the extreme right. Watson felt sure that his 
colleague had ‘the necessary information in your files which, together with your own 
recollections’, enabled him to provide the Agent with the information requested. An 
attached memorandum explained Watson’s circumspection. It advised that, the FFF 
was an ‘Extreme Right Wing Organisation’, which supported the Conservative Party 
but was ‘likely to compromise us in their zeal’.28 This is the first time Central Office 
revealed clearly its opinion of the FFF’s political nature. It is perhaps not coincidental
*yQ # ^
that Sir Waldron Smithers was no longer associated with the FFF. In addition,
25 See 36.
26 Mr. Watson to Mr. Bagnall, ‘Fighting Fund for Freedom’, 12 February 1963. CPA CCO 
3/4/62, Fighting Fund for Freedom, 1952-6.
27 Mr. Watson to Mr. Bagnall, ‘Fighting Fund for Freedom’, 12 February 1953. CPA CCO 
3/4/62, Fighting Fund for Freedom, 1952-6.
28 Initialled memo, probably from Mr. Bagnall, to Mr. Watson, ‘Fighting Fund for Freedom’, 11 
February 1953. CPA CCO 3/4/62, Fighting Fund for Freedom, 1952-6.
29 See 27.
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Central Office continued to monitor those it had already deemed either incorrigible or 
too extreme. Central Office noted, for example, the Daily M ail’s report of Andrew 
Fountaine’s attempted formation of a National Front Movement in 1952.30 This 
suggested that concern remained within Central Office at the harm Fountaine, an 
erstwhile Conservative parliamentary candidate, could still potentially cause to the 
Conservative Party. This type of anxiety is also evident when the British Housewives 
League reappeared. The BHL threatened a revival in Rochdale, angered at Chancellor 
Butler’s imposition of Purchase Tax on household and kitchen articles in the Autumn 
Budget of 1955. Central Office instructed the informing Agent to ‘watch this carefully 
in your Area and, if you find evidence of activity of this kind in any constituency, 
perhaps you would let me know’.31
However, it is not always possible to be definite about the reasons for Central Office’s 
attitudes towards certain organisations. For example, Central Office continued to 
receive reports of, and material from, The Society for Individual Freedom (SIF). SIF 
maintained a benign position to the right of the Conservative Party in Opposition, 
with a stated objective of a co-ordinated attempt ‘to resist the drift towards 
collectivism’. Now that the Conservative Party was in Government, SIF criticised it 
when it felt it did not fulfil SIF aims. Maijorie L. A. Franklin, for SIF, forwarded in 
February 1952 a copy of a SIF article regarding the 1951 General Election titled, ‘For 
the enlightenment and disillusionment of such members of the Conservative Party as
' X ' Xmay be disposed to be complacent regarding the result.’ The SIF article chided the 
Conservative government for failing to promise tough measures in its manifesto, such 
as repeal of the Trades Dispute Act, and warned that the economy was a tottering 
ruin. Now that they were in Office, the article continued, the Conservatives had
30 Internal Central Office Reference Sheet regarding Daily Mail article of 6 March 1952. CPA 
CCO 3/3/102, National Front, 1950-2.
31 N. E. Finnie to E. C. Bradbury Esq., ‘Housewives League -  Rochdale’, 24 November 1955, 
and B. Brooke to Mr. Bradbury, 28 November 1955. CPA CCO 3/4/15, British Housewives 
League, 1952-56.
32 C. Brogan, Individualism: the Journal of The Society For Individual Freedom, Bulletin Series 
No. 1, January 1953, 1.
33 Marjorie L. A. Franklin, 22 February 1952. CPA CCO 3/3/123, The Society for Individual 
Freedom, 1950-2.
34 Marjorie L. A. Franklin, 22 February 1952. CPA CCO 3/3/123, The Society for Individual 
Freedom, 1950-2.
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failed to curb the National Coal Board and the unions.35 Central Office might have 
thought SIF already had fixed attitudes regarding the Conservative government, as 
this was a mere four months after the 1951 General Election. Those named as 
responsible for this situation by the article would have reinforced such a view. The 
article identified Monckton and Butler as the appointments that were ‘enough to force 
the most docile and house-trained eyebrows to elevate in surprise’.36 SIF had 
specifically attacked cabinet members identified as being on the left wing of the 
Conservative Party, with Butler’s emergency Budget attracting particular criticism.37
Central Office responded to this attack on a Conservative government with only 
minimal counter-measures. SIF’s Director General requested assistance in 
approaching Conservative members six months after their critical article. Central 
Office Area Agent Brigadier Rawcliffe replied that Conservative Associations might 
see such an action as harmful to their interests and thus be unhelpful.38 Rawcliffe 
informed Central Office of his reply, and stated that, ‘I am inclined to feel that we 
have enough troubles of our own and that if we encourage our own supporters to join 
we might lose them.’39 Rawcliffe’s comments support three possible conclusions: a 
basic desire not to lose members; a belief that SIF would bring problems; and that 
SIF’s objectives appealed to Conservative members. By discouraging membership, 
they also limited SIF’s chances of success. Rawcliffe’s correspondence encapsulated 
many similar between Central Office and its Area Agents regarding SIF. However, 
there is little evidence of any stronger counter-measures by Central Office, save for an 
anodyne response after Eden became Prime Minister that identified SIF as a ‘small 
right wing association’.40 The problem facing Central Office, apart from concern over 
the impact on party membership, is that the ubiquitous Sir Waldron Smithers MP 
consistently promoted SIF and was one of its leading members. Smithers had
35 Marjorie L. A Franklin, 22 February 1952. CPA CCO 3/3/123, The Society for Individual 
Freedom, 1950-2.
36 Marjorie L. A. Franklin, 22 February 1952. CPA CCO 3/3/123, The Society for Individual 
Freedom, 1950-2.
37 Marjorie L. A Franklin, 22 February 1952. CPA CCO 3/3/123, The Society for Individual 
Freedom, 1950-2.
38 Brigadier J. M. Rawcliffe to Mr. Lowe, December 1952. CPA CCO 3/4/97, The Society for 
Individual Freedom, 1952-6.
39 Brigadier Rawcliffe to Mr. Watson, ‘Society for Individual Freedom’, 10 December 1952. 
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40 Mr. C. Gill to Mr. Carrick, The Society for Individual Freedom’, 9 July 1954. CPA CCO 
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instructed Franklin to forward SIF’s warning to the newly elected Conservative 
government. Smither’s wrote personally to John Hare at Central Office and lauded 
SIF’s activities, asked Hare and his friends to become members, and requested a 
donation.41 Smithers also requested that Central Office distribute a SIF-sanctioned 
publication that addressed the world’s spiritual and moral crisis42 Central Office 
could hardly take severe measures against Smithers. Such an action would result in 
awkward questions that possibly re-ignited memories of embarrassing associations. 
Central Office could not afford to denounce SIF as extremist when a Conservative 
MP was a prominent member and whilst the government enjoyed only a slim 
majority. Therefore, Central Office acted cautiously. The Chief Publicity Officer at 
Central Office requested 7,500 copies of the publication Smithers asked to be 
distributed, and enquired how many would be free of charge.43 However, Central 
Office files do not contain any ‘Memorandum of Agreement’ setting out a formal 
relationship with SIF, unlike that with the Bow Group.44 Nor was the publication 
concerned written by SIF. Nevertheless, the Chief Publicity Officer’s request does 
show that Central Office was prepared at this stage to have a relationship with SIF 
that was similar to the one it had with Aims of Industry.45
Central Office’s relationship with Aims of Industry (AIMS), if anything, became 
closer. AIMS continued to assist Central Office’s intelligence gathering, although the 
material was hardly secret. For example, AIMS Director Roger Sewill forwarded to 
Central Office positive media responses to Government legislation, such as that in 
World’s Press News which supported the introduction of commercial television 
outlined in the November 1953 Queen’s Speech.46 Central Office also accepted the 
results of AIMS’ research into industry. The General Director at Central Office 
informed a colleague of a conversation he had with Roger Sewill and stated that he
41 Sir Waldron Smithers to Lt. Colonel The Hon. J. H. Hare, O.B.E., M.P, October 1953. CPA 
CCO 3/4/97, The Society for Individual Freedom, 1952-6.
42 Waldron Smithers, 24 March 1953. CPA CCO 3/4/97, The Society for Individual Freedom, 
1952-6.
43 Chief Publicity Officer, 26 March 1953. CPA CCO 3/4/97, The Society for Individual 
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44 See 49.
46 See 36-37.
48 Roger Sewill to Lord Woolton, 12 November 1953; World’s Press News, 6 November 1953. 
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welcomed ‘any research into industry which his organisation could undertake’.47 This 
comment was a reference to AIMS’ ‘Industrial Information Service’. When Central 
Office accepted use of this service, it once again entered into a financial relationship 
with AIMS. AIMS also embarked on a campaign to explain the country’s problems 
to the electorate in simple terms. The first plank of this campaign was the production 
of explanatory films. AIMS requested permission to use a quotation from one of 
Churchill’s wartime speeches. This request resulted in the Prime Minister’s office 
asking Central Office for ‘your observations on the standing of the organisation and 
your advice on whether the Prime Minister should allow them to use this quotation in 
the way suggested’.48 This showed that the Prime Minister’s office knew that that 
Central Office had become the accepted repository of information on outside 
organisations. Whether Churchill acceded to AIMS request is unclear, but Central 
Office unarguably supported AIMS’ films. In October 1952, Central Office arranged 
for senior officials, including Chairman Lord Woolton and General Director Stephen 
Pierssene, to view the AIMS production Point o f No Return. Woolton and Pierssene 
were unable to attend on the day, but Central Office nevertheless sent representatives. 
These officials sent a report of the film to the General Director and Chief Publicity 
Officer, and described the film as ‘first-class propaganda from our point of view’.49 
However, AIMS laissez-faire views were just to the right of a Conservative 
government that had accepted much of the Attleean settlement. Central Office 
carefully avoided overt connections with any organisation that the party’s opponents 
could portray as right wing. Hence, when the officials reported that AIMS was to be 
removed from the credits in Point o f No Return as it had been accepted for public 
viewing, they added that ‘we should not be connected with it in any way ourselves at 
this stage’.50
Nevertheless, Central Office was unarguably more positive towards AIMS than other 
extreme-right groups. The fact that AIMS’ ‘extremism’ amounted to no more than a
47 S. H. Piersenne to Mr. Greville, ‘Industrial Information Service’, 24 November 1954. CPA 
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focus on economic liberalism substantially explained Central Office’s attitude. AIMS’ 
objectives and methods resonated with the views of Conservatives who realised their 
party had to adapt to the new paradigm revealed by Labour’s victory in 1945, and not 
just those like Smithers who wished to return to pure laissez-faire. Prominent amongst 
such Conservatives was the One Nation Group. E. H. H. Green described the One 
Nation Group as seeking ‘to construct a distinctive Conservative position on the role 
of the State which avoided ‘me-tooing Socialist solutions ... to blend judicious 
Statism with strong inflections of liberal market, laissez-faire ideas’.51 Central Office 
gathered information on the One Nation Group in accord with its remit. Its attitude 
towards the One Nation Group was benign, even positive, from the beginning. This 
was because, as Walsha showed, the One Nation Group attempted the acceptable 
objective of demonstrating how ‘Conservatism would meet the demands of postwar 
Britain’.52 In early 1952, for example, Central Office supported the ‘One Nation 
Campaign’, a countrywide tour in which the One Nation Group disseminated its
c - i
views on how the Conservative Party could remain relevant in post-1945 Britain. 
Central Office also supported the One Nation Group because its members worked 
with Central Office. Angus Maude, founder member of the One Nation Group, 
worked at the Conservative Political Centre within Central Office. The General 
Director, S. H. Pierssene, asked Maude for his fellow One Nation Group member’s 
reactions to the ‘One Nation Campaign’. Maude’s response revealed that the One 
Nation Group members put themselves at the disposal of the Speakers’ Department at 
Central Office, and went where that department instructed.54 Pierssene responded 
encouragingly, and suggested meeting to discuss further arrangements.55 However, 
Maude also identified a problem. He stated that most audiences were bad because 
they were mainly Conservative supporters, and argued that there was no point in 
going to strongly Conservative constituencies, whereas the One Nation Campaign had
51 E. H. H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth 
Century, OUP, Oxford (2002), 247.
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achieved a positive reaction on the few occasions it ventured into Labour areas.56 
However, Maude’s problem was in line with Central Office’s own objectives. Maude 
had identified the One Nation Campaign with the same problem Central Office had of 
how to disseminate the Conservative Party’s message to a section of the electorate 
that had voted heavily for Labour after the Second World War. Thus, the One Nation 
Group complimented Central Office’s work. This explained Central Office’s positive 
attitude toward the One Nation Group.
Similarity of objectives also explained Central Office’s less-overtly positive attitude 
towards AIMS. Like the One Nation Group, AIMS also organised a series of 
meetings, known as the ‘Brains Trust’. AIMS formulated these meetings ostensibly 
to provide audiences with a broad range of opinion. The meetings attracted Central 
Office attention. Mr. Hearn at Central Office deputed a Mr. Chandler to attend the 
1954 Nottingham meeting of the Brains Trust. Hearn concluded from Chandler’s 
subsequent report that the meeting was ‘probably too broad to be partisan’, but 
nevertheless advised that, ‘it is predominantly right-wing and Aims of Industry 
always make sure that is the majority view of the platform’.58 Reports provided to 
Central Office by AIMS showed that the audiences’ questions supported Conservative 
views. This was a consistent feature of Brains Trust meetings, which local newspapers 
reported. In Rochdale, strikes unsupported by unions had been the dominant topic.59 
Such strikes were occurring in the docks and railways at the time. Restrictive 
practices that adversely affected Cardiff and Bristol docks generated most interest at 
the Cardiff meeting.60 At the Wigan meeting, negative comments on Attlee’s 
argument that China should control Formosa vied with condemnation of poor road 
conditions.61 Strikes, housing and local government were among the issues discussed 
at Stirling 62 The audience raised similar topics in areas as diverse as Falkirk and
56 Angus Maude to S. H. Pierssene, ‘Speaking Tour of ‘One Nation’ M.P.s’, 19 February 1952. 
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Grangemouth.63 AIMS provided, therefore, a service that propagated Conservative 
Party thinking to a polarised people. This was valuable to a party that sought to attract 
non-Conservative voters. Hearn revealed this thinking when he said that, ‘From our 
point of view the hope is that floaters, particularly, will be convinced by the majority 
arguments of the Aims of Industry platform and when they hear something similar 
from a Conservative platform also will take our side.’64 This is evidence that Central 
Office saw AIMS actions as complimenting its own. Furthermore, there is also a hint 
of collusion between AIMS and Central Office. Mr. Horton at Central Office 
commented on the locations of future Brains Trust meetings and wrote that, ‘I am 
glad to know that the Aims of Industry are running their next season’s Brains Trust in 
our marginal areas.’65
Indeed, the location of AIMS’ Brains Trust meetings provided the key to Central 
Office’s positive attitude. Butlin’s holiday camps had mushroomed after the Second 
World War. New sites at Skegness and Clacton added to pre-war camps at Filey 
(1945), Pwllheli (1947), Ayr (1947) and Mosney (1948). In the 1950s, Billy Butlin 
acquired hotels in Blackpool, Brighton and Cliftonville. Northern towns decamped 
virtually en-masse for holiday activities that went far beyond the ubiquitous ‘knobbly- 
knees’ contest. Butlins in the 1950s provided middle and even highbrow 
entertainments to a clientele that was more diverse than subsequent ones. As 
represented in Hindle Wakes (1951), when almost whole towns’ inhabitants decamped 
to Blackpool, social interaction between different classes often ensued. Therefore, 
Butlins potentially provided a sizeable audience for AIMS’ propaganda away from 
the divisions of the factory and shop floor, and thus also the Conservative Party’s. In 
April 1954, Roger Sewill boasted to Lord Woolton at Central Office that AIMS’ 
Brains Trust meetings had been successful, and that AIMS planned a further eighteen, 
which it had arranged at Butlins holiday camps.66 This, Sewill indicated, meant that 
the Conservative message would reach large audiences, and that this provided
63 The Falkirk Sentinel, 19 November 1954 and the Grangemouth Advertiser, 20 November
1954.
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"audiences of 1000 per time guaranteed’,67 which Sewill underlined for emphasis. 
Woolton forwarded this information to Mr. Chapman-Walker at Central Office, and 
showed his interest in the terse but revealing comment: ‘You ought to see this.’68 
Within five months, the press had reported the impact of using Butlin’s for Brains 
Trust meetings. The Recorder, for example, mentioned Billy Butlin’s decision to 
become involved, focusing on the audiences’ response to specific questions. It 
referred to the adverse effects of nationalisation, and opined, ‘It might be thought that 
to make such remarks in front of an audience, the majority of which must have been 
Labour-inclined, would be flaunting with the possibilities of a riot.’69 This shows that 
the Recorder understood AIMS’ objectives. Its report that no riot ensued also 
reinforced the idea that shared objectives was the reason for Central Office’s positive
• • • 7ftrelationship with AIMS. Nor was the positive response of Brains Trust audiences 
limited to domestic issues. Sewill forwarded to Central Office a report by a Mr. Hunt, 
Head of the Public Relations at Aims of Industry, which focused on a particular 
audience’s response. Hunt also thought that the audience was ‘predominantly Labour 
supporters’, but reported that the answer given by a right-wing panellist to a question 
regarding the impropriety of Attlee, and other Labour leaders, visit to the newly 
Communist China, received a tumultuous response.71 Central Office’s political 
exploitation of the cultural phenomenon provided by Billy Butlin is, therefore, the 
basis for its positive relationship with AIMS.
This does not mean that Central Office took no counter-measures against AIMS. In 
Lowestoft, an AIMS representative sought contacts with local industrialists, and 
requested the assistance of the local Conservative Association. In return, the 
representative offered to disseminate propaganda useful to the Conservative Party. 
However, the representatives’ additional offer to contribute to the local association 
from funds he had collected for AIMS caused concern. The Secretary of Lowestoft 
Conservative Association informed the Central Office Area Agent, Brigadier
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Industry, 1952-6
68 Lord Woolton to M. Chapman-Walker, 29 April 1954. CPA CCO 3/4/27, Aims of Industry, 
1952-6.
68 'The Story of the Aims of Industry Brains Trust Programme’, Recorder; 11 September 1954. 
CPA CCO 3/4/27, Aims of Industry, 1952-6.
70 The Story of the Aims of Industry Brains Trust Programme’, Recorder, 11 September 1954. 
CPA CCO 3/4/27, Aims of Industry, 1952-6.
71 D. F. Hunt, Aims of Industry, 1 October 1954. CPA CCO 3/4/27, Aims of Industry, 1952-6.
61
Rawcliffe, that, ‘This scheme would be quite unofficial and known only to the 
Officers of the Association and one or two leaders in local industry.’72 However, the 
Secretary thought the offer might be improper, and asked Rawcliffe if such a scheme 
was advisable or operated elsewhere.73 Rawcliffe sought clarification from Central 
Office, but made his view know. He stated that it was, ‘a pity to encourage 
organisations which collect subscriptions from people who might otherwise support 
us and which make no comparable contribution to the maintenance of our own 
organisation’.74 General Director Piersenne replied that as, ‘Aims of Industry 
professes to be a non-political organisation it would not be right for it to make money- 
raising arrangements with Conservative Associations’, and added that AIMS’s actions 
could deflect money from the local Conservative Association, as they were ‘in some 
sense in competition’.75 This event showed that Central Office placed definite limits 
on the relationship it was prepared to have with AIMS.
It is unlikely that Piersenne was unaware of the existing financial relationship with 
AIMS. What, therefore, explained Central Office reluctance? Acceptance of cash, 
rather than services in kind, may have been a step too far. On the other hand, political 
circumstances had changed. Hitherto, most contact between Central Office and AIMS 
occurred during a Labour government with a large majority, or a Conservative one 
with a small majority. Piersenne, however, was writing after the 1955 General 
Election of 26 May, when Eden increased the Conservative majority to a comfortable 
fifty-nine. It is therefore possible that opportunism and necessity played a role in 
Central Office’s previous decisions. Now that the Conservative government was more 
secure, Central Office may have wished to distance itself from this external right- 
wing organisation. For, although AIMS had proved useful in the objective of 
appealing to Labour voters when the party’s hold on power was not secure, its 
particular form of ‘extremism’ was always potentially problematic for a Conservative 
government that had adopted the consensual approach to domestic issues of
72 G. Howard to Brigadier Rawcliffe, 6 September 1955. CPA CCO 3/4/27, Aims of Industry, 
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Butskellism. Eden removed R. A. Butler from the Chancellorship, but he made no 
philosophical change to domestic affairs. The consensual approach of Butskellism 
remained. Quite simply, the Conservative Party no longer needed AIMS. Therefore, 
Central Office did not want to draw attention to its connection with AIMS. There is 
evidence to support this. The Chief Publicity wrote to Pierssene on the same day that 
Pierssene rejected the Lowestoft offer. He enclosed a draft letter to all Constituency 
Agents, Central Office Area Agents and Assistant Publicity Officers, in which he 
advised that he intended to accept an AIMS offer to supply literature to the 
Conservative Associations.76 The Chief Publicity Officer had been in consultation 
with AIMS about such a possibility before the General Election.77 He advised 
Piersenne that, ‘we are very short o f material that we have produced ourselves for the 
use of the Constituency Associations,’ and stated that this literature would be useful 
without the Conservative Party incurring any costs.78 This was no different to 
previous co-operation between AIMS and Central Office. This time, however, 
Piersenne declined the offer, and justified the decision by pointing out that ‘Aims of 
Industry are at pains to proclaim themselves non-political and I don’t think it would 
do them or us any good if we were distributing their material from here.’79 The 
changed political context had altered Central Office’s financial and possibly collusive 
relationship with this particular right-wing organisation.
Other organisations, however, remained beyond the pale as far as Central Office was 
concerned. For example, the Anti-Communist Guardian (ACG), although purporting 
to be a new organisation, was in reality a resurrection of the Conservative Christian
AA
League. Central Office based its decision to shun the ACG on the knowledge that its 
proprietor, a Mr. George De Courtenay, was a crook. He had convictions for larceny, 
false pretences and house breaking.81 Central Office noted that after Parliament and
78 Chief Publicity Officer to the General Director, 'Aims of Industry Posters’, 15 September 
1955. CPA CCO 3/4/27, Aims of Industry, 1952-6.
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80 See 44.
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the Press exposed this, De Courtenay had ceased to use the title ‘Conservative’ in his 
bogus organisations.82 Central Office also realised that despite public exposure De 
Courtenay continued his criminal activities, and noted a conviction in January 1954.83 
However, De Courtenay, like all good confidence tricksters, included an element of 
plausibility in his schemes. He had claimed the support of prominent Conservatives in 
the ACG’s literature, which included the name of Sir Waldron Smithers MP.84 Central 
Office denounced De Courtenay and attempted to entice him into legal action against
• octhe Conservative Party. This showed that Central Office was vigilant in taking 
action against organisations that it believed could damage the Conservative Party’s 
reputation. The main determinant in the ACG’s case was De Courtenay’s disreputable 
character. Yet there is evidence that Central Office also used political criteria when it 
judged the ACG. Central Office noted that the ACG had a possible association with 
anti-Semitism. Mr. Gill at Central Office referred a colleague to the ACG publication 
Voice o f  Freedom, and stated, ‘I would draw attention to the advertisement on page 3 
for the Britons Publishing Society, an extreme anti-Semitic body which publishes 
scurrilous attacks on Jews.’86 The fact that the Britons Publishing Society also printed
8*7the Voice o f Freedom emphasised this connection. Mr. Gill’s comments are 
consistent with previous Central Office comments regarding the Britons Publishing 
Society.88 These comments by Central Office revealed a consistently hostile attitude 
towards known anti-Semitic extreme-right organisations. These comments are also 
consistent with the view that Central Office acted as the Conservative Party’s 
gatekeeper by denying official approval to potentially embarrassing individuals or 
groups.
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However, stopping individuals with embarrassing antecedents from joining the party 
was not always possible because of the autonomous nature of local Conservative 
Associations. Former members of Mosley’s British Union of Fascists had expressed 
their intention to vote Conservative immediately after the Second World War.89 Some 
undoubtedly joined the Conservative Party. Some may have explained membership of 
the BUF as misguided youthful indiscretion. Those at the margins of Mosley’s fascist 
party probably attracted little attention if they joined the Conservative Party. John 
Chamley, however, was not a peripheral BUF figure. All four of the Chamley
onbrothers had joined Mosley’s BUF. When the authorities closed down the BUF’s 
publication Action in 1940, it was John and a few others who had kept Mosley’s 
message going that published an eight-page booklet, British Freedom, to keep 
Mosley’s message alive.91 By this stage, John had risen within the BUF, and become 
its prospective parliamentary candidate for a Hull constituency. However, John 
Chamley did not contest the General Election that many expected to occur in 1940. 
Instead, Chamley spent the bulk of the war years interned, keeping company with 
fellow Mosleyites and members of other extreme-right organisations such as Admiral
M
Sir Barry Domvile. Chamley resumed his bakery business after the war, and soon 
became prominent in his local chamber of trade. He mixed with civic leaders and 
even enjoying the hospitality of Conservative MP Ernest Maples on the House of 
Commons Terrace.94 However, Chamley also became involved with Union 
Movement, Mosley’s post-war attempt at a political comeback. He claimed that he 
‘did not play a very active part in Union Movement affairs’, but Chamley spoke at 
Union Movement meetings and contributed to the ‘Small Shopkeepers Front’ section 
in Mosley’s publications Union and Action.95 He understood that his continued 
support for Mosley meant that he had to be ‘circumspect in the expression of my 
views’.96 Chamley nevertheless soon experienced problems. Chamley had continued 
to receive the monthly ‘Mosley News Letter’ and even attended meetings with
89 See 8.
90 John, Peter, Alfred and Sydney. Chamley, Blackshirts, 128-9.
91 Chamley, Blackshirts, 94.
92 Chamley, Blackshirts, 107.
93 Chamley, Blackshirts, 109. See 4.
94 Chamley, Blackshirts, 170ff & 195.
95 Chamley, Blackshirts, 203.
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^  97 •Mosley from 1946. One meeting received press coverage and became public 
knowledge. This forced Chamley to defend his actions before his local chamber of 
trade, which he described as keen to avoid depiction as a platform for neo-fascists.98 
However, Chamley’s election as President of his local Chamber of Trade in 1952 
seemed to prove that his connections with Mosley were no bar to civic 
advancement.99
Indeed, by 1950 the local Conservative Association considered Chamley a pillar of 
the community. The Conservative Party regained Ormskirk, the constituency in which 
Chamley lived, at the 1950 General Election. Ormskirk’s Conservative MP, Sir 
Ronald Cross, tried to entice Chamley into joining the Conservative Party on a 
number of occasions. Chamley believed this to be a precursor to his eventual adoption 
as a parliamentary candidate for the Conservative Party, and thus accepted an 
invitation to visit the home of the treasurer of the Ormskirk local Conservative 
Association. Chamley did not name the Treasurer, but described him as well known 
and influential. He was also, Chamley claimed, aware of Chamley’s support for 
Mosley and even hinted that he too was a Mosleyite but thought Mosley’s political 
prospects were nil. The Treasurer offered Chamley the chairmanship of the 
Burscough and Latham Branch of the Conservative Party, plus support should 
Chamley seek parliamentary nomination. Chamley accepted the offer, and cited that 
he had done so to enable him to further Mosley’s cause ‘through less obvious 
channels.’100 Thereafter, Chamley helped successive Conservative Ormskirk MPs and 
stood as a Conservative in a local council election. As in civic life, it appeared that 
Chamley’s support for Mosley was not a barrier to political advancement. Therefore, 
he applied to become a parliamentary candidate for the Conservative Party on 5 June 
1954, after he had secured the support of three sponsors.101 Central Office invited 
Chamley to an interview after he had gained the support of Area Office in 
Manchester. Here, however, Chamley’s political career met a Central Office
97 Chamley, Blackshirts, 196.
98 Chamley, Blackshirts, 196-199.
99 Chamley, Blackshirts, 204.
100 Chamley, Blackshirts, 206.
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roadblock. Asked at the interview whether he ‘did not consider that my earlier 
commitment might be a deterrent against my acceptance’, Chamley, perhaps 
unwisely, responded by pointing out that Churchill had changed allegiance during his 
political career. Central Office rejected Chamley’s candidacy.102
Why did Central Office reject Chamley? His comment about Churchill was a faux
pas, but insufficient to disbar him as Churchill’s political career was not a secret. It
was not beyond the capabilities of the Conservative Party machine to ensure a
candidate avoided making such comments in public. That is provided Central Office
wanted the individual in the first place. So why, if Central Office never wanted
Chamley as a candidate, did they interview him? It would have been difficult for
Central Office to refuse Chamley the courtesy of an interview as he had gained
acceptance at a local level, both in business and politics, and secured nominations
from prominent members of the party. Central Office may also have been intrigued,
and possibly even used the interview to elicit intelligence on former Mosleyites and
their intentions. Immigration from the New Commonwealth was rising and
Conservative MPs and PPCs had previously become embroiled in Mosley’s ‘anti-
1alien’ campaigns immediately after the war. Such a scenario fits the picture of 
Central Office guarding against the public recollection of the Conservative Party’s 
embarrassing pre-war connections. It is likely, therefore, that when Central Office 
interviewed Chamley they were meeting two objectives, one a matter of form, the 
other consonant with its role gathering intelligence on extreme-right groups and 
individuals. That Central Office never intended to sanction Chamley’s parliamentary 
candidature is easy to surmise. Central Office did not even bother to inform him of 
their rejection.104 Chamley’s subsequent failure to secure nomination to a safe council 
seat further proved that Central Office was determined to block his political career. 
When Central Office had the final decision over a local council nomination, it rejected 
Chamley,105 despite the local Conservative Association previously having considered 
him suitable to be a parliamentary candidate. Chamley was in no doubt why this had 
happened: ‘This small example of inside jiggery-pokery to prevent the election of a
102 Chamley, Blackshirts, 207-208.
103 See 8.
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one-time Blackshirt rather dismayed me, and at the first suitable opportunity I 
withdrew from local politics.’106 Thus, not only had Central Office acted to deny any 
national association between Chamley and the Conservative Party becoming widely 
known, it had additionally thwarted his local ambitions, and thereby minimised his 
connection with the party at a local level. It is hard to disagree with Chamley’s claim 
that his attempt to become a Conservative Party parliamentary candidate ‘must have 
been a dead duck from the start’.107
New Concerns
The Conservative Party’s information network continued bringing new organisations 
to Central Office’s attention. A Mr. Lee, the Chief Agent of the Bradford 
Conservative and National Liberal Association, wrote to General Director Stephen 
Pierssene at Central Office in February 1952 and requested information on a group
10ftcalled Common Cause. The events Lee set in motion showed how, and why, 
Central Office interest in an outside organisation developed. Lee included a Common 
Cause leaflet outlining its objectives and asked whether Conservative members should 
support this new organisation. An invitation to one of Lee’s ward secretaries to act as 
a local secretary for Common Cause had prompted his action.109 Central Office 
ascertained that people interested in combating Communism had attended Common 
Cause’s inaugural meeting in November 1951, and had agreed on a six-day 
conference in London for May 1952.110 The General Director saw little cause for 
alarm regarding party members, and responded with only a minimal counter-measure. 
He advised Lee that, ‘I feel that at this stage we should not give active party support 
to the movement, although there does not seem to be any reason why individual
106 Chamley, Blackshirts, 208.
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Conservatives should not join it.’111 Yet, Piersenne’s caution about an outside 
organisations’ potential to embarrass the Conservative Party remained, which meant 
that he advised a slightly firmer line regarding the ward secretary. Pierssene stated 
that, ever, ‘the position of the ward secretary of your Association may be a little 
difficult if he is to become secretary of the local branch of Common Cause as well, 
and if I were you I should tactfully discourage him from accepting the office’.112 
Nevertheless, Piersenne’s response portrayed an initial nonchalance towards Common 
Cause. However, this attitude had changed within one month. Lee had continued to 
supply Central Office with Common Cause literature, plus information on its 
leadership structure.113 Piersenne circulated the literature to others within Central 
Office.114 The Chief Publicity Officer suggested making unofficial enquiries and 
deferentially asking the aristocratic Chairman of Common Cause for his comments, 
before Central Office provided advice to all constituencies.115 Pierssene agreed to 
enquiries, and added that, ‘it would be just as well to see the lines on which it is 
developing and what its plans and prospects are’.116 This exchange revealed that 
Central Office had become more concerned about Common Cause. What explains this 
altered attitude?
The method by which Common Cause created it’s ‘groups’ questioned its claim of 
political neutrality. A Central Office report described how ‘prosperous and leisured 
people’ initially gathered as a ‘group’; only when supporters of all three political
117 i _ . .  •parties joined the ‘group’ was it transformed into a ‘branch’. Thus, there is a status 
and class perspective. Some of the names associated with Common Cause, such as 
Major-General Richard Hilton and Field Marshall Wilson, supported this notion.118
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The existence of trade unionists in Common Cause,119 on the other hand, provided the
possibility of socialist influence. This indicated two reasons for Central Office’s
increased concern. Common Cause was either another manifestation of the
Conservative dissent that it had encountered during the Attlee government.
Alternatively, socialists had used Common Cause to infiltrate and subvert an
otherwise benign organisation. Support existed for both possibilities. Piersenne
expressed the fear in March 1952 that Common Cause could become another Fighting
Fund for Freedom or Society for Individual Freedom.120 This indicated that Central
Office based its decision to investigate Common Cause on its perception that it was a
right-wing organisation. In August 1952, however, a Central Office Area Agent
reported concerns over the presence of two socialists acting as organisers of Common
1 1Cause’s Sheffield branch. Central Office despatched two observers as a result of
100this information resulted. Thus, Central Office may equally have based its decision 
to investigate Common Cause on its perception of it as a vehicle for the left wing. 
However, there are stronger reasons to support the notion that Central Office was 
concerned about the extreme right.
Common Cause’s aims did not seem extreme. The Common Cause literature 
forwarded to Central Office welcomed ‘all who support political democracy, cultural 
freedom and the rule of Law against totalitarianism and dictatorship’. Common 
Cause claimed many regional, and professional, branches, plans for an information
104centre and the imminent creation of a parliamentary group. However, its requests 
for assistance and funds negated these grandiose claims.125 Its claims of various 
political and religious affiliations apparently lessened the possibility of sectarianism
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•  •  i *yf%. - .1 •  •  *or sectional interest. Thus, it is unlikely that fear of a potential rival or sectarianism 
caused Central Office’s concerns. Common Cause declared its opposition to fascism, 
and sought to distance itself from the pre war British right and its links with fascism. 
It represented fascism as an alien ideology. Common Cause proclaimed that, ‘It 
opposes fascism of every hue (whether black, brown or red) and of every nationality 
(whether Italian, German, Russian, Spanish or British).’127 Yet, this was simply 
special pleading, a self-serving smokescreen by which Common Cause attempted to 
hide embarrassing pre-war antecedents. It is unlikely that this fooled Central Office. 
The address provided to forward funds to, 66c Elizabeth St, London, SW1,128 may 
have alerted Central Office. Central Office possibly knew that the proprietor of this 
address was Hugh Grosvenor, the Second Duke of Westminster.129 Central Office 
may not have known that Grosvenor provided this office free of charge, nor 
necessarily that Common Cause shared this address with an organisation assisting a 
known Nazi collaborator.130 However, it is inconceivable that Central Office was 
ignorant of Grosvenor’s pre-war connection to the extreme right and the suspicion he 
was a fifth columnist.131 Moreover, Central Office definitely did know that Lord 
Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton was the Chairman of Common Cause. The Chief 
Political Officer had identified Douglas-Hamilton as such when he responded to the
circulated Common Cause material.132 Recently released MI5 documents show Lord
1 ^Douglas-Hamilton secretly flew aircraft to assist Franco in the Spanish Civil War.
It is feasible to assume that the Conservative Home Secretary knew this, and that 
senior Central Office officials did so too given their well-known connections to the 
intelligence services.134 Therefore, the commonly known fact of Lord Douglas- 
Hamilton also being a Conservative and Unionist MP posed the potential to provide
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the Conservative Party’s enemies ammunition with which to rekindle embarrassing, 
and potentially damaging, charges of consorting with the extreme right. If so, 
Westminster’s involvement would only have added to Central Office concern. This 
explained Central Office’s desire to investigate further this particular recurrence of 
the extreme right. This replacement of Piersenne’s nonchalance with an atmosphere of 
vigilance, action and discouragement in Central Office by the end of January 1953 
supports this scenario. Miss Fletcher personally questioned a member of Common 
Cause as she had with The Guild of Good Neighbours.135 Fletcher admitted that 
Common Cause’s aims were unexceptionable. However, when Fletcher stated that she 
had "gained the impression that this is an organisation which we would be unwise to 
ignore, and I think we should do well to watch it’,136 she revealed an understanding 
that Common Cause was a cause for concern. Central Office consequently altered its 
advice not to join Common Cause to include all Conservative Party supporters, not 
just its officials.137 This was a stronger counter-measure than that revealed by 
Pierssene’s initial nonchalance.
Central Office’s contrastingly positive attitude displayed towards another new outside 
organisation further supported this picture of alertness to embarrassing extreme-right 
connections. As usual, Area Agents requested information on the organisation, the 
first record of such being for March 1952.138 The organisation’s name, Drake’s Drum, 
suggested the dawn of a new Elizabethan Age. Elizabeth II had succeeded George VI 
on 6 February 1952. The name of this organisation, a reference to an earlier English 
golden age, possessed connotations of palingenesis. Griffin argued that this was one 
characteristic of fascist groups.139 Later theories cannot be attributed retrospectively 
to the thinking of 1950s Central Office officials. However, we can expect them to be 
alert to possible connections between right-wing groups. The signature of Drake’s 
Drum leader, Mary Parsons, matched that of the Mary Parsons of the British
135 See 38-40.
136 F. R. Fletcher, ‘Common Cause’, 5 January 1953. CPA CCO 3/4/40, Common Cause, 
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Housewives League.140 It would be understandable, therefore, if Central Office was 
wary. Instead, requests for information about Drake’s Drum consistently attracted 
minimally refractory advice, saving for officials or the institutional. There was, for 
example, ‘no objection to individual Conservatives supporting this effort if they so 
desire, in a private capacity’.141 The Conservative Party was ‘not in any way officially 
(or even mildly unofficially) connected with it’.142 Indeed, Central Office even 
appeared to sanction Drake’s Drum. The Chief Publicity Officer described Drake’s 
Drum as ‘a perfectly respectable organization and one of which we approve’.143 This 
was far from the hostility Central Office exhibited towards the British Housewives 
League.
Expediency and opportunism explained Central Office’s attitude towards Drake’s 
Drum. Churchill’s Administration lacked confidence, realised the true message of the 
1951 General Election, and sought to widen its appeal. Instantaneous electoral change 
was, however, unrealistic. The rejection of the Conservative Party by nearly 57% of 
the electorate in 1950 and 52% in 1951 proved this,144 despite ideological change in 
the Industrial Charter. The anti-Conservative vote appeared substantial and 
recalcitrant. This presented the Conservative Party with a problem. It needed to attract 
non-Conservative voters, but they might reject overt appeals by the Conservative 
Party, perhaps unconvinced by the Conservative Party’s sincerity and commitment to 
the Attleean settlement. Yet, reliance on its own appeals was insufficient to attract 
these voters. Consequently, as seen with AIMS,145 the Conservative Party adopted a 
longer-term, covert strategy that complimented the realignment of its literature to 
attract hitherto hostile voters. Like Aims of Industry, Drake’s Drum fitted this 
approach. Drake’s Drum attempted to spread an anti-Communist appeal to the
140 Compare, for example, Mary A. Parsons, 6 April 1952 with Mary A. Parson to The Rt. Hon. 
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working class, and used Conservative trade unionists to distribute its literature
because it believed that, ‘through them we reach the most vital fields for our
activities’.146 It described the realities of Communist rule in the Soviet Union,
identified ‘Moscow stooges’ in the trade unions and warned of ‘Soviet laws’ coming
to Britain unless the workers ‘fight Communism -  and win!’147 Thus, Drake’s Drum
provided Central Office, and the Conservative government, with a useful and non-
attributable medium for achieving their objective of spreading the Conservative
message. Numerous comments supported the existence of, and reasons for, this
positive relationship. They also showed Central Office’s desire to keep it secret. A
Mr. Chapman-Walker at Central Office secured adequate supplies for Drake’s Drum
at a time when paper remained in short supply. In April 1952, Parsons thanked
Chapman-Walker for his ‘generous help in supplying paper’.148 Central Office
reassured Conservative officials of the legal vetting of all Drake’s Drum literature.149
Parsons promised not to use the Conservative Party organisation to spread Drake’s
Drum literature.150 Central Office revealed Parson’s promise not to implicate the
Conservative Party ‘in any way’ despite doing ‘some quite useful propaganda work in
our interests,151 and denied the existence of any institutional connection. Parsons
stressed to distributors that Drake’s Drum ‘must remain entirely unofficial and
dissociated from Conservative Party activities’.152 The Chief Publicity Officer,
meanwhile, revealed that Drake’s Drum could reach ‘people whom we cannot get at 
• 10m the normal way’. Regardless of Parson’s previous affiliations, and the name of 
her organisation, it is clear that Central Office stuck to its least refractory stance 
towards Drake’s Drum because it was useful to the Conservative Party.
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IFear of Communism also lay behind the emergence of the League of Empire Loyalists 
(LEL), an extreme-right group that focused on communism’s impact on the British 
Empire. Churchill and Eden’s government had adopted a harsher stance to imperial 
tensions, which suggested a desire to maintain overseas possessions. British forces 
brutally crushed the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya and contained communist 
insurgency in Malaya. Opposition to British involvement in Cyprus resulted in the 
jailing of the Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios in 1956. However, this 
picture of a government determined to withstand threats to the Empire was illusory. In 
June 1952, Eden presented his assessment of Britain’s overseas commitments to the 
Cabinet. Eden highlighted Britain’s inability to meet current demands, and 
recommended ‘transferring’ the country’s “real burdens’” .154 In the same year, 
Britain withdrew its Governor from the Gold Coast, which allowed Kuame Nkrumah 
to become Prime Minister one year after the British released him from prison. In 
Asia, a solution to racial tensions between Malays and Chinese looked unlikely 
against a background of an increasingly powerful Communist China plus recent 
Indonesian independence and colonial war in Indo-China.155 In Europe, the jailing of 
Makarios had only served to provide the Cypriot Independence movement, Enosis, 
with a martyr barely one year after its creation in 1955. The Conservative 
governments may have tried to give the impression that it possessed the stomach to 
fight and was not retreating from Empire, as Hennessey argued.156 However, it is 
unlikely that the extreme right, already suspicious at the direction of domestic policy, 
saw it this way.
Only Cabinet secrecy prevented knowledge of Eden’s recommendations and stopped 
confirmation of these suspicions. However, the coronation oath of Queen Elizabeth II 
in 1953, which contained far vaguer claims to imperial domination than that of 
George Vi’s in 1937, had set the tone.157 Additionally, the government’s policy 
towards Egypt provided tangible proof of imperial abandonment, and confirmed right- 
wing fears. In 1953, Churchill had stressed that Britain’s actions in Egypt ‘will set the
154 ‘British Overseas Obligations’, Memorandum presented to Cabinet by A. Eden, June 1952. 
Hennessy, So Good, 38-42.
155 Hennessy, So Good, 304-305.
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pace for us all over Africa and the Middle East’. 158 Churchill realised the strategic 
significance of Egypt, even if he did not elaborate on what the ‘pace’ was. The Suez 
Canal provided access to the Red Sea and Britain’s eastern territories. Thus, when 
Churchill acquiesced in the agreement Foreign Secretary Eden forged with Egypt to 
remove all British soldiers by June 1956 it seemed that the Empire was truly going. 
Eden’s failure when Prime Minister to secure Egypt’s signature to the Baghdad Pact 
of February 1955 as a quid pro quo looked weak. The Pact’s objective, to prevent the 
spread of Communist Russia’s influence to the Middle East and North Africa by 
forming a buffer comprised of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, lay in shreds. The 
Conservative government looked like it could neither maintain the Empire nor counter 
the left’s most extreme ideology. It had confirmed the imperial-right’s worst fears by 
its abandonment of the Conservative Party’s link with imperialism, and opened 
political space on its right flank. The League of Empire Loyalists stepped into this 
space.
Founded in 1954, the LEL presented a more serious threat to the Conservative Party 
than all the other extreme-right movements hitherto. The LEL operated ‘on a firmer 
footing than any other Right Wing or Fascist movement since Mosley’s pre-war 
heyday’,159 mainly because an expatriate living in Chile financially assisted it. Its 
leader, A. K. Chesterton, was able from 1953 to produce a regular publication, 
Candour, and had subsequently attracted a substantial membership in his quest to 
save the British Empire. Chesterton focused on the Empire and conflated the Soviet 
Union and America as the cause of imperial decline. This explanation appealed to 
many Conservatives’ fear of Communism and cultural anti-Americanism. 
Chesterton’s military and literary credibility no doubt helped too. He had served in 
both world wars and gained the Military Cross in the process, which attracted many 
military figures to the LEL. Employment at senior levels in Conservative publications 
provided Chesterton with an air of respectability. From April 1953, for example, 
Chesterton was the literary advisor and personal journalist to Lord Beaverbrook and a 
senior writer for the Daily Express group. His co-authorship, with the Jewish J. 
Leftwich, of The Tragedy o f  Anti-Semitism (1948), added to this impression of
158 N. Ferguson, Empire: How Britain made the Modem World, Penguin, London (2004), 355.
159 Bean, Shades, 98.
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respectability. So, too, did the presence of establishment-sounding individuals on the 
LEL’s Grand Council, such as Field Marshall Lord Ironside, The Earl of Buchan, 
Elizabeth Lady Freeman and Lieutenant-General Sir Balfour Hutchinson. From the 
beginning, however, the Conservative Party leadership exhibited a hostile attitude 
towards the LEL. Central Office abandoned its usual advice that individual members 
were free to join other organisations, and quickly adopted firmer counter-measures. It 
commissioned substantial reports that detailed the LEL’s membership, and collected 
intelligence material that far out-stripped those it had acquired for any other outside 
organisation. Central Office made it clear that membership of the LEL by any 
Conservative was unacceptable.
The LEL’s written attacks and publicity stunts partly explained increased interest and 
action by Central Office. Chesterton produced a series of publications titled ‘Sound 
The Alarm’ to accompany the launch of the LEL in 1954. These publications, 
occurring at the height of concerns over withdrawal from east of Suez, 
overwhelmingly attacked the Conservative government. Chesterton exonerated 
Churchill of treasonable intent, but laid the charge of self-delusional culpability at the 
leader of the Conservative government nevertheless. He stated that, ‘Sir Winston, 
after all his brave words, now presides over the liquidation of the British Empire, but 
so potent is the alchemy of his mind that no doubt he persuades himself that the 
process is really one of wafting the Empire to the sunlit uplands of his wartime 
imagining.’160 Chesterton did not extend any leniency to other government leaders or 
the Conservative Party. The Labour Government had lost Ceylon and Burma, 
weakened Britain’s position in Malaya, and negatively affected Britain’s oil supplies 
by abnegating Britain’s sphere of interest in Persia.161 The Conservative Party’s 
acceptance of these policies in Opposition, and their continuance of them when in 
power, had, Chesterton believed, resulted in the ‘rot at the core of Churchillian 
Conservatism’.162 He described Conservative leaders as collectively giving ‘every 
appearance of working for the abrogation of our national sovereignty as their supreme
160 A. K. Chesterton, Sound The Alarm! A Warning To The British Nations, Candour 
Publishing Company, Croydon, (1954), 8.
161 Chesterton, Alarm! 9.
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political objective’,163 and thereby levelled a charge of treachery. Nor did the 
parliamentary party fare any better. Chesterton portrayed the Conservatives as giving 
the Empire away as quickly as the Socialists had done, and noted there had been ‘only 
one or two protests from those whom some have supposed, too charitably, to be the 
custodians of the imperial cause’.164 Thus, Chesterton argued, all Conservative MPs 
were complicit in this treachery. This was a particularly odious and irritating charge to 
put whilst memories of the Second World War were still fresh, and was a recurring 
theme in Chesterton’s ‘Sound The Alarm’ series.
However, this charge was not as irritating or embarrassing as the LEL’s publicity 
stunts. Churchill’s resignation in April 1954 had triggered a wave of LEL protests 
focused on his successor, former Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Eden was the man 
most closely associated with the policy of ‘scuttle’ from Empire. The LEL protested 
against the first visit of Soviet leaders in April 1956, and delivered a wreath in 
memory of those killed under communist rule and a ten-foot long silver spoon to 10 
Downing St.165 In the following month LEL member John Bean interrupted a 
Conservative gathering at Warwick Castle. Bean loudly presented Eden with a black 
scuttle, and stated that it was ‘in view of the development of your Empire policies’.166 
In August 1956, Bean was one of the LEL protesters who gate crashed the Suez 
Conference at Lancaster House.167 A female LEL member hid backstage at a Young 
Conservative meeting at the Royal Festival Hall in late 1956 and walked straight on to 
the platform whilst Eden was speaking and protested against suppression of the recent 
Hungarian uprising. John Bean shouted slogans from the rear of the Hall before 
stewards physically removed him.168 The right-wing individual that attacked Eden at 
Bradford was an LEL member.169 Bean was also the 1950 recruit to Mosley’s Union
•  •  •  170Movement who had rejected the Conservative Party as not reflecting his views. He 
had joined the League of Empire Loyalists in 1955 in desperation at Union 
Movement’s tactics, but only after a two-month spell in the Conservative Party in
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1953 had confirmed his earlier views.171 The publicity stunts Bean and his LEL 
colleagues engaged in occurred in an increasingly televisual age, and thus brought the 
image of Conservatism divided and a government assailed by many erstwhile voters 
irritated at imperial betrayal into the living room of millions of voters. More 
prosaically, it made the Conservative leader look a fool.
Central Office’s adoption of more stringent counter-measures proved how seriously it 
took the threat posed by the LEL. Urgent and negative replies replaced the usual 
nonchalant advice that individual members were free to join outside organisations. In 
May 1955, for example, a Colonel Harrison of Eye Division informed Central Office 
of a meeting he had had with a constituent given a place on the LEL’s Council. 
Central Office responded with the formulation of a ‘short but forceful brief for 
Harrison to show the constituent why the Conservative party ‘do not approve of their 
activities’.172 The description of this task as ‘top priority’ and the command to 
produce it at the ‘earliest possible moment’ revealed Central Office’s sense of
1 71urgency. In the same month, the Conservative Parliamentary Prospective Candidate 
for Darlington, Sir Fergus Graham, sought elucidation from Central Office of the full 
case against the LEL after discovering that his ‘most eloquent and able’ lieutenant 
supported the LEL.174 The General Director feared legal action and did not give 
extensive comments. The LEL’s willingness to use legal action when it felt defamed, 
winning at least fourteen libel cases during its existence, explained the General 
Director’s reticence.175 However, when he referred to the ‘full case against the 
League’,176 the General Director revealed that Central Office was indeed making ‘a 
case’. He also inferred that this ‘case’ was stronger than that usually constructed, and 
that Central Office would probably disseminate it via more than the usual channels. 
The existence of press articles within Central Office files that reported party officials’
171 Bean, Shades, 59-93.
172 Barbara Brooke to Mr. Adamson, The League of Empire Loyalists’, 24 March 1955. CPA 
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comments about the LEL supports the idea of a co-ordinated campaign against i t 177 
This is not surprising as the LEL’s publications and actions had angered Central 
Office. The General Director, for example, failed to understand how any Conservative 
member could have any connection with an organisation engaged in the ‘violent
1 78denigration of the Prime Minister’. There is also a tangible sense of alarm over the 
potential impact on the Conservative Party. Central Office introduced ‘careful 
scrutiny’ of membership applications when it feared that the LEL was attempting to 
infiltrate the Conservative Party.179 Yet, no matter how irritating or embarrassing the 
LEL comments and stunts were, they do not explain adequately the increased level of 
refractory activity, or the fear of legal action by the LEL and concern that the LEL 
was acquiring a foothold within the Conservative Party. This is because these 
comments and the LEL’s stunts mask the main reason for Central Office’s attitude.
The earliest LEL publications revealed that anti-Semitism was the central platform of 
180its philosophy. They portrayed Jews systematically setting about the destruction of 
national institutions, countries and empires as they sought the creation of one-world 
government. In their place, Jews wanted to create internationalist organisations as a 
stage towards their ultimate objective. Jews were, therefore, the hidden hand behind 
all the wars and revolutions that had resulted in the fall of monarchies, and any 
subsequent disingenuous attempts at collectivist guarantees against their repetition. 
Thus, the Jews removed the Bourbons by means of the French Revolution, whilst the 
Habsburgs, Romanovs and Hohenzollems fell during a Jewish-financed Great War. 
However, the British monarchy had proved resilient to the anti-monarchism the Jews 
had unleashed across Europe. Thus, as the League of Nations, the initial vehicle of 
one-world government, had proved incapable of delivering their objective, the Jews 
set about the destruction of the British monarchy at its periphery, i.e. the British
177 For example, ‘League of Empire Loyalists: Correction and apology’, Yorkshire Evening 
Post, 6 February 1956. CPA CCO 3/5/88, League of Empire Loyalists -  general, 1956-59.
178 S. H. Pierssene to The Rt. Hon. Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, 31 October 1956. CPA CCO 
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179 Internal general directions from S. H. Pierssene to Mrs. Brooke, Mr. Karberry and Mr. 
Adamson, ‘League of Empire Loyalists’, 13 October 1955. CPA CCO 3/4/75, League of 
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Empire. Consequently, Jews instigated the Second World War to cripple Britain 
financially. However, to ensure that there would be no repetition of the League of 
Nations failure, the Jews created a frightening post-1945 scenario of two opposed 
ideologies that possessed nuclear weapons and struggled for world domination. 
Therefore, American capitalism and Soviet Communism were the twin pillars of a 
bogus contest, the Cold War, containment of which the Jews provided for in the shape 
of new, more powerful international organisations, such as the United Nations, 
NATO, SEATO and the Common Market. Nations’ eventual subservience to these 
internationalist organisations would, Chesterton implied, enable the Jewish 
denouement of one-world government. There was, Chesterton argued, substantial 
evidence that supported his world-view. Churchill had become Prime Minister as an 
ardent opponent of Nazism and supporter of Empire. Yet he had succumbed to 
American pressure and commenced dismantling the Empire in return for American 
assistance in the ‘Lend-Lease’ programme. The American president who had applied 
this pressure was a Jewish emplacement, like many American presidents. The ‘New 
York Money Power’ had provided American finance for ‘Lend-Lease’. It had abruptly 
ended Lend-Lease at the end of war in Europe and forced Britain to borrow heavily 
from America to finance domestic war damage and military commitments in the 
unfinished conflict in the East, which had increased the advantage of their nominee, 
the American president, in securing further concessions from British Prime Ministers 
to dismantle the Empire. Should there be any doubt as to the real identity of the ‘New 
York Money Power’, the names of institutions and individuals Chesterton identified 
were all Jewish.
Moreover, the LEL engaged in violent language and actions, and possessed the 
capacity to escalate it in search of its objectives. The LEL operated in a political 
milieu very different to that existing before the Second World War, one that eschewed 
political violence due to inter-war Fascism and Nazism. Nevertheless, the LEL 
advocated policies that necessitated violent solutions. Indian Independence had 
already provided a substantial impetus for colonies that desired independence. The 
LEL’s objective of maintaining the Empire would require substantial force to deny 
aspirations that this impetus had fuelled. The LEL condemned the decadent 
parliamentary democracy it perceived as incapable of halting imperial decline. Its 
comments implied the possibility of limiting the franchise to those patriots who
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agreed with LEL objectives. Disenfranchising a part of the electorate would also 
require force. More direct was the charge of treason levelled at the Conservative 
government. Chesterton argued that dismantling the Empire was, ‘treason, beyond 
doubt it is treason, to dissipate the heritage of a thousand years: to destroy the values 
which those thousand years have created, and prepare to hand over the sovereign right
tot
to our obedience’. The sentence for treason was capital punishment, and remains so 
until 1998. However, the gravity of this charge within a decade of the end of 
existential conflict carried more weight. It is unlikely that Chesterton did not realise 
this, or that those he accused, or his readers, failed to notice. Less ephemeral was the 
LEL’s actual activities. Violence frequently ensued. The LEL’s protest against the 
visiting Soviet dignitaries in April 1956, for example, resulted in its Organising 
Secretary, Leslie Greene and her fellow-protester receiving criminal convictions.182
Thus Chesterton, less than a decade after a war against a regime that exterminated 
Jews as the cause of Germany’s and the world’s ills, held Jews responsible for the 
British Empire’s collapse as part o f a wider conspiracy to secure a one-world, Jewish- 
dominated government. This conspiracy theory, together with language and objectives 
that suggested the LEL was capable of violent solutions, smacked of a British version 
of 1930s Germany. The antecedents o f individuals in the LEL supported the view that 
the LEL was a 1950s British throwback to right-wing extremism. Chesterton 
epitomised this. After leaving the British Union of Fascists, Chesterton had 
maintained his extreme-right credentials in 1939 by joining the Nordic League and 
becoming the editor of Lord Lymington’s New Pioneer.183 Chesterton was also 
responsible for the failed attempt to form the National Front after Victory, a coalition 
of extreme-right organisations including the British People’s Party.184 There were 
others in LEL with fascist connections too. Leslie Greene’s husband, Ben, was a 
former member of the British People’s Party.185 Anthony Gittens, a partner in Clair 
Press, the printers of the LEL’s Candour, provided a link with the Britons Publishing
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Society.186 P. J. Ridout, founder of the extreme-right British Empire Party that 
contested one seat in the 1951 General Election,187 was also a former member of the
1 fifipre-war Imperial Fascist League.
Nor was the LEL’s connection with the pre-war extreme right limited to these 
individuals. Historians have depicted members of the LEL as Colonel Blimp types 
determined to preserve a fast-disappearing world who gingered up the Conservative 
Party into preserving the Empire.189 The cartoonist David Low intended his Colonel 
Blimp creation to symbolise a reactionary right-wing establishment, but the 
subsequent film The Life and Death o f  Colonel Blimp (1943) sanitised Blimp into a 
confused but essentially harmless patriot. The LEL membership is replete with names 
that fitted the ‘Blimp’ epithet. However, these individuals were often far from the 
sanitised version. Major-General Richard Hilton, for example, was a member of 
Common Cause. Air Commodore G. S. Oddie was a pre-war member of the British 
People’s Party, and stood as its candidate in the March 1946 in the Combined 
Universities by-election.190 Furthermore, in Field Marshall Ironside, the LEL risked, 
in a way similar to Common Cause, rekindling the link between the Conservative 
Party and a possibly treacherous pre-war extreme right. Ironside’s involvement with 
the pre-war Nazi-sympathising Anglo-German Fellowship countered any benign 
Blimp-type characterisation.191 At a meeting on 12 November 1939, Major-General J. 
F. C. Fuller had revealed to Admiral Barry Domvile that Ironside supported the 
attempts of extreme-right groups like the Anglo-German Fellowship to halt the war 
with Nazi Germany.192 Domville was a member of many extreme-right organisations, 
and the government subsequently interned him under Defence Regulation 18B during 
the war as a potential threat to national security.193 His recollections are therefore 
open to dismissal as confused, justificatory recollections. On the same basis, so could 
Fuller’s as he was as a member of the Nordic League and involved in Lymington’s
186 Internal Central Office report, ‘Candour’, November 1954, 1. CPA CCO 3/4/75, League of 
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New Pioneer.194 Pugh described ‘Boney’ Fuller as Britain’s ‘most remarkable Phoney 
War fascist’, and argued that he was more a candidate for internment than 
promotion.195 Nevertheless, as Pugh recounted, Ironside attempted to have Fuller 
appointed his deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff.196 The War Cabinet 
overruled Ironside, no doubt aware of Fuller’s sympathies. Yet Ironside had supported 
Fuller at the highest political level. Therefore, it is difficult to accept that Fuller’s 
claim to Domvile of Ironside’s support was idle gossip. It is hardly credible that 
Fuller would intentionally harm such a powerful patron. Fuller was also an LEL 
member. Even if Central Office was unaware of these connections and their potential 
for embarrassment, which seems unlikely, there was always Chesterton. As the post­
war deputy-editor of the Conservative publication Truth}91 Chesterton was also an 
example of the remaining nexus between the Conservative Party and the extreme 
right.
Thus, regardless of whether the LEL as a whole was fascist, the actions, activities and 
antecedents of its members, plus its racist philosophy, made it possible to suggest that 
it was. Its multifarious connections with the Conservative Party made it potentially an 
extreme embarrassment to the Conservative Party. Central Office’s actions revealed 
that it was aware of this potential embarrassment. They also showed the reasons why 
the LEL’s posed such a problem to the Conservative Party. Central Office 
commissioned a report on the LEL and Candour in the same year that Chesterton 
launched them. The report highlighted individual’s fascist antecedents and anti- 
Semitic connections and identified members of the LEL’s National Council and 
National Executive.198 It concluded that Chesterton’s publications contained ‘the 
familiar strain of Fascism and anti-American Semitism’,199 and thus revealed why 
Central Office thought the LEL posed a serious problem. The consequence of Central 
Office’s investigation was a circular to all Conservative MPs, prospective 
parliamentary candidates, Constituency Agents and Central Office Area Agents. This
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195 Pugh, Hurrah, 297. See also A. J. Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller The Intellectual General, (1977), 
215.
196 Pugh, Hurrah for the Blackshirts, 297. See also Trythall, Fuller, 215.
197 Baker, Obsession, 194.
198 Internal report, ‘Candour’, November 1954. CPA CCO 3/4/75, League of Empire Loyalists, 
1952-56.
199 Internal report, ‘Candour*, November 1954, p. 2. CPA CCO 3/4/75, League of Empire 
Loyalists, 1952-56.
84
circular stated that all enquiries about the LEL should receive the comment that the 
Conservative Party could not recommend it because of its fascist ‘outlook’.200 The 
LEL’s fascist antecedents troubled Central Office most. Party Chairman Lord 
Woolton responded to a Captain Duncan’s concerns about the LEL’s publicity stunt 
during the Soviet leaders’ visit and advised that: ‘The driving forces behind these 
attacks are former members of Fascist and anti-Semitic organisations.’201 Herbert Lee, 
the Chief Conservative Agent for Bradford, informed the Yorkshire Post that the LEL 
appeared ‘to be of similar character to that of the pre-war British Fascist 
Movement’ 202 The Right Honourable Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, former Governor 
of Burma, complained that the LEL had ‘raped my Young Conservative Branch’, and 
described it as ‘being almost more Fascist than Oswald’s lot’.203 These comments 
were both ironic and credible, as Dorman-Smith had been a member of Lord 
Lymington’s pro-Nazi English Array before the war.204 However, proof that a desire 
not to be associated with any post-war manifestation of fascism motivated Central 
Office did not come from Conservative Party officials alone, but from Chesterton too. 
Chesterton denied he was a fascist and complained that Central Office was engaged in 
a deliberate smear campaign. He also publicly turned the accusation back on the 
Conservative Party. Chesterton dismissed his former membership of the British Union 
of Fascists as an ‘ancient fact’, and added that he was considering ‘publishing a list of 
Tory candidates and Members of Parliament who had also been members of the 
movement’.205 This threatened to remind the electorate of the Conservative Party’s 
interwar association with fascism and explain Central Office eagerness to block the 
LEL.
Central Office’s reaction when faced at the same time with another organisation it 
considered fascist reinforced the idea that it based the degree of its refractory
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comments and actions on its perceived nature of an organisation's extremism. In this 
instance, however, Central Office also revealed some methods it deemed acceptable 
to determine an organisation’s nature and potential threat. The Elizabethan Party 
possessed, like Drake’s Drum, a name evocative of a previous golden age. It operated 
in the West Country and presented itself as a new type of political party that stood 
against the established ones. Adverts placed in ‘personal’ columns of local 
newspapers entitled ‘England Expects’ sought individuals willing to stand as 
Elizabethan Party candidates in their own constituencies,206 unlike the strangers often 
adopted by the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. The information that the 
Elizabethan Party produced for these putative members placed it to the right of the 
Conservative government. The literature demanded reductions in direct and indirect 
taxation and the size of civil service, restrictions on price and wage increases, and a 
reversal of nationalisation and the need for increased productivity. However, the 
information also revealed imperialism similar to the LEL when it blamed all post-war 
governments for the loss of ‘vast tracts of the Empire which are vital to our future 
existence’. The accusation that all post-war governments were treacherous for 
ceding British territory revealed that the Elizabethan Party was another manifestation
A A Q
of extreme-right reaction to the dismantling of the Empire. Additionally, the 
Elizabethan Party claimed to be ‘recognised as the centre of resistance to all that is 
rotten in the policies of the old parties’.210 This language was redolent of Oswald 
Mosley.
Central Office considered the Elizabethan Party to be similar to the LEL and made 
this view known in the same communication, and with the exact same wording, that 
alerted Conservative Party officials to LEL’s nature.211 However, Central Office 
lacked the detailed knowledge it possessed for the LEL. Consequently, it decided to
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act on the Elizabethan Party’s request for local candidates. In July 1956, Mr. Kaberry 
at Central Office responded to an Area Agent who had forwarded an Elizabethan 
Party advert for candidates and asked, ‘I wonder if you could arrange for some 
suitable, reliable person to reply to the advertisement.’212 The Area Agent fully 
understood Kaberry’s comments and advised that he had immediately arranged ‘for
‘Jl'Xsomeone to reply to the advertisement’. The insouciant language does not hide 
what Kaberry wanted the ‘suitable’ and ‘reliable’ person to do. This person, a Mr. 
Lewis, acquired the material that revealed the Elizabethan Party’s right-wing
1Anature. Thus, Kaberry had arranged for a trusted individual to collect intelligence 
on a possibly embarrassing right-wing organisation just as preceding Central Office 
officials had. This was similar, for example, to action taken regarding the Guild of 
Good Neighbours, only in this instance distance from London necessitated the use of 
a local investigator. Unlike earlier examples, however, Central Office had arranged 
for someone to pose as a supporter of an extreme-right party. Central Office now 
possessed an increasingly adept and bold intelligence-gathering channel capable of 
gaining information on extreme-right organisations.
However, it would be incorrect to assume that Central Office’s only, or even most, 
important concern was imperialist extreme-right wing organisations that occupied the 
political space vacated by the Conservative Party. Most attention from July 1956 was 
admittedly on foreign matters after Egyptian President General Nasser nationalised 
the Suez Canal. Britain commenced a military attempt to seize the Canal within five 
weeks of Nasser’s action at the end of 1956. American financial pressure forced a 
halt, an ignominious failure of great magnitude that led swiftly to Eden’s resignation 
in early January 1957. However, during this period Central Office maintained 
surveillance of right-wing organisations that were angry at Conservative 
government’s domestic policies. The Middle Class Alliance (MCA) and the People’s 
League for the Defence of Freedom (PLDF) attracted particular attention, the latter of
O 1 C
which Ramsden believed was much more worrying for Central Office. Central 
Office’s investigation of the MCA and PLDF revealed just how formularised and
212 Donald Kaberry to Mr. Slinn, 12 July 1956. CPA CCO 3/5/63, Elizabethan Party, 1956-59.
213 Mr. Slinn to Mr. Kaberry, 13 July 1956. CPA CCO 3/5/63, Elizabethan Party, 1956-59.
214 Eric E. Phillips to Mr. M. J. Lewis, 16 July 1956. CPA CCO 3/5/63, Elizabethan Party, 
1956-59.
215 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 298.
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systematic its surveillance of right-wing organisations could be. Central Office 
formulated a ‘Committee of Investigation’,216 which the General Director instructed 
with a remit to discover the history, methods and prospects of the MCA and PLDF.217
01 ftThis committee possessed specific terms of reference. Central Office instructed the 
discovery of both organisations’ activities, strength and geographical spread. In 
addition, Central Office requested details of policies and methods, chief personalities 
and the type of people appointed as officials. The request for a judgement of the 
potential impact on support for the Conservative and Liberal parties, and the probable 
reaction of the Press, showed that Central Office was concerned about possible 
adverse consequences. Finally, Central Office requested advice on how to improve 
the Conservative Party’s intelligence on both organisations in the lead up to the next 
General Election, which showed that Central Office intended to continue to monitor 
both groups.
The MCA seemed a recurrence of irritated sectional interest akin to the earlier, 
similarly titled Middle Class Union 219 Its formation was due to the actions of one 
person, Henry Price, Conservative MP for Lewisham West since 1950. In July 1954, 
the Labour Party dominated London County Council and sought to purchase Price’s 
home compulsorily to build new council houses. Price had a personal axe to grind. 
He also believed inefficient unions were behind such schemes.221 In April 1956, Price 
announced the MCA’s formation. Price’s announcement coincided with a period of 
acute middle-class irritation, which was unfortunate for the Conservative government. 
In March, the Conservatives had performed badly at the West Walthamstow by- 
election, which prompted Central Office’s General Director Stephen Pierssene to
AAA
warn Eden that the middle-class was deserting the Conservative government. With
216 CPA CCO 120/3/1-6, Committee to examine the People’s League for the Defence of 
Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance (Mr. Cohen’s Committee), 1956-7.
217 S. H. Pierssene to Percy Cohen, Chairman of the Investigating Committee, 29 November
1956. Filed under CPA CCO 3/5/88, League of Empire Loyalists -  general, 1956-59.
218 The following is taken from the ‘Report of the Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples 
League for the Defence of Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance’, November 1956, p. 1. 
CPA CCO 120/3/1-6, Committee to examine the People’s League for the Defence of Freedom 
and the Middle Class Alliance (Mr. Cohen’s Committee), 1956-7.
219 See v.
220 ‘Compulsory order sought for MP’s home’, The Times, 23 July 1954.
221 ‘Parliament1, The Times, 22 February 1956.
222 ‘Formation of ‘Middle Class Alliance”, The Times, 24 April 1956.
223 See 50.
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portents for the June 1956 Tonbridge by-election so poor, the local Tory-owned Kent 
and Sussex Courier vied with the national press in criticising Eden’s government.224 
The result at Tonbridge was a ninety percent drop in the Conservative vote whilst the 
Labour vote remained static. This suggested that Pierssene was correct, and that the 
middle class had refused to vote for the Conservative government. The Times printed 
letters that praised the Tonbridge voters for refusing to support a party that 
implemented socialist policies. The middle-classes had had to pay higher interest 
rates on mortgages without the benefit yet of annual reviews of salary and clearly 
resented government policy. It is in this context Price launched the MCA and stated 
its objective was, ‘to preserve the middle classes for the service of the nation’.
Central Office’s Committee of Investigation reported in November 1956 that the 
MCA had a membership of approximately 50,000.227 This is not surprising as many 
Conservative MPs attended MCA meetings. Price claimed that over forty MPs
00ftsupported the MCA. However, Central Office rejected the idea that membership of
the MCA should result in expulsion from the Conservative Party, and decided to limit
counter-measures to discouraging financial or official support so as not to antagonise
000members of the MCA. Central Office based it decision partly on a belief that the 
MCA was an amateurish organisation without ‘a single person on its Executive 
Committee of any consequence’.230 More charitably, the MCA was not the personal 
vehicle of an ambitious right-wing individual. The Conservative government had 
chosen Price to give the Loyal Address to the Queen’s Speech in 1952.231 This was 
traditionally the role of a rising backbencher, not a troublemaker. Moreover, the MCA 
possessed essentially the same objectives, if not policies, of the Conservative Party, 
and, as Ramsden argued, the MCA would decline as the economic situation
224 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 296. See also CPA CCO 120/2/46 General Director’s file, 
Tonbridge, Apr. -  June 1956.
225 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 297.
226 ‘Middle Class Alliance’, The Times, 25 April 1956.
227 ‘Report of the Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples League for the Defence of 
Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance’, November 1956. CPA CCO 120/3/1-6.
228 ‘Report of the Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples League for the Defence of 
Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance’, November 1956, 8. CPA CCO 120/3/1-6.
229 ‘Report of the Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples League for the Defence of 
Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance’, November 1956, 8. CPA CCO 120/3/1-6. See also 
Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 298.
230 ‘Report of the Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples League for the Defence of 
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improved. These considerations informed the Committee of Investigations’ 
recommendation of a benign response to the MCA, and its specific instructions that 
local Constituency Agents should befriend individual members of it in their area. 
Hence, Central Office’s minimal refractory stance towards the MCA.
In some senses, the PLDF, founded in 1956, appeared to pose less of a threat from the 
right than the MCA. Its leaders included former Liberal Party parliamentary 
candidates and office holders, and only three Conservatives sat on the PLDF’s eleven- 
man National Committee.233 Central Office had instructed its Area Agents to ascertain 
as much as possible about the PLDF, which Ramsden argued revealed it had made 
little headway among leading local Conservatives.234 However, the PLDF’s existence 
troubled Central Office more than the MCA, despite nearly forty percent of the 
PLDF’s Area Convenors being non-Conservatives.235 The Committee of Investigation 
believed having Area Convenors signified that the PLDF’s intended to ‘create 
branches in all Parliamentary constituencies’. This probably raised doubts in 
Central Office about the intentions of the PLDF’s leadership. Either the PLDF 
represented an attempt to form a new party, or it sought to influence the Conservative 
Party by infiltrating it at local level using its Area Convenors. The PLDF had a 
regular newspaper and publishing company with which to disseminate its views in the 
shape of The People’s Guardian and the Free Press Society respectively. Moreover, 
the PLDF leader’s ambiguous denial that he intended to form a new party ‘at the 
moment’,237 would not have assuaged Central Office doubts.
The PLDF’s philosophy and methods also probably contributed to Central Office’s 
wariness. It possessed a libertarian economic philosophy that nevertheless 
countenanced the use of extreme interventionism to weaken the power of organised
232 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 298.
233 ‘Report of the Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples League for the Defence of 
Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance’, November 1956. CPA CCO 120/3/1-6.
234 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 299.
235 ‘Report of the Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples League for the Defence of 
Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance’, November 1956, 5. CPA CCO 120/3/1-6.
236 Report of the Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples League for the Defence of 
Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance’, November 1956, 5. CPA CCO 120/3/1-6.
237 Speech by Edward Martell, Liverpool, 16 October 1956. Quoted in ‘Report of the 
Committee of Investigation in to the Peoples League for the Defence of Freedom and the 
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labour. This viewpoint logically necessitated the creation of a strong, even 
authoritarian, government that was prepared to crush those rights that workers had 
gained as democracy expanded and despite decades of employers’ reluctance. 
Therefore, the PLDF’s objectives carried an implication of violence. As Ramsden 
stated, the PLDF was only ‘Liberal’ in the sense that it was like European ‘Liberals’ 
who operated on the right. In this regard, the PLDF appeared to be an example of 
the ‘ethnocratic perversions of liberalism’ identified by Griffin as one of the 
‘ideological mutations’ taken by the ‘fascist species of the radical right’ in a hostile 
post-war milieu.240 The PLDF’s leadership had definitely travelled towards an 
extreme-right destination and was currently ‘manoeuvring at the extreme rightward
* ) A \
end of the political spectrum’. The presence of a former Mosleyite in the PLDF’s 
leadership supported the suspicion that it was at least an extreme-right organisation,
' j A ' y
and possibly a nascent fascist one.
Furthermore, Edward Martell, the leader of the PLDF, was potentially a greater threat 
than the MCA’s Henry Price was. Martell initially attracted public attention by 
campaigning for a fund to celebrate Churchill’s eightieth birthday in 1954, and 
subsequently gained prominence for strike breaking activity.243 He acquired The 
Recorder in the mid-1950s and appealed for £10,000 to maintain production during 
the 1955 Press strike.244 Martell secured double the amount asked for, which enable 
him to create the Free Press Society from which the PLDF sprang.245 He clearly 
possessed the ambition, drive and vehicles to pursue whatever his ultimate objectives 
were. In the summer and autumn of 1956, Martell held PLDF meetings before large 
audiences in Liverpool and Edinburgh respectively. This arguably smacked of 1930s 
British Union of Fascist meetings. It suggested Martell was willing to make a populist 
appeal directly to the electorate. Martell’s actions, and the perception they engendered
238 Ramsden, Churchill and Eden, 299.
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within Central Office of the PLDF, probably influenced Party Chairman Oliver 
Poole’s decision to attack fringe organisations in July 1956. Poole singled out the 
PLDF.246 If so, it backfired. Nearly eight hundred letters poured into Central Office 
from Conservative Party voters and members, the overwhelming majority of which 
supported Martell*s activities.247 The Committee of Investigation provided a synopsis 
of the letters. The synopsis revealed that the letter-writers were predominantly 
dissatisfied with the Conservative government’s failure to curtail trade union power 
effectively and only limited comfort in that only twenty specifically stated that they 
had ceased subscribing to the Conservative Party.248 Martell clearly appealed to a 
section within the Conservative Party. The Committee of Investigation warned that 
the Conservative Party should have nothing to do with the PLDF,249 a decision based 
on its perception that the PLDF was an extreme-right wing organisation led by a 
dangerous populist. Thus, although Ramsden correctly argued that the PLDF blunted 
its own appeal when it patriotically supported the government over the Suez Crisis,250 
Central Office would continue to watch it, and Edward Martell, long after the main 
political casualty of Suez, Prime Minister Anthony Eden, resigned in January 1957.
Indeed Central Office would maintain surveillance of right-wing organisations and 
individuals, regardless of what prompted their actions, whether they were inside or 
outside the Conservative Party. It would do so, however, in a society that was 
different to that when the Conservative Party had formed the Voluntary Organisation 
Section within Central Office to investigate such organisations and individuals. On 
the positive side, rationing had disappeared and consumer choice increased. More 
people took annual holidays at resorts like Butlins. New fashions in clothing displaced 
wartime drabness. Electrical appliances had mushroomed, revolutionising work and 
home. Opportunity for social mobility had increased, notably referenced in the 
Kingsley Amis novel Lucky Jim (1954) that charted the career of Jim Dixon as he 
attempted to take advantage of the new possibilities available in a wealthier society.
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Yet there were negatives too. For, not everyone appreciated these changes. To some 
right-wing individuals, Jim Dixon epitomised much that was wrong about these 
changes, having attained a position in society to which he was simply unfit. 
Additionally, a denuded and fading empire had replaced the image of the heroic 
imperial power victorious over Hitler. Suez had laid bare Britain’s imperial 
impotence. Deference had declined as criticism of the still dominant social structure 
and establishment that many thought responsible for Suez increased. Mid-1950s 
Britain was, therefore, a time when the imperial verities of British world power no 
longer held sway. Literary representations of this changed Britain, such as John 
Osborne’s Look Back in Anger (1956), attracted for their authors in the summer of 
1956 the soubriquet ‘Angry Young Men’.252 These novels reflected their authors’ 
perceptions of the everyday realities that this transformed society posed for ordinary 
people. Many of these novels became films. They also presaged the realism of the 
‘New Wave’ in literature and the ‘kitchen sink dramas’ of television, a cultural 
phenomenon that reflected a less deferential attitude which would become 
increasingly prominent during the premiership of Eden’s successor.
251 Sandbrook, Never, 153-155.
252 Daily Express, 26 July and 4 September 1956.
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Chapter 3. Macmillan and Home: ‘Pink Socialism’ and 
‘True-Blue’ Conservatism.
Eden’s successor, Harold Macmillan, advised the Queen in January 1957 that his new 
government might not last six weeks. Macmillan said this only ‘half in earnest’,1 
which revealed his nervousness after the Suez fiasco. His first objective was to steady 
the Conservative government after Suez. He could not afford to lose many by- 
elections. Therefore, Macmillan maintained his predecessors’ cautious economic 
policies and avoided confrontation with organised labour. The economy continued to 
grow. After three losses in early 1958, the Conservative Party did not lose any more 
seats. Macmillan appeared a languid continuity with previous Conservative leaders. 
However, Macmillan was more progressive than either Churchill or Eden. He gave 
some indications of where his sympathies lay from the beginning of his premiership. 
In public, he supported progressives. In Cabinet, Macmillan preferred government 
spending to tackling inflation, and favoured accelerating decolonization. After 
Macmillan secured an increased majority at the 1959 General Election, these 
progressive views came to the fore. Domestically, this meant a turn leftwards. 
Macmillan introduced policies that provided a larger role for the state, which
>y
Ramsden described as ‘a shift to a neo-corporatist doctrine of indicative planning’. In 
imperial affairs, Macmillan made his views clear in a dramatic speech that warned the 
South African government to accept the inevitability of decolonization.
Macmillan’s policies had continuities with previous Conservative governments. State 
interventionism occurred in the Conservative-dominated National Governments of the 
interwar years, and arguably harked back to earlier Tory paternalism. Decolonization 
was underway from the later 1940s and continued under Churchill and Eden. 
However, the scope and extent of Macmillan’s policies suggested that he was more 
left wing than any previous Conservative leader. This was how many increasingly 
disgruntled Conservatives viewed matters. Economic liberals proceeded to attack 
Macmillan’s government from the right. Conservative governments had effectively
1 H. Macmillan, Autobiography: Riding the storm, 1956-1959, Macmillan, London (1971), 182- 
185.
2 Ramsden, Winds, 7.
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marginalised such groups before the 1959 General Election by working with some, 
such as Aims of Industry and Drake’s Drum, and by opposing others such as the 
People’s League for the Defence of Freedom. Now, the PLDF returned and coalesced 
with others into a sizeable pressure group. Existing ‘die-hard’ imperialist groups such 
as the League of Empire Loyalists maintained their attack on a ‘treacherous’ 
Conservative leadership. New groups emerged. Often, these groups opposed 
decolonization in openly racist terms. A group even formed within the Conservative 
Party containing all of these attacks from the right. This group, the Monday Club, 
worryingly appeared to include the issue of skin colour amongst its concerns.
Initially, there was little detectable change in the Conservative Party’s relationship 
with the extreme right under Macmillan’s leadership. Central Office continued to 
investigate extreme-right groups, and its agents provided intelligence. Yet, there was a 
change. Central Office took more vigorous action against the extreme right than 
hitherto. It interviewed leaders of extreme right groups, and attempted to identify 
Conservative members that were involved in them and pressurised them to desist. 
Central Office acted proactively when the extreme right contested by-elections, 
inferring that these groups had links with fascism and devising strategies that limited 
their chances of success. Central Office was even prepared to extend such charges to 
the PLDF, a group whose ‘extremism’ was of the economic kind, not racial. Central 
Office’s actions are unsurprising in the circumstances in which Macmillan succeeded. 
However, these were not isolated incidents. Central Office watched economically 
right-wing groups particularly closely. It defended the party’s stewards when they 
physically attacked extreme-right protesters. Central Office even rebuffed the 
Conservative Party’s own extreme right when it asked for assistance, whilst at the 
same time assisting the party’s progressive groups. Nor was action against the 
extreme right limited to Central Office. Macmillan’s Government marginalised that 
part of the extreme right that was concerned about immigration by enacting legislation 
that appealed to their voters without ever conceding to their demands fully.
The result was that the extreme right could do little to affect the Conservative Party’s 
electoral fortunes during Macmillan’s leadership. Macmillan secured the 
Conservative Party’s third successive electoral victory in 1959. In July 1957, 
Macmillan had commented, ‘indeed let us be frank about it; most of our people have
never had it so good’. The media subsequently paraphrased this into, ‘You’ve never 
had it so good’, which summed up the Macmillan government’s appeal. The 
electorate was like the characters in John Braine’s Room at the Top (1957) and Alan 
Sillitoe’s Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (1958), contemporary ‘New Wave’ 
fiction produced after Macmillan’s accession and subsequently turned into films,4 in 
that they had indeed never had it so good. The Conservative Party focused the 
electorate’s mind on improved living conditions with its election slogan, ‘Life’s better 
under the Conservatives.’ The Conservatives increased their vote for the third 
successive General Election, the first time since the mid-nineteenth century that a 
governing party achieved this, and secured a majority of over one hundred. Macmillan 
was now ‘Supermac’, the unflappable leader.5 However, this electoral success was 
misleading. It obscured an increasingly divided Conservative Party. Moreover, it also 
obscured the extreme right becoming a much more vociferous, organised and 
potentially dangerous entity than it had since the Second World War. This was 
because by following progressive policies, Macmillan’s government opened up 
political space for the extreme right. This was especially so in areas such as 
decolonisation, immigration, the economy and trade unions, and less so over Europe, 
the USA and defence. Consequently, the extreme right was not defeated during 
Macmillan’s leadership of the Conservative Party, but an increasingly prominent 
phenomenon in British politics.
The Conservative Party’s Left-Wing Leader
Macmillan was originally seen as the right wing candidate in the battle to succeed 
Eden, but was in reality according to Gilmour, ‘probably slightly to the left of Butler’ 
in a contest with no obvious right-wing candidate.6 Macmillan openly supported the 
Bow Group as Prime Minister and quickly made his ‘progressive’ sympathies 
apparent. In July 1957, the Bow Group invited Macmillan to the launch of its new
3 H. Macmillan addressing audience at Bedford, 20 July 1957.
4 Room at the Top was released in cinemas in January 1959 and Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning in October 1960. In both films, the main characters live their lives in a manner, and 
with a freedom, not available to their parents’ generations.
5 ‘Vicky’ (pseud.), ‘Introducing Super-Mac’, Evening Standard, 6 November 1958. This was a 
pre-election caricature intended to mock Macmillan, but backfired.
Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 129.
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periodical Crossbow. Although Macmillan had substantial engagements, his 
Secretary, who believed that Macmillan ‘may feel that the Bow Group is so worthy of 
support that he should come up especially in order to help them’,7 sought advice from 
Lord Poole at Central Office. Poole advised ‘that if Mr. Macmillan could manage to
o
go to their meeting it would be a very good thing’, and thus revealed Central Office’s 
approval of the Bow Group. On 1 October 1957, Macmillan publicly launched 
Crossbow.9 Central Office officials also attended.10 This would have irritated right- 
wing Conservatives and disillusioned those who viewed Macmillan as Eden’s right- 
wing successor. However, irritation and disillusionment would have been far greater 
if the right wing knew just how extensively Central Office assisted the Bow Group. In 
August 1958, Earl Woolton sought Central Office advice about a Bow Group 
invitation to become Patron of its appeal fund.11 Woolton clearly understood Central 
Office’s intelligence gathering role. Lord Poole responded that although he thought 
groups of this kind should stand on their own feet and remain independent from 
Central Office, and had therefore always refused to give any assistance from 
Conservative Party funds, the Bow Group nevertheless did valuable work for the 
party and therefore advised Woolton becoming its patron.12 Poole’s comments reflect 
the standard Central Office position that disclaimed any association with other 
organisations. Central Office stuck rigidly to this position. For example, when the 
Secretary of Crossbow sought confirmation of the way in which Central Office would 
be promoting it, Deputy Chairman Sir Toby Low advised of need to include wording 
approved by Central Office that pointed to the separate identities of both parties.13 
Legally, such claims may have been correct, but Central Office’s publishing 
relationship with the Bow Group, limited the reality of this disclaimer.14 Moreover, 
Central Office was also complicit on at least one occasion in securing funds for the 
Bow Group. It was on Low’s advice that the Bow Group’s Chairman sought funding
7 Philip du Zulueta to Miss F. Yonge, 9 July 1957. CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow Group, 1956-59.
8 F. Yonge to P. du Zulueta Esq., 12 July 1957. CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow Group, 1956-59.
9 James Lemkin, ‘CROSSBOW -  A NEW POLITICAL QUARTERLY’, 23 September 1957. 
CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow Group, 1956-59.
10 G. Howe to Lord Hailsham, 20 September 1957. CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow Group, 1956-59.
11 The Earl of Woolton to the Rt. Hon. Lord Poole, 25 August 1957. CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow 
Group, 1956-59.
12 Oliver Poole to the Earl of Woolton, 29 August 1958. CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow Group, 1956- 
59.
13 Geoffrey R. Fox to the Rt. Hon. Sir Toby Low, 6 May 1960, and Sir Toby Low to Geoffrey R. 
Fox Esq., 11 May 1960. CPA CCO 3/6/38, Bow Group, 1960-65.
14 See 49.
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from the United Industrialists Association (UIA).15 Barr and Davies argued that the 
UIA and its later guise as the British United Industrialists supported, amongst others, 
AIMS, the Progress Trust, Central Office and the wider Conservative Party.16 Davies 
also claimed that the Conservative Party set up the British United Industrialists as one 
of ‘a series of “cut out” organisations which laundered funds through seemingly
t 7neutral sources’. If correct, and there is nothing to suggest the contrary, then Central 
Office’s disclaimer regarding its connections with the Bow Group is even more 
tendentious.
Central Office clearly felt positively towards the Bow Group. Many invitations to
attend Bow Group functions are included within its files, as is evidence of collusion
with the Bow Group. Collusion is particularly evident regarding the Bow Group’s
areas of investigation. Murphy believed that Macmillan’s Government might even
have used the Bow Group as an instrument of policy over decolonization.18 Ian
Macleod’s identification of the Bow Group as an organisation from where the
Conservative leadership could fly ‘useful kites’ regarding the Commonwealth and
Colonies supported Murphy’s claim.19 So too did the presence within Central Office
files of a Bow Group Memorandum that supported government policy and was timed
to coincide with the release of the critical Devlin Commission Report on events in the
Central African Republic.20 Some Conservatives did voice their opposition to the
group. T. P. Tierney, an active member since 1945, responded to the Bow Group’s
advocacy of comprehensive education in 1957 and threatened to leave the party if it
adopted the policies of group whose only method of combating socialism was ‘by
•  21absorbing large doses of socialism into official Conservative policy’. Although the 
party’s relationship with the Bow Group was obscure, some Conservatives raised their 
suspicions about it. Major Becket, Chairman of the North Dorset Conservative
15 Tom Hooson to J. B. Hobbs of the United Industrialists Association, 24 October 1960. CPA 
CCO 3/6/38, Bow Group, 1960-66 (Aldington’s inserted file).
16 J. Barr, The Bow Group: A History, Politicos, London (2001), 24-46. Davies, Nation, 179- 
184.
17 Davies, Nation, 180.
18 P. Murphy, Decolonization, 216ff.
19 CPA CRD 2/53/29, Future Policy correspondence and notes; letters to R. A. Butler, Feb. -  
Nov. 1958, 24 February 1958, 3. Macleod identified the One Nation Group as another avenue 
for this.
20 Central Africa: The Challenge of 1960, July 1959. CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow Group, 1956-59.
21 T. P. Tiemey to Lord Hailsham, 16 December 1957. CPA CCO 3/5/38, Bow Group, 1956- 
59, 3.
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Association, identified Conservative Political Centre printing of Bow Group 
publications as probable evidence of a financial relationship, but instead of asking 
whether there was any organisational or financial relationship of any kind with the 
Bow Group, Beckett asked a series of easily evaded questions.22 What was clear was 
that the new party leader actively supported the Bow Group, and enough evidence 
existed to suggest Central Office acted accordingly. Richard Rose noted that just after 
the 1959 General Election the non-party London Observer referred to the Bow Group 
as an example of ‘that secret and unacknowledged alliance between the leadership and 
the younger progressives’. This was important for one reason. Notwithstanding 
Ramsden’s argument regarding the error of describing the Bow Group as left wing,24 
this is exactly how many contemporaries saw it. Richard Rose showed that even non- 
Conservative newspapers thought the Bow Group was ‘a shorthand phrase for the 
Tory Left’.25 This view was especially prevalent amongst right-wing Conservatives. 
T. E. Utley, for example, thought the Bow Group ‘hardly to be distinguished from
<yjr
radical liberalism and sometimes even from socialism’. Nor did the extreme right 
miss it. Edward Martell stated that, ‘It is obvious that the Bow Group speak mainly 
for a clique of people who should really be in the Socialist party. And yet the Prime 
Minister, who has the final say in these matters allows them to continue their 
disastrous sway over the fortunes of the Conservative Party.’27 These views led to an 
increasingly divided party when the Bow Group’s right-wing opponents responded. 
Therefore, for right-wing Conservatives already disillusioned with the leadership’s 
policies, Macmillan’s accession had resulted in a turn leftwards.
The clearest sign of a leftwards turn came in a rush to decolonisation. In Race and 
Power (1956), the Bow Group advocated decolonization. Such a policy would 
unarguably anger the right wing of the party. Macmillan informed the Cabinet swiftly
•  90  #in January 1957 of his intentions to accelerate decolonisation, perhaps realising that
22 Major E. F. Beckett to R. A Butler, 7 January 1961. CPA CCO 3/6/38, Bow Group, 1960- 
65.
23 R. Rose, The Bow Group’s Role in British Politics’, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 
14, No. 4 (Dec., 1961), 865.
24 Seldon and Ramsden, ‘Ideas’, 168-185.
25 Rose, ‘Bow*, 865.
28 Daily Telegraph, 18 February 1960, quoted in J. Barr, Bow, 68.
27 ‘Helping Mr. Gaitskell, The New Daily, (nd, but probably 1962 as it refers to the Liberal 
revival seen at the Orpington by-election).
28 Ramsden, Winds, 22.
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Eden’s resignation provided the opportunity to pursue a policy unpalatable to many in 
the Conservative Party. Abstentions and resignations during the Suez Affair suggested 
caution. However, Macmillan realised the difficulty of implementing faster 
decolonisation if divisions revealed by Suez and other imperial disentanglements were 
allowed to widen and had acted to isolate the probable head of any revolt. Robert 
Gascgoyne-Cecil, Lord Salisbury, symbolised High Tory imperialism. He was the 
grandson of the Conservative Prime Minister responsible for associating the 
Conservative Party with the Empire. Salisbury was also a scion of the Cecil family, a 
family whose connections with the Conservative Party and Conservatism reached 
back over four hundred years. Moreover, Salisbury knew that Macmillan had 
minimised opposition in Eden’s Cabinet to the military attempt to recover the Suez 
Canal, only to be one of the first critics when it failed, because he had been 
Macmillan’s partner in ensuring the Cabinet’s acquiescence.29 Thus, in a deferential 
party, Lord Salisbury was especially dangerous to Macmillan. Macmillan therefore 
marginalised Salisbury by instructing the civil service to brief the press on Salisbury’s 
limited importance to the Government.30 He then orchestrated Salisbury’s isolation in 
Cabinet over the less contentious issue of the release of the imprisoned Greek 
nationalist leader Archbishop Makarios in March 1957, knowing that Nasser would 
soon reopen the nationalised Suez Canal.31 Nasser reopened the Canal the following 
month. Macmillan had succeeded in putting distance between his government and 
Eden’s over the Suez embarrassment, at the cost of Salisbury’s resignation as Lord 
President of the Council. In that same year, Ghana and Malaya gained independence. 
Sandbrook argued that literary representations, such as Anthony Burgess’ ‘Malayan 
Trilogy’ (1956-9), depicted not only a deflated and worn down imperial ideal, but 
mother country too.32 Such a view was unacceptable to many on the right. Inflaming 
this situation, after the October 1959 General Election with an increased majority and 
a personal mandate, was a less circumspect Macmillan. Six days after the General 
Election, Macmillan replaced the right-wing Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, 
with the more liberal Iain Macleod. Just prior to departing on a month-long tour of
29 Harold Evans, Downing Street diary: the Macmillan years 1957-1963, Hodder and 
Stoughton, London (1981), entries for 24 & 28 August 1956.
30 S. J. Ball, ‘Banquo’s Ghost Lord Salisbury, Harold Macmillan, and the High Politics of 
Decolonization, 1957-1963’, Twentieth Century British History, 16, 1 (2005), 77.
31 Ball, ‘Salisbury’, 77-81.
32 Sandbrook, Never, 301.
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African colonies early in 1960, the Bow Group released Africa -  New Year 1960, 
calling for Kenyan independence.33 On 3 February 1960, Macmillan addressed the 
Parliament of South Africa and left no doubt about his intentions when he proclaimed 
that, ‘The wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, 
this growth of national consciousness is a political fact.’ These comments signalled 
that Macmillan had decided to abdicate Britain’s imperial role in Africa. Historians 
have debated the reasons behind it ever since.34 Right-wing reaction to it, both outside 
and within the Conservative Party, hardened immediately.
Macmillan had also signalled that a liberal attitude would similarly prevail in the 
Home Office when he moved Chancellor R. A. Butler to the Home Office in the 
January 1957 reshuffle. Thus, it is unlikely that right-wing individuals who demanded 
restrictions on immigration were hopeful of success. Although all citizens of the 
Empire technically had a right to reside in Britain, it was not until post-war 
decolonisation began that immigration became a potentially serious issue. The 
Churchill and Eden governments unwisely ignored it. D. W. Dean showed that a 
combination of not wanting to antagonise the Commonwealth, the desire to present an 
image of enlightened Conservatism, limited experience of domestic issues, and Suez 
meant that these governments left these concerns over immigration to fester. The 
problem of such a stance is that it created a vacuum that the extreme right exploited. 
Tensions erupted a year after Macmillan became Prime Minister. Two weeks of race 
riots in Nottingham in 1958 foreshadowed more notorious rioting in Notting Hill in 
August. Oswald Mosley stepped into the trouble. Mosley utilised the propensity of 
‘Teddy Boys’, youths who supported the new cultural phenomenon of American ‘rock 
and roll’ who were identified with violence and racism from the start, to form gangs 
and fan racial hatred against coloured immigrants. Conservative MPs raised the issue 
at the October party conference. Sir Cyril Osborne’s motion, which called for entry 
controls, gained the delegates’ support.37 The government limited its response to
33 Barr, Bow, 57-58.
34 R. Ovendale, ‘Macmillan and the Wind of Change in Africa, 1957-1960’, The Historical
Journal, 38, 2 (Jun., 1995), 455-477. See also Murphy, Decolonization, passim.
36 D. W. Dean, ‘Conservative Governments and the Restriction of Commonwealth Immigration 
in the 1950s: The Problem of Constraint, The Historical Journal, 35, 1 (March 1972), 171- 
194.
36 Sandbrook, Never, 335-447.
37 Ramsden, Winds, 43.
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negotiating with Commonwealth countries.38 The clear intent was to buy time. 
Mosley’s failure to secure election at Kensington North in the 1959 General Election, 
despite being confident of success in the constituency containing the worst of the 
rioting, indicated that the Government was correct not to act precipitately.
However, the problem of incorporating immigration policy in the 1959 General 
Election manifesto, plus local Conservative Associations’ hostility and activists’ 
reports that voters persistently raised the issue, meant that Macmillan’s government 
lost the option of doing nothing about immigration thereafter.40 The actions of its own 
MPs and councillors after the 1959 General Election reflected the government’s 
limited room for manoeuvre. Newly elected Birmingham MPs formed a committee to 
secure controls on immigration, as did local Conservatives in Brixton and 
Birmingham. The Conservatives bucked the national trend by taking control of 
Smethwick council on a platform that called for immigration restrictions 41 Demands 
for action, which became increasingly prominent at party conference as immigration 
and unemployment both increased, resulted in the Commonwealth Immigration Bill 
of 1961. However, Party concerns were not the only considerations Butler faced as he 
drafted this government response. Dean argued that immigration restrictions, 
especially if seen to be racist, would limit Britain’s moral authority as leader of the 
Commonwealth.42 He added that the creation in 1958 of the Institute for Race 
Relations, based on a belief in the international importance of race relations, ensured 
that race related legislation had an international perspective, which meant that Butler 
could not consider immigration a purely domestic issue.43 Thus, Dean concluded that 
immigration problems gave Butler an opportunity to present ‘a multi-racial 
Commonwealth as a new enlightened force in the world’.44 Butler chose to present 
this enlightened view of Conservatism. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 
did not preclude further increases in the rate, or plan effectively for the consequences 
of immigration. However, by doing so it still left some political space on the right for 
the dissatisfied to exploit.
38 Ramsden, Winds, 43.
39 Thurlow, Fascism, 217.
40 Ramsden, Winds, 43-44.
41 Ramsden, Winds, 160-151.
42 Dean, ‘Immigration’, 173.
43 Dean, ‘Immigration’, 174.
44 Dean, ‘Immigration’, 174.
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Britain had a confused relationship with Europe and the USA that was inherently 
associated with lost Empire, as was defence issues. Having lost an Empire and 
impoverished itself in the process, Britain sought a new paradigm that allowed it a 
leading role whilst maintaining its defensive integrity. Large defence spending was 
impossible in peacetime, especially if Conservative governments were to honour 
commitments to the Welfare State. The Commonwealth, with its emerging 
nationalisms, would not necessarily prove a vehicle for this new role, which left 
Europe or the USA as the only viable alternatives. Both presented problems. Britain 
was ambivalent to Europe from the time of Monnet’s ECSC proposal.45 Membership 
of the European movement would also have an impact on the Conservative Party. The 
National Farmers Union (NFU), bitterly opposed to the EEC’s agricultural policies, 
influenced a substantial number of Conservative MPs on this matter. Iain Gilmour 
was Conservative MP for Central Norfolk from 1964, and thought that the NFU 
influenced approximately eighty Conservative MPs, with up to fifty of them actively 
opposing entry into the Common Market.46 Central Office officials watched local 
Conservative Associations for signs of anti-Common Market revolt.47 Monitoring 
external Conservative organisations also revealed worrying beliefs, including the 
Common Market as another ‘Popish Plot’ by Catholic Europe to undermine Protestant
40
England. Therefore, entry risked revealing party divisions. Procrastination was also 
risky. Unfavourable economic comparison could result in the electorate returning a 
Labour government. This could magnify Conservative Party divisions because many 
Conservative MPs influenced by the NFU represented rural constituencies with large 
majorities, and therefore among the last to be removed in a Labour election victory, 
leaving them disproportionately influencing the parliamentary party. Small wonder, 
then, that Macmillan later cited fears of splitting the Conservative Party for initially 
vacillating over Europe.49 These fears combined with Conservative leaders’ belief in a 
special relationship with the USA,50 and the electorate’s view of Europe as a 
troublesome continent that had unnecessarily embroiled Britain in two vast
45 See 33.
46 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever; 161.
47 Davies, Nation, 365.
48 Davies, Nation, 365.
49 H. Macmillan, At the end of the day, 1961-1963, Macmillan, London (1973), 31.
50 Davies, Nation, 365.
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conflicts,51 resulted in the government looking to the USA as the alternative focus to 
Empire.
However, positive attitudes towards the USA were not universal within the 
Conservative Party. Many Conservatives had voted against American financial aid 
after 1945 because they understood the negative cost to empire of the USA’s wartime 
assistance.52 The USA’s initial adoption of an isolationist nuclear policy had forced 
Britain to seek an independent nuclear deterrent in economically straitened 
circumstances.53 Moreover, the USA wanted Britain to join and lead Europe as it was 
hostile to the British Empire and thought that the Commonwealth evinced a continued 
‘colonial mindset’.54 American hostility towards British military intervention in Suez 
had amply demonstrated this belief. In 1962, former USA Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson rubbed salt into British imperialists’ wounds when he claimed that, ‘Britain 
has lost an empire and has not yet found a role’.55 However, Macmillan desired to 
maintain the ‘special relationship’ and sought the USA’s approval prior to applying 
for membership of the Common Market. This indicated that Britain was unwilling to 
put Europe before its relationship with the USA, which, Gilmour believed resulted in 
de Gaulle applying France’s veto in 1963.56 To many Conservatives, the USA must 
have seemed at best a conditional, and at worst an untrustworthy ally. Nowhere was 
this more evident or more troubling for Macmillan than over a failed defence policy in 
the autumn of 1962. On 19 December 1962, the USA unilaterally jettisoned the air- 
launched ballistic missile Skybolt. This left Britain with no credible nuclear deterrent. 
Britain seemed reliant on an ally with its own national interests at heart, not those of 
the fading British Empire. The Nassau Agreement of December 1962, wherein Britain 
leased its submarine base at Holy Loch to the USA in return for nuclear-armed Polaris 
missiles, amplified an unequal relationship that seemed determined to weaken the 
remaining British Empire.
51 Weight, Patriots, London (2002), 101.
52 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 25-26.
53 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 40.
54 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 73.
55 Hennessey, So Good, 274.
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Unfortunately, for Macmillan, his political troubles occurred at a time when British 
deference was clearly breaking down. The ‘Angry Young Men’ movement in 
literature and film, and satire on television and radio, exemplified this change. 
Beyond the Fringe satirised the impotent government that the Nassau Agreement had 
revealed. It attacked the Conservative establishment mercilessly, and to a vastly 
increased audience than its precursor, The Goon Show, evidenced by the issuing of 
over 10 million television licences by I960.58 Peter Cook portrayed the hapless Prime 
Minister reflecting on the Nassau Agreement. Cook showed Macmillan saying in 
reference to his conversations with President Kennedy: ‘We talked of many things, 
including Great Britain’s position in the world as some kind of honest broker. I agreed 
with him when he said no nation could be more honest, and he agreed with me when I 
chaffed him and said no nation could be broker.’59 The Conservative government’s 
apparent incompetence in economic matters and geo-politics seemingly confirmed 
right-wing fears that it was ready to ditch the Empire and compromise British 
sovereignty. Painfully for the government, liberal comedians lampooned it. Europe, 
the USA and defence were, unsurprisingly therefore, issues that right-wing critics of 
the Conservative government frequently raised.
The government’s economic policies and attitudes towards trade unions attracted 
right-wing attacks even more consistently. Right-wing criticisms continued from 
attacks during Churchill and Eden’s administrations, but became more vociferous and 
voiced suspicious of Macmillan’s true political persuasion.60 Macmillan’s government 
tried to avoid industrial unrest in the immediate aftermath of Suez, probably fearful of 
a collapse in sterling.61 It climbed down swiftly after encouraging employers’ 
resistance, which resulted in more strikes in 1957 than for over thirty years and 
angered Conservatives in the process.62 Macmillan’s failure to support Chancellor 
Thomeycroft’s demands for expenditure cuts resulted in the resignation of the whole
57 See 92.
58 Sandbrook, Never, 384.
59 Sandbrook, Never, 574.
60 Hennessy recounts Attlee’s belief that Macmillan was moving to join the Labour Party and, 
but for the war, would have been Labour’s next prime minister. It is unlikely that such a view 
was exclusive to Attlee. Hennessey, So Good, 557.
61 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 135. See also Ramsden, Appetite, 364.
62 Ramsden, Winds, 29-30. Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 135. See also N. Fisher, lain 
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Treasury frontbench on 6 January 1958 and exposed economic division within the 
party leadership. Ramsden identified these resignations as the moment when 
‘Macmillanite Conservatism chose the primrose path of inflation rather than the 
narrow gate that led to sound money’. Many party activists made known their 
support for Thomeycroft.64 The Conservatives lost three successive by-elections at 
Rochdale in February, and Glasgow Kelvinside and Torrington in March. The fact 
that Labour’s vote held or dipped proportionately to a reduced turnout highlighted the 
plummet in Conservative votes as irritated Conservatives abstained. However, the 
defeat in summer 1958 of a poorly executed London Bus Strike raised the 
Government’s popularity. Additionally, the inflationary impact of the government’s 
economic policies had yet to materialise. Consequently, five by-elections on 12 June 
1958 produced no shocks, and heralded a reversal of fortunes that Macmillan carried 
through to the 1959 General Election. However, this was a temporary respite.
A doubling of strikes in the decade to 1960, 90% of them unofficial, provided 
satirists’ with material of a unionised Britain. Socially realistic ‘British New Wave’ 
films flourished between the late 1950s and 1964 and focused predominantly on the 
realities of living in a changing society for the working class, lives in which strikes 
loomed large. Thus strikes, in particular, were a worrying undertone to General 
Election victory. Thereafter, the ‘inflationary seed-corn’ that Clark identified in 
Macmillan’s first term germinated,65 which led to price increases and fears of more to 
come. Macmillan was unwilling to contemplate using unemployment as a fiscal 
measure; a position based on pre-war experiences of unemployment as MP for 
Stockton-on-Tees and revealed in his book The Middle Way. Instead, Macmillan 
adopted the ‘New Approach’ in 1961. It aimed to forge harmony between 
government, industry and the unions, and was essentially the reinforcement of state 
intervention, planning and controls that was anathema to the right. In 1962, the 
formation of the National Economic Development Council and National Incomes 
Commission, which apparently institutionalised trade unions’ role in the economy, 
symbolised Macmillan’s corporatist approach. This grated with many in the party.
63 Ramsden, Winds, 33.
64 CPA CCO 3/6/88, League of Empire Loyalists -  general, 1956-9, and CCO 20/8/2, 
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Party activists passed resolutions at local and national level and revealed an 
increasingly hard-line approach to unions after the 1959 election.66 An Area Chairman 
reported defeatism amongst party workers and identified the government’s taxation 
and trade union policies as the culprit.67 Many questioned whether Macmillan or the 
party leadership was truly Conservative by arguing that there was little difference 
between the government and opposition, especially in areas such as the Welfare 
State.68 Macmillan’s search for economic consensus had paradoxically divided the 
Conservative Party in a similar manner as his attempts to deal with decolonisation, 
immigration, relations with Europe and the USA, and defence. It was against this 
background of a bifurcating party that Central Office contended with existing and new 
threats from the right, both outside and within the Conservative Party. These threats 
materialised extremely quickly after Macmillan became Prime Minister.
Outside Right.
Macmillan faced a by-election barely one month into his premiership at Lewisham 
North. The Conservatives had won the constituency in 1955 on a 77% turnout. 
Labour’s support at the by-election remained virtually unchanged on a still healthy 
70% participation and secured victory. This was understandable in the immediate 
aftermath of Suez. Moreover, as three candidates stood at the by-election instead of 
the two in 1955, the Conservative’s second place with a loss of over 4000, was hardly 
disastrous. However, the third candidate was not a Liberal, but Leslie Greene of the 
League of Empire Loyalists. She gained 1487 votes, which exceeded Labour’s 
majority. Therefore, it is probable that the LEL had damaged the Conservative Party 
at the ballot box by attracting disgruntled right-wing Conservatives. This was 
arguably the first time that an extreme-right group had affected the Conservative Party 
in this manner after the Second World War. Central Office correspondence during the 
contest suggested, despite an initial air of nonchalance, that it realised the possible 
harm that the LEL could inflict in the by-election. This led to consideration of other 
counter-measures during the campaign. Revealed thereafter is continuing alienation
66 NUEC 7 April 1960, 7 September 1961. Reigate CA minutes 3 February 1961 and 16 
February 1962.
67 Ramsden, Winds, 157.
68 Ramsden, Winds, 157. Area Correspondence file CCO 2/6/15, Wessex, July 1960 -  Dec. 
1964.
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of Conservative members and supporters as the Conservative Party blocked the LEL. 
There was also an indication that the Conservative Party had replaced its tolerance of 
fascist groups before the Second World War with an attitude that was wholly 
negative.
Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith visited Central Office on 4 January 1957 and presented to 
the General Director, Sir Stephen Pierssene, some notes on the LEL should they 
contest the Lewisham North by-election. Dorman-Smith warned of the need to brief 
the Conservative candidate thoroughly, and described the LEL as a ‘thoroughly 
reactionary semi-fascist organisation’.69 He commented on the LEL’s pre-war 
connections to Oswald Mosley and drew attention to anti-Semitic, anti-black, white 
supremacist views in its literature.70 Pierssene believed that a response from the 
Conservative Party provided such opponents with sought-after publicity, and so 
advised that it was ‘generally better to ignore freak candidates and not to attack 
them.’71 However, he acknowledged Dorman-Smith’s argument that the LEL may 
fight Lewisham North as it came so soon after Suez, and accepted his suggestion of a 
‘carefully worded and well-timed letter to the Times or the Telegraph, or indeed one 
of the Express newspapers’.72 When Pierssene requested a Mr. Adamson and two 
other Central Officer officials considered this action and report back, he showed that 
Central Office was willing to increase its level of activity against an extreme-right 
wing organisation. By 17 January, Deputy Chairman Oliver Poole was sufficiently 
concerned to inform Macmillan of the possible harmful effect on the Party of losing 
the seat. Poole argued that the LEL’s attraction of ‘a certain amount of dissident 
middle class vote and some right wing extremists’ complicated the issue.73 Poole also 
advised that Henry Price, Conservative MP and leader of the Middle Class Alliance, 
had promised support for the Conservative candidate.74 This information, together
69 Internal memo from S. H. Pierssene to Mr. Adamson, ‘League of Empire Loyalists’, 7 
January 1957, attachment. CPA CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
70 Internal memo from S. H. Pierssene to Mr. Adamson, ‘League of Empire Loyalists’, 7 
January 1957, attachment. CPA CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
71 Internal memo from S. H. Pierssene to Mr. Adamson, 'League of Empire Loyalists’, 7 
January 1957, attachment. CPA CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
72 Internal memo from S. H. Pierssene to Mr. Adamson, ‘League of Empire Loyalists’, 7 
January 1957, attachment. CPA CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
73 Confidential letter from Oliver Poole to the Prime Minister, 'North Lewisham Bye-Election’, 
17 January 1957. CPA CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
74 Confidential letter from Oliver Poole to the Prime Minister, ‘North Lewisham Bye-Election’, 
17 January 1957. CPA CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
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with details of reinforcements Poole had had drafted into the constituency, suggested 
that it was concern over the possible non-democratic actions of extremists within the 
LEL that concerned Central Office most rather than middle-class dissidents.75
The following day, 18 January, Mr. Adamson reported the results of his 
considerations to Pierssene, and agreed with Dorman-Smith’s suggestion of placing a
7letter in the newspapers. Adamson suggested that Dorman-Smith should attack the 
LEL’s campaign as futile and likely to result in the Socialists winning.77 However, 
when it came to the LEL’s nature Adamson suggested a more circumspect stance. 
For, whilst Adamson advocated questions about the LEL’s anti-Semitism, he 
nevertheless emphatically warned against mentioning Oswald Mosley and fascism.78 
His reasoning provided fascinating insight into how perception of ‘fascism’ and an 
organisation’s nature now shaped Central Office’s position. Adamson initially 
justified this stance by describing Mosley as inconsequential, but also suggested that 
the term ‘fascism’ had altered: ‘The man does not count today and the term has a
70changed connotation.’ Unfortunately, Adamson did not elaborate. Genocide had 
indelibly imprinted fascism with anti-Semitism in public perception. The 
Conservative Party wanted to forget its pre-war connections with fascism. If Central 
Office highlighted the LEL’s anti-Semitism but avoided accusing it of fascism, it 
could associate the LEL with Nazi brutality without raising potentially embarrassing 
questions for the Conservative candidate. This is why Adamson warned that 
mentioning Mosley and fascism only provided the LEL’s leader, Chesterton, with the 
opportunity to counter-accuse that, ‘there are Members of Parliament in the House 
who were nearer Mosley than he was and then goes on the attack against the Tories’.80 
Therefore, it would seem that Central Office had quickly learned that earlier attempts
75 Confidential letter from Oliver Poole to the Prime Minister, ‘North Lewisham Bye-Election’, 
17 January 1957. CPA CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
76 E. A. Adamson to S. H. Pierssene, ‘League of Empire Loyalists’, 18 January 1957, 1. CPA 
CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
77 E. A. Adamson to S. H. Pierssene, ‘League of Empire Loyalists’, 18 January 1957, 1. CPA 
CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
78 E. A. Adamson to S. H. Pierssene, 'League of Empire Loyalists’, 18 January 1957, 1. CPA 
CCO 120/2/63, Lewisham North, Jan. -  June 1957.
79 E. A. Adamson to S. H. Pierssene, ‘League of Empire Loyalists’, 18 January 1957, 1. CPA
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to describe the LEL as fascist rebounded against the Conservative Party, and 
adopted instead a more subtle approach of smearing opponents whilst distancing the 
Conservative Party from any prior connections. It is in this context that we should see 
the Daily Telegraph's description on 28 January of Greene as a ‘crackpot 
candidate’.82
By the end of January, one of the Central Office employees with whom Adamson had 
concocted this approach felt confident and advised Pierssene that the LEL was not 
making much headway. However, two days after losing Lewisham North on 14 
February, this official, Mr. Bagnall, reported to Pierssene the conclusions of a post­
mortem meeting held at the local Conservative Association. Bagnall identified 
Labour’s misrepresentation of the recent Rent Act as the main reason for loss, but 
thought that the LEL candidacy was the second cause.84 He described this as an 
‘interesting new development’, and highlighted the LEL’s anti-American comments
QC
and posters as particularly important. There was also a jolt for those who thought the 
LEL would attract votes equally from both main political parties. Bagnall reported 
that, ‘Most of those present this morning were convinced that the Independent 
Candidate took most of her votes from us.’86 Even more worryingly, ‘It was even 
known that members of our own association in Lewisham stated that after Suez and 
the abortive action they were going to give Miss Greene a vote to show what they 
thought of the Tories.’ The report’s comments made clear that whatever counter­
measures Central Office took against the LEL, it was insufficient in the immediate 
post-Suez circumstances. However, Macmillan was intent on accelerating 
decolonisation and could not tolerate the existence of an organisation that exploited 
the vacuum of imperial disgruntlement on the right of the Conservative Party. Central 
Office’s subsequent actions proved just how intolerable the existence of the LEL was
81 See 84.
82 Daily Telegraph, 28 January 1957.
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to the party leadership. They also show how Lewisham North proved a watershed in 
the actions it was prepared to sanction, endorse or acquiesce in, against the extreme 
right.
Publicity stunts remained the most obvious aspect of LEL activity during Macmillan’s 
premiership. In March 1957, an LEL protester interrupted Macmillan’s first major 
public speech.88 At the October 1957 Party Conference John Bean tolled a bell for an
SOempire that the Conservative Party had allegedly betrayed. The LEL even managed 
to break into the BBC’s programmes in 1958 and denounce the government’s decision 
to integrate Britain’s forces with NATO.90 Meanwhile, the Conservative bureaucracy 
continued to gather intelligence on the LEL and report its impact on specific areas and 
local Conservative Associations. One report identified the Branch Chairman of the 
Cambridge Conservative and Unionist Association as an active member of the LEL.91 
An internal report highlighted Conservative Party connections with the LEL, which 
included LEL members Field Marshal Lord Ironside and Major-General Richard 
Hilton, the former an erstwhile President of the Conservative’s Central Norfolk Area 
until 1954, the latter involved in the Young Conservatives.92 One Area Agent noted 
the simultaneous nature of LEL protests in many Yorkshire constituencies on the 
morning of government proposals for Cyprus in 1958, which raised the possibility 
that this was a co-ordinated campaign fuelled by inside knowledge.93 These are but a 
few examples. The Conservative Party and Central Office’s reactions revealed an 
increasing preparedness to use tougher measures against the LEL. For example, the 
Area Agent responsible for the Cambridge and Unionist Association reported that 
party members had attempted to oust the Branch Chairman and members of his family 
for their sympathies towards the LEL.94 The author of the internal report that 
identified Ironside and Hilton, although not wishing to commit firm instructions to
88 Bean, Shades, 104.
89 Bean, Shades, 114-115.
90 Thayer, Fringe, 59.
91 Lewis G. Martell to Sir Stephen Pierssene, 3 April 1957. CPA CCO 3/5/88, League of 
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92 Internal memo to the Chairman, ‘League of Empire Loyalists. Peoples League for the 
Defence of Freedom’, 5 July 1957, 2. CPA CCO 3/5/88, League of Empire Loyalists -  
general, 1956-59.
John Winning to the Chief Organisation Officer, ‘League of Empire Loyalists’, 30 June 
1958. CPA CCO 3/5/88, League of Empire Loyalists -  general, 1956-59.
94 Lewis G. Martell to Sir Stephen Pierssene, 3 April 1957. CPA CCO 3/5/88, League of 
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paper, made it clear that, ‘Area Agents should be informed and asked to make the 
point known’ that membership of the LEL was incompatible with Conservative Party 
membership.95 Central Office demanded that Conservative organisations identified 
individuals sympathetic to the LEL.96 However, Central Office’s response to the 
LEL’s stunts presented the best evidence of how far it was prepared to go to thwart 
this particular extreme-right organisation.
Mr. G. E. Higham of Stockton Heath, Warrington, encapsulated alienation from the 
Conservative Party and hostile reaction to its counter-measures against the LEL. He 
wrote to Oliver Poole at Central Office in June 1957. Higham identified himself as ‘a 
lifelong Conservative, by birth, upbringing and inclination’, and protested about the
07Conservative Party’s treatment of LEL activists. He highlighted manhandling and 
threats of violence and asked Poole how Conservatives could act in this manner 
towards individuals whose principal loyalty was to ‘her Majesty, The Empire (or what 
is left of it), and the White British way of Life’ 98 Higham compared the actions 
Conservatives had meted out to LEL members to the leniency he claimed to have 
witnessed to ‘Communist TRAITORS’ at Conservative party meetings, and thus 
expressed his anger in similar manner to Clan Briton’s Tomlinson.99 He also stated 
that many others shared his views and warned Poole of the consequences for the 
Conservative Party unless it returned to ‘the ordinary common decencies and 
Loyalties which people like me have been brought up to believe in’.100 This letter was 
the first in a number between Higham and Central Office over more than twelve 
months. Poole’s responded by implying that Higham was misguided due to ignorance. 
He set out the errors of the LEL’s disruptive activity at Conservative events and
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denied that Conservative stewards had been violent.101 Higham comprehensively 
rebuffed Poole’s interpretation and elaborated, which in the process expanded upon 
extreme-right characteristics evident in his initial letter. He reiterated disgust at the 
Conservative Party’s treatment of LEL activists compared to their tolerance towards 
Communists. Higham claimed that officials at a Warrington Conservative Association 
meeting, at which he was present, granted permission to a ‘Communist interloper’ to 
question the platform and, thereafter, distribute copies of the Daily Worker}02 
Higham interpreted this as evidence that the party did not adhere to true Conservatism 
and was becoming soft on socialism. Whilst he admitted that he did ‘not altogether 
agree’ with the LEL’s actions, he saw no other way people could ‘protest against the 
behaviour of a so-called Conservative Government which is perpetually letting the 
country down and behaving in the Liberal-Socialist-Fabian manner which was 
expected of its predecessors’. When Higham complained about the futility of 
writing to MPs, Ministers, newspapers and even the BBC, and of the consequent lack 
of an alternative, Higham revealed his frustration with contemporary democracy.104 
Thus, Higham implied that only by making non-parliamentary protests like the LEL 
could he and likeminded individuals achieve their objectives.105 Higham showed just 
how far to the right of the Conservative government he had become when he 
demanded redress for injuries that the Conservative Party had perpetrated or 
acquiesced. These grievances included, ‘The Liquidation of the Empire under the 
supervision and influence of the U.S.A., ‘The appalling influx of Coloured people into 
the country’, ‘The perpetual subservience to the U.S.A. in all matters’, ‘The European 
Free Market’, and ‘Taxation’.106 Higham’s correspondence was a futile exercise. 
Central Office stuck to Poole’s position of blaming the LEL and denying 
Conservative violence. Nevertheless, Higham was another example of how the
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Conservative parliamentary Party isolated an extreme-right supporter sufficiently 
enough to consider leaving the Conservative Party.
Despite Poole’s denials Conservative violence occurred. Many witnessed it. It reached 
its apogee at the 1958 Blackpool Conservative Party Conference where an LEL 
interruption to proceedings resulted in assaults on the individuals concerned. Centre- 
Right publications were outraged. Bernard Levin, writing under the pseudonym 
‘Taper’ in the Spectator, condemned the Conservatives for the punching and kicking 
of a defenceless LEL protester whilst on the floor. There was, Levin charged, only 
one conclusion: ‘There lies perilously close to the surface in some of the members of 
the Tory Party a layer of brutal, Fascist thuggery that breaks through at the sign of 
resolute disagreement.’107 Levin’s comments were in more than one sense ironic. 
Leaving aside Chesterton’s charge of fascism within the Conservative Party,108 Levin 
had touched on how far Central Office was prepared to go now in smothering the 
Conservative Party’s association with any organisation that rekindled its erstwhile 
association with fascism. The legal consequences of these events support this 
interpretation. Media coverage of the violence was extensive. The LEL identified 
Conservative member George Finlay as the chief culprit and sued for assault. The 
judge acquitted Finlay and awarded him costs,109 a decision that vindicated Poole’s 
assertion to Higham that the LEL caused trouble to peaceful Conservatives. Finlay 
may have been innocent. The Conservative Party may not have organised the 
violence. However, that does not mean that Central Office was not prepared to defend 
it. Numerous letters from Conservative witnesses that supported the LEL’s version of 
events poured into Central Office.110. How Central Office handled these letters 
showed it was prepared to go to great lengths to defend the party’s action against the 
LEL. Despite possession of this contrary evidence, Central Office made a legal 
deposition that denied the LEL’s claims.111 If Central Office disclosed these letters, it 
meant that it was willing to contradict individuals who, by being present at party 
conference, had indicated at least some level of support for the Conservative 
government. However, nothing in its files showed that Central Office disclosed these
107 ‘Taper1, Violence at Blackpool’, Spectator, 17 October 1958.
108 See 84.
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letters. This showed that Central Office was prepared to alienate more supporters to 
defeat the LEL, and indicated the actions it deemed acceptable to counter this threat 
from the right. It also meant that Central Office was possibly prepared to distort 
evidence when it made its legal deposition. If correct, Central Office was prepared to 
go to extraordinary lengths to harm the LEL. Whichever action Central Office 
actually took, these events and their legal fall-out indicated that the Conservative 
Party was willing to go further than ever to block the extreme right.
From 1958, the League of Empire Loyalists declined. Thayer stated that this was 
because the Conservative hierarchy had made it known that membership of the LEL 
‘meant political death9 to any Conservative with ambitions.112 Complaints in Candour 
of actions against the LEL supported Thayer’s assertion. These actions included the 
removal of the Cambridge Conservative Association chairman and the expulsion of a 
member of the Conservative Hackney Association.113 Candour also highlighted 
negative employer reaction and a general social exclusion, which it categorised as 
‘silent treatment, vituperation, ridicule and abuse’.114 In this climate, it is not 
surprising that a Conservative parliamentary candidate who was associated with the 
LEL felt compelled to resign his candidacy.115 It is not possible to attribute these 
incidents to Central Office solely. Considering the likely social arenas in which the 
LEL’s members experienced ‘social exclusion’, such as the workplace, golf club and 
other socially conservative organisations, some of these incidents probably reflected 
wider Conservatism’s disapproval of the LEL. However, they were probably also the 
avenues via which local party activists channelled their leaders’ warnings about LEL 
membership to aspirant Conservatives. Moreover, from 1960 onwards the 
Conservative Party employed stewards with specific instructions to block LEL 
attempts to disrupt the Party Conference, a development noted by national 
newspapers.116
112 Thayer, Fringe, 60.
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Consequently, the ability of the LEL to harm Macmillan’s government lessened. The 
LEL’s disruption of the 1962 Party Conference received little press coverage.117 The 
LEL failed partly because the post-war electorate was no more than lukewarm about 
the British Empire. Prosaic cultural symbols of empire such as Camp coffee and 
‘Empire Made’ toys formed part of day-to-day existence in the 1950s, but, as 
Hennessey showed, ‘by the time decolonisation had been achieved, Empire was 
already forgotten, surviving in the national consciousness as little more than a source 
of nostalgic philately’.118 Nowhere was this more obvious than in imperial 
commemorations. The Empire Day Movement, founded in 1903 by an ardent 
supporter of Edwardian patriotic movements, advocated annual celebration of Empire. 
From 1916 onwards, Britons throughout the Empire celebrated ‘Empire Day’.119 It 
was a major event involving school parades, the BBC, Church and Crown, and 
reached its apogee in 1925 when 90,000 attended a thanksgiving service held at 
Wembley Stadium as part of the Empire Exhibition.120 Interest thereafter declined and 
state institutions’ support for it diminished. Save for a brief resurgence during the 
1953 Coronation, Britons had rejected the imperial ideal even before the Suez Affair. 
Weight noted that Ministers were aware of the people’s lack of interest in or 
knowledge of the Commonwealth, and surmised that the government based its 
determination to provide vigorous governmental support to change ‘Empire Day’ into 
‘Commonwealth Day’ in 1958 on a desire to appease the Conservative Party’s right 
wing.121 When the change came, in 1959, it was instead to a ‘Commonwealth Week’, 
not merely a day, with a touring exhibition visiting British cities. The exhibition soon 
proved a total failure, however, and the government abandoned ‘Commonwealth 
Week’ for lack of support in 1962, a decision meekly accepted by the Empire Day
1 *70Movement, which dissolved itself the same year.
The failure of other imperialist right-wing groups to make any headway supported this 
image. In November 1957, for example, internal Central Office correspondence
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reported on the Elizabethan Party. It noted Central Office’s previous highlighting of 
the Elizabethan Party’s anti-Americanism and fascism, and dismissed claims of 
extensive membership.123 It also highlighted anger at Conservative policy towards 
India, Sudan and Suez, and a fear of unchecked communist infiltration within the 
establishment and trade unions. E. S. Adamson, who was a Central Office official 
and not a mere Area Agent, interviewed the leader of the Elizabethan Party, Frederick 
Guest. This indicated that Central Office took its surveillance activity towards this 
extreme-right organisation seriously. The report quoted Guest’s belief that ‘the 
wretched’ Conservatives were ‘too cowardly to work for anyone or even have a 
policy of their own’,125 which was a typically extreme-right belief that there was little 
difference between Conservative and Labour. Guest claimed there was a deliberate 
attempt to hinder the Elizabethan Party by a ‘news blackout imposed by the party 
newspapers and the State controlled B.B.C.’.126 If true, Guest’s accusations revealed 
that the Conservative Party used a new, more extensive method to marginalise the 
extreme right More substantial was the Elizabethan Party’s irritation at Conservative 
policy under Macmillan. Demands for reductions in the cost of living and taxation, 
offset by increased production, showed the Elizabethan Party’s anger at government 
economic policy. Calls for the removal of nationalised industries as the first stage 
in improving industrial relations reinforced the idea that the government pandered to
10ftthe trade unions. However, the Elizabethan Party’s overwhelming focus on a 
foreign policy based on the Empire and British interests alone, closer Empire ties, 
limiting NHS access to non-foreigners, and an independent nuclear deterrent with the 
Empire as a defence polity, revealed that imperialism was at its heart.129 However, not 
one single Elizabethan Party candidate stood for election in 1959. Considering that 
domestic issues remained the focus of the overwhelming majority of people, this is
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not surprising. Inability to mobilise an electorate apathetic to imperialism meant 
increasing marginalisation for organisations that were already marginal.
In opposing the LEL and investigating the Elizabethan Party, the Conservative Party 
played a part in this marginalisation. It continued to do so when LEL members 
defected to Edward Martell’s People’s League for the Defence of Freedom,130 an 
extreme-right wing group that, unlike the LEL, was not anti-Semitic. Also unlike the 
LEL, the PLDF focused on issues that more obviously affected the electorate. Like 
the LEL, the PLDF’s prominence early in Macmillan’s government had resulted from 
contesting a by-election. With an appeal based on domestic issues, the PLDF arguably 
posed a greater threat than the LEL. The by-election at East Ham North in July 1957 
showed that Central Office realised this, and that it had learned from the LEL’s 
challenge at Lewisham North by adopting a more proactive refractory stance.
Edward Martell, the PLDF’s chairman, believed that political trends made it 
impossible for Conservatives to overturn a Labour majority exceeding five thousand, 
but nevertheless thought that, ‘an anti-Socialist not tied to the Conservative Party 
might conceivably deprive the Socialists of the seat’.131 He argued that the 
Conservatives stood no chance in the East Ham North by-election, and suggested to 
Conservative party chairman Oliver Poole that he allow the PLDF to challenge 
Labour instead. Therefore, unlike the LEL Martell sought Conservative party co­
operation. Indeed, whilst he admitted that the PLDF was often critical of government
policy, Martell proposed to Poole a meeting to discuss a co-ordinated anti-Socialist 
1campaign. General Director Pierssene acted according to the conclusions of prior 
Central Office investigations into Martell,133 and curtly advised him there was no 
point in further discussion as selection was a matter for the local Conservative 
Association.134 Martell’s subsequent attempt to gain co-operation of the local 
Conservative Association received the same curt response, which show the
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Conservative Party’s centre and periphery acted in unison. Central Office was 
suspicious of Martell and determined not to have any association with the PLDF. 
Some Central Office Area Agents saw an opportunity to ‘follow out the excellent 
North Lewisham arrangements without too much difficulty when it comes to fighting 
East Ham’.136 This suggested that Central Office Agents’ were aware of the 
conclusions reached in the wake of the LEL’s campaign on how to counter the 
extreme right, and welcomed the opportunity to implement them.
Martell reacted to these rebuffs on 13 March with a populist appeal in the PLDF’s 
newspaper, The People's Guardian. Always replete with letters and articles that 
criticised trade unions and their leaders, The People’s Guardian articulated the views 
of a large section of the electorate, and implicitly criticised the government at the
117same time. This particular edition of The People’s Guardian was no different. It is 
easy to see why Central Office would be concerned. It listed PLDF meetings 
throughout the country, including verifiable details of venues, attendees and platform 
speakers such as Commander Hyde C. Burton, and thus reflected the countrywide 
extent of PLDF support and Conservative alienation.138 The People's Guardian 
printed Martell’s correspondence with Central Office over the East Ham North by-
1 'IQelection. It portrayed the PLDF’s candidature at East Ham as, ‘An opportunity to 
show both Tories and Socialists that the public has had enough of party antics’,140 
which increased fears that Martell actually intended to harm the Conservative 
government despite his attempts to secure Central Office co-operation. Martell’s 
request that readers participated in a referendum to support a PDLF candidacy in East 
Ham North indicated a worrying ability to harness disillusioned Conservative 
populism to attack Conservative government policies.141 Finally, Martell used The
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People's Guardian to increase PLDF membership and activism, which gave the 
impression that he wanted to create a new political party on the right of the 
Conservative Party.142 Such a party would undoubtedly harm a Macmillan 
government that followed a centrist path. If Martell succeeded in providing an 
alternative for disgruntled Conservatives, he could potentially harm the Conservative 
Party permanently, especially if future Conservative governments failed to counter 
socialism. Consequently, Central Office, as the bureaucratic echo of the Conservative 
leadership, opposed this particular threat from the right determinedly.
By 20 March, even before confirmation of a PLDF challenge, Central Office 
exhibited a resolve that was swifter and firmer than during the LEL challenge at 
Lewisham. General Director Pierssene, part of the triumvirate that co-ordinated the 
Conservative Party’s response to the PLDF, stated his belief that, ‘I think we should 
go ahead at once and prepare a plan of action and a line of attack.’143 In a contrast 
with his usual nonchalance towards ‘freak candidates’, Pierssene stated that, ‘I do not 
think that this is a case where the best policy would be to ignore them altogether.’144 
The responses to Pierssene’s comments mirrored this more proactive attitude and 
showed that Central Office was prepared to learn from, and take advantage of, any 
developments or consequences of the PLDF candidacy. Percy Cohen, the second 
member of the triumvirate, viewed a PLDF candidacy as likely to exploit present 
industrial troubles, and raised the possibility that East Ham North was only the 
beginning of a concerted PLDF campaign. Cohen argued that whoever the PLDF 
candidate turned out to be, they might only be ‘a guinea-pig in order to judge whether 
future by-elections should be contested’.145 He advised caution until the PLDF 
revealed the identity of its candidate and until Central Office knew ‘whether any 
prominent local Conservatives are to be associated with him’.146 Cohen thus showed 
that Central Office realised the PLDF’s potential to occupy political space to the right
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of the Conservative government and attract prominent dissidents. In the meantime, 
Cohen advised that Central Office relied on reports from its Area Agents on any 
PLDF developments in the constituency.147 Should they confirm a PLDF candidacy, 
Cohen argued, Central Office ‘should have an observer there throughout the
1 Aftcampaign" - Cohen identified four duties of this observer: to study tactics; provide
the Conservative candidate with information and guidance; report regularly to Central
Office and other interested departments; and draft questions to be put at PLDF
election meetings.149 He ended by stating that focus at all elections should be the
defeat of Socialist candidates. Nevertheless, Cohen had argued in favour of systematic
and coherent counter-measures against the PLDF challenge. The third triumvir’s
comments supported the view that Central Office acted more proactively in this by-
election. Mr. Adamson referred to the LEL’s use of outside supporters in the
Lewisham by-election and raised with Pierssene the probability of similar methods by
the PLDF.150 Adamson acknowledged that any action against the PLDF ‘in respect of
this by-election must be taken within the Constituency’, but considered ‘whether
some action on our part is necessary to curtail an ingress of League supporters from
the Home Counties’.151 Adamson was not kite flying, but making a serious
recommendation about how Central Office could counter the PLDF. He also
considered tougher measures and looked to the future when he concluded that, ‘One
most important point is whether now, or after the by-election, the attention of
Conservatives should not be drawn to the departure of the League from its original
stated intentions, and inferring that Conservative Members of the League must
10consider the question of loyalties.’ Adamson’s language showed that he thought 
Conservative PLDF supporters to be disloyal, and that Central Office should consider 
further action against them.
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Central Office was also aware of developments within the PLDF. The same day that 
Adamson sent his comments, Pierssene received intelligence from Harold Soref, an 
unsuccessful Conservative candidate at the 1955 General Election.153 Soref reported 
that a meeting to determine the PLDF candidate was occurring that morning and 
wagered that Martell would secure the nomination, a view that Pierssene immediately 
forwarded to Chairman Poole.154 Poole responded quickly with a report to Macmillan, 
which suggested that Central Office was concerned to counter the PLDF challenge 
regardless of Cohen’s comments about focusing on defeating the Socialist 
candidate.155 Poole highlighted the government’s failure to enforce secret ballots on 
trade unions and end their restrictive practices, and warned Macmillan that it was 
‘inevitable that Martell will take away a number of Conservative votes’.156 This 
showed that Poole understood the basis of Martell’s appeal to Conservative voters. 
Poole pinned his hopes for a Conservative victory in the by-election on the positive 
effects of the forthcoming Budget, but recommended that the party put ‘a
1 ^ 7considerable effort into fighting this bye-election’. However, instead of focusing on
the Labour candidate, Poole argued that Conservatives should ‘devote most of our 
attentions to the People’s League candidate, as we cannot in any circumstances 
win’. This was not a counsel of despair, but a reasoned appraisal of the likely result 
and from whence damage to the Conservative Party would come. Nor was it defeatist. 
Poole requested Macmillan’s permission for two Cabinet ministers to participate in 
the by-election,159 and subsequently referred to the assistance of hundreds of party 
workers,160 which showed that Poole was determined to resist the PLDF challenge. 
Just how seriously Central Office intended to counter the PLDF, and by what 
methods, soon became clear.
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On 27 March, R. Bagnall, the Chief Organisation Officer, explained to Pierssene why
Central Office had sent an un-proofed letter to the Chairman and members of the local
Conservative Association in the East Ham North constituency. This was an
administrative error. Nevertheless, the content of the letter, which asked recipients to
resist the PLDF’s attempts to secure enough support from Conservatives for their
candidacy, showed that Central Office tried to strangle the PDLF at birth.161
Subsequent events showed how. On 1 April, Cohen forwarded further information to
Pierssene and Adamson. Cohen pointed to strikes that were occurring, and argued that
Martell was certain to use them as proof of his warnings about trade union power and
Conservative government weakness. He developed his earlier comment that East
Ham was a springboard for future PLDF challenges, and warned that Martell
intended, if he saved his deposit, to use East Ham as the pilot-scheme for these 
1putative challenges. Cohen had also acquired further intelligence on Martell’s 
intentions. He was aware that Martell had rejected LEL assistance.164 This made it 
more difficult to level the same charges against Martell as those levelled at the LEL 
candidate at Lewisham. However, Cohen nevertheless advocated that Conservative 
activists used the accusation of fascist connections against the PLDF. He called for 
the preparation of reasoned criticisms of the PLDF’s demands and heckling material 
for Martell’s meetings, and argued that if any LEL involvement was detected, ‘our 
line might be to hint, through hecklers, that Martell has Fascist allies’.165 The 
resignation of the chairman of the Young Conservatives in East Ham, a Mr. Bell, 
proved that a personal attack on Martell formed part of Central Office’s campaign in 
the by-election. Bagnall forwarded a Daily Telegraph cutting to Pierssene and a report 
on the resignation.166 The cutting described the Young Conservative chairman’s 
disgust at the conduct of the campaign, and quoted him stating that, ‘it would appear 
that Mr. Bangay [the Conservative candidate] is preparing to conduct his campaign in
161 R. Bagnall, ‘East Ham North’, 27 March 1957. CPA CCO 120/2/61, East Ham, Mar. -  June 
1957.
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CPA CCO 120/2/61, East Ham, Mar. -  June 1957.
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the form of one long attack against Mr. Martell’.167 Bell was evidently aware of the 
existence of such a campaign, if not Central Office’s concern about Martell that 
informed it.
There was also evidence that Central Office implemented a greater degree of activity 
against Martell and the PLDF in the constituency. In the month of the poll, Central 
Office’s unsuccessful attempt, with Prime Minister Macmillan’s assistance, to enlist 
Churchill’s support revealed the extent of its concern.168 Undaunted by its failure, 
Central Office continued to seek to control the situation. With more success, it 
imported Central Office intelligence officers for work in the East Ham constituency. 
In a letter to the Central Office Area Agent responsible for east Ham North, Pierssene 
noted the recruitment of a James Hankey who had ‘undertaken to perform some 
intelligence duties’.169 Pierssene demanded that Hankey consulted with officials 
involved in the Lewisham campaign, and requested information from the Area Agent, 
Mr. Horton, of what plans had evolved and whether Hankey had begun preliminary
170investigations. Horton responded that Hankey had already read the report on the 
Lewisham defeat and had visited East Ham on a number of occasions, which 
reinforced the notion of a more alert Conservative party machine that was readier to 
meet the extreme-right threat of the PLDF.171 Moreover, when Horton advised that he 
would endeavour to carry the ‘additional expenditure’ caused by Hankey’s
177activities, he revealed that this was beyond the normal activities borne by 
Conservative constituencies or areas.
These actions represented more vigorous counter-measures actions than the party had 
deployed in the Lewisham by-election. The result at East Ham North, a halving of the 
Conservative vote, a similar sized Labour majority and a saved PLDF deposit,
167 ‘Chairman Quits: East Ham Young Conservatives’, The Daily Telegraph, 25 April 1957.
168 Oliver Poole to the Prime Minister, 3 May 1957, H. Macmillan to W. S. Churchill, 14 May 
1957, W. S. Churchill to H. Macmillan (nd), and H. Macmillan to S. H. Pierssene, 18 May 
1957. CPA CCO 120/2/61, East Ham, Mar. -  June 1957.
169 S. H. Pierssene to Mr. Horton, ‘East Ham North’, 3 May 1957. CPA CCO 120/2/61, East 
Ham, Mar. -  June 1957.
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171 Mr. Horton to S. H. Pierssene, ‘East Ham North’, 6 May 1957. CPA CCO 120/2/61, East 
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justified Central Office’s tougher stance. An ineffective response to the PLDF could 
have resulted in a stronger PLDF performance. Instead, Central Office revealed that it 
was determined to counter the government’s critics on the right.
Central Office’s actions during 1957 also reflected the political tenor of the new 
Macmillan government and his two primary objectives. In line with Macmillan’s 
comments to the Queen, the first objective was to ensure the government’s survival. 
This meant that the party had to maintain distance from ‘extreme’ organisations and 
individuals. Central Office’s changed attitude towards the Society for Individual 
Freedom (SIF) confirmed that the party’s priority was to maintain the Conservative 
Party’s distance from extreme groups. It had previously identified the SIF as a small, 
right-wing organisation,173 but Central Office considered it in March 1957 as ‘very 
right-wing in character’.174 It was a small, but significant, difference coming so soon 
after Macmillan had become Prime Minister. The candidacy of former Conservative 
parliamentary candidate Andrew Fountaine at the Norfolk South West by-election of 
March 1959 further supported the idea that the Conservative Party maintained 
distance from extremists. Ramsden described Fountaine as ‘disowned by the Party in 
1950 and now on the far right’, and argued that Fountaine’s candidacy caused worry 
within Central Office.175 Without evidence to the contrary, Ramsden assumed that 
Central Office wished to avoid embarrassing connections with an extreme-right 
individual. The evidence that supported the second objective is clearer: a three-figure 
majority at 1959’s General Election. This result further limited the potential of 
extreme-right groups to harm the government. However, it did not mean that they 
would meekly acquiesce. On the contrary, despite this comfortable mandate, 
Macmillan now faced opposition from a right wing that the government’s policies, 
and the society it represented, alienated to an extent unequalled by any other post war 
Conservative prime minister.
174 CCO 170/1/3/2 Women’s National Advisory Committee Outside Organisations Sub­
committee - Minutes, July 1951 -  Oct. 1960, 26 March 1957.
175 Ramsden, Winds, 37. CPA CCO 120/2/83, South West Norfolk, Jan. -  Mar. 1959.
125
Moving Right?
In A Kind o f Loving (I960),176 sexual desire conflicted with social mores. Apprenticed 
in a white-collar occupation, Victor is a man of solidly blue-collar working-class 
background. The object of his desire, the lower-middle class Ingrid, becomes 
pregnant, which compelled Victor to marry her. Financially forced to live with 
Ingrid’s mother, Victor is soon bored with their gossiping, game show-watching 
vacuity, and irritated at the elder woman’s criticism of striking busmen and miners. 
Almost inevitably, Victor walked out, but, receiving short shrift from his parents, 
Victor reconciled with Ingrid and settled for ‘A Kind of Loving’ in dingy premises 
away from her mother. A Kind o f  Loving also reflected late-fifties and early-sixties 
continuity and change. Victor’s parents envisioned better jobs, even social 
advancement for their three children. Ingrid and her mother lived in a semi-detached 
house with modem amenities, especially the television set, a house that was typical of 
many built when Macmillan was the Housing Minister. Yet, predominantly working- 
class football supporters still attended matches in suits, men and women who worked 
for the same company remained segregated on the shop floor and canteen. Victor’s 
decision to marry Ingrid reflected surviving conventions of shame and honour, 
hilariously captured by the registrar intoning the marriage service as if a prison 
sentence, whilst his sister’s incredulity when he admitted marrying Ingrid only for the 
sake of the baby mirrored changing attitudes. A Kind o f  Loving was a snapshot of a 
society undergoing change. Victor struggled against contemporary society’s 
constraints and long held mores, yet stood at the gate of the ‘permissive society.’ In 
this, A Kind o f Loving typified other works of the time, such as John Braine’s Life at 
the Top (1962), which was a sequel to Room at the Top (1957). Braine’s main 
character prospered in this changing, affluent society, but he was not necessarily 
contented with the results it afforded him. For many right wing individuals these 
changes were not necessarily for the better and the society portrayed by authors like 
Barstow and Braine was alien and troubling.
176 Made into a film in 1962, it is part of a trilogy covering Vic Brown’s life, the other two 
novels being, The Walkers on the Shore (1966) and The Right True End (1976). They form 
part of the ‘Realism’ movement of the 1960s, which also included John Braine, author of 
Room at the Top (1957), and later a convert to the Monday Club.
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New groups reflected this alienation, from society generally and the Conservative 
Party particularly. For example, Major-General Richard Hilton, formerly of Common
177 17ftCause and the League of Empire Loyalists, formed the True Tories in 1960. He 
complained that a lack of religious instruction had left students with ‘practically no
• 170knowledge of right and wrong’, and implicitly accused the more liberal Home 
Secretary, Butler, o f failing to redress the situation. In arguing thus, Hilton reflected a 
wider concern about juvenile delinquency. Films such as No Trees in the Street
(1958), Violent Playground (1958), And Women Shall Weep (1960) and Some People 
(1962), associated juvenile degeneracy with period’s lazy prosperity. Hilton 
highlighted the soft punishments that the judiciary meted out to offenders, and 
decried, ‘No wonder our standards of morality have gone to pieces, and with them our 
British character.’180 Hilton also argued that there was ‘a general lack of courage in
• 1 f tltackling the evil trends of post-war society’. He stated that the blame for these ‘evil 
trends’ was the, ‘positive poison, mostly from America, which is poured into the 
minds of Britons by almost every form of propagandist machinery -  the cinema, 
television, sound radio, cheap books, the “gutter press”, and above all by that
• 1 ft7American device for destroying juvenile minds -  ‘the comic strip’. Here, Hilton 
identified many prominent social features of society under the Conservatives that 
books and films of this period referenced. When he called for a return to the 
‘unalterable principles upon which British greatness was established’,183 which he 
identified as ‘a robust religious faith’ and ‘healthy moral standards, dependent on 
rigid distributions between right and wrong’,184 he showed that he was utterly 
opposed to the society that had emerged under Conservative governments.
Hilton opposed imperial decline just as Colonel Renfrew, wistfully remembering the 
end of empire in India, did in John Osborne’s Look Back in Anger (1957).185 
However, unlike Colonel Renfrew, Hilton did not simply pine for long-gone imperial 
grandeur. Nor did Hilton accept the imperial apathy of an electorate that contentedly
177 See 110.
178 Colwell, Radical, 15.
179 The Tenets of True Toryism. Leaflet 2: The British Character (1960), 7.
180 The Tenets of True Toryism. Leaflet 2: The British Character (1960), 7.
181 “True Tory’ Campaign 1961: Manifesto (1)’, 2.
182 The Tenets of True Toryism. Leaflet 2: The British Character (1960), 7.
183 “True Tory’ Campaign 1961: Manifesto (1)’, 2.
184 “True Tory’ Campaign 1961: Manifesto (1)’, 2.
185 J. Osborne, Look Back in Anger, London (1957), 70.
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watched comic depictions of imperial bureaucratic impotence in films such as 
Carlton-Browne o f the FO (1959) and The Mouse That Roared (1959) whilst they 
minimally participated in commemorations of Britain’s overseas role. Instead, 
Hilton attacked. He held Conservative governments responsible, especially that of 
Macmillan. In the True Tories’ Political Manifesto of 1961, Hilton began by 
describing the Conservative Party, in former times as, without question, ‘traditionally 
the patriotic party’.187 Its return to power in 1951, Hilton stated, had reassured right- 
wing patriots who believed it would avert the fall of the British Empire, restore 
Britain’s prestige and redress the decadence affecting society.188 However, Hilton 
argued, ‘appeasement of anti-British agitators, the betrayal of Her Majesty’s loyal 
subjects abroad, and a general lack of courage in tackling the evil trends of post war 
society ... continued unabated throughout the Conservative period’.189 Hilton went 
further and commented that despite its ‘unchallengeable size’, the Conservative 
government after 1959 ‘surpassed its predecessors in the shameful characteristics of 
appeasement and betrayal, which are the hall-marks of “official” Conservatism to-
1QAday’. Therefore, Hilton explicitly attacked Macmillan and his government with two 
particularly wounding charges, one ageless, the other still resonant in 1960s Britain.191
However, the True Tory manifesto was more than a generalised attack on 
Conservative governments. For example, it denounced the Commonwealth as a 
‘spineless agglomeration of nations, no longer, even on paper, under British 
leadership’, and thus revealed a specific belief that Conservative governments were 
trying to obscure the reality of decolonisation.192 Hilton cited the treatment of 
Archbishop Makarios as an example. Makarios was the charismatic leader of Greek 
Cypriot attempts to gain independence. Eden had exiled Makarios as a troublemaker. 
In 1959, however, the Queen welcomed Makarios as an honoured guest. Although 
this was part of a wider process to resolve conflict in Cyprus, Hilton nonetheless saw 
this as similar to the appeasement of anti-British agitators who terrorised British 
subjects, as occurred before Ghana gained independence in 1957, and was occurring
186 Sandbrook, Never, 304.
187 “True Tory’ Campaign 1961: Manifesto (1)’, 2.
188 “True Tory’ Campaign 1961: Manifesto (1)’, 2.
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in the Kenyan Mau Mau uprising.193 Hilton contrasted this appeasement with the 
government’s treatment of another colony. The Central African Republic, formed in 
1953 by a coalition of Nyasaland and South and North Rhodesia, was a penumbra of 
white colonial rule. Macmillan’s government believed independence was inevitable 
and, under pressure from the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, it 
pressurised its constituent parts towards decolonisation. According to Hilton, this was 
unsurprising because it was white settlers, not ‘black demagogues’, being threatened 
with force by Colonial Secretary Macleod if they did not ‘accept Whitehall’s betrayal 
with good grace’.194 Hilton thus revealed his belief in the Conservative government’s 
willingness to appease ‘a few anti-British Commonwealth politicians’.195 Moreover, 
when Hilton bemoaned Britain’s lack of any fighting forces worthy of the name and 
claimed that Britain’s existence was now dependent on a ‘none too genuine ally or 
upon the condescension of the United Nations,’196 he also revealed anti-Americanism 
and anti-internationalism.
Nor did Hilton miss changes that occurred at home, especially those within organised 
labour. Leader of the London Bus Strike in 1958 was Frank Cousins, General 
Secretary of the Transport and General Worker’s Union. Elected in 1956, Cousins’ 
appointment heralded a changing of the guard from moderate to left wing 
leadership.197 Peter Hennessey described Cousin’s leadership of the TGWU as ‘the 
toughest industrial opposition any postwar premier had had to face so far’, and 
remembered commuter’s rage during the Bus Strike.198 Hilton specifically criticised 
the Conservative government’s industrial policy in the True Tories’ 1961 ‘Manifesto’, 
and pointed to their failure to prevent victimisation or unofficial strikes by enacting 
legislation as an example of appeasement.199 The Manifesto also highlighted rising 
living costs in general and the Welfare State in particular. Hilton deemed the former 
most detrimental to those on fixed incomes but less so to the industrial worker, who 
he described as the ‘pampered child of socialism and false toryism alike’.200 The
193 “True Tory’ Campaign 1961: Manifesto (1)’, 2.
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Welfare State attracted condemnation for appeasing the ‘idle and feckless at the 
expense of the industrious and enterprising’.201 Hilton attacked the Conservative 
government’s corporatist economic policies. However, his irritation did not end at 
economic matters. R. A. Butler’s five-and-a-half-year tenure of the Home Office had 
brought a liberalisation in categorising homicide, resistance to the reintroduction of 
corporal punishment and a relaxation of laws governing licensing hours, betting and 
gambling, and obscene publications. This brought the opprobrium of party activists 
upon Butler’s head annually at Party conference. Hilton’s views accorded with 
many these activists. Hilton pointed to violent crime levels and described Butler’s 
refusal to comply with calls for tough measures as appeasement of ‘a few cranky 
psychiatrists at the cost of flouting those who put him in office’.204 Hilton made many 
such criticisms of contemporary society that mirrored the alienation of many 
Conservatives towards their Home Secretary. The True Tories’ Manifesto was, thus, a 
directed attack on the specific policies of Conservative governments, Macmillan’s in 
particular.
The remedies suggested in the True Tories’ Manifesto of 1961 were extreme. They
AAC
included social service cuts in order to fund an independent national defence, 
heavier penalties for violent crime, penalising young offenders’ parents, and allowing 
police to kill certain criminals on sight.206 Yet, the Manifesto was more than the 
demands of an extreme-right individual. It also evidenced Hilton’s continuing 
rightwards journey. The methods Hilton suggested showed this best. Formerly a 
Conservative Party member, Hilton claimed that the initial objective of the True 
Tories at its inception in 1960 was the ‘gradual re-education of the Conservative
•  0 (\ 7electorate, as a whole, in the temporarily forgotten principles of “true toryism’” . A 
reawakened Conservative electorate that pressurised the leadership by their votes and
A A O
withdrawn funds would bring the party ‘back into the path of patriotism’. However, 
by the time of the Manifesto, with Macmillan’s New Approach commencing, Hilton’s
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attitude had changed. Hilton now described his initial plan as unworkable due to the 
leadership only being in touch with the electorate at election time. He accused 
Macmillan’s government of holding the electorate in contempt, especially on crime 
and coloured immigration, and argued that, ‘Right-wing patriots must, therefore, bring
9 nopressure on this obstinate leadership in the legitimate ways that are open to us.’ 
Despite using the word ‘legitimate’, Hilton’s appeal did not quite rule out other 
means. Moreover, although he mentioned democratic measures such as letter-writing 
and cancelled subscriptions, Hilton’s italicisation of ‘pressure’ indicated he was an 
individual who at least contemplated the possibility of non-democratic measures. In 
opinions and remedies as well as methods, Major-General Richard Hilton was an 
example of a wider trend in which the Conservative Party alienated right-wing 
individuals by adopting policies and a political stance they considered was hitherto 
associated with the left. The Conservative Party’s action against the extreme right in 
this instance was that it forced such individuals into the political spotlight without the 
comforts of belonging to a monolithic, mainstream political party and had no 
relationship henceforth with them whatsoever. However, the Conservative Party’s 
opposition to Hilton and the True Tories was more than mere repulsion. In this 
instance, attraction played as great a part.
Skin colour was central to Hilton’s Weltanschauung. In the third True Tory leaflet of 
1960, ‘Who are the British?’, for example, Hilton advocated the creation of a new 
British Empire and denounced the vagueness of the Commonwealth as reflected in the
9 i nCoronation oath. This new empire, united under one monarchy, would become one 
economic and defensive unit, in which British minorities enjoyed the protection of 
Her Majesty’s Government.211 Therefore, being British conferred substantial 
privileges regardless of domicile. Whom did Hilton regard as ‘British’ however? 
Hilton stated that the term ‘British’ ‘should be reserved for those whose home country
919is the United Kingdom’, but added a caveat that ‘even here caution is needed’. He 
posed the question of whether a Jamaican living in Britain was British because of his
209 True Tory’ Campaign 1961: Manifesto (1)’, 3.
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11 The Tenets of True Toryism. Leaflet 3: Who are the British? (1960), 2-3.
212 The Tenets of True Toryism. Leaflet 3: Who are the British? (1960), 3.
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residence, and answered emphatically: ‘Obviously not, say True Tories, if there is any 
meaning at all in race.’ Even if the individual concerned was the most loyal subject, 
who for Hilton included those who adhered to the proper rules and mores of British 
society, ‘this does not, and never can, make him “British” by race’.214 It is clear from 
this alone that race was to be the determining characteristic in Hilton’s new British 
Empire. It is doubly ironic that Hilton’s views found reflection in Winds o f Change 
(1961), a film that utilised Macmillan’s Pretoria speech, and contained the juvenile
nit
violence that Hilton deplored. Moreover, Hilton clearly distinguished between 
being ‘British’, as determined by race, and being a ‘British subject’, which he saw as 
a description that applied to all within the Empire. Hilton stated that both terms had 
become indistinguishable due to lax language and attitudes, and argued that this gave 
rights of entry to individuals with no real loyalty to Britain as they were, by race, not
91 (%really British. To Hilton, this laxity threatened Britain’s existence: ‘True Tories 
insist that such laxity is illogical, suicidal and must be stopped at once.’217 By 
‘suicidal’, Hilton meant the dilution of the ‘white race’. This was a contemporary 
racist view that the film Sapphire (1959) successfully portrayed with a ‘respectable’
91 ftwhite mother killing her son’s mixed race fiance. Along with remedies of an 
immediate end to non-British immigration, repatriation of immigrants arriving in the 
last five years and an end to the betrayal of white settlers,219 Hilton called for a colour 
bar on all immigration to avoid the consequences evident in Sapphire. Unfortunately, 
for any political ambitions that Hilton harboured, a colour bar on immigration was 
exactly what the Conservative government provided.
Despite immigration providing an ‘undercurrent of dissent’,220 the Conservative 
governments of 1951 onwards had avoided it. By 1955, the Eden government, was 
increasingly aware of the protests from local Conservative Associations regarding the 
effects on housing and public health, and concluded that immigration controls were 
inevitable, only to decide that the time was not ripe. This reflected divisions within
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the Conservative Party hierarchy over immigration. Lord Salisbury, for example, 
urged Eden to take action before it was too late, only for the Commonwealth 
Relations Secretary, Lord Home, to counter effectively by warning that the issue was 
‘a red-hot question within the Commonwealth and we must if at all possible avoid 
it’. Additionally, Suez had made it less likely that a government that needed allies 
would wilfully antagonise potentially separatist parts of the Empire. Thus, for foreign 
and domestic reasons, the Conservative government avoided the immigration issue. 
Nevertheless, grassroots concerns about it remained. In 1958, Sir Cyril Osborne 
angrily told the press that, ‘it was time someone spoke out for the white man in this 
country’.222 Party Conference supported his call for entry controls.223 The government 
did gain some respite. Negotiations with Commonwealth countries ensured that the 
issue remained off the agenda at the 1959 General Election.224 Oswald Mosley’s 
failure to convert exploitation of the 1958 race riots into electoral success in 1959 
provided additional respite. Polling 8.1%, Mosley lost his deposit in Kensington 
North, an area badly affected by the riots.225 However, respite was minimal.
The 1959 General Election produced the paradoxical effect of a Prime Minister with a 
much-increased majority but also potentially far more hostility from the right. Some 
newly elected Birmingham Conservative MPs united and pressed for action against an 
issue they claimed that the electors had raised during the campaign.226 In January 
1961 Harold Gurden, Conservative MP for Birmingham Selly Oak, arranged a 
meeting to campaign for immigration controls that was comprised of party
997backbenchers who represented areas where immigration was keenly felt. The 
following month, Osborne put a motion to the Commons that provided seemingly
9 9 0
coherent and reasonable arguments in favour of immigration control. However, 
coherence and reasonableness disappeared when Osborne explicitly identified
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coloured immigrants as the major problem. His comment, ‘This is a white man’s 
country and I want it to remain so’, was more in tune with Hilton. Debate within 
the Commons was openly racist at times, with Norman Pannell, Conservative MP for 
Liverpool Kirkdale, especially prominent. This presented the government with a 
dilemma. If the leadership granted immigration controls, they would be open to the 
charges of racism that would refresh memories of embarrassing pre-war connections 
with fascism. However, if the leadership failed to act it would inflame the right wing, 
which seemed to be coalescing and more organised after 1959. The government 
spokesman’s comments in the debate Osborne’s motion initiated reflected this 
dilemma. David Renton, the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office, 
assured the Commons that the government was against discrimination when he denied 
or minimised every problem that those seeking immigration controls raised. Yet, 
paradoxically, Renton argued that immigration would become a more severe problem 
if it continued. The admission that the government, nevertheless, was indeed 
considering possible solutions questioned Renton’s conclusion that the motion was 
impractical and the government not ready to act.
Late in 1961, the government introduced the Commonwealth Immigration Bill. Rising 
unemployment, especially severe amongst New Commonwealth immigrants, 
contributed to the government’s decision. Worsening economic conditions resulted 
in the government’s poor performance in four by-elections in spring 1962 and 
culminated in the shocking loss at Orpington on a 27% swing to the Liberals. 
Therefore, this Bill was largely a response to the electorate’s economic fears. 
However, there is also little doubt that immigration per se also increasingly concerned 
the electorate. Investigations revealed that the number of those thinking immigration 
too high had increased, and reached 84% of those polled by 1963.234 In one sense, 
therefore, the decision to introduce the Bill after many years of delay was a 
consequence of pressure exerted from outside the government and party. Yet, internal 
pressure also played a powerful role. Many letters from party members in the
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Conservative Party Archive support this. The actions of Conservative MPs Gurden, 
Osborne, Pannell, et al added weight to this view. More cynically, as Ramsden 
argued, the Bill allowed the Conservative government to ‘get back in touch with the 
views of its grass roots’. It may also have pacified those Conservative MPs that the 
extent and speed of decolonisation had alienated. This also had implications for the 
Conservative Party’s relationship with the extreme right. The Bill did not place limits 
on future immigration, or address the issue of repatriation. Both omissions allowed 
the government to combat charges of racism and memories of painful pre-war 
associations resurfacing. However, the implementation of a colour bar, made clear 
by exempting Southern Irish immigrants from stringent entry requirement, did meet 
one of the extreme right’s most substantial demands. In doing so, the government 
extended its reach into extreme-right political space it hitherto avoided. This 
presented problems for the extreme right. The politically involved, like Hilton, may 
have understood the Bill’s limitations. However, its enactment in 1962 provided those 
who were considering supporting extreme-right groups with a dilemma. Should they 
vote for a Conservative government that, despite some members’ obvious distaste for
9 V)the Bill, and despite extensive and swift decolonisation, now passed a law that 
addressed their fears of coloured immigration? Alternatively, should they cast their 
vote for a miniscule group such as the League of Empire Loyalists or True Tories? 
The lack of any electoral breakthrough in any by-elections in the 1959-64 Parliament, 
suggests that extreme-right voters, maybe reluctantly, stuck with the Conservative 
Party.240 ‘Extremism’ not being synonymous with ‘stupidity’, most of these voters 
undoubtedly knew that their objectives had more chance of realisation by voting 
Conservative. Regardless of intent, therefore, the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 
1962 cut the feet from under the True Tories and further limited the appeal of the 
League of Empire Loyalists.
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Many people in Britain may have shared Hilton’s views on immigration. Some 
undoubtedly shared his views on race. Few shared his imperial ambitions, especially 
after 1945. Interwar parties that advocated the imperial cause had achieved 
respectable levels of support. However, between the war and Hilton’s launch of the 
True Tories in 1960 their results were derisory. For example, the Empire Free Trade 
Crusade (1929-31) and the United Empire Party (1930-31) secured votes of 24-37% at 
by-elections in 1930 and 1931.241 In contrast, the British Empire Party of P. J. Ridout 
(1951-52) gained only 3.4% in the one constituency it contested in the 1951 General 
Election. The subsequent vehicle for Ridout’s views, the League of Empire Loyalists, 
had secured only 4% at Lewisham North in February 1957.242 Those that focused their 
British Nationalism domestically rather than imperially faired no better. Whilst 
Mosley was performing badly at Kensington North in the 1959 General Election, John 
Bean, erstwhile member of Mosley’s Union Movement and the League of Empire 
Loyalists, unsuccessfully campaigned for the National Labour Party candidate at St. 
Pancras North, who gained just over 4%. These results supported Hennessy’s view 
that the electorate was apathetic towards a moribund Empire.244 There was other 
evidence too. Contemporary observers, such as John Osborne, believed traditional 
working-class entertainments such as music hall to be declining.245 Instead, just as 
Barstow depicted in A Kind o f  Loving, people watched their modem equivalent, 
television productions such as Saturday Night at the London Palladium and game 
shows like What’s My Line, in the isolation of their homes. In 1960, the same year 
that Hilton formed the True Tories, the film version of The Entertainer based on 
Osborne’s play of 1957 coincidentally premiered. Osborne used the disappearing 
music hall genre as a metaphor for the declining Empire in The Entertainer 2A6 He 
portrayed Britannia naked save for a trident and helmet, which represented 
cinematically the weakness of Britain’s imperialism just as Hilton represented it 
politically. It was a view that Britons themselves increasingly voiced.247
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Not all groups alienated by societal changes focused on immigration and race. Fears 
about the changing morals that A Kind o f  Loving exemplified provided an impetus to 
Moral Re-Armament. Moral Re-Armament emerged from the Oxford Group founded 
in 1938 by Reverend Frank Buchman. It intended to bring Christian values to the fore 
in political and social issues. This objective was acceptable to many Conservatives. 
However, in 1946 prominent Labour MPs had highlighted the Oxford Group’s 
associations with leading members of the Nazi Party.248 Any connection with Moral 
Re-Armament, therefore, carried the danger of resurrecting the Conservative Party’s 
connections with interwar fascism. Central Office and progressive Conservatism 
could not tolerate this. In April 1962, a Conservative MP narrowly missed de­
selection for his membership of Moral Re-Armament, and received the instruction to 
spend more time with his constituency.249 Central Office objected to Conservatives 
using party platforms to make Moral Re-Armament speeches.250 Similar to the stance 
towards R. W. Petter and the New Reform Party, Central Office objected also to the 
religious bigotry inherent within an exclusively Christian political organisation that 
promoted just one religious creed. Some Conservatives complained that Central 
Office issued directives that warned local associations against associating with Moral 
Re-Armament, and sought clarification from it.252 These brought the by now standard 
Central Office reply that denied any connection or association with such 
organisations.253 Within Central Office, correspondence revealed the belief that Moral 
Re-Armament was ‘ultra right wing.’254 Central Office may or may not have issued 
written directives, but its opinion of, and therefore attitude towards, Moral Re- 
Armament was consistent with the post-1945 desire to avoid embarrassing 
connections with organisations it perceived as extremely right wing.
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The problem for extreme-right individuals such as Hilton was that they backed an 
imperial horse that the electorate now considered lame whilst massive sales of Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover, after jurors acquitted its publishers of indecency charges on 2 
November 1960, suggested that Moral Rearmament flogged a dead one. The 
centrality of race in the thinking of the extreme right had been proved equally limited 
by Mosley’s inability to exploit the issue. If the most recognisable character amongst 
the extreme right could not harness genuinely held concerns about immigration, what 
chance had those with much less public recognition? Economic considerations were 
far more pressing for the electorate. The ubiquitous nature of economic concerns, 
affected all electors and not just right-wing extremists, and thus made this issue 
potentially far more problematic for the Conservative party and government. Here, 
however, two factors provided scope for the extreme right to attack Macmillan’s 
government on a non-imperial front: poor economic management and a failure to 
counter increased trade union militancy.
The Right to Work.
Chancellor Amory’s 1959 give-away budget might have helped Macmillan win the 
1959 General Election, but it also increased the trade gap and inflation as imports 
increased to meet consumer demand. Affected by pre-war experiences of 
unemployment in Stockton-on-Tees, Macmillan baulked against harsh remedial 
measures that would produce it. Amory realised the necessity of overturning the pre­
election budget and offered to resign, but Macmillan refused. Amory consequently 
produced a neutral budget in April 1960. On Amory’s eventual resignation in June 
1960, Macmillan made Selwyn Lloyd Chancellor, a promotion Sandbrook thought 
indicated Macmillan’s determination to run the Treasury himself. However, when the 
measures introduced by Lloyd also appeared to be failing, evidenced by the shattering 
loss of Orpington in March 1962, the axe quickly fell on Lloyd. Macmillan 
mishandled the resulting reshuffle, the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ wherein Macmillan 
sacked a third of the Cabinet, which destroyed Macmillan’s unflappable public image. 
Importantly when considering the opinions of the right wing, however, Macmillan’s 
effective takeover of the Treasury in 1960 identified its policies with the Prime
138
Minister personally. Viewed in this light, the New Approach of 1961, a turn towards 
corporatism and state planning,255 becomes even more a product of Macmillan’s 
political philosophy. Macmillan was the author of The Middle Way, a book that 
advocated state intervention and consensus with labour. It was a philosophy bom 
from witnessing the depredations caused by economic slump in the inter-war years as 
Stockton’s MP. Macmillan’s firm control of the Treasury was consistent with these 
views. However, his philosophy was unacceptable to many on the right. 
Macmillan’s actions, which arguably revealed to right-wingers a Prime Minister 
incapable of managing the economy due to a personal penchant for socialistic 
economic theory, would not have lessened their suspicions about a Prime Minister 
that they held responsible for the staggeringly swift dismantling of the British Empire.
Apparent appeasement of organised labour exacerbated these suspicions. Organised 
labour was the domestic vanguard of Communism for many right-wingers, but not 
exclusively so. For example, the Boulting Brothers, who produced I ’m All Right, Jack
(1959), a film satire of union selfishness and incompetence that the left viewed as an 
unpardonable assault on the Labour movement, supported the Liberal Party.257 The 
film depicted ostracism, a Lenin-worshipping shop steward who refused to accept a 
union member’s incompetence as sufficient grounds for dismissal, a wildcat strike 
that spread throughout British industry and a government minister who was incapable 
or unwilling to become involved. The film struck a chord with many due to the 
increased incidence of such action in the real economy. The composition in the film 
of those demonstrating against the unofficial action was also revealing when 
considering the right’s attitude towards this phenomenon and the government’s 
inertia. Amongst the protesters that supported the right to work the only two 
organisations explicitly depicted are the British Housewives League and the League 
of Empire Loyalists. This suggested that the Boulting brothers knew exactly who was 
prepared to confront the unions when the Conservative government would not. Much 
harder hitting was the winner of the 1961 BAFTA Award for Best British Screenplay,
255 See 105.
256 Sandbrook cites several senior Cabinet members unhappy with this position. Sandbrook, 
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The Angry Silence (1960). It opened with a pre-arranged meeting between a naive 
union official and an imported communist agitator, and made clear that what followed 
resulted from communist design. The communist manipulated the union man into 
escalating petty grievances into a wildcat strike. Tom Curtis was an employee at the 
factory who was struggling to make ends meet with two children and a pregnant wife 
in an inadequate flat and faulty television brought on hire purchase. Curtis ignored the 
unofficial strike because it was unpaid. The union official, unaware that the 
communist agitator worked under instruction from his political masters to disrupt the 
factory’s contribution to the Cold War effort, accepted the agitator’s plan to utilise 
Curtis’ stance. Curtis was ostracised and intimidated. Sympathy strikes occurred. 
National press and television became involved. Alan Whicker devastatingly 
interviewed juvenile strikers and revealed the ignorance and callousness of those who 
had victimised Curtis. Schoolchildren attacked Curtis’ son, and Curtis lost sight in one 
eye when beaten by two of Whicker’s interviewees. Vilified in the left wing press, 
Conservative newspapers praised The Angry Silence for dealing with an issue many 
thought that the government ignored.259 The Angry Silence was simplistic, inaccurate 
and even paranoid. British unions were much less active than their European counter­
parts and many British workers held long-standing grievances in an unequal society. 
However, that is to miss the point. The film succeeded because it resonated with an 
electorate that personally or vicariously experienced the effects of union action. The 
criticism of union excesses by those who wrote, filmed, directed and starred in it 
reflected this experience. Many of them deferred their salaries for ‘a labour of love 
rooted in political conviction’ 260
The fact that the British electorate could only experience circumstances in Britain 
minimised charges that industrial relations were worse elsewhere. It is unlikely many 
electors soothed their irritation by comparing British industrial relations with those in 
Europe, Japan or America. Instead, what was evident was that the government 
appeared incapable or unwilling to act against increased industrial action. The average 
number of strikes lost in the decade to 1964 increased by nearly 50% on the previous
259 Sandbrook, Never, 355. Tony Shaw, British cinema and the Cold War: the State, 
propaganda and consensus, I. B. Tauris, London (2006), 165. The Times, 14 March, 18 May 
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decade, and working days lost nearly doubled. Wildcat strikes increasingly 
predominated. Macmillan’s government submitted to union demands or introduced 
poorly thought out policies. Soon after the General Election of 1959, for example, 
Macmillan agreed a 5% rise for railway workers to avoid a crippling strike. It did not 
work. Strikes followed in the docks, car and construction industries and the Post 
Office in 1960 and 1961. Similarly ineffective was Chancellor Lloyd’s attempts to 
curb economic pressures. His ‘pay pause’ of July 1961 to March 1962 applied only to 
public sector workers and had no statutory enforcement. The unions were outraged. 
Pay awards simply ignored the ‘pay pause’. Therefore, the ‘pay pause’ failed 
dismally. Such was the concern that The Stagnant Society (1961), which attacked the 
restrictive role played by unions in achieving a more prosperous society, became an 
unlikely best-selling book for the Industrial Editor of the Financial Times. The 
Stagnant Society, which favoured planning as a remedy for economic malaise and 
intellectual torpor, reflected Macmillan’s views in The Middle Way. It was in this 
atmosphere that Macmillan had openly turned corporatist and introduced the National 
Economic Development Council. However, regardless of whether the Conservative 
government’s response was a product of benign inertia, woolly-minded appeasement 
or something more sinister, the effect was similar to that which had favoured the 
emergence of Hilton and the True Tories. Macmillan’s government had opened 
political space on the right by failing to remedy economic problems. This failure 
performed a similar role to that over immigration in that it forced disillusioned 
extreme-right figures to choose whether to operate beyond the comforts provided by 
party membership or accept party discipline. As one right-wing MP who 
unsuccessfully attempted to remain inside the Conservative Party subsequently put it: 
‘Into the vacuum of political leadership thus created ... stepped the dynamic 
personality of Edward Martell.’262
Since the 1957 East Ham by-election, Edward Martell’s People’s League for the 
Defence of Freedom (PLDF) had been quiescent. Redundancies at Martell’s printing 
presses and reduced publications of The People ’s Guardian suggested that Martell’s 
political impact had ended. However, disgruntled Conservatives continued to voice
281 Sandbrook, Never, 357 ff.
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their discontent in Martell’s publications. In April 1960, Martell felt that the 
circumstances were propitious enough to re-enter the political spotlight. He therefore 
launched The New Daily. This newspaper advocated ‘a return to Christian 
principles’,264 and criticised the government’s failure to counter inflation, union 
strength, falling moral standards and government spending persistently.265 Like 
Hilton, Martell tapped into the morality debate that Hennessy identified as a particular 
phenomenon of the time.266 Unlike Hilton, Martell’s comments focused almost 
exclusively on domestic issues. These comments soon took an exasperated and 
irritated tone. For example, Martell responded to the government’s justification of its 
non-intervention in industrial action with the response. He stated that, ‘If this is the 
best that Tory intellectuals can do in their approach to the menace which trade 
unionism in its present form presents to the nation we might as well put our money on 
the London School of Economics and be done with it.’ Martell argued that the 
current Conservative Party leadership was too entrenched to effect the necessary 
changes, and in The New Daily suggested its removal. When regional Conservative 
newspapers, such as the Hornsey Conservative News, extolled the government’s 
achievements, The New Daily retorted that the government was failing in areas 
including independent defence capability, trade union power, crime, transport, 
inflation and productivity.269
The New Daily’s comments harked back to a golden age and sought a charismatic 
individual to run the country. Theoreticians who focus on the primacy of culture in 
identifying fascism see these features as hallmarks of fascism. These features were 
present in Martell and The New Daily. For example, when Sir Cyril Osborne decried 
Protestantism’s lost influence resulting in a soft generation unwilling to endure the 
discipline necessary to withstand communism’s challenge to Christendom, The New
264 ‘An Experiment in Independence: Our Policy and Why’, The New Daily, 3 May 1960.
266 The Guilty Party’, The New Daily, 9 May 1960, is one of many examples.
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7 7 0Daily agreed. Osborne’s comments reflected sharply declining attendance at 
Protestant services,271 but they also tapped into the Orange strand within 
Conservatism that other extreme-right figures such as Petter of the New Reform Party
• 777had displayed. For The New Daily, the solution was obvious. It lauded Oliver 
Cromwell as the epitome of Englishness and bemoaned that no such leader was
770
currently available. Nevertheless, it continued, ‘he certainly exists and may we hear 
from him very soon’.274 Whom did The New Daily mean? Additionally, although it 
did not advocate like Hilton the restoration of a British Empire based on skin colour, 
Martell’s publication embroiled itself in the immigration issue. It identified ‘coloured 
immigrants’ as the source of problems in housing, vice, crime, unemployment and the
77*
welfare state. The New Daily called for a check on coloured immigration yet denied 
any prejudice, which resembled right-wing Conservative MPs rather than Oswald 
Mosley. Nevertheless, it is unsurprising that The New Daily had to deny charges of
7 7 /
fascism from the outset, or that it was ‘secretly backed by Sir Oswald Mosley and
777his so-called “Union Party’” . The author of the article that denied these accusations 
described Mosley as a ‘demagogue’ and was incredulous that anyone would think The 
New Daily ‘would ever accept support of any kind from a Fascist source’, and 
concluded that malice lay behind these rumours.278 Yet, it was The New Daily’s 
comments on immigration that had made such an accusation credible.
Frustratingly, The New Daily did not identify its accusers. However, it is the same 
damnation by inference that Central Office suggested its activists used on Martell’s 
People’s League for the Defence of Freedom at the East Ham by-election.279 Central 
Office had continued to monitor Martell. His literature continued to circulate within
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O^A
constituencies, and enquiries about them to Central Office received the same
AO 1
emphatic denial of support as hitherto. This effective intelligence system provided 
both the means and opportunity to act against MartelFs organisations. Moreover, 
Central Office possessed a motive for describing The New Daily as fascist because of 
the similarity of MartelFs views expressed in it and those of right-wing Conservative 
MPs who were increasingly at odds with the party leadership since the 1959 General 
Election.282 If effectively made, such charges would diminish the credibility of The 
New Daily’s attacks against the government. It would also remove an avenue of 
support to dissident Conservative MPs. Central Office had proved consistently hostile 
to any extreme-right organisations that displayed what it thought were fascist or racist 
characteristic or antecedents. Thus, whilst it is unclear whether Central Office or any 
other Conservative organisation made the specific charges against The New Daily, or 
whether it resulted from their previous inference at East Ham, their agency in them is 
likely. Unfortunately, for Macmillan’s government, the accusations appeared not to 
stick as The New Daily and Martell prospered. The frequency of The New Daily’s 
comments on immigration declined after the introduction of the Commonwealth 
Immigration Bill in 1961. This was perhaps not coincidental, considering the impact 
of the Bill on The New Daily’s readers. It may also have helped MartelFs publication 
as it reduced the likelihood that The New Daily would comment on immigration, the 
one issue that its opponents could link with fascism. However, this left Macmillan’s 
government with an even bigger problem. It could no longer simply smear The New 
Daily as a fascist or racist organisation as it now presented coherent arguments on less 
contentious issues from the right that resonated with irritated Conservative MPs and 
voters.
Commander Hyde C. Burton was a regular contributor to MartelFs publications who 
epitomised Conservative irritation. The New Daily serialised Burton’s comments 
under the heading ‘The Great Betrayal: An Indictment of a Decade of Conservative
280 For example, letter from Sir Thomas More, Bart., CBE, MP, to The Rt. Hon. Sir Toby Low, 
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Socialism, 1952-1962’. A retired naval officer and veteran of both world wars, 
Burton had commercial interests in Malaya.284 However, his concerns about 
decolonisation had not led him to the imperialist stance of Chesterton or Hilton. 
Instead, Burton criticised from the direction of the ‘Freedom Right’. He believed in 
economic liberalism, which placed him and those of similar views outside those of 
contemporary Conservative governments. Burton also understood that many dissident 
Conservative and extreme-right groups existed because of Conservative governments’ 
actions in other areas. He identified, interestingly, the Society for Individual Freedom, 
Middle Class Alliance, Elizabethan Party, Fighting Fund for Freedom, and Aims of 
Industry as examples. Nevertheless, Burton’s articles overwhelmingly focused on 
Conservative governments’ mishandling of domestic and economic issues. In January 
1961, for example, Burton lambasted ‘weak Conservative governments’ for betraying 
the country by their failure ‘to protect the general community against the demands of 
the militant trade union leaders and semi-Communist shop stewards who call the
'yo/i
tune’. In September 1961, he described Chancellor Lloyd’s ‘pay pause’ as a panic 
measure, and claimed this was the ‘direct and inevitable result of ten years of 
Socialism administered by so-called Conservative Governments’.287 Instead of 
proving the trustees of private property and individual liberty, Conservative 
governments had ‘sold the country down the river’.288 Burton threw the Prime 
Minister’s words back at him when he argued that Macmillan had duped the 
electorate with phrases such as ‘You have never had it so good’ whilst he 
unscrupulously pursued socialist policies that Burton thought was, ‘bringing us to 
national bankruptcy’.289 Burton condemned Chancellor Lloyd for being Macmillan’s 
puppet and giving in to threats by the President of the Electricians Trade Union.290 
Burton viewed this surrender, which proved the impotence of the pay pause, as
•  0Q1reviving ‘an inflating wage spiral’. If readers missed Burton’s inference of political
283 Subsequently published including comments for 1952 and 1963 as The Great Betrayal: An 
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cowardice, or what was required, he made it clear when he compared ‘Our weak- 
kneed “Conservative” politicians’ who never have ‘the “guts” to throw down that 
challenge’, with de Gaulle and Roosevelt who had made strikes in nationalised 
industries illegal. Successive Conservative Governments had ‘run away every time 
a national industry has put in a wage claim’, and the ‘latest surrender’ to the 
Electricians had finally squashed any hopes that the ‘correct and resolute action’ of 
implementing a true free market economy would ever occur.293 By the end of 1961, 
Burton wondered whether, ‘after ten years of Socialism administered by pseudo- 
Conservatives, free enterprise in Britain has come to an end’.
What Central Office thought of attacks like this is unknown. However, it was 
sufficiently concerned by November 1961 to ascertain Martell’s financial situation.295 
Martell plainly operated in fertile soil and echoed views held by many Conservatives. 
On 1 January 1962, he responded to their perception that Conservative governments 
had failed by forming The National Fellowship. He claimed that 2000 people backed 
him.296 This included Conservative MPs Dr. Donald Johnson and Captain Henry 
Kerby,297 who frequently spoke at large meetings of The National Fellowship in 
places like London’s Caxton Hall.298 Members sported a badge declaring ‘Resurgat 
Britannia’.299 Funds appeared plentiful.300 Martell seemed to be making a significant 
move.
Martell used The New Daily to spread The National Fellowship’s views. It reached a 
circulation of approximately 100,000,301 and was therefore capable of making an 
impact. This meant that Commander Burton’s criticisms of the Conservative 
government’s economic mismanagement and adherence to what he perceived as 
socialist philosophy reached a wider audience. In February 1962, on the establishment
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of the National Economic Development Council, Burton warned that Britain was 
moving towards ‘an era of governmental dictatorship’.302 The following month, 
Burton attacked ‘the present left-of-Centre leadership which continues to impose 
Socialism on both Parliament and the country’.303 Burton believed that the 
government had failed to recognise the significance of the by-election defeat at 
Orpington, explained it when he claimed that, ‘the true Conservative feels that he has 
to revolt against what he considers to be the Government’s mischief and 
unwisdom’.304 He also believed that Macmillan and the rest of the Cabinet would ‘not 
be deflected from their Socialism’, and denounced the Conservative Party’s failure 
to do anything to stop them. He did reveal some racist sentiment when he denounced 
the Conservative Party as ‘a party of expediency, a party of retreat, the party of 
cowardice, the party of surrender to the blackmail of organised trade unions at home
p/wr
and to the black demagogues abroad’. Yet there was little substantial that suggested 
racism akin to that of Hilton. The summer of 1962 brought some relief from Burton’s 
offensive. According to Burton, the 13 July ‘Night of the Long Knives’ Cabinet 
reshuffle presented an opportunity to fight the forthcoming General Election on: 
‘Conservative principles and not on Socialist expediency’.307 However, whatever 
relief summer brought it was gone by the autumn. On 3 October 1962, The New Daily 
carried an open letter from Burton to Macmillan. Inconvenienced by a rail strike, 
Burton once again levelled the charge of cowardice against a government that failed 
to deal with organised labour. Burton ended with the claim that Macmillan was doing 
as much harm domestically as he had in Africa, and implicitly called for a revolt to 
remove him.308 By attacking from the right, The National Fellowship posed a threat to 
the Conservative government as it provided critics like Burton with a regular medium.
Central Office kept The National Fellowship at arms length and monitored it 
throughout 1962. Donald Johnson MP explained why it did so when he stated that 
official disapproval of his link with it was ‘virtually guaranteed’ because it was
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‘considered dreadfully Right-Wing to be with the National Fellowship’. More 
specifically, Johnson continued, in 1962 it was still ‘considered to be the extreme of 
Right-Wingism to criticise the trade unions even for their most irresponsible
■^1 A
actions’. Additionally, Johnson made it clear that it was from Central Office 
specifically that this disapproval was forthcoming.311 The warning not to become 
involved with Martell that Central Office sent to the Conservative candidate at the 
July 1962 Leicester North East by-election supported Johnson’s claim of Central
■>1A
Office involvement. Admittedly, Johnson memoirs are frustrating. His claim that 
official disapproval was ‘perhaps natural on account of the type of support it
7  1 ' Xattracted’, was unexplored. Nor can we ignore the possibility that official 
disapproval of Johnson may have resulted from his own actions. Johnson engaged in 
personality clashes and supported awkward parliamentary Motions, which would not 
have endeared him to Central Office.314 Yet, that does not lessen Johnson’s belief that 
Central Office frowned on membership of The National Fellowship because it viewed 
it as extremist. Indeed, Johnson’s comments simply confirmed the view that Central 
Office was the Conservative Party’s vehicle for counter-measures against perceived 
extremists, which it had also demonstrated in official attitudes towards MartelFs 
earlier vehicle the Peoples League for the Defence of Freedom. In this instance, the 
word ‘vehicle* appropriately explained Central Office’s caution. For in 1962, Martell 
joined the Conservative Party. His aim, according to Johnson, was to make his 
views dominant within the Conservative Party by 1975. Martell may have desired 
political advancement. Ramsden thought it was a possibility and noted that Martell 
swiftly became a ward chairman in the Hastings Conservative Association. If so, 
Central Office faced an extreme-right organisation that sought entry into, and maybe 
domination of, the Conservative Party. Support from Conservative MPs made 
countering Martell problematic. Charges of fascist antecedents, for example, were 
untenable with The National Fellowship as it had two Conservative MPs on its
309 Johnson, Cassandra, 111.
310 Johnson, Cassandra, 112.
311 Johnson, Cassandra, 114.
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National Executive. Subsequent actions showed that Central Office understood the 
need for careful and subtle handling of The National Fellowship.
The events of 1963 proved how careful Central Office needed to be. Martell brought 
his various organisations together under the umbrella title ‘Freedom Group’ and 
increased his campaign against Macmillan’s government. Mass, organised Freedom 
Group meetings provided evidence of the scale of Conservative discontent. The 
Freedom Group orchestrated letter-writing campaigns that ensured ministers were 
aware of this discontent. Unofficial referenda campaigns organised via The New 
Daily and mainstream newspapers targeted unpopular policies and ministers. Given 
front-page prominence in The New Daily, the results of these referenda made clear 
that Conservative’s irritation focused on the Government’s ‘pink-socialism’ and those 
who administered it. These were radical methods aimed to effect radical policies. 
Both were anathema to traditional Conservatives. At the same time, the Government 
looked increasingly inept. In January, President de Gaulle ended Macmillan’s hopes 
of Britain entering the EEC, and at a stroke removed the Prime Minister’s chance to 
deflect attention away from domestic concerns. In June, the Profumo Affair erupted. 
It dealt a severe blow to the government and to the Prime Minister. Macmillan’s 
support for Profumo did not reflect the public’s sense of scandal, and therefore 
reinforced the notion of an increasing disconnection between the government and the 
electorate. Thus, it appeared that as well as creating political space on the right of the 
Conservative Party, Macmillan had also created a political vacuum at the head of 
government.
Martell commenced 1963 with an article in The New Daily titled ‘A Year of Great
1 1 0
Activity For Us All’. Having placed comprehensive adverts in the previous day’s 
Times and Daily Telegraph, Martell launched an ‘Independence Campaign’ that urged
T 1Q
rejection of the Nassau Agreement. He advocated a staged letter-writing campaign 
that involved successively the reader’s MP, Chairman of the local Conservative 
Association, national newspapers and the Prime Minister, and tapped Conservative 
anti-Americanism exhibited by the likes of Hilton to reinforce demands for an
318 The New Daily, 1 January 1963.
319 See 103.
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independent British nuclear deterrent. However, perhaps more worrying was Martell’s 
intention to increase the Freedom Group’s potential impact by a recruitment drive, 
and the publication of A Book o f  Solutions that suggested a rudimentary political 
manifesto.320 Whether this heralded a new party or not Central Office took no 
chances. On 8 January, Central Office decided that all Chairmen of Conservative local 
associations had to provide the names of constituents who had joined Martell’s 
organisation.321 A letter of 9 January from a Chairman in the North West Area that 
asked Martell, as a ‘gesture of goodwill’, for the names of constituents in his area 
showed that local association Chairmen acted quickly on this directive. This was a 
vigorous act by Central Office. In one sense, it was more vigorous than the attempted 
identification of members of the League of Empire Loyalists within the Conservative 
Party as that did not include constituents. This does not prove that Central Office 
intended a witch-hunt against Freedom Group members in the party. However, at the 
very least it is evidence that Central Office attempted to counter Martell’s impact on 
the Conservative Party at the local level. Added to Central Office’s previous 
comments about Martell’s organisations, and Donald Johnson’s views regarding 
Central Office’s opinions, this directive indicated that Central Office saw Martell’s 
Freedom Group as a viable extreme-right organisation that posed a potential threat to 
the Conservative Party. If so, Martell’s subsequent actions suggested Central Office 
was correct.
The year 1963 did indeed prove to be a year of ‘Great Activity’ for the Freedom 
Group. At the end of January, The New Daily began a referendum on Cabinet changes 
that asked readers which members they trusted, which they wished to see promoted, 
and whom they wanted demoted. Shortly after came some evidence of Freedom 
Group influence in the citadels of traditional Conservatism. Under the liberator- 
pseudonym of ‘Brutus’, a regular contributor to The New Daily highlighted an article
320 The New Daily, 1 January 1963, 8. See also article on 4 February, which suggests that the 
Freedom Group held unions to blame for Polaris and the Nassau Agreement.
321 R. J. Webster to the General Director, ‘National Fellowship’, 8 January 1963. Incorrectly 
dated 1962, this letter is clearly responding to a Martell letter of 29 December 1962. CPA 
CCO 3/6/128, The National Fellowship, 1960-66.
322 H. Homby Fairclough to Mr. Martell, 9 January 1963. CPA CCO 3/6/128, The National 
Fellowship, 1960-66.
323 ‘How Would You Change The Cabinet, The New Daily, 26 January 1963.
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in The Daily Telegraph titled: ‘Is It Too Late For The Tories?’324 The use of the 
soubriquet Daily Torygraph reflects the common view that the Daily Telegraph is the 
Conservative Party’s ‘house-paper’. The article ‘Brutus’ highlighted, written by Colin 
Welch, advocated Freedom Group policies. Brutus’ requested that The Daily 
Telegraph, ‘adopt Mr. Welch’s policy and campaign for it with all the undoubted
'l'yc
authority they possess’. This showed that Welch’s views were not the paper’s 
official stance. Nevertheless, ‘Brutus’ saw the article as a positive step and pointed to 
another encouraging sign. Under the sub-heading ‘Light Is Breaking Through’, 
‘Brutus’ identified two Motions at the 16th Annual Conference of the Surrey Young 
Conservatives as especially noteworthy, one that called for tough anti-union 
measures, the other critical of the lack of ‘Conservative’ policies under the current 
government.326 Brutus thought that, ‘The fact that the powers-that-be which control 
such Conferences have allowed two such Motions to get on the Agenda is quite as 
important as the wording of the Motions themselves.’ Thus, it appeared that the 
Freedom Group’s grassroots political campaign was beginning to affect institutional 
Conservatism.
In February, The New Daily criticised the government’s handling of the steel industry. 
The government had supported two nationalised steel companies, Richard Thomas 
and Baldwins, in their attempt to purchase the privately owned Whitehead Iron and 
Steel Company. The New Daily referred to Labour MP Michael Foot’s Tribune article 
and agreed with him that the Conservative Party now had no argument should future 
Labour government nationalise the steel industry completely. Conservative writers 
also contributed articles that criticised the Conservative Research Department’s 
inability to counter the assumption that progress was synonymous with being left 
wing. Anthony Lejeune argued that, ‘It is surely possible to present radical Right- 
wing policies which would seem more exciting to young people than the conventional 
fussiness of the Left’. The same edition of The New Daily proposed another letter- 
writing campaign, this time to support the parliamentary Motion Conservative MP
324 ‘Brutus’, ‘Right Thinking Grows In Tory Circles’, The New Daily, 30 January 1963.
325 ‘Brutus’, ‘Right Thinking Grows In Tory Circles’, The New Daily, 30 January 1963.
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Harold Gurden had tabled that called for a Royal Commission to investigate the 
causes of strikes and disputes. The New Daily described Gurden’s action as ‘an 
attempt to make the Government face up to a matter which they have consistently 
avoided since they came to power eleven years ago’, and thus tarred all post-war 
Conservative governments with the brush of industrial appeasement. By also listing 
the names of Conservative MPs who supported Gurden’s Motion, The New Daily 
reinforced the message that it represented the views of disgruntled backbenchers as 
well as ordinary party members. The following day, The New Daily colourfully 
combined an attack on governmental inertia over this issue with a warning about the 
damage government inaction caused. It stated that the ‘maggot of inactivity has eaten 
its way into the organisation of the Tory Party until it has become one of the main
I
reasons for a malaise which threatens the Party’s very existence’. Less than a week 
later, The New Daily’s claimed that its letter-writing campaign was responsible for 
increased support for Gurden’s Motion from Conservative MPs, and exhorted its 
readers to step up their campaign. Considering the political context and that Martell 
was already the subject of one comprehensive report,333 it is highly probable that these 
activities concerned Central Office increasingly.
March provided no respite. The New Daily reported a Freedom Group meeting in 
Canterbury in March and focused on Martell commenting about a Conservative 
leadership that imposed Socialism on the party and country.334 More troubling was the 
inclusion in the same edition of a two-year programme of Freedom Group activity. 
This indicated that organised criticism would not cease before parliament ended in 
1964. However, Central Office did not have to wait until the next Freedom Group 
meeting for criticism of the government. The next day The New Daily’s Editorial 
attacked Iain Macleod, whom the right viewed as the chief proponent of the 
government’s socialist tendencies and blamed for its failure to counter trade union
330 ‘Campaign To Promote a Royal Commission on Industrial Disputes’, The New Daily, 13 
February 1963.
331 ‘Hammer It Home!’ The New Daily, 14 February 1963.
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333 See 87.
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abuses.336 The week following, The New Daily announced a new style of campaign by 
the Freedom Group, dubbed the ‘Hastings Experiment’.337 The ‘Hastings Experiment’ 
aimed to swamp a single constituency with the Freedom Group’s political material, 
and included a series of four conferences.338 Martell portrayed it exaggeratedly as a 
response to grassroots demands. In reality, the ‘Hastings Experiment’ was simply a 
product of Martell’s organisational and publicity skills. Nor was it an experiment. It 
was a carefully prepared event to further the Freedom Group’s role and his own 
ambitions. The New Daily published its lead article about the ‘Hastings Experiment’ 
before and not after its occurrence. Its favourable reporting of the second meeting, 
which described it as attracting twice the expected audience, cannot hide the fact 
that this only amounted to sixty individuals and possibly included Freedom Group 
officials. These facts bear out the impression that the Freedom Group was Martell’s 
personal vehicle more than the product o f grassroots Conservative revolt, and should 
be borne in mind when considering The New Daily's reports of the Hastings 
Experiment. It noted that all audience members wished to keep the Labour Party from 
power and the consensus view that, ‘there is not much hope of doing so if things are 
allowed to go on drifting as they are at present’. Thereafter, The New Daily 
portrayed the audience’s view that the Conservative Party was not the vehicle for such 
ambitions, and made it clear that, ‘they feel there is no incentive to work for the 
Conservative cause because traditional Conservative policies have been abandoned, 
their complaints and suggestions are ignored and evaded, and pink Socialism pervades 
the Party more and more’.341 The article concluded by stating that he believed Central 
Office was interested in the ‘Hastings Experiment’ and promised to forward its full 
results to the party chairman.
As the ‘Hastings Experiment’ was in the public domain, Central Office probably 
knew about it. Doubtless, Central Office viewed the ‘Hastings Experiment’ in its true 
light: a contrived event from an extreme-right individual who possibly aimed to 
attract Conservative discontent and use it to replace or takeover the Conservative
338 'Mr. Macleod’s Chimera’, The New Daily, 12 March 1963.
337 'Growing Interest In The Hastings Experiment, The New Daily, 18 March 1963.
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Party. Thus, Central Office could not afford to ignore the Freedom Group’s potential 
impact on the Conservative Party regardless o f the limited attendance at its events. 
The result o f the Colne Valley by-election three days later on 21 March 1963 would 
not have eased Central Office fears about Martell’s possible impact on the party. The 
Conservative candidate in a distant third place polled less than 50% than in the 
previous General Election. The New Daily judged that this was the ‘writing on the 
wall for the coming General Election’, and proclaimed that ‘The Macmillan Revival 
Has Failed’ and demanded that ‘MacLeod Must Go Now.’ 342 MartelFs subsequent 
comments lent weight to fears that he was prepared to act in ways contrary to the 
leadership’s views and not necessarily in conjunction with the Conservative Party. 
Martell argued that there was no evidence of a change for the better, and stated in 
italics for impact, ‘unless somebody makes it happen ’,343 He said that if Conservative 
leaders could not be made to understand that ordinary members had a right to play 
their part in preparing for the next General Election, and failed to improve their ways, 
‘they must not be surprised or resentful if we attempt to do it for them -  and 
ourselves’.344 Finally, if the Conservative leaders ignored the results of the ‘Hastings 
Experiment’, Martell hinted menacingly that, ‘we must try some other way’.345 These 
were not merely glib words. Central Office could not ignore an organisation of 
alienated and irritated Conservatives, especially one that claimed, despite the
i/
attendance at the Hastings Experiment, to have 160,000 members.
In May, Anthony Lejeune provided a more coherent explanation for this alienation 
that identified the impact o f a philosophical/ideological divide on the political system, 
and the organisation of the Conservative Party, as key factors.347 Lejeune argued that 
new political paradigms had re-orientated British politics. The fulcrum of politics had 
been moving steadily leftwards, epitomised, according to Lejeune, by trade union 
collective bargaining where employers were merely allowed to lose at a slower rate 
rather than win. By participating in this process, the Conservative leadership appeared 
to right-wing voters to be collaborating in an inexorable leftwards drift. Lejeune
342 The Writing On The Wall’, The New Daily, 23 March 1963.
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argued that whereas this process usually ameliorated the left o f the Labour Party as a 
step in the right direction, for right-wing Conservatives it was always a step away 
from their position. This meant that right-wing individuals who maintained their 
political stance became increasingly isolated from an ever-receding centre, thus 
turning such individuals into extremists. Exacerbating this, Lejeune continued, the 
mass o f these right-wingers were in the constituencies and, as such, were physically 
isolated from the councils o f the Party, which made it more difficult practically to 
effect the Party’s actions in government. Additionally, the autonomy o f local 
Conservative Associations, which Lejeune implied further isolated right-wing 
individuals, provided an organisational distance between party members and leaders. 
Thus, Lejeune argued that when Conservative governments acquiesced in policies 
opposed by right-wing Conservative Party members,348 right-wing anger at the 
government’s betrayal o f what they saw as true Conservatism combined with feelings 
o f impotence to result in alienation and anger. Consequently, some would abstain at 
the next General Election, whilst those that voted would not vote Liberal or Labour, 
but reluctantly vote Conservative only to stop Labour winning. Here, Lejeune had 
explained the Conservative Party’s refractory alienating action, if not quite taking it to 
the conclusion that some newly dissident Conservatives would consider voting for 
extreme-right parties, such as the League o f Empire Loyalists, or even like Hilton of 
the True Tories, forming them.
If Lejeune correctly claimed that the Conservative governments’ failure to combat 
encroaching socialism created right-wing extremism, then subsequent events would 
have increased their number. Labour surged into an 18.5% opinion poll lead in the 
weekend after Lejeune’s article. This prompted more criticism of Macmillan and his 
administration in The New Daily?49 The following week, the Profumo Affair shook 
Macmillan’s government to its core. Martell used his position as editor of The New 
Daily to produce front-page banner headlines that denounced ‘Degeneracy And 
Indolence In High Places’ and ‘The Collapse of Leadership.’350 Martell put the blame 
firmly at Macmillan’s door. He asked readers to look back over the previous two
348 Here Lejeune cites the example of Conservative governments increasing spending on the 
welfare state and an imminent increase in Nl contributions.
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years to see what had gone wrong and identified declining moral standards, especially 
increasing gambling, drinking and vice, as a product of Macmillan’s lack of 
leadership. Nor, Martell continued, did anybody seem to care, most notably the Prime 
Minister who had remained on holiday while his government was ‘rocked by one of 
the greatest Parliamentary scandals there has ever been’.351 The answer, Martell stated 
emphatically, was to stop the harm the current government and Prime Minister were 
doing: ‘Somehow they must be stopped.’352 However, who was going to affect this? 
Martell did not advocate a solution enforced from the top. Instead, Martell stated that, 
‘the people must give their leaders leadership, and teach them that no nation can live 
that does not maintain certain standards of behaviour that should not need 
defining’.353 Thus, although Martell undoubtedly reflected extreme-right feelings that 
society was degenerate and decadent, and may even have shared such views, his use 
of the Profumo Affair was no different from other government failings that he 
identified in that the solution he suggested involved a pivotal role for ordinary 
Conservatives, like those in the Freedom Group that Martell led.
What, however, was this role to be? Whether Martell aimed to usurp the Conservative 
Party’s role by creating a new party, or merely sought to alter its ideological position, 
is difficult to deduce. On the one hand, public events such as the ‘Hastings 
Experiment’ and thinly veiled hints that the Freedom Group would have to act if the 
Conservative Party failed to do so, suggested that the Freedom Group could become a 
political party. On the other, Martell wrote openly to all Conservative MPs and 
offered assistance in marginal seats, which suggested that he wanted Conservative 
Party success. Yet, in one sense, the question is immaterial. For, even if Martell’s 
objective was the apparently less-sinister motive of ideological change, the fact is that 
if Martell succeeded it would, after many years o f Conservative acceptance of post­
war consensus, effectively result in a new political party. It would certainly not be the 
same party as that led by Macmillan. This, in turn, warrants a brief re-appraisal o f the 
role o f Central Office outlined earlier,354 especially vis-&-vis right-wing organisations. 
Stuart Ball stated that Central Office did not exist ‘for any mysterious or sinister
361 'Thus Fell Rome', The New Daily, 8 June 1963.
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363 ‘Thus Fell Rome’, The New Daily, 8 June 1963.
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purpose, but simply to provide a range o f services to the leader and to the party as a 
whole’, and maintain efficiently the contact between the two.355 As such, Central 
Office was a reflection o f the political philosophy and ideology of the leader and the 
views of the membership. This implied an equal relationship. However, when the 
members’ views clashed with those o f the leader, as was the case with those who 
supported the Freedom Group and indeed all other extreme-right groups, it was the 
leader’s views that prevailed in Central Office. It was most emphatically not 
Macmillan’s wish that Edward Martell should take advantage of his current troubles 
so that Martell could ditch him and his political views and replace them with those 
represented by the Freedom Group. More generally, Central Office’s role included 
avoiding embarrassing connections with the extreme right. Its functions included the 
monitoring of, and carrying out o f counter-measures against the extreme right. This 
had included monitoring Martell for some time by this stage, and it is unlikely that 
Central Office was not considering what MartelFs intentions now were carefully. 
However, more germane to both the narrow issue of Martell’s possible objectives and 
the wider one of the Conservative Party’s attitude towards the extreme right, is what 
Martell soon explicitly stated and did. For, one month after the Profumo Affair, 
Martell explicitly outlined a coherent Freedom Group plan to combat the Labour 
Party at the next General Election and capture the Conservative Party from within.
On 5 July, The New Daily carried details o f the Freedom Group’s plan to thwart 
Labour. Under the headline ‘The Plan To Keep The Socialists Out’, it reported 
Martell’s boast that the Freedom Group ‘has now developed into the most powerful 
organisation of its kind in Great Britain’.356 Martell stated three reasons why he 
believed the Freedom Group was capable o f achieving its objective. Firstly, with over 
100,000 members and growing, all noted on a ‘Master-lndex’ that included details of 
the constituency and special interests, the Freedom Group had sizeable support which 
the leadership could mobilise at short notice.357 Secondly, possessing a non-unionised 
printing works built into a public company with £1/2 million in capital meant that the 
Freedom Group enjoyed a propaganda machine immune to hostile trade unions, and
366 Ball, Structure’, 192.
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potential access to funds.358 Thirdly, in The New Daily the Freedom Group had a 
means of communicating its objectives to its members six days a week.359 These 
boasts may have been completely hollow. Central Office’s attempt to elicit details of 
Conservative members of Martell’s groups suggests that it took them seriously 
however. Nor is this surprising considering that Martell had announced that, ‘The task 
of every Supporter o f the Freedom Group is thus to become an active leader in the 
Conservative Party in his or her area’ so as to push Freedom Group policies and root 
out ‘Semi-Socialist MPs and prospective candidates ... as quickly as possible’.360 This 
was much more than the adoption of street and platform cultures as seen in the British 
Housewives League and other extreme-right groups by an angry but hitherto 
compliant Tory-voting middle-class.361 Instead, it was a plan for infiltration of the 
Conservative Party. It was possibly even more. Martell now hinted at greater things. 
He acknowledged that the Freedom Group had the potential to become a new party.362 
He added that, ‘Nobody is going to deny that there is a need for such a party.’ 
These are not isolated words taken out o f context. They were in the public domain 
like the ‘Hastings Experiment’, and so Central Office would probably have been 
aware of them. Thus, suspicion that Martell intended either infiltrating the 
Conservative Party or forming a new one to challenge it, must have increased. 
Martell’s subsequent move into a political vacuum created by Conservative Party 
inaction would have seemed part o f this ‘plan’.
Martell’s noble sentiments o f accepting the democratically expressed wishes o f the 
people may also have informed the Conservative Party’s decision not to contest the 
Bristol South East by-election. The by-election was a consequence of Tony Benn’s 
renouncement o f his peerage. Martell’s decision to stand as a ‘National Fellowship- 
Conservative’ candidate put him and his organisation in a position whereby they 
could portray themselves as a right-wing alternative to an absent Conservative Party. 
This was certainly the view of The Times, which reported that Martell campaigned in 
front o f blue posters that bore the name ‘Conservative’ in large letters and ‘National
368 ’The Plan To Keep The Socialists Out, The New Daily, 5 July 1963.
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Fellowship’ in smaller ones, and that he refuted accusations that he had no connection 
with the Conservative Party by brandishing his party membership card.364 The 
probability that the public would make the connection between Martell and the 
Conservative Party was extremely high. Central Office opposed Martell very actively. 
Firstly, it monitored The National Fellowship’s selection process, and was aware that 
three candidates were under consideration.365 Secondly, Central Office asked 
Conservative supporters to abstain from the election, which would deny Martell 
support.366 Finally, Central Office attempted to portray Martell’s candidacy as obscure 
and irrelevant. The Chairman of the Bristol Conservative Association, Sir Kenneth 
Brown, declared that, ‘I have only heard of the National Fellowship in name. 1 know 
nothing of them.’367 The General Director at Central Office dictated to the Deputy 
Central Office Area Agent an official ‘line’ for officials to take that stated that those 
standing against Benn had ‘no connection whatever with the Conservative Party and 
are receiving no support from me’.368 Central Office instructed that all queries were to 
receive the response that the Conservative Party was ‘in no way connected with the 
present by-election’.369 Thus, Central Office sought to limit MartelFs chances. Its 
claims were also less than credible. It is hard to believe, for example, that Central 
Office, which was so concerned about Martell that it had commissioned a ‘Committee 
of Investigation’ into his activities, did not know that in 1961 he had become a ward 
chairman o f the Hastings Conservative Party. Moreover, Sir Kenneth Brown’s 
knowledge o f Martell’s organisations may well have been zero, but that does not 
mean that he did not know that they, and Martell, were the object of Central Office’s 
counter-measures. As Chairman of the local Conservative Association, Brown would 
have received and acted upon the Central Office directive of 8 January that sought the 
names of Conservative Party members and voters who had joined the Freedom 
Group.370 Conservative officials were prepared to make dubious comments to hinder
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an extreme-right organisation. Given the severity of the political context, it is 
understandable that officials wished to limit the impact of this particular external 
extreme-right organisation. What made this more likely was the simultaneous 
emergence of an internal extreme-right organisation that threatened to combine 
alienation over the Conservative government’s domestic policy with anger at its 
imperial policy.
Inside Right
Lejeune’s argument that Conservative governments forced right-wingers onto the 
extreme right can apply somewhat to the Monday Club. Formed in 1961,371 and 
taking its name from the day Macmillan made his ‘winds of change’ speech, the 
Monday Club was a response by young Conservative Party members to rapid 
decolonisation.372 By explicitly questioning this policy alone, the Monday Club 
placed itself on the extreme right vis-a-vis the Conservative Government. In the 
mockingly titled pamphlet Wind o f Change or Whirlwind?, the Monday Club stated 
that the Macmillan government’s desire to appear progressive had led it to decide 
upon ‘a Hasty Abandonment of British responsibilities in Africa’.373 It described the 
government’s decolonisation policy as one of ‘Abdication and appeasement’.374 The 
Monday Club claimed that this had ‘put Kenya on the verge of bankruptcy and 
resulted in a loss of confidence in the Rhodesias that undermined its Federation, and
'Xnc
the driving of South Africa from the Commonwealth’. The Monday Club’s 
alternative was a return to ‘Conservative principles’,376 and not the abandonment of 
Britain’s civilising role. Only this, it concluded could stop the creation of weak states 
prone to ‘exploitation by the forces opposing us in the cold war’. These were the 
traditional calls of the alienated imperialist right wing in that they exhibited typical 
traits such as racial chauvinism, criticism of the Conservative government and fear of 
left wing ideology. However, the Monday Club was much more than simply the
371 R. Copping, The Story of the Monday Club, Monday Club, London (1972), 5.
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Conservative Party’s version of the League of Empire Loyalists or True Tories. When 
it called for an independent nuclear deterrent, tougher measures on crime, action on 
wildcat strikes, a rationalised welfare state, reduced taxation, and expressed concerns 
over entry into the Common Market,378 the Monday Club camped firmly in the 
political space of other extreme-right organisations like the Freedom Group too. As it 
explicitly came from within the Conservative Party, the comprehensive nature of this 
criticism made the Monday Club potentially a far more potent threat to Conservative 
governments than other right-wing organisations.
Initially, Central Office appeared relaxed about the Monday Club. An early Central 
Office report on the Club, perhaps reflecting the predominant influence of the middle- 
aged within the Conservative Party, focused insouciantly on the involvement of 
Young Conservatives.379 This does not mean that Central Office neglected its role of 
investigator of right-wing organisations. On the contrary, the report showed that 
Central Office maintained its intelligence gathering role when it identified four Young 
Conservatives who had attended a Monday Club meeting at the Onslow Court Hotel 
on 25 September 1961.380 Similarly, on 29 November the Chief Organisation Officer 
wrote on a letter from the Secretary and Agent of the Wirral Conservative Association 
that requested information on the Monday Club: ‘Do we know anything about this 
outfit? If not can we get a line on it?’381 This was typical of many previous requests 
from its intelligence network regarding other right-wing organisations. It also showed 
that Central Office’s early actions towards the Monday Club accorded with its 
specifically ordained function to investigate other organisations. Outwardly, the Chief 
Organisation Officer maintained a carefree, even dismissive air. He responded to the 
Wirral Conservative Association’s request for information on the Monday Club and 
denied any organisational link between it and the Conservative Party, and confidently
378 Policy and Aims of the Monday Club, Monday Club, London (1961), 1-2.
379 A S. Gamer to the Chief Organisation Officer, ‘Report on the Monday Club’, 27 
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stated that Monday Club circulars to Divisional and Young Conservative chairmen 
would not win it any support.
Nevertheless, Central Office continued to monitor the Monday Club. Central Office 
officials wrote two other, more comprehensive documents on the same day that the 
Chief Organisation Officer replied to the Wirral Conservative Association. The first 
document was a more detailed report on the Monday Club by E. S. Adamson. It was 
significant because it revealed what Central Office thought the Monday Club’s 
objectives were and who backed it. Adamson highlighted the role of youth in the 
Monday Club’s formation, particularly its first chairman, Paul Bristol, whose failure 
to become a Conservative prospective parliamentary candidate he noted.383 He stated 
that requests for information about the Monday Club were now coming in ‘from all 
over the country’.384 Adamson thought that this reflected an attempt by these young 
party members to ‘set up an organisation along the lines of the Bow Group’.385 If so, 
then Adamson at least thought it possible that the Monday Club intended to create an 
intellectually coherent body of opinion to influence policy from within the 
Conservative Party like the Bow Group. Adamson stated that, ‘It would be interesting 
to know who is behind the movement or who is putting up the money for the printing 
etc.’ He identified one candidate as ‘John Dayton and his True Tories’, and 
justified his suspicion by stating that Dayton ‘seems to have plenty to spend and this
‘y o n
sort of attack would fit with his ideas’. Also noteworthy was Adamson’s comment 
that the only mention of the Monday Club in the press was in The New Daily, and that 
the Free Press, ‘which is Martell’s’, printed the Monday Club’s literature.388 
However, Adamson believed that this connection was ‘purely fortuitous for Martell
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has no money to spare nor is this his line of country’,389 which may have allayed the 
suspicions of some in Central Office that the Monday Club was another Martell 
organisation.
Others were not so sure, as seen by the second Central Office document of 30 
November 1961. Central Office’s Area Agent, A. S. Gamer, wrote the document. It 
was a response to a request for information about the Monday Club from the Unionist 
MP S. Knox Cunningham, who had received the Club’s literature. Cunningham was 
also Macmillan’s Parliamentary Secretary. He telephoned Central Office to enquire 
about the Monday Club, and then wrote from 10 Downing Street and requested 
further information.390 Gamer referred to the Martell connection and thought that, ‘It 
may be that they get their money from there.’391 This showed that some thought it was 
possible that Martell was behind the Monday Club. However, Gamer’s letter also 
revealed how Central Office viewed the Monday Club. Gamer advised that Central 
Office had sent an ‘unofficial observer’ to the Monday Club meeting of 25 
September.392 This ‘observer’ thought that the Monday Club was ‘formed by former 
members of the Bow Group who held extreme-right views’.393 When Gamer 
dismissively described the Monday Club to Cunningham as a very small organisation 
of ‘a few enthusiastic young members’, he reiterated this belief that they held 
‘extreme right wing views’.394 The Significance of this second document, therefore, is 
that it revealed that Central Office believed that the Monday Club was an extreme- 
right organisation from the beginning.
On 4 December 1961, Central Office commenced counter-measures against the 
Monday Club. It instructed its Area Agents to respond to all inquiries with the 
common line that there was no organisational link between the Conservative Party
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and the Monday Club. The directive showed that Central Office had monitored the 
Monday Club’s growth throughout the country and its awareness of the extent of 
interest in the Club. Area Agents, acutely aware of the need for loyalty as Macmillan 
attempted to implement contentious decolonization, acknowledged the directive 
swiftly. Central Office, meanwhile, exuded nonchalance about the Monday Club. It 
based this attitude, as Ramsden noted, on a belief that the Monday Club was a product 
of temporary upper-middle class youthful exuberance.397 Confirming such views was 
a report to the General Director in January 1962 that described the Monday Club as, 
‘a group of young people of extreme right wing views who operate in Chelsea/South 
Kensington and hold their meetings at the Onslow Court Hotel by way of roughing 
it’.398 However, on 24 January, ‘Peterborough’ announced in The Daily Telegraph 
that ten Conservative MPs and Lord Salisbury would be attending that day’s Monday
OQQ
Club meeting on Rhodesia. Considering Salisbury’s antecedents, and coming from 
a credible, Conservative source, this news would have punctured any nonchalance 
within Central Office. Two days later, The Daily Telegraph confirmed Salisbury’s 
attendance. Worse, Salisbury had become the Monday Club’s patron, and begun his 
tenure of this position with a salvo aimed directly at Macmillan’s government when 
he said that, ‘There never was a greater need for true Conservatism than there is
i A A
today.’ This was a different matter. Salisbury would undoubtedly attract party 
critics to the Monday Club. On the same day, Patrick Wall, Conservative MP for 
Haltemprice, visited London Area Agent Gamer and asked him what Central Office’s 
view of the Monday Club was.401 This probably reflected Wall’s awareness that 
Central Office was a repository of intelligence on right-wing groups. Gamer 
concluded that Wall had decided to support the Monday Club, which, he warned 
Central Office, would result in other MPs joining and the Monday Club increasing its 
strength.402
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Any residual indifference there may have been within Central Office now 
disappeared. Whereas Central Office had looked favourably on membership of the 
Bow Group, in February 1962 it ordered its own Young Conservatives’ department to 
cease contacts with the Monday Club. Area Agents continued sending intelligence 
reports to Central Office. Central Office monitored attempts to create new Monday 
Club branches, and was probably alarmed to note that any negative aspects did not 
hinder its success. For example, disappointment at the lack of clarity over aims in a 
Monday Club presentation in February did not, according to the Central Office Area 
Agent for the Western Area, dampen the interest of two vice-chairmen, two vice- 
presidents, the Divisional Chairman of the Young Conservatives and two other office 
holders of the St. Ives National Liberal and Conservative Association.404 They felt 
that the Monday Club contained ‘the essence of the considerable dissatisfaction with 
recent Party policy which has been evident throughout the country’.405 Central 
Office’s Area Agents and those working for them tried to hinder the Monday Club. In 
February, Central Office Agent Mr. Welch rejected the need for a Monday Club 
discussion group in Durham and claimed that the Conservative Political Centre met 
such needs. Welch showed that he knew precisely the remit of the December 
directive when he passed all of his correspondence on this matter to the Area Agent 
Mr. Livingston, who in turn forwarded it to Central Office.407 Area Agents did not 
limit their counter-measures to ordinary party members. In April, the Conservative 
MP for Yeovil asked the Chairman of his local Conservative Association for the 
names and addresses of Young Conservatives whom he thought would be amenable to 
an approach by the Monday Club.408 The Area Agent, Mr. Slinn, told the Chairman 
that the Monday Club was not part of the Conservative Party and to withhold the
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details requested. Slinn forwarded the details of the enquiry to Central Office, 
including his instruction to deny information to a sitting member of parliament.410 The 
Chief Organisation Officer thanked Slinn and made plain that in April 1962 Central 
Office thought that the Monday Club was an ‘extremely right wing’ organisation, 
‘and obviously are not to be trusted’.411
Thus, although Ramsden argued correctly that Martell’s activities diverted 
‘dissatisfaction from channels that could have been more dangerous’, which implicitly 
included the Monday Club,412 it does not mean that Central Office ignored it. Indeed, 
it could hardly afford to do so, considering the Monday Club’s actions and comments 
in the difficult year of 1963. Between 1 April and 15 July, when a large Labour poll 
lead and the Profumo Affair rocked the government, 24 new members brought the 
Monday Club’s membership to 198.413 Leading members hoped that affecting 
reorganisation and embarking on a number of operations would give the Monday 
Club ‘a firm place in Conservative politics’.414 An ‘Annual Dinner’ planned for 
October lent the Monday Club respectability. By August, Lord Home was among 
other distinguished guests of the Monday Club.415 Meanwhile, the Monday Club had 
sought funds to cover production costs for a pamphlet that they intended to distribute 
at the October party conference, Conservatism Lost? Conservatism Regained.416 
Behind the scenes, Monday Club leaders criticised Macmillan’s policies, particularly 
foreign and imperial, and revealed views similar to Hilton of the True Tories. In
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September, Salisbury expressed to Patrick Wall his fear that the government’s current 
policy of decolonisation would cause ‘the old White Commonwealth countries’ to 
abandon Britain’s sphere of influence, leaving only ‘the blacks, who have no 
sympathy with Britain and all that Britain stands for’.417 This language was not simply 
reflective of contemporary discourse, but was the result of a personal credo of 
imperialism sunk deeply in the roots of the Cecil family, and in which ‘race’ justified 
British dominance. For Salisbury, if the government abandoned imperialism it would 
have dire consequences. Salisbury believed blacks to be ‘our problem’, and the 
likelihood of a ‘future white versus black racial world conflict’ to be ‘very great’ if 
the policy of swift decolonisation continued 418 As these comments came from such a 
high profile individual, it was also likely that Central Office saw race as crucial to the 
Monday Club’s existence from virtually the beginning. It is hard to believe that 
Central Office was ignorant of these views.
The publication of Conservatism Lost? Conservatism Regained just before the party 
conference in October 1963 would have removed any ignorance of the Monday 
Club’s views in Central Office. Martell’s Tileyard Press printed it and it touched on 
many areas. It saw decadence as rife in a Britain where material wealth uneasily 
coexisted with declining religious and moral standards.419 A powerful, centralising 
state had eroded individual liberties.420 The machinery of government, economy, 
business, taxation and nationalised industries all needed reforming.421 Yet, Britain’s 
colonies were the main-focus of the pamphlet. The government had allowed British 
colonies their independence, and bribed the electorate into acquiescence ‘with 
promises of greater affluence and materialism’.422 Further, ‘Nothing can be more 
destructive of Britain’s good name than certain aspects of the Government’s African 
policy since I960’, where, the publication implied, the Government had been less 
than honest in its actions.423 The Monday Club held Macmillan responsible. Criticism 
of ‘Too much of the old school-tie, of nepotism’ transparently referred to the over­
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representation in the Cabinet of the major public schools, particular Macmillan’s alma 
mater, Eton, and the preponderance of Macmillan’s relatives in the whole 
government.424 It quoted Lord Home saying that, ‘I think the greatest danger in the 
world today is that the world might divide on racial lines’,425 and thus revealed the 
centrality of skin colour to early Monday Club thinking, as well as the desire to 
remove Macmillan. The pamphlet was a rallying-call to ‘new leaders’,426 for 
distribution at what looked liked being a very difficult party conference.
Right turn Homewards?
Perhaps fortuitously for Macmillan, he did not attend the 1963 party conference at 
Blackpool. Ill health forced his sudden resignation and absence from party 
conference. Alec Douglas-Home, another Etonian, surprisingly succeeded Macmillan 
rather than the expected R. A. Butler or Lord Hailsham. In some respects, this 
reinforced existing political alignments. In replacing the ‘Edwardian’ Macmillan with 
Home, the Conservative Party merely substituted an ersatz anachronism for a real one. 
Home was the fourteenth earl of a family first ennobled in the fifteenth century. 
Maternal ancestry connected Home to the late Stuart and early Hanoverian 
aristocracy. Home was barely an early, let alone contemporary, renaissance figure, 
and therefore contrasted poorly with the dynamic, scholarship boy from Huddersfield 
leading the Labour Party since early 1963, Harold Wilson. The existence of a 
phenomenon that did not trouble Home’s forbears exacerbated this contrast. On 
television Home’s voice, personality and even physiognomy reinforced the idea that 
the Conservatives had turned in desperation to its aristocratic core. It did not help that 
television ownership was thirteen times greater than when the Conservatives regained 
office in 1951.427 In others respects, however, the political context changed. Unlike 
his three predecessors as Conservative leader, Home had been a loyal lieutenant of 
Neville Chamberlain.428 The hierarchy of the 1922 Committee of backbench 
Conservative MPs supported Home’s candidacy. Gilmour described them as, ‘good, 
solid citizens, hangers and floggers, who deplored what had been done in Africa and
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thought the Government had moved far too far to the left at home’.429 Home was 
unequivocally the candidate of the party’s right wing. His succession therefore 
presented both Central Office and alienated right wing Conservatives with a new 
situation for the post-war era: a right-wing Conservative Party leader and Prime 
Minister. It changed the relationship between the extreme right and the Conservative 
Party.
Unlike Macmillan, Home did not have the luxury of over three years to make his 
appeal before he had to call a General Election. Only a bare twelve months were 
available to him. This may also have influenced the clear change in the attitude of 
some extreme-right organisations and their relationship with the Conservative Party. 
Definite changes in their attitude were detectable. This was most obvious in the 
Freedom Group. The events of the Bristol South East by-election would not have 
allayed fears within Central Office that Martell intended either to infiltrate the 
Conservative Party, or to launch a new party. He had appeared on national television 
twice and secured 19% of the vote, which allowed Martell to claim that ‘millions’ had 
now heard of his organisation 430 Central Office quickly warned Home against contact 
with Martell. Ramsden stated that this was because Central Office believed that 
Martell would use any contact to portray himself as a confidant of the new Prime 
Minister 431 Thus, Central Office continued to oppose Martell. However, the Freedom 
Group’s attitude towards the government had altered. On 21 October 1963, The New 
Daily announced that Home’s accession had restored its belief in a future 
Conservative election victory.432 It also welcomed the removal of R. A. Butler from 
domestic policy and Iain Macleod’s resignation from the Cabinet and Party 
Chairmanship, and claimed ‘The Conservative Party’s dangerous drift to the left has 
now been halted.’ The New Daily declared that Home’s promotion of right-wingers 
demonstrated ‘that progress and development need not be leftwards’.434 Perhaps 
significantly, the Area Agent for the South East reported to the Chief Organisation
429 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever; 187.
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Officer the positive reception given to Home’s accession at a public meeting in 
Martell’s constituency.435
Central Office’s stance towards Martell and his organisations now changed. 
Somewhat disingenuously, it claimed to Home’s Constituency Secretary in November 
1963 that it had never ‘set out to dissuade any of our supporters from joining Mr. 
Martell’s movements’, and stated its pleasure at Martell’s support.436 Central Office 
now argued that Martell’s current position could ‘do nothing but good’,437 and denied 
ever taking any inimical action towards him. A reformulation of Central Office’s 
position towards Martell was underway. As Martell embarked on yet another 
referendum to influence government policies in January 1964,438 the General Director 
at Central Office ordered another dossier on him and his organisations. The result was 
much different to earlier ones in one vital respect. Gone were the innuendoes of 
fascism.439 Now, The New Daily was ‘anti-fascist’.440 However, this does not mean 
that Central Office ceased to monitor Martell’s activities. A subsequent report 
summarised the extent of contact with Martell’s organisations within Areas and local 
Conservative Associations.441
Central Office had not necessarily had a collective change of heart regarding Martell. 
There was too much grudging language and qualifying comments in its 
correspondence. Central Office described the Freedom Group’s views as ‘fair enough 
... as it stands at the minute,’ which suggested that Central Office thought this new 
situation was only temporary.442 Additionally, Central Office’s new stance does not 
mean that it had suspended its suspicions of Martell’s ultimate intentions. For
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example, a Central Office Area Agent reported Martell’s attempt to stop the removal 
of his own Association Chairman in March 1964.443 The Agent forwarded his report 
to the General Director, and the Chief Organisation Officer wrote on it, ‘You see how 
right we were. This is the “encounter battle.” I suspect we shall now have “a struggle 
for full control” and no Queensbury rules!’444 This was firm evidence that Central 
Office took seriously Martell’s intention to infiltrate and take over the Conservative 
Party, which he had expressed in July 1963.445 Nevertheless, Central Office stance 
towards Martell during Home’s premiership was different to that exhibited whilst 
Macmillan was Prime Minister. Moreover, it was a change that removed one of the 
most substantial barriers to an organisation’s chances of having a relationship with the 
Conservative Party: a perception of fascist connections. Unlike previous Martell 
organisations, the Freedom Group formed a relationship with the Conservative Party.
At the end of April, the Yorkshire Post announced that the Freedom Group intended 
to become involved in the Huyton constituency of Labour leader Harold Wilson.446 
Martell announced that thirty-eight Conservative MPs supported the Freedom Group 
and announced the beginning of a ‘decapitation strategy’ defeat Wilson in case 
Labour won the expected autumn General Election.447 On 2 May, Martell extended 
the Freedom Group’s offer of assistance to all Conservative Associations, and claimed 
that he had informed Party Chairman Lord Blakenham of his actions. Two days later, 
as Freedom Group adverts announced in The Times its involvement in the Huyton 
constituency and requested donations,448 Martell wrote to Blakenham and offered the 
Freedom Group’s co-operation to the Conservative Party, which included use of The 
New Daily.449 Martell received a polite, but non-committal response 450 He wrote to 
Blakenham once more, and this time included a copy of a letter to the Chairman of the
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Huyton Conservative Association, Mr. R. Bradley, which made it clear that the two 
men had recently met.451 If Central Office wanted to stop Martell in his tracks, this 
was the time, since no working relationship had yet developed. Central Office had 
previously issued prohibitive directives concerning Martell,452 and so was perfectly 
capable of such an action. However, at the end of May the Observer’s report on 
events in Huyton made it clear that Central Office had not issued any such directive. 
Instead, it quoted Martell as saying, ‘We are very ready to conform to the conditions 
proposed by the Huyton Conservative Association.’453 Central Office had not stopped 
the contact. What followed proved this was not simply a case of a local association 
exercising its autonomy. The following day, The Daily Telegraph covered the story. 
Perhaps reflecting Central Office’s wishes, the paper downplayed Martell’s likely 
impact, but did not deny his involvement.454 In mid-June, Blakenham admitted 
privately to Conservative MP Joan Vickers that Martell was indeed assisting the party 
in Huyton. He justified Martell’s co-operation in Huyton, and elsewhere, by when he 
stated that it was acceptable ‘providing it is on our terms and not on his and if it is 
made quite plain that any of his members working for us agree to do so under the 
control of the Constituency Officers and Agent in support of our policy’.455 Thus, 
Blakenham confidentially revealed the existence its working relationship with an 
individual whom Central Office had previously been prepared to smear with 
accusations of fascism. In September, Martell wrote to Blakenham and enclosed the 
instructions given to Freedom Group workers assisting in Huyton, which were 
completely in accord with the remit Blakenham outlined privately to Joan Vickers 456 
This further proved the existence of a relationship. Additionally, even if this, or the 
newspaper reports, had not raised awareness of this relationship, there was the issue 
of the campaign poster. For, although Blakenham forced Martell to remove the 
Freedom Group’s name from the poster, the printing press acknowledged on it,
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Tileyard Press, belonged to Martell.457 Central Office knew this from its earlier 
investigation of Monday Club literature.458 Just in case it had forgotten about it, one 
call to the phone number given for Tileyard Press would reveal that it had the same 
telephone number as the Freedom Group.459
How, then, are we to explain this changed attitude? Opportunism is a possible answer. 
The Conservatives had been in power for thirteen years and looked staid compared to 
Labour. Did Central Office believe that the Freedom Group had changed? The 
‘Freedom Group’s General Election Policy’, printed in the May editions of 
respectable publications such as The Times and Spectator, called for immigration 
restrictions not to be based on skin colour.460 This removed one of Central Office’s 
most consistent post-1945 dividing lines in determining relations with extreme-right 
groups, and thus made any association with the Freedom Group less risky. A desire to 
lessen Martell’s potential to harm the Conservative Party may also explain why 
Central Office used him. Martell’s criticism of the Government’s continued apathy in 
summer 1964 may have been viewed by Central Office as evidence that Martell 
retained personal ambitions, whether inside the Conservative party or not. This would 
explain why, in the letter to Vickers that justified using Martell, Blakenham stressed 
that he would not be happy to see ‘his group take over even the smallest section of our 
organisation’.461 However, this does not rule out the possibility that Central Office 
used Martell to keep him within the Conservative fold whilst keeping him at arms 
length. If so, this was also a conscious counter-measure against Martell. Just as likely, 
Martell had become the victim of the paradoxical problem that faced all leaders and 
supporters of extreme-right organisations. The Conservative Party attracted as well as 
alienated the extreme right. It seemed to have changed its orientation under Home, 
and thus appeared more attractive to Freedom Group members. If so, Central Office 
played a less conscious role in blocking Martell.
457 Edward Martell to Lord Blakenham, 23 September 1964. CPA CCO 3/6/101, Freedom 
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In one sense, the Conservative Party’s dual role is difficult to detect under Home. 
With such a short space of time, Home effectively played Macmillan’s hand, as 
Ramsden noted. Extensive changes were injudicious in election year. They would 
leave the Government open to obvious questions as to why policies followed for 
thirteen years were no longer suitable. Nevertheless, Home’s government did proffer 
olive branches to the right. A promised inquiry into trade-union practices and 
legislation, for example, directly answered the Freedom Group’s demands for a Royal 
Commission.463 The forcing through of the abolition of Resale Price Maintenance, 
whilst it irritated many traditional Conservatives, appealed to right-wing advocates of 
economic liberalism.464 Thus, just as in the Commonwealth Immigration Bill, the 
Conservative Party extended its reach rightwards to deny political space to those 
seeking to exploit it, in this instance Edward Martell and his Freedom Group, and 
attracted his supporters. If so, then the change of stance by Central Office towards 
Martell and his organisations becomes even more understandable. By allowing the 
Freedom Group’s participation in the General Election, specifically in Huyton and 
generally elsewhere, Central Office increased the probability that these formerly 
alienated supporters would vote Conservative in the General Election. Additionally, 
by doing so Central Office drove a wedge between Martell and his supporters. It 
offered just enough to the latter to win them over and thus limited Martell’s ability to 
use them as a vehicle for his personal ambition. By acting thus, Central Office 
maintained its function as a barrier to the extreme right. Blakenham’s justification for 
using the Freedom Group revealed this. Blakenham confidentially reassured the 
Conservative MP that Central Office only accepted Martell’s assistance on him giving 
‘very specific undertakings that he will not make his co-operation prior to the Election 
an occasion for pursuing policies in which he and his Group believe but which are not 
accepted by us’.465 In doing so, Blakenham showed how, in this instance, Central 
Office had limited the potential impact of extreme right wing policies. Proof that this 
strategy worked came during the General Election campaign, when Martell 
acknowledged that Freedom Group members now felt that ‘no extraordinary measures
462 Ramsden, Winds, 217.
463 See 150.
464 R. Findley, The Conservative Party and Defeat: the Significance of Resale Price
Maintenance for the General Election of 1964’, Twentieth Century British History, 12, 3 
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are needed’,466 and thus abandoned a secret plan to field fifty candidates. The reason 
was obvious. The plan had been conceived when a ‘sweeping Labour victory in the 
General Election was a certainty’.467 Now, simply, it was not. The reason why Martell 
no longer believed it to be a certainty was that the Conservative Party under Home 
was again an attractive proposition to formerly alienated right-wing Conservative 
supporters. The reason why Martell abandoned his plan, however, had much to do 
with Central Office’s actions.
There was a definite change in the attitude of the Monday Club too. A leading 
member noted that the press considered that Conservatism Lost? Conservatism 
Regained? was ‘an attack against the leadership’ 468 This was far more serious than an 
attack from outside the party. Moreover, the fact that it had quoted Lord Home’s 
intemperate words on race made before he became Prime Minister made this 
publication even more impolitic.469 It caused recriminations within the Monday Club 
and a re-assessment of what it stood for. Corresponding with Lord Salisbury, Sir 
Patrick Wall MP thought that the Monday Club’s young Chairman, and his friends’ 
use of it as their personal vehicle caused the problems 470 Furthermore, Wall thought 
that whereas consensus existed within the Monday Club regarding Africa, diverse 
views existed on other subjects, and concluded that the Club needed an effective 
machinery of consultation.471 These events show that the Monday Club was still 
rudimentary in its policy formulation, dissemination and position. Senior figures like 
Wall also saw its comments as irresponsible now that Home had replaced Macmillan, 
the catalyst for its formation. The ensuing furore within the wider Conservative Party 
soon caused the resignation of the Monday Club’s Co-Chairman and Vice- 
Chairman472 The Monday Club sought to repair any damage and issued a swift 
explanation and a reassuring statement. It claimed that the offending publication was
488 Edward Martell to Lord Blakenham, 5 October 1964. CPA CCO 3/6/101 Freedom Group,
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an expression of ‘what we felt to be lacking in the Conservative system of 
government’.473 Now, the apology noted, there was ‘already a welcome new 
atmosphere in the conduct of our affairs, nor is the present Prime Minister unaware of 
the truth about Africa’ 474 Therefore, it stated, the Monday Club henceforth ‘must and 
will offer constructive suggestions to the Government as to how it can develop 
Conservative principles into practical policies’.475
This damage limitation by a right-wing organisation that was still in its infancy had 
immediate consequences. Despite noting that one hundred new members had joined in 
the previous year, the minutes of a General Meeting of 14 November 1963 recorded 
the Chairman’s disappointment at the poor attendance.476 Patrick Wall ensured that 
the Monday Club discussed its orientation and function at the next meeting on 
Monday, 9 December 1963 477 However, the circular that proposed the discussion 
showed that one embarrassing publication had not cowed the Monday Club, or that it 
was prepared to settle for obscurity. This ambitious organisation was avowedly right- 
wing and remained intent on pursuing its policies. The circular pointed to the Club’s 
focus on African and Commonwealth affairs, and admitted that the Monday Club 
‘attracted an ultra-right label’,478 which it justified as an inevitable consequence of 
focusing on areas that attracted most criticism of the government. A proposal at the 
recent Annual General Meeting that the Monday Club ‘cease to be the exclusive 
preserve of the Right and should attract and embrace every colour of opinion in the 
Conservative Party’,479 had received short-shrift. Stating that there was ‘no virtue in 
this’, the circular’s author argued that the consequence of such a move would be the 
Monday Club withering away ‘into complete ineffectiveness’.480 Instead, the Monday
473 Monthly Newsletter, Monday Club, November 1963.
474 Monthly Newsletter, Monday Club, November 1963.
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Club should be a ‘vocal conscience of Tory Principles’,481 which counterbalanced 
left-wing clubs like the Bow Group. When the circular stated that the Monday Club 
should function as the ‘nagging conscience and a spur to the Party or Government to 
act on true Tory principles’,482 it identified the Club with other post-1945 extreme- 
right champions of Conservative ideals. However, as it organised itself into specific 
departments,483 the Monday Club presented a far more realistic and coherent prospect 
of dealing with ‘specific aspects of policy where these Tory principles have either 
been abrogated or not yet realised’,484 than these external extremist groups. When it 
called for an enlarged parliamentary group that liaised with a small ‘action group’ and 
was backed by a team of letter writers, the circular proposed an effective mechanism 
for disseminating Monday Club views that was similar to Edward Martell’s 
organisations. However, the method outlined held greater promise of success. The 
circular advocated switching the Monday Club’s vigorous attacks away from the 
Conservative Government to the Labour Opposition. It argued that this would 
legitimise the Club’s policies and thus increase their chances of acceptance, ‘however 
much they were disapproved of by the pinker and less resolute Conservatives’.485 This 
showed that although the Monday Club may have changed the focus of attack, it did 
not intend to change its orientation as an organisation that operated on the extreme 
right of the Conservative Party. Its members intended its function to be a ‘rallying 
point of the Right rather than the somewhat inert refuge of the Right’.486
This picture of a refocused, policy-developing organisation that was eager not to 
alienate the party leadership continued throughout election year 1964. The 
relationship between Central Office and the Monday Club, despite the Monday Club 
being determinedly right wing, was therefore predominantly positive. In February, the 
Annual General Meeting of the Monday Club rejected another call for greater
481 Circular titled The Monday Club’, 1. Private Papers of Sir Patrick Wall, Monday Club:
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representation from across the Conservative Party and welcomed the removal of those 
who were ideologically unsound.487 However, minutes of the same meeting recorded 
the co-operation of the Conservative Political Centre at Central Office in publishing 
the Monday Club pamphlet Strike Out or Strike Bound*** In April, the Monday 
Club’s Council attacked the more left-wing Bow Group and determined on a clearer 
definition of Monday Club domestic policy to increase chances of their inclusion in 
the forthcoming manifesto.489 In July, the Conservative Political Centre decided not to 
publish the Monday Club pamphlet, Automation*90 This may have resulted from a 
desire to avoid contentious issues near the General Election rather than any desire to 
limit contact with a group that attacked progressives within the party. Alternatively, 
Central Office may have simply used the Monday Club’s publications to attract 
alienated supporters, cherry picking its acceptable literature whilst ignoring those 
deemed too contentious or extreme. If so, the Monday Club at this time was an 
attracting agent in the Conservative Party’s alienation/attraction role vis-a-vis the 
extreme right. There does not appear to have been any antagonism towards Central 
Office from the Monday Club at this stage. On the contrary, members of the Monday 
Club determined to, ‘Improve our standing with the Party Organisation’ and resolved 
that, ‘all our efforts should be towards helping the Party over the next few months’ 491 
Therefore, the Monday Club during Home’s leadership, unlike that under 
Macmillan’s, was clearly not prepared to ‘rock the boat’. Its publication of The 
Handmaidens o f  Diplomacy in summer 1964 supported this picture.492 It 
comprehensively outlined deficiencies in Britain’s strategic political warfare aims and 
focused on areas where criticism of previous Conservative Governments was 
possible. There was none. The pamphlet instead reserved its negative comments for
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the traditional targets of Conservative ire such as the civil service and the BBC,493 and 
thus avoided alienating the new administration. It received favourable comments in 
The Times,494 and 4an almost unprecedented number of inquiries and requests for 
copies’.495 This publication arguably attracted dissident Conservatives back into the 
fold. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Monday Club offered to provide Central 
Office with a canvassing squad at the General Election,496 nor that Lord Blakenham 
specifically asked for Monday Club assistance as the General Election loomed.497
A more positive attitude towards the Monday Club does not mean that Central Office 
ceased to be hostile towards right-wingers. Donald Johnson MP admitted holding
i Q A
views that Central Office considered extremely right wing. As well as being on The 
National Fellowship’s National Executive, Johnson was a Monday Club member. He 
believed that his criticism of the government’s health policy had resulted in counter­
measures by the Party organisation: "Platforms throughout the country were fenced in
a q q
by the Party machine.’ He was in little doubt that Central Office received reports 
from within his local Conservative Association of the criticisms he made of the
<fV\
government. Johnson also questioned whether Central Office was neutral in 
disputes within a constituency. He surmised that Central Office made its views known 
by a "discreet phone call from Chairman at Headquarters to Chairman of Constituency 
Association’, and argued that the supposed autonomy of the local Conservative 
Associations was a subterfuge.501 Association chairmen were, Johnson believed at the
cry} # .
time, deservedly known as the ‘hatchet-men’ o f the Party. In this instance, Johnson 
spoke from bitter experience.
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On 14 October 1963, Johnson’s Association deselected him as Conservative candidate
for Carlisle.503 His account, obviously being partial, warrants cautious handling.
Additionally to be borne in mind is the trouble that Johnson caused his government,
and his constituency.504 Johnson’s case is also opaque. It does not definitely prove
that Central Office was involved. Nevertheless, some incidents suggested Johnson had
a point when he suspected central orchestration in his removal. It is probable that the
Carlisle Conservative Association decided to deselect Johnson before Macmillan
resigned. Constituency files revealed that Central Office knew that the Carlisle
Association considered deselecting Johnson at least one year before it happened.505
Moreover, there is evidence of suspicious contact between Central Office and the
Carlisle Conservative Association before Johnson’s de-selection. Johnson pointed to
some events during the party’s 1963 Blackpool conference, during which Macmillan
resigned. He cited the contact between the Treasurer of the Carlisle Conservative
Association and Sir Toby Low, Vice Chairman at Central Office, especially the
•  _strange occurrence of the Treasurer personally driving Low to his hotel. The 
Treasurer was not a senior party official in the Blackpool area, so it is hard to explain 
why he undertook this task. Johnson’s inference is that Low helped the Carlisle 
Association to engineer his removal. The idea that the Treasurer and Low did not 
discuss the problem presented by Johnson, particularly at this difficult time for the 
government, is hard to sustain. The events o f the extraordinary meeting that Johnson 
forced on the Carlisle Conservative Association in June 1964 to air his grievances 
after his de-selection were also highly suspicious. The local press reported doubts 
over the right of some of the attendees to vote on the issue or even be present.507 It 
probably did not help Johnson that Edward Martell was amongst those that most 
vocally pointed out suspicions of sharp-practice.508 Therefore, it was possible that 
Central Office guided or advised the Carlisle Conservative Association in removing
503 Johnson, Cassandra, 186.
504 CPA files for Carlisle constituency CCO 1/11/43, 1/12/43 and 1/14/43 reveal Johnson
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Johnson, and maybe even in countering him afterwards. However, in one sense the 
question of Central Office’s agency in these events is irrelevant. Regardless of who 
was culpable, the Conservative Party had ensured the de-selection of an extreme-right 
MP. It was unlikely that Home, as a new Prime Minister, wished to worsen party 
divisions by reversing a decision that had occurred amidst the turmoil of his 
succession. Having a more right-wing leader in this instance was, thus, irrelevant.
Nevertheless, Home’s accession clearly did have an impact on the extreme right. 
Some policies o f the Freedom Group and Monday Club were now either in accord 
with those of the Conservative Government, or nearly so. The Freedom Group and the 
Monday Club still operated in the Conservative Party’s nebulous right-wing border, 
but were now more firmly within it. This tempered the nature and extent of their 
extremism when judged by the political position of the Conservative Party. It also 
presented a problem for right-wing extremists who criticised Conservative 
Governments prior to the Home administration. Should they remain loyal to the 
Conservative Party? Did Central Office’s co-operation with the Freedom Group 
betray the Conservative Party’s true opinions or not? Had the Conservative party at 
last returned to ‘true Conservatism’? The emergence of the Monday Club within the 
Party would have strengthened the views of any extreme-right voter who thought it 
had. Some probably still abstained. Others probably remained loyal. Loyalty was now 
the position of Commander Hyde C. Burton. Burton had been a vocal and persistent 
critic. Johnson Publications, the family firm of Donald Johnson MP, published his 
criticisms. Burton nonetheless stated that there was little alternative to voting
•  509Conservative.
Other voters probably remained immune to Burton’s argument and voted for extreme- 
right parties. Major-General Richard Hilton, for example, formed the True Tories into 
the Patriotic Party in 1964 and contested two seats at the General Election. The 
League of Empire Loyalists contested three. All five candidates polled less than 2% of 
the votes and lost their deposits, but they provided an outlet for extremist views and 
people voted for them. Former LEL member John Bean was another outlet for these 
views when he contested Southall and attracted just over 9%. Bean’s performance
509 Burton, Betrayal, 3-4.
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aside, these were miniscule rewards. Yet, they are also informative. For, although far 
too limited to be definitive, they nevertheless supported the idea that the Conservative 
Party attracted the extreme-right vote. A Conservative candidate openly fought his 
campaign on the extreme-right’s political space and proved that the Conservative 
Party attracted extreme-right voters. Notoriously using the slogan ‘If You Want A 
Nigger For A Neighbour Vote Labour’, Peter Griffiths at Smethwick bucked the 
national swing to Labour, and turned a Labour majority of 3544 into a Conservative 
one of 1774. These may have been Labour voters. However, at this General Election 
Labour’s vote remained virtually static, only 0.3% higher than at the 1959 General 
Election, and provided it with a 4-seat majority. Therefore, it is feasible that Home’s 
accession, and the actions of Conservative Party organisation thereafter, had attracted 
some formerly alienated supporters away from extreme-right parties to an extent 
unlikely under a continued Macmillan leadership. If so, then Home’s Conservative 
Party had proved as refractory to the extreme right as Macmillan’s and his 
predecessor’s, although in this instance by attraction rather than alienation.
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Chapter 4. Edward Heath: a rightwards turn and the 
coalescence of the extrem e right, 1964-70.
In some respects, Britain in 1964 was much different from when the Conservative 
Party was last in Opposition. Earnings had increased, prices appeared stable, 
unemployment remained low and consumer goods were plentiful.1 Affluence had 
replaced austerity as the country’s leitmotif: according to one Nye Bevan obituary, the 
hum of the spin-dryer drowned the sounds of class warfare. Computers were 
beginning to impact on British business too, which led to fears about jobs. Art was 
finding new expression in Pop and Op Art. The Public Libraries and Museum Act
(1964) had precipitated an explosion in reading that continued throughout the decade. 
The opening of Terence Conran’s first Habitat store in 1964 began an emphasis on 
stylish living that reflected this affluent society. Increased affluence had also resulted 
in a greater emphasis on youth culture, shaped largely by American influences such as 
the new musical phenomena of rock and roll and a growth in nightclub culture.4 The 
advent of The Beatles proved a watershed in British popular music, widening 
generational differences and presaging change for decades to come. Films, books and 
television reflected the passage of another watershed to a less deferential society. By 
1964, kitchen sink dramas, social realism and satire had entered the mainstream of 
literary and visual representation. Religion and morality likewise appeared different. 
Church attendances continued falling. The Wolfenden Report (1957), which had 
called for legalisation of homosexuality, had tentatively commenced moves towards a 
more tolerant society when it came to sexual mores. Most famously, jurors had 
acquitted Penguin Books of obscene publication in the Lady Chatterley trial of 1960. 
This all reflected a more questioning and liberal attitude towards morality, which 
Philip Larkin had best summed up in his claim that sex began in 1963, between the 
Chatterley ban and The Beatles first L.P.5
1 Sandbrook, White, 17.
2 Evening News, 7 July 1960.
3 A. Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, Hodder and Stoughton, London (1962), 45.
4 Weight, Patriots, 302-3.
5 Philip Larkin, Annus Mirabilis (1967).
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The long-standing superstructure of British society had also changed. The Empire, 
apparently robust in 1951, was virtually over. Increased coloured immigration 
visually reminded people Britain's imperial decline as former colonial subjects laid 
claim to little-tested rights of citizenship. This was a far more important phenomenon 
of British life by 1964 than in 1951. Cultural representations increasingly reflected it. 
Some earlier films had presented a positive image of black immigrants. The Proud 
Valley (1940), told the story of Welsh villagers who accepted a musical black miner 
from West Virginia.6 However, this was the exception. By 1964, there existed a 
marked focus on the negative impact of black immigration. Films such as Flames in 
the Streets (1961) had highlighted white anxieties over black immigration. Similarly, 
Colin Maclnnes had portrayed areas of high black immigration and the race riots of 
1958 as un-English in his book Absolute Beginners (1959). This negative attitude 
towards black immigration continued after 1964. In 1965, the vice-president of the 
Empire Day Movement described such immigration as ‘the gravest social crisis since 
the industrial revolution’.7 The State funeral of Winston Churchill occurred in the 
same year. The passing of this imperial soldier and war leader symbolised the passage 
of an imperial age just as increased black immigration presaged the dawn of a 
multicultural one.
Yet, continuities existed. The Nassau Agreement ensured Britain remained dependent 
on America for nuclear technology and weaponry. The building of New Towns 
continued. The New Towns Act (1946), which Attlee’s Government intended to 
relieve over-crowding in industrial areas, had resulted in fourteen new developments 
in the 1940s and 1950s. Conservative and Labour governments continued this policy 
throughout the 1960s, which was were reflected in television programmes set in New 
Towns such as the police series Z Cars (1962-78) and the soap opera The Newcomers 
(1965-69).9 Changes in fashion and social mores were often slow to reach parts of 
Great Britain. Many changes were limited to an unrepresentative London-based 
coterie of the educated and wealthy. However, even changes that occurred usually 
possessed strong antecedents. For example, violence in Easter 1964 between Mods
8 Weight, Patriots, 294.
7 Lord Elton, The Unarmed Invasion: A Survey of Afro-Asian Immigration, Bles, London 
(1965), 7.
Sandbrook, White, 114-115.
9 The following synopsis derives from Sandbrook, White, 175-182, unless stated.
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and Rockers prompted shocked and condemnatory headlines. Yet, this was simply a 
more virulent form of endemic youthful violence that stretched back via Teddy Boys 
in the Fifties, Spivs in the Forties, Biff Boys in the Thirties, to the late Victorians who 
coined the word ‘hooligan’ for working class boys engaged in violence during the 
August holiday. Nor was the ‘Permissive Society’ an established fact. Capital 
punishment continued in 1964, whilst abortion, homosexuality and suicide remained 
criminal acts. Divorce remained a painful and unjust process. Moreover, the Empire 
may have been dying, but many in the colonies and in Britain had not accepted this. 
Nor had any new organisations challenged effectively the dominance of the three 
main political parties.
However, this image of continuity was not how some in Britain perceived the 
situation. When Christopher Booker began working in autumn 1965 on The 
Neophiliacs: The Revolution in English Life in the fifties and sixties (1969), he 
intended to provide a clearer perspective on ‘that bewildering tidal wave of change 
which had been sweeping through Britain and the Western World’ from the early 
fifties.10 Booker was not alone in seeing Britain in 1964 as very different from the 
1940s and early 1950s, or in criticising it. Paul Johnson in the New Statesman 
deplored the obsession with modernity.11 Even satirists took a break from lampooning 
politicians and poked fun at popular music instead.12 Perhaps Bennett was correct in 
Forty Years On (1969), in which he acknowledged the inevitability of change whilst 
paying due cognisance to the past. Yet, the 1964 General Election was both similar 
and different to an earlier contest in some important respects. Just as in 1945, when 
Attlee had caught the mood of an electorate that demanded radical change, Harold 
Wilson in 1964 sensed a desire to break free from the image of post-imperial decline. 
Wilson consequently sought a modem, classless society, a ‘New Britain’, and landed 
on the slogan ‘White Heat of Technology’ as the means to capture the Zeitgeist. 
Unlike Attlee, however, Wilson only had a four-seat majority. This meant that 
Britain’s first Labour Prime Minister in thirteen years would almost certainly have to 
seek a greater majority soon.
10 C. Booker, The Neophiliacs: The Revolution in English Life in the fifties and sixties Pimlico, 
London (1969), 7.
11 New Statesman, 28 February 1964.
12 ‘Introducing the Turds’, in R. Ingrams, The Life and Times of Private Eye 1961-1971, 
Harmondsworth, London (1971), 111.
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In government, Wilson continued to condemn ‘thirteen years of wasted government’ 
under the Conservatives. Consequently, the Labour Government enjoyed the goodwill 
that had resulted from the simple but effective demand of ‘time for a change’. 
Unfortunately, for Wilson, the picture of economic stability that the Conservatives 
presented during the election campaign proved to be a chimera, which meant that the 
new government faced severe economic problems. Yet, despite this, and the problem 
of contending with a reduced majority due to the loss of Leyton plus the opposition of 
two right-wing Labour MPs, Wilson managed to turn an 8% Conservative lead in the 
polls in August 1965 into a Labour lead of 7% in September. Thereafter, Labour 
maintained a 7% lead throughout winter 1965/66. Thus, when at the end of March 
1966 Wilson sought a mandate that ensured sufficient time to deal with problems, the 
electorate accepted his claim that the Conservative governments were responsible for 
them and gave him a 97-seat majority. However, a working majority did not solve 
Britain’s deep-seated economic problems. On 18 November 1967, the Labour 
Government devalued the pound, and swiftly fell eighteen points behind the 
Conservatives. The position improved under new Chancellor Roy Jenkins. Labour 
regained a poll lead one week after Jenkins’s April 1970 Budget. This was illusory. 
Wilson’s government had lost economic credibility irretrievably when it devalued the 
pound.
Concerns over the economy were a large stick with which to beat the Labour 
Government. However, the Conservatives attacked the Government in many other 
areas too. Industrial relations were most obvious. Unofficial ‘wildcat’ strikes 
proliferated from 1966. Industrial action coincided with severe economic problems, 
whilst the emergence of radical union leaders Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon revived 
fears of Communist subversion. In June 1966, for example, Wilson denounced the 
strike by the National Union of Seamen as inspired by Communists. The Dockers 
struck in autumn 1967 just as irresistible pressure for devaluation mounted. Working 
days lost continued to soar after devaluation, which led The Times to dub 1968 ‘The 
Year of the Strike’.13 On 16 January 1969, Wilson’s Government published arguably
13 The Times, 10 October 1968.
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the most famous government White Paper, In Place o f  Strife. It proposed statutory 
obligations on trades unions and measures to limit industrial unrest. However, In 
Place o f  Strife failed, caught between economic necessity and the political expediency 
of not alienating the Labour party’s main source of funding. A divided Cabinet faced 
opposition from the unions and a bitter dispute at the Ford motor plant in Dagenham 
and a backbench revolt.14 Therefore, it ditched the penalties in its White Paper and 
accepted a vague promise that the unions would seek the advice of the TUC on 
wildcat strikes. The promise proved baseless almost immediately. Wildcat strikes 
erupted in the docks, the Post Office, British Leyland and in the National Health 
Service. The 7 million working days lost in 1969 easily outstripped the previous 
year’s record high of 4.7 million. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party’s policy 
statement Fair Deal at Work (1968) balanced obligations and rights, and thus 
contrasted favourably with In Place o f  Strife to provide a viable prospect to halt 
apparently endemic industrial unrest.15 Newspapers supported it across the political 
spectrum.16 By-election victories after its publication in June 1968 at Oldham West 
and Nelson and Colne, and the following March at Walthamstow East, indicated that 
voters thought that the Conservatives possessed answers to this seemingly intractable 
problem.
Nor did Wilson’s Government appear to make much progress solving the country’s 
social ills, unlike Attlee’s administration. Wilson was unlucky. Conservative 
governments sporadically faced popular representation of social issues in series such 
as Armchair Theatre. However, The Wednesday Play, an anthology series that 
devastatingly highlighted social problems, ran conterminously with the Labour 
Governments from 1964-70. A larger television audience than when the 
Conservatives were in government watched this series of plays that revealed shocking 
conditions. For example, Up the Junction (1965) portrayed lives dominated by petty- 
thieving, illicit sex and back street abortions. Cathy Come Home (1966) depicted 
unemployment, homelessness and concluded harrowingly with scenes of the state
14 David Wood, 'Loyalists prepared to vote against unions Bill, The Times, 20 May 1969.
15 Heath, Life, 287-288. Ramsden, Winds, 285-286. J. Ramsden, The Making of Conservative 
Party Policy: The Conservative Research Department since 1929, Longman, London (1980), 
243 & 267.
16 Heath, Life, 288.
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removing children from their hapless mother’s care. It acquired iconic status swiftly. 
Dennis Potter linked issues of social mobility and class. In Stand Up, Nigel Barton
(1965) and Vote, Vote, Vote fo r Nigel Barton (1965), Potter recounted one man’s 
journey from respectable, working-class grammar-school boy into the cynical world 
of party politics. However, Potter’s Nigel Barton plays were more than a portrayal of 
social mobility and class betrayal. He depicted Barton’s Labour Party Agent advising 
him to put party before principles, and thus suggested the moral turpitude of the 
contemporary political scene. Wilson thought the BBC biased and determined to 
undermine the government.17 Implicit criticism of the government was not limited to 
BBC plays. In 1968, Ted Lewis published Jack's Return Home, a tale of corruption, 
pornography, provincial crime, gambling and revenge. When work on the film 
version, Get Carter, commenced in the last months of Wilson’s government, the 
producers set it in Newcastle. The leader of Newcastle Council, Labour councillor T. 
Dan Smith, epitomised local corruption. Illegal building contracts led to his 
subsequent imprisonment. Smith made a factual mockery of Wilson’s ambitions for a 
‘New Britain’ forged in the ‘White Heat’ of technology as much as Potter’s play 
mocked it fictionally. However, a much more frightening symbol of Labour’s failure 
was Ronan Point. Ronan Point was a high-rise tower block commenced in 1966 and 
finished on 11 March 1968, which the government intended to provide affordable 
housing for the working-class. It collapsed on 16 May killing four and injuring 
seventeen. The investigation that resulted found serious shortcomings and 
irregularities behind the facade. This seemed a fitting allegory for Wilson’s ‘New 
Britain’.
However, the Labour Government’s problems were not necessarily comfortable issues 
for the Conservative Opposition either. Society’s ills presented problems for a broad- 
church party that included progressives and reactionaries because morality was often 
at the heart of debate. Films, books and newspapers made it difficult to ignore the fact 
that society’s trends had changed and continued to do so. In the Oscar-winning 
Darling (1965), Julie Christie portrayed an amoral single woman who used sex to 
achieve success. Murder and, for the first time in British cinema, full-frontal female
17 Sandbrook, White, 607ff.
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nudity, were the main features of Blowup (1966). Teenage marriage, domestic abuse 
and a life degenerating into prostitution formed the plot of Poor Cow (1967). Lindsay 
Anderson’s I f  ... (1968), surreally reflected subversion in the ultra-Establishment 
surroundings of a Public School and questioned the existing social structure. At the 
other end of the social spectrum Ken Loach’s Kes (1969) which depicted a 
dysfunctional family and a boy’s futile attempt to break free from the confines of an 
inadequate education system and avoid becoming a miner, highlighted the potential 
for challenging the status quo. For many traditional Conservatives, these films 
reflected a troubled decade, one in which a Church of England Bishop published a
1 ftbook that questioned God’s existence, youths fought openly on British beaches, 
church attendances continued to decline, and drugs, sexual immorality and other 
social problems appeared far more prevalent. Yet, the Conservative Party had to 
appeal to this electorate too. Reaction to the 1968 Wootton Report indicated this 
dilemma. The Conservatives opposed the report’s conclusion, which stated that the 
danger of cannabis smoking was overstated. This no doubt pleased some party 
members, but it also risked alienating both the young and libertarians. Meanwhile, 
other events called the ‘Permissive Society’ into question. Newspapers and television 
covered the trials of the Richardson Brothers and Kray Twins, bringing tales of 
organised crime, protection rackets, torture and cold-blooded murder to the public’s 
attention. Unarguably most shocking was the Moors Murderers. These were not new 
phenomena. However, the abolition of the death penalty, easing of divorce laws and 
the decriminalisation of abortion, homosexuality and suicide, were new.
Great Britain’s role was even more problematic for the Conservative Party. This was 
predominantly because of Britain’s international position, which involved unresolved 
questions about its relationships with the USA, Europe and the Commonwealth. Each 
relationship highlighted Conservative Party fault-lines. Support for America had 
damaged Macmillan’s attempt to join the Common Market. That in turn highlighted 
divisions between pro-EEC and imperialist Conservatives. For two reasons, any focus 
on the remaining imperial possessions was problematic for the Conservative Party. 
First, divisions existed amongst Conservative MPs over whether to support the
18 John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God, SCM Press, London (1963).
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remaining white-minority governments that resisted moves to majority, black rule. 
This resulted in the parliamentary party dividing three ways in 1965, when the Labour 
government imposed oil sanctions on Rhodesia after its white-minority government 
declared unilateral independence rather than grant concessions to the black majority. 
Secondly, Conservative support for white-minority governments risked exacerbating 
the tensions that surrounded black immigration. This would allow opponents to 
portray the Conservative and Unionist Party as the party of division within the United 
Kingdom. Such views could limit Conservative Party fortunes if, as seemed likely, 
Great Britain became increasingly multi-racial. Yet if the Conservative Party failed to 
address concerns over immigration, they risked dividing the party and presenting the 
extreme right with political space in which to thrive. Thus, the Conservative Party 
leadership faced the quandary of dealing with immigration whilst maintaining party 
unity. In April 1968, Shadow Cabinet member Enoch Powell brought this to the fore 
spectacularly when he warned of ‘rivers of blood’ if coloured immigration continued.
Moreover, questions of unity were not simply issues of skin colour. On 14 July 1966, 
Plaid Cymru gained it first parliamentary seat when Gwynfor Evans overturned a 
large Labour majority in Camarthen. On 2 November 1967, Winnie Ewing performed 
the same feat for the Scottish National Party in the hitherto safe Labour seat of 
Hamilton. These events may have reflected deep-seated economic concerns. They 
were also evidence of a strengthening separatist nationalism, and they proved not to 
be ephemeral blips in the United Kingdom’s history. An increasingly polarised 
Northern Ireland similarly questioned the Union, if from a different perspective. The 
Republican-Catholic ambition remained the reunion of Ireland, stoked by grievances 
over blatant discrimination by gerrymandered protestant authority. Unionists, on the 
other hand, felt isolated. Ulster’s unionists, suspicious of acts of conciliation towards 
the Republic by Westminster, opposed Civil Rights Movements and divided into 
conservative and die-hard loyalists. Hardliners even spoke of declaring unilateral 
independence similar to Rhodesia. This too presented problems for the leaders of a 
party that supposedly stood for British union.
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A reaction to these changes set in. This was most notable amongst hitherto left-wing 
literary figures. In 1967, Kingsley Amis explained his right-wing conversion in ‘Why 
Lucky Jim Turned Right’ in the Sunday Telegraph. John Braine joined the Monday 
Club, which published A Personal Record (1968), Braine’s explanation of his 
political journey from left to right. One Labour MP formed his own political party and 
espoused views that found favour with the Conservative Monday Club. These high 
profile conversions were not necessarily welcome as the issues that prompted 
conversions were often difficult for the Conservative Opposition also. The 
Conservative Party leadership also alienated many of its supporters when it failed in 
varying degrees to oppose ‘progressive’ measures. This failure once again left 
political space on the Conservative Party’s right flank for others to exploit. 
Consequently, conservative groups emerged to fight in areas that the Conservative 
Party appeared unwilling to, just as in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The National 
Viewers and Listeners Association (NVLA) led by Mary Whitehouse was the most 
famous of these groups. Whitehouse was a long-standing member of Moral 
Rearmament and had previously fought the consequences of modem consumerism 
and mass culture when she attacked the BBC in a ‘Clean-Up TV Campaign’ in 1963. 
However, when Whitehouse launched the NVLA in spring 1965, she no longer simply 
targeted the BBC. Instead, Whitehouse now focused on the areas of change that the 
Conservative Party either ignored or accepted, and inveighed against the welfare state, 
consumerism, working-class affluence and the power of the unions.
In contrast, extreme-right groups appeared to be in decline. The membership of the 
League of Empire Loyalists and True Tories fell markedly. Financial irregularities 
discredited Edward Martell and made the Freedom Group defunct. However, this was 
an illusory picture. Black immigration remained a potent issue in British politics, and 
was especially difficult for the Conservative Party. ‘Residents’ Associations’ emerged 
demanding an end to black immigration. Edward Martell joined the bandwagon and 
supported an anti-immigration candidate in a 1966 by-election. In early 1967, a large 
section of the extreme right used its racist anti-immigration views to coalesce into the 
National Front. This was Britain’s first credible extreme-right party since the Second 
World War. More troubling for the Conservative leadership was the existence of such
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views within the party, particularly in the Monday Club. The Monday Club was far 
more than a single-issue movement. It contained traditionalists and neo-liberals who 
engaged in a wide variety of topics. However, the Monday Club also contained 
members whose views on immigration resembled those of the external extreme right 
very closely. In this period, the immigration issue increasingly dominated Monday 
Club activity. Once again, the risk of association with the extreme right loomed for 
the Conservative leadership. This was also a far more dangerous time for the 
Conservative Party than at any period since 1945. Racism had provided the extreme 
right with a unifying ideology and presented extreme-right voters with a home for 
their votes away from the Conservative Party. Moreover, Powell’s entry into the 
immigration debate in 1968 placed racism centre-stage in British politics and risked 
splitting the Conservative Party between liberals and racial-nationalists. There was 
even the possibility that Powell would take over the Conservative Party if the 
leadership failed to win the next election.
However, the party leadership stuck to its policy of countering the extreme right. In 
1965, Edward Heath replaced Home as party leader. As Heath came from a lower- 
middle class grammar school background like Harold Wilson, he seemed the 
appropriate person to oppose the Labour prime minister. He was the first leader that 
Conservative MPs elected by secret ballot. Heath was difficult to categorise, as Blake 
recognised.19 Some viewed Heath as the right-wing candidate in the contest to 
succeed Home. This was possibly because Heath had forged a reputation as a tough 
parliamentary operator as Macmillan’s Chief Whip. Alternatively, it was because 
Heath had forced the Resale Price Maintenance Bill onto the statute book against the 
wishes of many Conservatives, as Gilmour stated. However, Heath was no right­
winger. He had entered parliament at the 1950 General Election and quickly became a 
member of the One Nation Group. Despite the presence of two right-wing advocates, 
the One Nation Group had supported the post-war consensual approach and 
Macmillan’s leftist policies.22 Therefore, Heath identified himself with Conservative
19 Blake, Conservative Party, 300.
20 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 219.
21 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever, 219.
22 V. McKee, ‘Conservative Factions’, Contemporary Record, 3,1 (Autumn, 1989), 30-32.
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Party progressivism from the beginning. He saw trade unions as an ‘estate of the 
realm with whom co-operation was both desirable and necessary’, an opinion he 
adhered to even when industrial action increased.23 He also rejected racism.24
Heath ensured that the party bureaucracy reflected his own stance by replacing the 
Chairman Home had appointed. This resulted in Central Office’s attitude towards the 
Monday Club becoming unambiguous. Central Office was complicit in the Monday 
Club’s consistent failure to gain representation in party organisations, whilst at the 
same time it continued to assist the Conservative Party’s progressive groups. Heath 
combined these internal manoeuvrings against the extreme right with a rightwards 
shift in the Conservative Party’s political orientation. He incorporated some of the 
extreme-right’s views without ever acceding to them totally. He continued to reject 
the extreme-right’s racism, but adopted a tougher stance towards immigration. Heath 
also moved towards the views previously espoused by the ‘freedom right’ on the 
economy and industrial relations, which culminated in the Selsdon Declaration of 
January 1970. Right-wing Conservatives such as Norman Tebbit believed that the 
Selsdon Declaration was the Conservative Party’s ‘first repudiation of the post-war 
Butskellite consensus’, and that ‘Heath was committed to the end of that corporate 
consensus and to the new liberal economics’.25 It is doubtful that Heath was sincere in 
this rightwards shift. Heath’s actions were probably little more than political 
expediency, a reflection of the difficult political context in which he led the 
Conservative Party. However, Heath had presented the extreme-right wing with a 
problem as he had placed the Conservative Party firmly in its territory. His actions, 
and those of the bureaucracy that served him, continued to present the extreme right 
with the dilemmas that the post-1945 Conservative Party had consistently posed.
23 Heath, Life, 193 and passim.
24 Heath, Life, 455.
25 N. Tebbit, Upwardly Mobile: An Autobiography, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London (1998), 
94.
26 J. Campbell, Edward Heath, Jonathan Cape (1993), 264-6. See also A. Roth, Heath and 
the Heathmen, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (1972), 16 & 206-7.
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Right, Left, Right.
Views expressed by extreme-right groups reflected this period’s difficult context. In 
1965, the leader of the League of Empire Loyalists complained about the destruction 
of the White Commonwealth, and stated that that Britain had lost its independent 
nuclear capability due to the Nassau Agreement.27 Chesterton particularly criticised 
coloured immigration: ‘The supreme treason in the British Isles, however, is the 
creation of a colour problem in a White nation where no such problem has existed 
throughout hundreds of years of its existence.’ Chesterton reiterated these views at 
the LEL’s twelfth annual conference in October 1965, at which he also scorned 
American materialism, the Churches’ betrayal of Christendom, the horrors of 
decolonization and Britain’s reliance on foreign debt. However, Chesterton’s 
problem by 1965 was that the League of Empire Loyalists was a fractured rump 
damaged by splits, departures and adverse publicity. In 1956, Colin Jordan had left 
and formed the more overtly Nazi White Defence League. John Tyndall and John 
Bean left in 1957 and created the National Labour Party to counter coloured 
immigration. Consequently, the League of Empire Loyalists appeared little more than 
a training ground for neo-Nazis and neo-fascists. This added credibility to Central 
Office claims that the League of Empire Loyalists was a fascist organisation. 
Chesterton continued to bruit his views of a Jewish conspiracy to control the world, 
which alienated many people, and gave the impression of fanaticism, which in turn 
added further weight to Central Office claims. Chesterton’s world-view was 
especially obvious when he chose the Britons Publishing Company to distribute the 
book that outlined it, The New Unhappy Lords (1965). LEL membership had 
declined from 3000 at the height of the race riots in 1958 to around 300 by 1961. 
Nothing indicated that this fall had reversed by 1965. Also in 1961, Chesterton had 
lost the main source of LEL funding when expatriate Chilean R. K. Jeffery died.31 All 
three LEL candidates in the 1964 General Election had lost their deposits. Thus, 
Chesterton vented his spleen to a dwindling audience. The Conservative Party, and
27 A. K. Chesterton, The New Unhappy Lords: An exposure of power politics, Candour, 
London (1965), 135 & 151.
28 Chesterton, Lords, 155.
29 A. K. Chesterton, Empire or Eclipse: Grim Realities of the Mid-Twentieth Century, Candour, 
London (1965), passim.
30 As seen in a Britons Publishing Co. leaflet, LSE Pamphlet Collection, Misc Coll 1124.
31 Bean, Shades, 211.
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those newspapers that supported, simply ignored the LEL, probably because they 
considered it irrevocably damaged.
Edward Martell, however, elicited a different response from the Conservative Party. 
Martell’s companies had experienced financial difficulties by 1965. Martell had failed 
to repay the loans he had requested in The New Daily. Disgruntled creditors wrote to 
MPs. On 18 June 1965, Labour MPs demanded an inquiry and public protection ‘from 
this kind of racketeer whose personal guarantees are worthless’.32 Martell responded 
the following day with hand-delivered letters that challenged Labour MPs to repeat 
their accusations without parliamentary privilege.33 Four months later, Martell won an 
apology and retraction.34 This did not mean that Martell’s financial troubles had 
ended. In January and February 1966, Martell faced bankruptcy petitions.35 In 
September 1967, the London Gazette secured a receiving order against Martell. The 
following month, the Official Receiver estimated Martell’s debts at over £100,000.37 
By March 1968, the London Bankruptcy Court estimated Martell’s debt had increased 
to £179,600 and ordered him to submit a full statement of affairs within twenty-one 
days or face serious consequences.38 This process was an unedifying spectacle for 
Martell.
For Conservative Central Office, however, Martell’s problems presented an 
opportunity. Central Office now developed selective amnesia. It claimed to have 
‘always refused to have any working arrangement with any of his organisations’, and 
recalled ‘that in 1957 Mr. Martell contested East Ham as a People’s League 
Candidate’ rather than his National Fellowship Conservative candidacy at Bristol in 
1963.39 Internal Central Office files correctly claimed in August 1966 that Martell’s 
failure to honour loans was ‘nothing to do with us’.40 This was typical Central Office
32 'Freedom Group: M.P.s demand inquiry’, The Times, 18 June 1965.
33 'Mr. Martell Replies To Challengers’, The Times, 19 June 1965.
34 'Mr. Martell’s Libel Action’, The Times, 6 October 1965.
35 'Mr. Martell: Petitions Dismissed’, The Times, 21 January 1966. ‘Petitions Against Mr. E.
Martell Adjourned’, The Times, 11 February 1966.
36 ‘Martell faces new crisis’, The Times, 20 September 1967.
37 ‘Mr. Martell’s debt hopes’, The Times, 6 October 1967.
38 ‘£179,000 debts of Mr. Martell’, The Times, 16 March 1966.
39 Anon, ‘Mr. Edward Martell’, 18 June 1965. CPA CCO 20/52/1, Edward Martell, June 1965-
70.
40 C. Craig to Mr. Webster, ‘Marten’s Freedom Group’, 15 August 1968. CPA CCO 3/7/21, 
Freedom Group, 1966-67.
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denial of association with outside organisations. By November 1966, Central Office’s 
position had hardened. Central Office responded to a Conservative MP’s request for 
assistance in recovering money lent to Martell with the claim: ‘The Party has always 
made it clear that we would have nothing to do with the Freedom Group and all offers 
from the Group as such have been refused.’41 This was patently untrue. Reaction 
within Central Office to the MP’s request revealed one reason why its position had 
hardened. Mr. Craig thought Martell’s problems ‘might be a good opportunity’ to
AOfinally deal with Martell. Craig’s subsequent comments are also consistent with the 
view that Central Office acted as the Conservative Party’s agency for monitoring and 
acting against the extreme-right. For example, when Craig informed his colleague Mr. 
Webster that ‘Martell seems to be getting under way with the New Daily’,43 he 
revealed that Central Office had continued to gather intelligence on Martell. When 
Craig suggested that ‘Perhaps it would be a good opportunity of nipping him in the 
bud by drawing attention to his unpaid debts, perhaps by a letter to the Telegraph or 
the Express’,44 he illuminated one of the methods in which Central Office acted to 
block the extreme right.
Central Office officials maintained their stance towards Martell, even when 
corresponding with their own Party Chairman, Edward du Cann. When Mr. Webster 
received a complaint from du Cann about money lent to Martell, he suggested to Mr. 
Craig in December 1966 that, ‘I think we should reply that the Freedom Group has no 
connection with our Party at all, nor are we in any way responsible.’45 Webster’s 
conclusion is debatable. His use of the present tense may be significant. Perhaps 
equally significant, du Cann was a Home appointee. Edward Heath disliked du Cann. 
Both men had discussed an appropriate time for du Cann to leave Central Office.46 
This discussion occurred before the March 1966 General Election. It had also become 
common knowledge that Heath planned to remove du Cann by the time of du Cann’s
41 Letter from Mr. Robert Mathew MP, attached to internal memo from C. Craig to Mr. 
Webster, 4 November 1966.Untitled letter to Robert Mathew, Esq., T.D., M.P., 9 November 
1966. CPA CCO 3/7/21, Freedom Group, 1966-67.
42 C. Craig to Mr. Webster, 4 November 1966. CPA CCO 3/7/21, Freedom Group, 1966-67.
43 C. Craig to Mr. Webster, 4 November 1966. CPA CCO 3/7/21, Freedom Group, 1966-67.
44 C. Craig to Mr. Webster, 4 November 1966. CPA CCO 3/7/21, Freedom Group, 1966-67.
45 R. J. Webster to Mr. Craig, The Freedom Group’, 6 December 1966. CPA CCO 3/7/21, 
Freedom Group, 1966-67.
46 Heath, Life, 290.
196
A HDecember 1966 complaint. Press rumours to this effect circulated at the October
iO
party conference. It is highly unlikely that officials within Central Office were 
ignorant of du Cann’s probable removal. Therefore, this particular Central Office 
correspondence does not detract from the argument that Central Office blocked the 
extreme right. Instead, it reflected internal party machinations and Central Office’s 
remit to act in accordance with the Party leader’s wishes. As the new party leader was 
a member of the One Nation Group and detested right-wing extremism,49 this 
correspondence supported the view that Central Office was the Conservative Party’s 
agent for limiting the extreme-right’s chances. These party developments also 
provided another reason for Central Office’s tougher attitude towards Martell.
There was another reason too. Publicly, Central Office continued to deny a corporate 
relationship with Martell. On one occasion, it did admit privately that it had played a 
role in Martell’s association with the wider Conservative Party. It revealed 
confidentially to a Conservative MP that it had previously insisted that any Freedom 
Group assistance ‘must be done on an individual basis by joining the local 
Association’.50 However, the nature of this admission, one that showed that Central 
Office attempted to limit Martell’s opportunities within the party, does not detract 
from its continued denial of association with Martell. It is possible to argue that 
Central Office based its tougher stance on a desire not to be associated with Martell’s 
financial irregularities alone. However, its willingness to publicise Martell’s 
difficulties argued against this. What else, then, had precipitated this change? Central 
Office had possibly reverted to a more negative stance towards the extreme right after 
the brief hiatus of Home’s leadership. It is also possible that Central Office based its 
tougher stance on a suspicion that Martell ultimately intended either infiltrating the 
Conservative Party or forming a new party.51 If so, the Nuneaton by-election of 
March 1967 may have influenced Central Office. The National Party’s candidate at 
Nuneaton was decorated war veteran, Air Vice-Marshall ‘Pathfinder’ Bennett. 
Bennett was briefly a Liberal MP in 1945, but like Martell had long-since travelled
47 Heath, Life, 290.
48 Ramsden, Winds, 269. See also CPA CCO 20/63/1, Resignation of Edward du Cann, 1967.
49 Heath, Life, passim.
50 Anonymous confidential letter to Cranley Onslow, 28 April 1967. CPA CCO 20/52/1, 
Edward Martell (Freedom Group), 1965-70.
51 See 154-157.
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rightwards. His candidature included demands that reflected the contemporary 
context. There was a call for ‘True British Honour, Integrity and Loyalty’, especially 
towards Rhodesia’s White, minority government.52 Bennett blamed the Conservatives 
as much as the Labour Government for events in Rhodesia. He rejected the Treaty 
of Rome and suggested that Britain remained outside the Common Market.54 Bennett 
advocated trade union reform, reduced taxation, abolition of the rating system and 
cutting welfare spending.55 He emphasised that his demand for a five-year suspension 
of immigration applied to all races.56 However, when he justified this on the grounds
r* 7
of increased housing problems and unemployment, Bennett implicitly identified that 
section of immigrants most likely to experience such conditions, which meant blacks. 
Bennett’s election literature was thus typical of contemporary extreme-right material. 
The Conservative party did not want to be associated with such views. In small print 
at the foot of the last page of the literature was the attribution, ‘Printed and Published 
by E. Martell, Election Agent to Air Vice-Marshall Donald Bennett.’58 This also 
explains Central Office’s tougher stance towards Martell.
Exactly when Central Office knew of this connection is unclear. Central Office files 
do not clarify this issue. Yet, Central Office monitored events in Nuneaton and 
Martell’s actions, and these indicated awareness of the connection with Bennett. The 
committee overseeing the Nuneaton by-election convened on 15 September 1966. The 
secret minutes of the meeting for the section titled ‘Running of the Campaign’ 
recorded that, ‘It must be made quite clear in future that the Central Office Agent was 
in charge of the running of the campaign.’59 This may have reflected a difficulty 
peculiar to the Nuneaton Conservative Association, but seems unlikely due to the
absence of any evidence to this effect, plus the supposed autonomy of Conservative
Associations. It is possible to suggest, however, that Central Office intended to 
maintain effective reporting channels at Nuneaton because of Martell. For, although 
there is nothing in Central Office files that suggested problems in Nuneaton, there is
52 ‘Don Bennett’s Election Address’, 1967.
53 'Don Bennett’s Election Address’, 1967.
54 ‘Don Bennett’s Election Address’, 1967.
55 ‘Don Bennett’s Election Address’, 1967.
56 'Don Bennett’s Election Address’, 1967.
57 ‘Don Bennett’s Election Address’, 1967.
58 ‘Don Bennett’s Election Address’, 1967.
59 ‘Notes of Meeting of By-Election Committee’, 15 September. CPA CCO 20/55/8, Nuneaton, 
1966-1967.
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material that related to Martell. On 9 February 1967, Bryan Edgell, an Agent in the 
Reading Conservative Association, wrote to du Cann and revealed confidential 
information imparted by Martell. Edgell acknowledged many years acquaintance with 
Martell, and reported Martell’s claim of an approach by a number of ‘big boys’ from 
the Freedom Group who were willing to fund a new party.60 Martell had acquiesced 
and formed the National Party to fight the next five elections until Heath and du Cann 
left the leadership of the Party and Central Office.61 The National Party operated from 
the address of ‘Modem Organisers’, one of Martell’s other groups,62 and appeared a 
more extreme reprise of the Freedom Group. Martell’s financial difficulties made this 
venture less feasible. In May 1968, however, Martell revealed in court that nearly 
ninety percent of his 748 creditors were not making a claim against him. The bulk of 
these creditors were probably disgruntled Conservatives who had responded to 
Martell’s appeals in The New Daily. Their refusal to pursue Martell freed him to 
pursue his political objectives and, arguably, confirmed continuance of grassroots 
irritation towards the Conservative Party. Consequently, Central Office maintained 
their tougher attitude towards Martell and continued monitoring him.
Major General Richard Hilton’s activities should have concerned Central Office more 
than those of the financially embarrassed Martell. Hilton was now Vice-President of 
the British National Party, and Chairman of the Patriotic Party that had contested two 
seats at the 1964 General Election, as well as leader of the True Tories. Hilton was 
also Honorary President of the National Youth League, a group that claimed to be 
Britain’s only ‘one hundred percent’ patriotic youth movement confined to those of 
British ancestry.64 From these positions, Hilton occupied political space to the right of 
the Conservative Party, and believed that the ‘wide divergences between the 
Conservative front bench and the Conservative electorate’ provided him with 
opportunities.65 Hilton attempted to exploit divisions within the party over issues such 
as immigration and Rhodesia, and argued that the Conservative Party was ‘seething
60 Bryan Edgell to Edward du Cann, 'Report on National Party’, 9 February 1967. CPA CCO 
20/52/1, Edward Martell (Freedom Group), June 1965-70.
61 Bryan Edgell to Edward du Cann, 'Report on National Party’, 9 February 1967. CPA CCO 
20/52/1, Edward Martell (Freedom Group), June 1965-70.
62 Bryan Edgell to Edward du Cann, ‘Report on National Party’, 9 February 1967. CPA CCO 
20/52/1, Edward Martell (Freedom Group), June 1965-70.
63 ‘Guarantee error, Mr. Martell says', The Times, 4 May 1968.
64 D. Shipper, Trouble For The Tories', Tribune, 12 August 1966, 8.
65 D. Shipper, ‘Trouble For The Tories’, Tribune, 12 August 1966, 8.
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with discontent against its present leadership’.66 Hilton also appeared to have a plan 
taking advantage of these divisions. He claimed to have abandoned fighting elections 
and now openly advocated infiltrating the Conservative Party, particularly via the 
Young Conservatives. The aim was the familiar refrain of the alienated extreme right: 
‘re-converting the Conservative Party to patriotism’.67 Hilton outlined a two-stage 
‘Ten Year Plan’ to accomplish his objective, which he based on a belief that the 
Conservative leadership had so severely discontented their supporters that it would 
remain in opposition for at least ten years. Hilton wanted True Tories to infiltrate 
Conservative Associations via activism in local issues and then, having secured 
sufficient influence, dominate the voting. Hilton even set up a central Headquarters in 
London to co-ordinate the True Tories’ campaign.
However, Hilton and the True Tories did not worry the Conservative leadership and 
Central Office. The True Tories were an old movement, notwithstanding Hilton’s 
connection with the National Youth League. This constrained a movement that sought 
to infiltrate the Conservative Party via the Young Conservatives. The seventy-two 
year old Hilton realised this when he attempted to form a working committee of 
young patriots aged between twenty and thirty-five to take over the leadership of the 
True Tories.68 There was little evidence that it ever existed. Nor had Hilton enjoyed 
any obvious success in his aims to bring the Conservative Party back to ‘True 
Toryism’. This was because whilst the leadership’s position on many issues 
undoubtedly irritated some Conservatives, at least as many were probably reluctant to 
oppose it actively, and others agreed with it. Hilton unwittingly acknowledged this 
when he blamed divergence between the Conservative leadership and members on the 
rank-and-file who had ‘blindly allowed themselves to be led by a gang of doctrinaire 
Left-wing intellectuals’.69 These comments helped to explain why Hilton’s True 
Tories had run out of steam by 1966. Membership, once possibly over 3000, was by 
then less than half that number,70 which explained Central Office’s minimal interest in 
the True Tories, despite Hilton’s advocacy of infiltration of the Conservative Party.
66 D. Shipper, Trouble For The Tories’, Tribune, 12 August 1966, 8.
67 D. Shipper, Trouble For The Tories’, Tribune, 12 August 1966, 8.
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Therefore, at this stage there seemed many reasons why the Conservative Party 
should be unconcerned about the extreme right outside the party. Since the 1964 
General Election, the external extreme right had proved its limitations. This does not 
mean that the Conservative Party ignored it. Intelligence gathering continued. The 
Conservative Party also monitored opportunities afforded to the extreme right, 
especially the impact of black immigration on local communities. A result of black 
immigration was the emergence of protesting ‘residents associations'. These 
associations sprung up in the early 1960s in areas where black immigrants settled. 
Membership came from the three major political parties, but especially the 
Conservative Party. They were often schismatic. This was because local 
Conservatives determined that within the residents’ associations no single body 
emerged that was strong enough to jeopardise the Conservative Party’s chances of
71attracting the anti-immigrant vote. In Birmingham, for example, Conservatives were 
involved in an argument within the Birmingham Immigration Control Association that 
resulted in the formation of an additional two residents’ associations.72 Local factors 
and the presence of members of other political parties no doubt played a role in these 
schisms. However, if this view of the local Conservatives’ action is correct, then their 
determination to stop residents’ associations from uniting into a single body also 
hindered the development of the extreme right. It was an opportunistic attitude best 
seen when Peter Griffiths took advantage of residents’ fears of black immigration in 
Smethwick and delivered a victory for the Conservative party in the 1964 General
- t o
Election. John Bean later claimed that the Birmingham Branch Organiser of 
Mosley’s Union Movement invented Griffiths’ election slogan.74 Griffiths put racism 
at the forefront of his campaign and accepted the assistance of BNP members in his 
campaign.75 His actions once again raised the fear that the electorate would remember 
the Conservative’s pre-war associations with fascism. This view is supported by Bean 
claims that, ‘In some respects Griffiths’ victory was a victory for us.76 However, the 
Smethwick result was also a victory for a Conservative candidate who took advantage 
of the tensions caused by, and the divisions of, anti-immigrant residents’ associations.
71 Walker, National Front, 54.
72 Walker, National Front, 54.
73 See 180.
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In reality, Griffiths had reduced the extreme-right’s chances by operating in their 
space, evidenced by the BNP’s failure to field a candidate.
Nor was it only Griffiths, or a few local Conservatives, that crowded the political 
space of residents’ associations and extreme-right parties. From the 1950s, 
Conservative Party MPs had expressed concerns about coloured immigration.77 The 
manner in which they did so had ensured that the public knew that a repository for 
their fears existed within the Conservative Party. Nor was Conservative MPs’ concern 
limited to public pronouncements. Just after the 1964 General Election, a Mr. R. F. 
Beauclair wrote to Conservative MP Sir Patrick Wall. Beauclair stated that his family 
were ‘certainly not racists in any way’, then likened coloured immigration to the 
invasion planned by Hitler against which he had fought, and described coloured 
immigrants as unsuitable to Britain’s climate and modem political system as they 
were ‘by nature simple indolent people, who thrive in a simple country 
environment’.78 Beauclair did not have in mind the green pastures of Wall’s 
Yorkshire constituency. In his reply, Wall stated that although he was not personally 
opposed to the immigrants, he too was ‘extremely concerned’ about it.79 He also 
believed that the present problems caused by these immigrants would be ‘nothing 
compared to the problems we shall face in a generation’s time’ when their children 
would be competing ‘directly with our own British people’.80 These comments, 
especially the last, made it clear that Wall, like Hilton of the True Tories and many 
others of the extreme right, did not see coloured immigrants as British, or ever likely 
to become so. Beauclair agreed with Wall’s comments and claimed that there was no 
need for immigrant labour, that the true number of immigrants was higher, and 
warned that when these immigrants were on the electoral roll and voting Labour, the
o i
Conservative Party could soon cease to exist. However, the Conservative Party had 
not acquiesced in its own demise, but had provided a more viable alternative for those
77 See 100-101.
78 R. F. Beauclair to Major P. H. B. Wall, MC, MP, (nd) 1964. Private papers of Sir Patrick 
Wall, University of Hull.
79 Patrick Wall, MC, VRD, MP to R. F. Beauclair Esq., 23 November 1964. Private papers of 
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80 Patrick Wall, MC, VRD, MP to R. F. Beauclair Esq., 23 November 1964. Private papers of 
Patrick Wall, University of Hull.
81 R. F. Beauclair to Major P. H. B. Wall, MC, MP, 24 November 1964. Private papers of Sir 
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voters sympathetic to the residents’ associations who were tempted to vote for 
extreme-right parties.
However, the belief that the Conservative Party leadership was unaware of the 
dangers immigration posed to its continued existence, as expressed by Beauclair, 
resulted in the formation of the Racial Preservation Society (RPS). The RPS 
commenced in 1965 with Beauclair amongst its members and sought to galvanise 
residents’ groups into a coherent movement to play a wider political role.82 It focused 
its attention on a wider stage rather than limit itself to local issues. The RPS 
demanded, for example, a referendum on immigration. More pertinent perhaps to an 
electorate that increasingly watched television was the RPS’s attack on what it 
perceived as a cultural acceptance of ‘mongrelisation’. When the soap opera 
Coronation Street began in 1960 Granada Television intended it to run for only 
thirteen episodes. Its popularity caused a reassessment. By 1964, Coronation Street 
regularly attracted an audience of over 20 million people. In 1965, the RPS attacked a 
storyline that involved the adoption of a mixed-race child as a cynical attempt to 
soften up the viewers into accepting race mixing. The RPS accused other television 
programmes of brainwashing their audience too. It also published lists of 
Conservative MPs it thought ‘sound’ on immigration.84 As leading figures in the RPS 
included former members of Mosley’s British Union of Fascists,85 this list was 
potentially very embarrassing for the Conservative Party. By doing so, however, the 
RPS was also acting inimically to its own interests. By publishing the names of 
sympathetic Conservative MPs the RPS simply increased the possibility that potential 
supporters of extreme-right parties would vote for these ‘sound’ Conservative 
candidates rather than waste their vote on miniscule parties.
More problematic for the RPS was that on immigration the Conservative Party 
actually faced both ways. For, although some Conservative MPs, and probably many 
party members, were hostile to immigration, they could do little about this in the 
House of Commons. Apart from the obvious problem of being in opposition, anti-
82 A. Sykes, Radical Right, 102.
83 'Newsletter1, December 1967, 5. The Racial Preservation Society, CPA CCO 3/7/46, Racial 
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immigration Conservative MPs were at odds with their own parliamentary leadership 
and much of the wider party. In 1965, for example, the Conservative ffontbench 
acquiesced in the Labour Government’s Race Relations Act. At the 1965 
Conservative Party Conference, platform speakers did not advocate anti-immigration 
measures. There was some dissent from the conference floor. However, when Reg 
Simmerson, who represented the London University Graduates Association, argued 
that ‘To allow in immigrants is madness; to allow in coloured immigrants is double 
madness’, he received jeers as well as cheers. The case of Peter Griffiths, the new 
Conservative MP for Smethwick, typified the Conservative party’s split over 
immigration. Some sections of the Conservative Party warmed to Griffiths, as 
invitations to speak at local associations and Young Conservative meetings 
evidenced.87 The attitude of the leadership was very different. Edward Heath may 
have dismissed anti-immigration Conservative MPs with the nonchalant comment
oo
that, ‘Every party has its extremists’. He also recorded that many treated Griffiths 
with particular opprobrium: ‘Griffiths was a severe embarrassment to us and he was 
rightly shunned in Parliament when he arrived.’89 In this instance, ‘us’ probably 
meant the party leadership and those progressive Conservatives who baulked at the 
anti-immigration stance of some of their fellow Conservative MPs. In a party where 
the leadership determined policy, this was sufficient to stymie those who wished for 
harsh anti-immigrant measures. It also indicated the leadership’s willingness to act 
against the extreme right even if it was within the parliamentary party.
The wider Conservative Party’s ambiguous stance on immigration went right to the 
heart of the dilemma faced by the RPS and all extreme-right movements. The 
Conservative Party contained members who were sympathetic to these groups’ aims 
and thus attracted their potential voters, yet alienated their activists by offering little 
probability of actually delivering their objectives. The Conservative Party caught the 
RPS in its jaws of attraction and repulsion, as it did to all other extreme-right groups. 
As ever in this process, Central Office acted as the agent of repulsion since it reflected 
the leadership’s wishes. Central Office was, for example, at best evasive when it
86 ‘Delegates Split On Immigrants’, Daily Telegraph, 15 October 1965.
87 Walker, National Front, 53.
88 Heath, Life, 455.
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replied to the RPS’s questions. On at least one occasion, all participants in an RPS 
letter-writing campaign received from Central Office the same stereotyped reply. If 
Central Office’s evasion stemmed from its desire to avoid embarrassing connections, 
then a subsequent comment from an RPS member suggested this was a wise position. 
A ‘Mrs L’ wrote: ‘I have been a member of Sir Oswald Mosley [sic] and his party for 
years, but in this great democracy of ours, only Communists get the voice.’91 Mrs L
•  92was irritated that the Conservative Party had sponsored two immigrant councillors. 
This was an overt example of how the Conservative Party acted against the extreme 
right. In December 1967, the RPS tacitly acknowledged that the Conservative Party 
had the ability to thwart its aims when it argued that someone should hang above 
Central Office the legend ‘Abandon Hope All Ye Who Enter Here.’93
From 1967, the RPS declined and the majority of its members joined the National 
Front, leaving only a rump. One of these, Dr. David Brown, attempted to arrest the 
RPS’s decline. In 1966, Brown had formed his own party, the National Democratic 
Party (NDP). Now, Brown tried to maintain the RPS’s message by merging his NDP 
with other small extreme-right groups. By 1969, these included The British Defence 
League (BDL). John O’Brien led the BDL. He was a member of the Shrewsbury 
Conservative Association. In April 1969, the RPS and BDL produced a combined 
bulletin.94 A combined bulletin suggested that the RPS rump was struggling to 
survive. Its demands reflected contemporary social issues. The bulletin criticised the 
Wootton Report (1968) for its liberal attitude towards drugs and argued for measures 
that were more repressive.95 However, the RPS’s position was indistinct from that of 
the Conservative Party, which showed that the Conservative Party, having created 
political space for the extreme right to exist in, also occupied it and thus denied it 
space in which to operate. The bulletin had racism at its core and unsurprisingly
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blamed non-white immigrants for society’s ills. It highlighted, for example, the 
imprisonment of three drug smuggling Pakistani men at Sowerby Bridge in 1968. 
However, the bulletin also supported Conservative MPs who opposed the 
parliamentary leadership on issues such as immigration and the Common Market and 
named them. It attacked progressive Conservative MPs in the familiar tones of the 
extreme right. The bulletin particularly criticised Sir Edward Boyle MP and pledged 
to ‘support any opposition to this man, from whatever source it comes. Let us purify 
and purge the Tory party, and relieve the parliamentary scene of this strange 
person.’96 There was even a comment that suggested that Conservatives withheld 
party subscriptions due to their irritation at the leadership.
The bulletin also threatened violence. Initially, this threat seemed implicit, and 
directed at the Left. The bulletin stated that failure to redress the electorate’s concerns 
would lead it to turn further rightwards and warned of ‘dire consequences ... for all 
the motley crew of unpatriotic citizens whose allegiance is to a foreign creed, not their 
own country’.97 It believed that progressives dominated the Conservative Party, and, 
as the party was likely to gain power at the next General Election, argued that Edward 
Heath would be ‘putty in the hands of the centre faction of the Tory party’.98 This 
belief in progressives’ domination of the Conservative Party was a constant refrain of 
the post-1945 extreme right. The bulletin argued that the result would be the 
electorate’s disillusion with all mainstream parties. This was reminiscent of the claims 
of interwar fascists, who sought the sweeping away of the political ‘old gangs.’ The 
consequences that the bulletin identified suggested that violence was not simply 
implicit in the RPS’s character, and revealed the possibility of worrying beliefs. The 
bulletin argued that since both mainstream parties had failed the nation, ‘the stage will 
be set for a resurgence of the forces that produced extremist governments in Italy and 
Germany in the twenties and thirties. The left and centre will have brought it on
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themselves AND IT WILL SERVE THEM DAMN WELL RIGHT.’99 Admittedly, 
this may have reflected concern within the rump of the RPS that Britain faced the 
possibility of a rise in neo-Nazism. Their belief that those who had left the RPS in 
1967 had joined a party tainted by neo-Nazism and fascism supported this possibility. 
However, the presence of former fascists in the RPS before 1967 argued against this, 
as does an obvious racist ideology and the use of violent terminology. This casts 
serious doubts on whether the RPS’s conclusion was a warning or a wish. What is 
certain is that the RPS existed in the nebulous border between the right-wing edge of 
the Conservative Party and the extreme-right, and carried the potential to embarrass 
the Conservative Party. This explains why Central Office evaded the RPS. The later 
bulletin, with its more obvious extremism, proved the wisdom of this stance. Central 
Office stance denied the RPS any credibility from Britain’s sole right-wing 
mainstream party and contributed to its fracture and decline.
These examples do not mean that Central Office focused solely on groups and 
individuals that always operated on the extreme right. At a time in which literary 
figures like Amis, Larkin and Braine renounced their socialism in favour of the right, 
Central Office was alert to the possibility of political parallels. One such example in 
this period was Desmond Donnelly, Labour MP for Pembroke West since 1950. 
Although originally aligned with Aneurin Bevan, as a consultant to engineering firms 
and merchant banks and passionately anti-Soviet Donnelly was an incongruous 
member of the left wing of the Labour Party. Like Edward Martell, Donnelly 
embarked on a rightward journey, albeit one that started further left on the political 
spectrum. Donnelly supported the moderate Hugh Gaitskell for the Labour leadership 
and opposed his more left-wing successor Harold Wilson. By the mid-1960s, 
Donnelly was a thorn in the side of the Labour Government. Donnelly was one of the 
two Labour MPs who opposed nationalisation of the steel industry during the Labour 
Government of 1964-66.100 This was particularly difficult for Prime Minister Wilson 
because the Conservatives’ unexpected victory at the Leyton by-election on 21 
January 1965 left the government with a parliamentary majority of three.
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However, at this stage Central Office appeared to have had little interest in Donnelly. 
He was, after all, simply a rebellious Labour MP. Yet coincidentally, the events 
Donnelly was peripherally involved in, particularly the Leyton by-election, adds to 
our understanding of the relationship between the Conservative Party and the extreme 
right. Central Office was deeply anxious during the by-election campaign. In 
November 1964, C. A. J. Norton, the Central Office Agent responsible for the Greater 
London Area, provided a preliminary report on the constituency. Norton noted the 
likelihood of a BNP candidacy and a proliferation of ‘Keep Britain White’ slogans, 
and that one third of people canvassed raised the ‘colour question’.101 One reason why 
this might have worried Central Office is obvious. Harold Wilson carried out his 
intention of appointing Patrick Gordon Walker as his first foreign secretary. However, 
Walker’s defeat in the 1964 General Election meant that an unelected individual held 
one of the highest offices of state. The Labour leadership imposed Gordon Walker as 
their candidate in Leyton to secure his swift return to the Commons. Gordon Walker 
was the candidate Griffiths defeated at Smethwick in the 1964 General Election. The 
Conservative Party risked becoming embroiled once again in the divisive issue of race 
and possible identification with the extreme right. Central Office monitored extreme- 
right activity in the by-election, and thus reinforced the view that it was fear of 
association with the extreme right that determined its actions.
On 4 January 1965, the Chief Organisation Officer informed the General Director at 
Central Office of the extreme right disrupting a Labour press conference, and noted 
the role played by a Mr. Colin Jordan.102 Four days later, after visiting Leyton with 
Area Agent Norton, the Chief Organisation Officer expressed his concerns about 
Jordan’s activities. He reported that there was ‘a great deal of rowdiness owing to Mr. 
Colin Jordan and I hope we shall not get the backwash of some of this’,103 thereby 
revealing fears that extreme-right activity could harm the Conservative Party. There 
were two reasons to be worried. Jordan was a former member of the British People’s
101 C. A J. Norton, ‘Leyton By-Election’, 18 November 1964. CPA CCO 600/18/83, Leyton, 
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Party and the Midlands Organiser of the League of Empire Loyalists before the latter 
expelled him for his blatant neo-Nazism in 1958. Thereafter he launched a number of 
openly Nazi movements and amalgamated with others extremists to form new parties 
such as the BNP. Jordan was thus a link between the Conservative Party and neo- 
Nazism thanks to his membership of the League of Empire Loyalists. Secondly, if the 
Conservative candidate at Leyton ran a racist campaign that was similar to Griffith’s 
at Smethwick, which included assistance from the BNP and blatant racism, there was 
a real risk that this would further taint the Conservative Party. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that the Conservative Party candidate at Leyton, Ronald Buxton, colluded 
with the BNP. John Bean, a founder member of the BNP, claimed that Buxton 
promised that he would ‘call for a moratorium on all further immigration for two 
years’ if Bean withdrew from the contest.104 Bean withdrew, and later claimed that 
Buxton willingly accepted BNP assistance, which included distribution of 8000 of its 
‘Stop Immigration’ leaflets’.105 Buxton’s small victory margin, a mere 205 votes, led 
Bean to claim the Leyton result a victory for the BNP.106 However, he was shocked to 
see that Buxton abused the BNP after the result.107 Buxton’s behaviour may have been 
little more than opportunism. It also showed that the Conservative Party could 
overpower a much smaller extreme-right movement, use it, attract its supporters and 
then dismiss it disdainfully. If Bean’s claims are correct, Buxton had acted in a very 
risky manner. This explains the Chief Organisation Officer’s comments. Knowledge 
of Burton’s behaviour and the involvement of the BNP would magnify its anxiety. 
The role, if any, that Central Office played in Buxton’s behaviour is unclear, but the 
reasons for the Chief Organisation Officer’s concerns are not.
What is also clear is that Central Office was more concerned with the Leyton by- 
election than with Desmond Donnelly. However, this changed as Donnelly became 
more alienated from the Labour Government. In February 1965, Donnelly expressed 
views on Britain’s industrial relations that later found resonance in the Conservative 
Party’s Fair Deal at Work. Donnelly argued that Britain could not ‘survive as a
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leading industrial nation if it accepted that three men should do two men’s jobs or that 
out-of-date practices are sustained’.108 On the Welfare State, Donnelly called for an 
elimination of waste and a refocusing of priorities and expenditure limits. The 
following month, Donnelly rebuked the government for failing to support the USA 
wholeheartedly in its conflict with Vietnam and denounced the ‘present cacophony of 
Anti-Americanism’.109 Three months after the 1966 General Election, and with the 
government facing the prospect of devaluation, Donnelly questioned whether Britain 
had a government with sufficient courage and competence to deal with the crisis.110 In 
1967 Donnelly became the News o f the World’s chief political correspondent, from 
where he continued to criticise the Labour Government. The power of the trade 
unions was a particular target of Donnelly’s, similar to Martell in The New Daily 
beforehand.111 The final breach with the Labour Party came when devaluation in 1967 
resulted in reduced defence spending and the government withdrew from its 
commitments ‘east of Suez’. On 18 January 1968, Donnelly resigned the Labour 
Whip. Two months later the Labour Party expelled him. Donnelly responded by 
writing Gadarene ’68 (1968), a biblical reference to the Labour Government’s 
headlong flight towards suicide. At some stage in the same year, the Monday Club 
gave Donnelly a two-minute standing ovation after he had addressed them. He also 
formed his own political party, the United Democratic Party.
1 1TGiven the terms of reference presented to it regarding outside organisations, it is no 
coincidence to find that Central Office’s interest in Desmond Donnelly also 
commenced in 1968. On 29 November 1968, Donnelly wrote to a Mr. Eastwood and 
enclosed a leaflet that claimed that the crisis facing Britain was ‘essentially political 
as well as economic’.113 The leaflet, Through the Barriers, revealed Donnelly’s belief 
that society was decadent, government overspent, especially on the welfare state, 
individual and business taxes were excessive, the need for private provision, the need 
for government to cease interfering in the economy and industry, and a nationalistic
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foreign affairs stance.114 Conservatives sympathised with many of these demands, but 
the leadership by no means accepted them all. Some of the demands mirrored those 
found in the literature of groups to the right of the Conservative Party. Eastwood 
forwarded this material to the Conservative Party, presumably his local Conservative 
Association, from where it found its way to the Central Office Area Agent. On 16 
December 1968, the agent forwarded these documents to Mr. Webster at Central 
Office, and stated that he ‘thought you would like to have this in case you had not 
already seen this’.115 These are the earliest extant documents in Central Office’s file 
on the United Democratic Party, although it is probable that Central Office already 
knew about Donnelly’s activities, including his appearance before the Monday Club.
In this instance, it is how the documents arrived at Central Office that is interesting, 
not just their content. These documents showed that Central Office’s intelligence 
network was not limited to its own agents as they originated from a businessman. This 
leads to two important conclusions as to how the Conservative Party thwarted the 
extreme right. First, the demands of the party leadership took precedence when 
necessary, despite the supposed autonomy of the local associations. This is 
unsurprising, but sheds light on the importance of Central Office. In the case of 
extreme-right groups and individuals, the leadership’s demand was simply to avoid 
embarrassing connections. The actions of Central Office thus have far proved this was 
a constant requirement. The leadership also demanded that Central Office handle 
carefully issues that could divide the party. As many of these potential divisions 
during Heath’s leadership centred on the Monday Club, Donnelly’s presence at one of 
its meetings meant that monitoring of the United Democratic Party also became a 
requirement. The second conclusion is that Central Office had an extensive reach. If 
Eastwood was a party official, or member of a local Conservative Association, 
Central Office had a great reach within the Conservative Party. However, if Eastwood 
was not a member of a local Conservative Association, Central Office’s reach 
extended deeper into society. Considering that Central Office had positive 
connections with some right-wing groups, such as Aims of Industry, this scenario is
114 Through the Barriers’, (nd). CPA CCO 500/64/1, United Democratic Party (Desmond 
Donnelly), 1968-69.
115 A. S. Gamer to Mr. Webster, ‘Mr. Desmond Donnelly’, 16 December 1968. CPA CCO 
500/54/1, United Democratic Party (Desmond Donnelly), 1968-69.
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likely. It seems that Central Office’s intelligence gathering went far beyond its own 
bureaucracy.
Central Office continued to gather intelligence on Donnelly and the United 
Democratic Party. In May 1969, this included the first issue of Opportunity, the 
United Democratic Party’s newspaper.116 The following month J. Galloway, the 
Central Office Area Agent for the West Midlands, placed observers at a Keele 
University meeting where Donnelly was to speak in support of the United Democratic 
Party’s candidate in the Newcastle-under-Lyme by-election. This again showed the 
active measures that Central Office employed to monitor outside organisations. 
Galloway’s report mentioned the alarm of some Conservatives at the similarity of 
Donnelly’s views to those of the Conservative Party.117 The result of the by-election 
on 3 October suggested that these Conservatives were justifiably concerned. The 
Conservative candidate, Nicholas Winterton, came second to the Labour candidate by 
1042 votes. The United Democratic Party candidate secured 1699 votes. Therefore, 
the Conservative Party had arguably lost a by-election because a former Labour MP 
had journeyed into the political space just to its right. In June 1969, the Central Office 
Area Agent for Wales and Monmouthshire forwarded a cutting from the West Wales 
Guardian in which Donnelly criticised the Conservative Party Leadership’s poor
liftperformance. In his attached report, the agent stated that, ‘There are members of 
our Party who view Donnelly as all but Conservative.’119 No political party could 
afford to ignore these events. Yet, there seemed to be little consternation within 
Central Office. There were no comments written on these documents, and there are no 
revealing internal memos within the file. Donnelly’s views were not too far to the 
right, which probably explained Central Office’s attitude. Nor did the United 
Democratic Party contain any connections with pre-war fascism or any evidence of 
racism, unlike some other organisations. Although Central Office was probably 
irritated at the by-election loss and interested by the ovation given by the Monday 
Club, it was not as disconcerted by Donnelly as it was by extreme-right groups.
116 CPA CCO 500/64/1, United Democratic Party (Desmond Donnelly), 1968-69.
117 J. Galloway to Mr. Webster, ‘Mr. Desmond Donnelly M.P.’, 11 June 1969. CPA CCO 
500/54/1, United Democratic Party (Desmond Donnelly), 1968-69.
118 ‘Slipping Tories’, The West Wales Guardian, 20 June 1969.
119 L. Wolstenholme to Mr. R. J. Webster, 26 June 1969. CPA CCO 500/54/1, United 
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Another reason Central Office was not as concerned about Donnelly was that whereas 
nearly all extreme-right movements saved their most vitriolic comments for the 
Conservative Party, Donnelly’s attacked the Labour Government. The Conservative 
leadership probably welcomed this. This notion is supported by a cartoon in the 
Conservative Party’s ‘house paper’, the Daily Telegraph, which depicted Donnelly as 
a shop proprietor standing in front of his window display offering ‘Taxes Slashed’, 
‘All Goods Guaranteed Denationalised’ and ‘Fantastic Cuts in Welfare’. Behind 
Donnelly stood Prime Minister Harold Wilson outside ‘Harold’s Super Duper 
Market’, obviously irritated by Donnelly’s claim that ‘Our customers are always
190right.’ Donnelly reproduced this cartoon in the first edition of Opportunity. The 
Daily Telegraph’s positive portrayal of Donnelly also pointed to another reason for 
Central Office’s attitude. Donnelly’s policies were very close to those of a 
Conservative Party that had also moved rightwards since 1967. Finally, whilst 
Donnelly’s political position obliged Central Office to monitor him and his party, 
other groups posed far more problems for the Conservative Party and required its 
attention, both outside and within the party.
In 1967, the extreme right moved to overcome weakness it had displayed since the
1911964 General Election. The catalyst was the 1966 General Election. Chesterton had 
already created ‘Candour Leagues’ to run sanction-busting petrol convoys to 
Rhodesia. These sanctions would remain because Labour now possessed a large 
majority. Chesterton believed that the result of the General Election made it 
propitious for the extreme right to unite. The Conservative Party leadership had 
provided it with the political space to do so, as seen in its acceptance of the Labour 
government’s immigration legislation and the emergence of residents’ associations.122 
However, just outside the right wing of the Conservative Party was a very small space 
in which to operate. Mosley had proved how difficult this was either side of the 
Second World War, when he failed first with the British Union of Fascists and then 
with Union Movement. Chesterton’s League of Empire Loyalists and the myriad neo-
120 Opportunity, 31 May 1969, p. 1. CPA CCO 500/64/1, United Democratic Party (Desmond 
Donnelly), 1968-69.
121 Walker, National Front, 58.
122 See 202.
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Nazi and neo-fascist groups it spawned had failed. Nevertheless, Chesterton began 
negotiations after the General Election with the BNP, RPS and a number of smaller 
extreme-right groups.
Negotiations resulted in the formation of the National Front on 7 February 1967. This 
was Britain’s first coherent extreme-right political party since the Second World War, 
and it possessed the potential to make an electoral impact. It included members of the 
League of Empire Loyalists, the Racial Preservation Society and the British National 
Party. Alongside Chesterton, the party leader, the National Front included figures 
such as Major-General Hilton, Air Vice-Marshall Bennett, Andrew Fountaine and R. 
F. Beauclair. Initially excluded were individuals whose comments or actions more 
easily categorised them as Nazis or fascists, such as Bean, Tyndall and Jordan. 
However, this proved to be temporary. Bean and Tyndall soon became members, 
which left only Jordan of the prominent extremists outside the National Front. In time, 
the National Front attracted others, including John O’Brien of the British Defence 
League. Although inchoate, the National Front quickly provided the previously 
fractured extreme right with a common focus. It emerged in a context that included 
fears about immigration and Europe. The National Front became Britain’s largest 
extreme-right party. It presented the Conservative Party with its biggest challenge 
from the right since Mosley in the 1930s.
On 2 October 1967 Anthony Royle, the Conservative MP for Richmond, forwarded 
National Front literature to Anthony Barber, Edward du Cann’s successor as 
Chairman at Central Office, and told him of its distribution in Beckenham.123 Royle’s 
action indicated that some Conservative MPs thought it was their duty to forward this 
type of information and material to Central Office. Royle was a progressive 
Conservative.124 He stated to Barber that, ‘I thought that the appropriate department of 
Central Office might be interested.’125 What Central Office read would have 
confirmed that the National Front was an extreme-right party. The National Front’s
123 Anthony Royle MP to The Rt. Hon. Anthony Barber MP, 2 October 1967. CPA CCO 
3/7/37, National Front, 1967-77
124 Ramsden, Winds, 198.
125 Anthony Royle MP to The Rt. Hon. Anthony Barber MP, 2 October 1967. CPA CCO 
3/7/37, National Front, 1967-77.
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literature called for repatriation of coloured immigrants.126 It announced the formation
of a ‘Free Speech Defence Committee’, which included former Conservatives
Andrew Fountaine and Henry Newnham, to champion the cause of those charged
under the Race Relations Act (1965).127 It opposed Britain’s membership of the
Common Market.128 The National Front also demanded an end to overseas aid unless
it clearly benefitted Britain’s interests, the establishment of a strong national
government that restored the nation’s pride, honour and greatness, and the
replacement of the coloured Commonwealth with a new political unit based on the
economic and strategic union of Britain and the White Dominions. Unsurprisingly,
given these objectives, the Britons Publishing Society published at least one of the
National Front’s leaflets and shared the address of the National Front’s Free Speech
Defence Committee. Perhaps more troubling was the realisation that included in the
attached literature list of ‘Kinsmen Books’, the National Front’s publishing section,
1was work by individuals connected with the Conservative Party. This included The 
Puppetters, written by erstwhile Conservative parliamentary candidate Harold Soref 
and his fellow Monday Club member Ian Greig, and The Defeat o f Communism and 
No Vision Here, written by another Monday Club member, D. G. Stewart-Smith. 
Alongside these works was the notorious Protocols o f  the Learned Elders o f Zion.
The official who received Royle’s correspondence immediately asked his colleague, 
Miss Varley, whether Central Office had any ‘knowledge or contact with the National 
Front’.131 Varley responded that Central Office did indeed have such knowledge.132 
This suggested that Central Office had monitored the National Front before Royle’s 
letter arrived. Varley’s response revealed Central Office’s opinion of the National 
Front and the steps it had taken to counter its growth. Varley showed her disdain for 
the National Front when she described it as ‘an amalgamation (or should I say unholy
126 ‘Racial Hatred’, NF Publications. CPA CCO 3/7/37, National Front, 1967-77.
127 ‘Free Speech Defence Committee’, NF Publications, CPA CCO 3/7/37, National Front, 
1967-77.
128 ‘The Common Market, NF Publications, CPA CCO 3/7/37, National Front, 1967-77.
129 ‘Save Britain From Final DisasterJ, NF Publications, CPA CCO 3/7/37, National Front, 
1967-77.
130 CPA CCO 3/7/37, National Front, 1967-77.
131 Colin Craig to Miss Varley, ‘Mr Anthony Royle MP’, 4 October 1967. CPA CCO 3/7/37, 
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alliance?) between John Bean’s British National Party and the League of Empire 
Loyalists’.133 She identified Bean as Colin Jordan’s ‘first lieutenant’ in his ‘fascist 
organisation’ before ‘striking out on his own’, which demonstrated a belief that the 
National Front was associated with fascism.134 Varley also stated that the component 
parts of the National Front were ‘too discredited to prove a real threat to us’,135 which 
indicated that Central Office thought it unlikely that these associations could damage 
the Conservative Party quite as much as before. The extreme-right’s failure to make 
any political headway, partly thanks to Central Office’s efforts, justified Varley’s 
comment. Her attitude did not result in any deviation from Central Office’s usual 
negative action towards the extreme right, and she implemented well-tried policies 
against the National Front. She admitted that the National Front could attract the 
support of ‘some of our extreme right-wing members’, and stated that Central Office 
would ‘certainly advise any of our people approached to have nothing whatsoever to 
do with them’.136 Additionally, Varley’s comments encapsulated two ways in which 
the Conservative Party blocked the extreme right. First, as it already contained 
‘extreme right-wing members’, the Conservative Party captured those whom any new 
extreme-right party needed to succeed. Secondly, in Central Office the Conservative 
Party had an established mechanism via which it warned members against joining 
parties like the National Front, not least if they contained individuals renowned for 
publicity stunts and engagement in street politics.
Barber summed up Central Office’s attitude to the National Front when he stated in 
his response to Royle that, ‘They all seem to be a pretty dangerous crowd!’137 Central 
Office continued to monitor the National Front for the remainder of the 1966-70 
Parliament. A. S. Gamer, the Area Agent for the North West, requested information 
about the National Front from Central Office in 1968.138 His request suggested that
133 J. F. Varley to Colin Craig, ‘Mr. Anthony Royle, MP’, 9 October 1967. CPA CCO 3/7/37, 
National Front, 1967-77.
134 J. F. Varley to Colin Craig, 'Mr. Anthony Royle, MP’, 9 October 1967. CPA CCO 3/7/37, 
National Front, 1967-77.
135 J. F. Varley to Colin Craig, ‘Mr. Anthony Royle, MP’, 9 October 1967. CPA CCO 3/7/37, 
National Front, 1967-77.
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either Central Office’s intelligence gathering had not performed effectively in the 
North West, or the National Front’s impact there was limited. An inquiry from an
1 TO _ . . #associate in the insurance industry had precipitated Gamer’s request. The inquiry 
provided further evidence of the social reach of the Central Office intelligence 
gathering system. However dismissive Central Office was about the National Front’s 
prospects, it warned Gamer that as it was attempting to project an image of 
respectability, the National Front ‘could be a bigger nuisance’ than its constituent 
parts had proved.140 Central Office had a point. In 1969, the Conservative Party’s 
opponents noted that the National Front included Admiral Sir Barry Domvile on its 
National Council.141 Domvile was a former BUF member interned during the Second 
World War. Therefore, his presence posed a potential problem should the 
Conservative Party ever become associated with the National Front. This also 
explained the Conservative Party’s vigilance towards the National Front as the 1970 
General Election approached. An example of this came on 4 May 1970 in the 
response of Mr. Carrick at Central Office to material forwarded by the Conservative 
MP for Petersfield, Miss J. M. Quennell. Carrick thanked Quennell for the 
‘opportunity of discussing this organisation with you in view of the immense amount 
of work you have done’.142 Admittedly, this was a cryptic comment, made more so by 
the absence of Quennell’s material from the file. However, Quennell’s 
correspondence reinforced the notion gained from Anthony Royle that some 
Conservative MPs actively opposed the National Front.
Central Office’s attitude towards the National Front was consistent with its policy 
since 1945. In all cases, Central Office had aimed to avoid any negative impact on the 
Conservative Party. Yet, although Central Office was aware of the potential harm the 
National Front posed, there was not yet any acute anxiety. By 1967, Central Office 
had investigated extreme-right organisations under the remit provided in 1948 for 
nearly twenty years. With a few exceptions, all extreme-right organisations had 
collapsed. Some had produced parliamentary candidates, but as the electorate easily
139 A. S. Garner, The National Front, 12 August 1968. CPA CCO 3/7/37, National Front, 
1967-77.
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identified them with Nazism or fascism, they all fared badly. Arguably, only the 
League of Empire Loyalists candidature at Lewisham North in 1957 had harmed the 
Conservative Party. Yet, the Conservative Party had effectively rebuffed the LEL at 
the 1958 party conference at Blackpool, and thereafter watched it fracture. Therefore, 
Central Office’s apparently relaxed attitude in 1967 was understandable. The National 
Front’s poor performance since its inception warranted Central Office’s attitude. 
During the 1970 General Election campaign, Central Office received a report on the 
National Front’s performance in recent municipal elections from the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews.143 Central Office informed the sender that it had forwarded 
the report to the other political parties, which was perhaps an effort to minimise a 
Conservative Party link with the National Front.144 The report showed that the 
National Front possessed the potential to deprive the Conservative Party of council 
seats. In 1969, for example, the National Front polled over 10% in Cardiff Cathays, 
and the next year at Huddersfield South Central its vote far exceeded Labour’s margin 
of victory over the Conservatives.145 In reality, however, these results were of little 
cause for concern. Seats where the National Front may have deprived the 
Conservatives of victory were few, whilst the unknown previous loyalties of its voters 
made firm conclusions difficult. Nowhere did the National Front win a council seat. 
Nor would the National Front’s dismal by-election performance have unduly worried 
Central Office. On 28 March 1968, former Conservative parliamentary candidate 
Andrew Fountaine stood at Acton, the only seat the National Front contested in the 
period 1966-70, and gained a mere 5.6% of the vote. At Acton, a Labour majority of 
4941 turned into a Conservative one of 3720, so Fountaine’s candidacy did not cause 
much concern. Yet, there was another reason that explained Central Office’s apparent 
lack of concern about the National Front. Within the Conservative Party, an extreme- 
right group had posed far more problems than the National Front.
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The Internal Extreme Right
The official history of the Monday Club described its first five years as ‘The Years of 
Struggle’.146 Membership was small, possibly caused by a confusing attitude towards 
the Monday Club that emanated from the Conservative Party leadership and 
bureaucracy. Central Office had attempted to block the Monday Club when 
Macmillan was party leader, and then appeared to adopt a more positive stance under 
Home. That changed again after the 1964 General Election. Pressure mounted quickly 
for Home’s resignation, and Edward Heath, a member of the One Nation Group, 
replaced him on 27 July 1965. Once again, a person unsympathetic to the right led the 
Conservative Party. Moreover, there was little prospect of Heath’s early removal, as 
he was the first Conservative leader elected by the party’s MPs, and another General 
Election was expected soon. The Monday Club responded by transforming itself into 
a mass organisation. In 1965, the Monday Club removed restrictions that limited 
membership to Conservative Party members under 35.147 Thereafter, membership 
increased considerably, more than fivefold between 1964 and 1969 according to the 
most cautious estimates.148 After the 1966 General Election, sixteen Conservative 
MPs including Harold Gurden and Patrick Wall were Monday Club members.149 
From the General Election of 1964 onwards, the Monday Club looked increasingly 
like a party within a party. It adopted a political platform that attacked the ‘liberal 
establishment’ for its involvement in the decline of British society and the 
abandonment of loyalists abroad, a stance similar to many post-war external extreme- 
right groups. The Monday Club included the Conservative Party leadership in this 
‘liberal establishment’. Its development was more dangerous than that of other groups 
for two reasons. First, the Monday Club had a higher calibre of member than other 
extreme-right groups. Therefore, their concentration on society’s divisions, most
t4e Copping, Story, 8.
147 P. Seyd, ‘Factionalism’, 470.
148 Copping claims a membership of 200-300 at the end of 1963. Copping, Story, 7. Seyd puts 
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obviously immigration, threatened to exacerbate existing tensions to a degree that 
other groups could not achieve. Secondly, the Monday Club was unarguably of the 
Conservative Party and operated within it, unlike virtually all of the other extreme- 
right organisations Central Office had faced since 1945. Therefore, it threatened to 
identify society’s divisions explicitly with those of the Conservative Party, which was 
potentially electorally disastrous.
An early sign of the Monday Club’s changed intent after the 1964 General Election 
came in November 1964 when Paul Williams replaced Paul Bristol as chairman.150 
Williams had been a Conservative MP for Sunderland South from 1953 until 1964. 
However, he sat as an Independent MP from 1957-58, after he resigned the 
Conservative whip in protest over the decision to withdraw from Suez. His 
appointment as Chairman of the Monday Club was probably a result of the fallout 
after the publication of Conservatism Lost? Conservatism Regained}51 However, 
under Williams, the Monday Club’s more concerted and outspoken opposition to the 
Labour Government frequently put it at odds with the Conservative leadership. We 
can see evidence of the Monday Club’s opposition to the Conservative frontbench in 
an internal memorandum on immigration by Tim Hardacre of December 1964. 
Hardacre cited Griffiths’ success at Smethwick and that of other similarly minded 
Birmingham MPs, and argued that this was a consequence of ‘the grave problems 
caused by the post-war influx of coloured workers from the Commonwealth’.152 This 
was a clear criticism of Conservative Governments that held power for thirteen of 
these nineteen years. Hardacre continued in same vein. He identified the continual 
‘failure to appreciate the present and future difficulties caused by the 500,000 new 
immigrants in our country’, and identified immigrants’ deficiencies in hygiene, social 
behaviour, customs, language and consequent impact on housing, education and jobs, 
which, he concluded, made racial discrimination ‘understandable in the present state 
of affairs.153 Hardacre suggested that the Monday Club note how MPs like Griffiths 
had made use of coloured immigration. Many of these MPs were now in the Monday
t5° ‘Minutes of a Meeting of the Monday Club Executive’, 5 November 1965. Private papers of 
Sir Patrick Wall. Monday Club: 1961-1989. 40/2, November 1963 -  December 1964.
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Club. Hardacre’s was a harder line than hitherto and the language he employed 
redolent of the extreme right. Whether the party leadership or Central Office knew 
about this memorandum is unclear, but a copy of a similar memorandum in the 
Conservative Party Archive date-stamped 15 February 1965 by the Conservative 
Research Department suggests that they did.154 In February 1965, the Monday Club’s 
pamphlet, Immigration Into the U.K., tempered this language, and included some 
progressive measures. Moreover, its stated objective, assimilation of all immigrants, 
seemed laudable. However, the method it proposed to achieve its objective showed 
that the substance of Hardacre’s memorandum remained. The pamphlet proposed 
tighter administration of the colour bar inherent in the 1962 Immigrant Act to keep 
numbers to a minimum.155 Other recommendations included the establishment of 
hostels for single coloured immigrants, clearer information on immigrant 
unemployment levels and regular checks for incidence of venereal disease and 
tuberculosis. These measures directly addressed the fears raised by extreme-right 
parties such as the BNP. In doing so, the Monday Club reduced the space available to 
the BNP. However, such comments also brought the Monday Club’s motives into 
serious question. The Monday Club had based its immigration policy solely on skin 
colour. Nowhere was there criticism of white immigration. The Monday Club 
memorandum received by the Conservative Research Department proved this when it 
claimed that, ‘Colour exaggerates differences. Competition for housing, education and 
health services cause resentment.’156 This would have left the party leadership and 
Central Office with little doubt about the Monday Club’s views and objectives 
regarding immigration.
Also issued early in 1965 was The Role o f  Subversion in Foreign Affairs. This 
Monday Club pamphlet criticised previous Conservative Governments more 
explicitly. It focused on the threat posed by Communism and stated that, ‘When last 
in office Conservative leaders appeared to many of their supporters to be providing an
154 ‘A Monday Club Memorandum on Immigration Into The U.K.’, 1965. CPA PUB 117/10.
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inadequate defence to this threat.’157 However, this pamphlet also targeted the current 
Conservative Party leadership as much as previous ones. It warned that, ‘the party 
leaders would be well advised to assure their supporters that they appreciate the 
contemporary threat to the British Commonwealth and state unequivocally that they 
intend to do something effective about it’. Here, the Monday Club implied that the 
Conservative Party leadership remained insufficiently anti-communist. More 
ominously, the pamphlet threatened that, ‘unless steps are taken and are seen to be 
taken, many otherwise loyal Conservative supporters will become increasingly 
disillusioned: may refuse to vote for the party and may even become more swayed by 
extremist groups because their fears have not been allayed’.159 Although this pamphlet 
did not represent the collective view of the Monday Club, we cannot dismiss it simply 
as one individual’s view. For, although its author, Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, was active 
in anti-Communist circles,160 all Monday Club pamphlets required the approval of the 
chairman, and the National Executive where possible, before publication.161 
Moreover, the Monday Club applied this caveat to all its publications. The Monday 
Club was aware of the Conservative Party’s opposition to the extreme right, a role 
that had forced individuals since 1945 into a number of extreme-right groups such as 
Clan Briton and the True Tories.
The Conservative Party leadership could neither ignore this criticism from its right 
wing, nor exaggerate divisions within the party given the proximity of a General 
Election. However, Central Office still made its view of the Monday Club known. 
Lord Salisbury requested Central Office help to acquire office space and £1000 funds 
for the Monday Club in November 1964. The General Director responded: ‘Not 
bloody likely.’ When Sir Robert Renwick donated £250, a Miss Yonge made it 
clear that Central Office would not provide the rest, and informed the Chairman that,
1 f^X‘As a matter of interest I gather that this is about 6% of what the Bow Group gets.’
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These examples contrast markedly with previous assistance to the Bow Group. They 
also revealed that Central Office remained hostile to the Monday Club, and suggested 
that the positive attitude it adopted whilst Home was party leader was more apparent 
than real. Nevertheless, at this time only low level blocking of the Monday Club by 
obstruction of its literature occurred. This was possibly a consequence of electoral 
considerations. On 6 April 1965, for example, a meeting of the Monday Club’s 
Executive Committee agreed that chairman Williams should seek to meet the Party 
Chairman ‘with a view to correcting the discrimination in the Research Department 
and Conservative Political Centre against Monday Club publications’.164 Both 
departments were within Central Office. Williams duly requested ‘fair recognition for 
the work of the Monday Club in the Research Department and the C.P.C.’ and 
suggested a meeting to Chairman du Cann.165 Mr. Craig at Central Office thought that 
Williams’ request was a complaint about the allegedly preferential treatment Central 
Office afforded to the Bow Group.166 By July 1965, the Monday Club’s Council 
discussed Central Office’s alleged preferential treatment of the Bow Group. The 
minutes referred to ‘instances of discrimination against Monday Club publications by 
the C.P.C., in particular in a recent advertisement in the Sunday Times’.167 In the 
same month, Williams reported that party Chairman Edward du Cann had provided 
assurances that there was no question of any bias against the Monday Club within the 
party organisation.168 The Monday Club may have accepted the good faith of the 
Chairman’s assurances. Du Cann was loyal to the still incumbent party leader and 
fellow right-winger Alec Douglas Home.169 However, du Cann’s assurance did not 
allay the Monday Club’s suspicions. The Council members to whom Williams 
reported agreed that, ‘in view of certain specific instances, such as the fact that no 
Monday Club Literature was ever on display at Swinton, a file should be compiled
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1 *7ftgiving examples of bias which should then be shown to Mr. du Cann’. This 
decision reflected the Monday Club’s suspicion that even with Home as party leader, 
‘the pink miasma of the Bow Group continued to overshadow conservative policy. 
The leftists were deeply entrenched.’171 The ‘Swinton’ referred to is Swinton College, 
the North Yorkshire establishment where the party leadership provided political 
education for its members. Prominent amongst those attending Swinton College were 
members of the Bow Group, who were engaged in a deliberate strategy of forming 
political relationships with other members and the party leadership.172
Du Cann’s assurances bore fruit when Central Office printed a small review of a 
Monday Club pamphlet and the CPC agreed to publish a toned-down Immigration 
Into the U.K.113 The Monday Club Council considered ‘Bias at Central Office’ again 
in September 1965, but decided that, ‘no complaint should be made at present as the 
attitude was becoming more favourable’.174 CPC’s agreement to publish the Monday 
Club’s pamphlet on Europe and display the club’s literature in its bookstall at the
17Sforthcoming Conservative Party conference at Brighton influenced this decision. 
This was a definite alteration in activity, but did not prove that the party approved of 
the Monday Club. The Conservative Party faced the prospect of Prime Minister 
Wilson calling a General Election at any time. Therefore it is unsurprising that Central 
Office tempered its obstruction of Monday Club literature. This is not quite the whole 
picture. Its decision to publish^ Europe o f  Nations: a practical policy for Britain was 
not difficult as this Monday Club pamphlet reflected the more pro-European stance of 
Edward Heath; Central Office simply abided by the wishes of the party leader. Nor 
did the apparent change in Central Office’s activity mean that it, or the wider party 
organisation, truly welcomed the Monday Club’s interventions. For example, when 
the Monday Club’s Council again considered Central Office’s bias, Harold Soref
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complained that no member was ‘ever selected in a winnable seat’.176 It is possible to 
dismiss this as sour grapes as the agreement to stock Monday Club literature did not 
include The Puppeteers, which Soref had co-authored.177 The subsequent appearance 
of this pamphlet on the National Front’s approved literature list suggested that any 
Central Office concern about it was well founded.178 Nevertheless, Soref s claims 
pointed to a wider obstruction of the Monday Club. Central Office compiled lists o f 
acceptable candidates and one of its officials attended candidate selection meetings. 
Moreover, the actions of Edward Heath confirmed Central Office obstruction of the 
Monday Club. Immediately after 1964 General Election defeat, Home appointed
179Heath to mastermind the biggest policy review since the Industrial Charter. Heath
managed over thirty working groups that investigated a broad spectrum of policy.
Ramsden argued that Heath’s election as leader strengthened his control over these
groups.180 The result was the policy statement Putting Britain Right Ahead, published
in time for the 1965 Party conference. Heath maintained these policy groups and
control over them after he was heavily defeated at the 1966 General Election. Seyd
stated that Heath never appointed any of the Monday Club’s nominees to these policy
|£1
groups, even thought they submitted names for consideration. Heath’s actions are 
consonant with Central Office’s consistent post-1945 hostility towards any group to 
the right of the Conservative Party, especially when compared to the support given to
i  q <2
progressive groups within the Conservative Party.
Rhodesia was the issue that most obviously highlighted the Monday Club’s difference 
from progressives and its position on the right of the Conservative Party. After the 
disintegration of the Central African Federation, two of its three constituent parts, 
Zambia and Malawi, had adopted black majority rule. The white minority rulers of the 
other member state, Rhodesia, refused to accept such an outcome, and elected a hard-
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line government led by Ian Smith. British pressure to compromise failed. On the eve 
of the 1964 General Election, Smith threatened to unilaterally declare independence 
rather than accept subordination to majority rule.183 This situation caused acute 
problems for the Conservative leadership. It could not condone an illegal act. Yet, the 
party’s right wing would not accept any abandonment of its ‘kith and kin’. Initially, 
right-wingers formed the Friends of Rhodesia, a group that initially caused little 
concern at Central Office because its perceived extremism deprived it of funds. 
Money from Rhodesia changed this situation, and resulted in the launch of the Anglo-
I o/
Rhodesian Society on 9 September 1965. This development promised concerted 
pressure on the Conservative leadership as the Monday Club’s patron Lord Salisbury 
led the Anglo-Rhodesian Society. Moreover, as the issue at stake concerned skin 
colour, Rhodesia threatened to inflame racial tensions in Britain. It also threatened to 
identify the Conservative Party in public perception with divisive issues both at home 
and abroad. The Monday Club involved itself prominently in the question of 
Rhodesia. Marie Stuart showed that whilst right-wing Conservative MPs did not agree 
on all topics, the Monday Club used the Rhodesia issue to give the right wing 
coherent organisational force with which to assail Heath.187 Therefore, the Monday 
Club provided a direct challenge to the Conservative leadership. The impact Rhodesia 
had on the Conservative Party in parliament, when it’s MPs amazingly divided three 
ways over the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia, embarrassed the party 
leadership. The new party leader appeared weak and the party divided. However, the 
actions taken by the Conservative leadership shows that it was quite prepared to meet 
the Monday Club’s challenge.
With a declaration of independence increasingly likely, Heath’s shadow cabinet 
released a statement on 6 October 1965 that announced the parliamentary 
Conservative Party’s opposition to it and its desire to see Rhodesian independence 
based on majority rule, a statement it intended ‘to be helpful to the Government in a
183 Smith said he was prepared to consult tribal chiefs on the possibility of granting a limited 
franchise based on the 1961 Constitution. B. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, Harper Collins, London 
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very difficult situation’.188 The Daily Telegraph's editorial of the same day mirrored 
the shadow cabinet’s statement, and indicated that the Conservative leadership would 
go further if necessary. It stated that there was little difference between the positions 
of the government and opposition, and implied that there would be little dissent from
1 SOthe Conservative leadership if the government imposed sanctions on Rhodesia. 
These sanctions included an oil embargo, which Chesterton’s Candour Leagues 
subsequently tried to break.190 The Conservative leadership, or Central Office, had 
used the Daily Telegraph to warn the Monday Club how far they were prepared to go 
to oppose it. That day’s letters to the editor showed how far the Conservative 
leadership’s position was from Monday Club members’ views. Patrick Wall 
suggested modification of the Rhodesian constitution ‘to ensure that power does not 
yet pass to the majority race’.191 Wall’s qualified statement was in line with the 
Monday Club’s professed agreement with the idea of eventual black majority rule and 
a solution that was ‘just to all races’.192 However, Monday Club pronouncements 
never said when black majority rule would be viable, but always placed it some time 
in the indefinite future. Some Monday Club members made comments that suggested 
‘eventual’ was synonymous with ‘never’. Patrick Wall’s comments to Beauclair in 
1964 revealed a chauvinistic belief that some individuals were unfit to govern 
themselves by dint of skin colour.193 His view was more in line with the leader of the 
League of Empire Loyalists than with the Conservative Party leadership. It is unlikely 
that Wall was a lone voice in the Monday Club. At no stage had the post-1945 
Conservative leadership shown any desire to be associated with such views. It is 
possible that the Monday Club opposed a unilateral declaration of independence on 
purely legal grounds, not skin colour, and that it based its opposition to any sanctions 
on a belief in their ineffectiveness. This was certainly the Monday Club’s position. 
However, it was inconsistent to oppose independence because it was illegal and then 
oppose legally imposed sanctions. This made support for the white minority in 
Rhodesia within the Monday Club look similar to that of the League of Empire 
Loyalists.
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Unlike the League of Empire Loyalists, the Monday Club in 1965 was not a declining 
rump. By 1965, it contained a number of MPs and party grandees and was thus 
difficult for the party leadership and Central Office to deal with. If the leadership 
appeased the Monday Club, it risked associating the whole party with the wider 
extreme right. On the other hand, if either the leadership or Central Office 
antagonised the Monday Club they risked dividing the party just before another 
General Election. Nevertheless, as the leadership mobilised the party machinery to 
oppose the Monday Club, it showed just how determined it was to act against the 
extreme right within its own ranks. The leadership used its control of party conference 
to block Lord Salisbury’s motion opposing sanctions in the event of UDI.194 The 
Daily Telegraph reported conference’s overwhelming cry of ‘No!’ when asked if they 
should even debate Salisbury’s motion.195 In a television broadcast on 30 October 
1965, Prime Minister Wilson ruled out the use of force if Rhodesia declared 
independence, but threatened sanctions, particularly on oil. The following day, the 
Monday Club began preparations for ‘a public campaign for support for Rhodesia’.196 
On 11 November, Ian Smith declared Rhodesia’s independence. In parliament, the 
Conservative Party leadership reacted once more to contain the Monday Club and 
limit any split within the parliamentary party. On 13 November, Heath appeared 
before a meeting of the 1922 Committee of Conservative backbenchers. Although 
some backbenchers were unhappy, Heath gained their assurance that they would not
107oppose the Government’s enabling the application of sanctions. The parliamentary 
debate on the enabling bill was notable for two incidents: the ejection of Colin Jordan 
for shouting slogans supporting National Socialism and Rhodesian independence;198 
and the failed attempt to force a division on the bill’s second reading by the Monday 
Club’s Edward Taylor, despite the ‘black looks from his Front Bench’.199 Jordan’s 
intervention graphically illustrated the danger of any Monday Club opposition to the 
agreed Conservative Party position. Support for the Rhodesian regime placed
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Conservatives in the same camp as neo-Nazis like Jordan. The events that led up to 
the passage of the Southern Rhodesia Bill on 15 November 1965 are an example of 
negative parliamentary activity by the Conservative Party towards the extreme right.
However, the Monday Club quickly proved its resilience, unlike the vast majority of 
other extreme-right groups the Conservative Party had blocked. It convened a 
‘Rhodesia Emergency Committee’ in the House of Commons on 17 November and 
planned a large-scale emergency public meeting.200 This ability to react quickly and 
utilise the offices at Westminster puts the Monday Club on a higher plane of 
credibility than all other extreme-right groups. In contrast to the dismissive attitude 
displayed towards most extreme-right wing groups, Conservatives viewed the 
Monday Club as a potential force in British politics. ‘Peterborough’ in the Daily 
Telegraph attributed this to chairman Paul Williams: ‘He has used his undoubted 
political acumen and experience of Westminster to shape a mixed assortment of 
Right-wingers into a more coherent force.’ This was dangerous for the 
Conservative leadership because the Daily Telegraph’s comments added to the 
Monday Club’s growing credibility, and threatened to divide the Conservative Party. 
The Daily Telegraph recognised this possibility when it identified a Monday Club 
member as representative of the polarisation that beset the Conservative Party.202 The 
Monday Club’s emergency public meeting reinforced this image of it as a potentially 
divisive, yet credible, extreme-right group.
The Daily Telegraph reckoned that 500-600 people attended the Caxton Hall meeting 
on 22 November 1965. This was an impressive figure for a swiftly arranged 
meeting. The Monday Club distributed its pamphlet, ‘Rhodesia And You’. On its first 
page, the Daily Telegraph reported that the platform criticised the new Conservative
A A i  A A t f
leader. The attendees passed a resolution deploring oil sanctions. ‘Three rousing
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cheers for Mr. Ian Smith’ ended the meeting.206 This was potentially explosive. In the 
same Daily Telegraph edition, ‘Peterborough’ recognised the danger that the Monday 
Club’s meeting posed and stated that it ‘symbolised an incandescent element in the 
Conservative Party just now’.207 ‘Peterborough’ tacitly acknowledged that the 
Conservative Party had forced the Monday Club to operate in extreme-right political 
space. The Monday Club appeared to recognise the difficulty of operating in this 
space, and the difficulty of its position, when it released a press statement that denied 
leading the approval of Smith.208 Awareness that association with the extreme right 
outside the party posed a serious risk came when Patrick Wall forwarded the 
resolution to party leader Edward Heath on 24 November and stated that, ‘we 
managed, I am glad to say, to eliminate Fascists or members of the League of Empire 
Loyalists, etc.’.209 It is doubtful that this statement allayed Heath’s suspicions and 
fears. Moreover, the press statement failed to condemn the ovation or say whether the 
platform joined in the audience’s chorus of approval, and therefore walked a very 
fine, obfuscating line. Wall also denied that the Monday Club platform had supported 
Smith when he wrote to a prominent Conservative. However, Wall showed his own 
partiality when he warned that the Conservative Party had under-estimated the extent
o i nof sympathy for Ian Smith and stated this was dangerous. Moreover, Wall also 
claimed that the Rhodesian Government’s action was only ‘technical treason’ 
committed ‘by some of Her Majesty’s loyalist subjects’.211 Events at the Caxton Hall 
and Wall’s comments indicated that the Monday Club engaged in double-speak. The 
Conservative leadership did not accept the Monday Club’s assurances. Evidence for 
this came in barely-attributed comments on the Daily Telegraph’s front page on 30 
November. It quoted former ministers who stated that they were ‘quite happy for 
those MPs who were prepared to support an illegal regime to be smoked out’, and 
then opined that, ‘The activities of the Right-wing Monday Club have incurred
206 Tory Cheers For Ian Smith’, Daily Telegraph, 23 November 1965,1.
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growing disfavour among members of the Shadow Cabinet.’212 It implicitly warned 
the Monday Club that the Conservative leadership was quite prepared to act against it.
On 21 December 1965, the Government placed an Order in Council before parliament 
to implement the embargo of all petroleum products to Rhodesia. The Opposition
T1 ^accepted sanctions provided they were not punitive. Oil sanctions were punitive as 
they affected all sections of Rhodesian society. However, if the Opposition voted 
against the measure it would leave them open to charges of racism for appearing to 
endorse a white regime’s actions against its majority black citizens. If they supported 
the Order, it would open the Conservative leadership to charges that they were weak 
and had deserted Britain’s ‘kith and kin’. Heath used his predecessor, Home, to try to 
placate opponents of oil sanctions. Home was more amenable to the Monday Club, 
for under his leadership Central Office had been more positive towards the Monday
T 1 A .Club. Home had attended the Monday Club’s foundation dinner in 1964, and would
c
later attend other prominent functions. He called for a compromise that mirrored 
the Monday Club’s position of accepting eventual majority rule in Rhodesia.216 The 
Monday Club’s response reinforced the idea that it was engaged in double-speak. It 
did not accept the leadership’s olive branch but saw it as a chance to end the 
Conservative leadership’s bipartisan approach. On 16 December, ninety Conservative 
MPs, including many Monday Club members, signed a censure motion against the
0 1 *7leadership. The Conservative leadership responded by deciding that abstention was 
better than going back on its word. Admittedly, this expedient backfired when 31 
Conservative MPs voted with the Government and 50 voted against. Nevertheless, the 
leadership’s stance indicated that it was prepared to accept party disunity rather than 
the Monday Club’s position, which would have explicitly identified the whole 
Conservative Party with an extreme-right, racist position.
Others opposed the Monday Club as well as the Conservative leadership. 
Conservative MPs were also prepared to voice their opposition. They believed
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themselves to be a ‘counter-balance’ to the Monday Club and organised to ‘meet the 
challenge posed by the right wing’.218 These Conservative MPs originally intended to 
abstain in the vote on sanctions, but eventually supported the Labour Government on 
21 December after they became aware that Monday Club MPs were going to deny the 
leadership’s instructions to abstain 219 A belief that it was important to make the
oo(\public aware of their more moderate views motivated them. However, these ‘pro­
sanctions’ Conservatives suffered consequences. Local associations and officials 
exerted pressure on them to explain their actions, and one MP had to contend with the 
imposition of a hostile, sizeable and clearly organised meeting in his Worthing
constituency. Stuart argued that it is difficult to prove the Monday Club’s role in these 
001events. A failure to adhere to the party line was a sufficient reason for anger within 
local associations. Nevertheless, he believed the Monday Club was responsible for 
these events and cited as evidence the activity of the Anglo-Rhodesian Society in 
these Conservative MP’s constituencies.222 One MP responded effectively to these 
events. Faced with an 800 strong audience, the Conservative MP for Worthing, 
Terence Higgins, blocked an attempt to pass a resolution in favour of Ian Smith by 
grabbing the microphone.223 A Council member of the Anglo-Rhodesian Society 
complained that Higgins’ views were ‘indistinguishable from those of a Socialist’, 
and compared them to the true Conservatism of Monday Club member Sir Patrick 
Wall.224
Meanwhile, on 14 January 1966, Monday Club’s Chairman Paul Williams responded 
to the events following the Order in Council. He issued a statement that described the 
Conservative Opposition as a ‘meaningless irrelevance’, and stated that, ‘To some of 
us outside Parliament it appears to be neither Conservative nor an Opposition.’225 
These comments, expressed in language similar to that of the extreme right, showed
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the extent of the Monday Club’s alienation from the Conservative Party leadership. 
Williams’ statement provided another reason for the Monday Club’s alienation other 
than disagreement over Rhodesia. Williams argued that the Conservative Party was 
not in a position to attack the Labour Government thanks to Heath’s reliance on ‘a 
host of committees studying largely irrelevant details of policy’.226 This view 
reflected the leadership’s exclusion of Monday Club members from the policy review 
groups, and probably explains frequent discussion of bias against the Monday Club in 
the club’s minutes. A perception that the Monday Club was a potentially dangerous 
group that operated within and attracted external extreme-right malcontents would 
explain the Conservative leadership’s decision to exclude it from policy review 
groups. Wall’s letter to Heath after the Caxton Hall meeting showed that he 
understood the leadership’s fear that the Monday Club attracted external extremists 227 
Otherwise, why mention them? Other commentators linked the Monday Club with 
fascism. When Lord Salisbury claimed that the Monday Club stood for the ‘traditional 
principles of Conservatism on which I was brought up long before fascism was 
thought o f , the journalist Robert Kee asked him if these were the same principles of 
his grandfather, who thought home rule should be limited to ‘people who are of 
Teutonic race’.228 In the month before a General Election, Kee’s comments were an 
unwelcome reminder of the Conservative Party’s embarrassing pre-1939 connections 
with the extreme right. The Monday Club acknowledged fears that it attracted 
external extremists when its Executive Council discussed the problems of infiltration 
and how to deter unwelcome members. Williams also understood this, and 
informed du Cann that Monday Club members were being encouraged to ‘do 
whatever possible to help the Conservative Party during the Election’.230 However, 
when the electorate returned a Labour government with a much-increased majority at 
the end of March 1966, Williams reverted quickly to attacking the Conservative Party
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for its insufficient opposition to Labour, and to demanding fair treatment for the 
Monday Club.
On 4 April 1966, the Monday Club’s Executive Council met at the Wig and Pen Club 
in Fleet Street. Foremost amongst the issues it discussed was the Conservative Party’s 
post-election policies and attitudes. The Executive agreed on a delegation to du Cann 
and highlighted the need for aggressive opposition and a general philosophy that 
differed from Socialism. This was a criticism of Heath’s leadership, and his study 
groups, with which Heath continued. The Executive Council also resolved to ‘demand 
that Right-Wing Candidates receive fair consideration and the bias of the recent past 
be corrected’, which evinced a sense of increased exasperation at perceived bias 
against the Monday Club. Du Cann tacitly admitted that bias existed when he 
explained that, ‘the Right Wing has a dirty name’. Du Cann asked Williams to 
inform him if he ‘ever came across any discrimination against the Monday Club’.234 
This Williams did. He told du Cann that the Northern Area Young Conservatives had 
informed him that their National Officers’ implored them to co-operate ‘with the 
universities and the Bow Group’, and concluded, ‘I hardly need say any more about 
discrimination.’235 The following day, Williams telephoned Central Office and 
additionally complained that the Conservative Political Centre did not stock a 
particular Monday Club pamphlet, which was contrary to du Cann’s undertaking.236 
Du Cann denied any ‘conscious discrimination’,237 but his Personal Assistant, Miss 
Benton, asked the Young Conservatives National Organising Secretary, Mr. Durant, 
for his comments.238 Layton-Henry argued in 1973 that in the 1960s the Young 
Conservatives’ National Officers were firmly in the progressive mould of Butler,
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Macleod, Macmillan and Boyle, and were to the left of its membership. He 
described Durant as ‘the embodiment’ of the Young Conservative’s progressive 
leadership.240 Central Office files that were unavailable to Layton-Henry in 1973 
proved that he, and the Monday Club, was correct. Ian Durant informed Benton that, 
‘There is no doubt that the present National Officers have very little at all in sympathy 
with the aspirations of the Monday Club’, and claimed that it was therefore ‘natural 
that they should tend to ignore them’.241 This proved the substance of the Monday 
Club’s complaint. Durant denied that this was discrimination and described it instead 
as ‘their honest opinions as to the way the Party should go’.242 However, as this came 
from an organisation that supposedly represented all Young Conservatives, and was 
not a policy-forming body, this was a specious argument that admitted to the omission 
of a sizeable and growing section of the party. Durant dismissed the Northern Area 
Young Conservatives as ‘rather out on a limb politically, being rather extreme right 
wing’,243 and showed that he thought that political respectability did not extend to 
those he considered extreme. When he stated that this extremism made it ‘natural’ for 
Northern Area members to express their concerns to Williams, Durant made it clear 
that he did not consider the Monday Club to be respectable.244 Finally, when Durant 
suggested raising this matter when National Officers and the Party Chairman ‘next 
had a meeting’,245 Durant, whose office was within Central Office, revealed that the 
Young Conservatives National Officers were indeed part of the party machine 246
The Monday Club’s justified suspicion of discrimination received confirmation in 
July, when Williams again complained about the Young Conservatives. Williams 
advised du Cann that the last meeting of the latter’s National Advisory Committee 
had agreed, ‘at the discretion of its National Officers’, to invite observers from 
outside bodies to its meetings.247 Williams claimed that the Young Conservatives
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Committee did this ‘to allow such people as the Bow Group’s liaison officer to attend 
meetings without being made a formal member’.248 He made a thinly veiled 
accusation of discrimination and expressed his ‘trust that our liaison officer on these 
matters will also be welcomed to future meetings’.249 Williams had a strong case. 
There was no equitable reason for the Young Conservatives to treat any bone-fide 
Conservative organisation differently. However, the response to Williams showed that 
the Young Conservatives were prepared to continue to do exactly that. Inside Central 
Office, Mr. Craig dismissed Williams as having a ‘persecution complex both 
personally and on behalf of the Monday Club’.250 Sir Adrian FitzGerald, a founder 
member of the Monday Club, denied this description emphatically and described it as
^ciindicative of someone with a ‘bitter grudge’ against Williams. This is a salutary 
reminder of the importance of personal animosities in institutional relationships. Craig 
thought it necessary to acquire the advice of Richard Webster. Webster adopted the 
time-honoured Central Office tactic of disassociating itself from trouble. He stated 
that the Monday Club should put a proper request to the Young Conservatives, and 
that ‘We should not be involved in this anyway.’252 However, Webster added in 
handwriting, ‘I’ve warned Durant.’253 This was not a disinterested action. Subsequent 
events proved that Central Office actually worked closely with the National Young 
Conservatives on this issue, despite Webster’s comments. On 1 August 1966, 
Williams wrote to Alan Haselhurst, National Chairman of the Young Conservatives, 
and demanded fair treatment for the Monday Club.254 Haselhurst perfunctorily 
dismissed Williams’ accusation of unfairness and criticised him for approaching the 
Party Chairman on a matter ‘solely within the province of the Young Conservatives 
National Officers’.255 Williams replied that as a former Vice-Chairman of the Young
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Conservatives he understood that its responsibility, like all National Committees of 
the party, was to reflect all opinions within the party.256 He also probably touched on 
Central Office’s real concern when he argued that, ‘many people have too easily 
accepted Harold Wilson’s smear that we are semi-Fascist’.257 However, what 
Williams cannot have known is that before he responded Haselhurst had forwarded a 
draft to Mr. Craig at Central Office and stated that, ‘If the Chairman is happy about it, 
this is the reply I will send.’258 Central Office amended it, noted Haselhurst’s 
agreement to their involvement, and added it to its growing Monday Club file.
This was not the only example of bias against the Monday Club in the summer of
1966. On 26 May, Williams wrote to du Cann and expressed his wish to submit 
names of suitable Monday Club members for Heath’s study groups 259 This request 
does not seem to have borne fruit. The following month, Williams noted that Heath 
had requested the Bow Group to examine capital taxation and asked du Cann whether 
‘there is any chance that the Monday Club will be consulted in a similar way’.260 
Again, this request appeared to have been unsuccessful. In July, Williams enquired 
about the prospects of Monday Club member F. J. Abbott, who had applied to join the 
Conservative Research Department and had even secured an interview 261 Central 
Office officials concocted an excuse for Abbott’s failure that stated that no vacancies 
existed. Taken in isolation, these incidents seemed trivial. Collectively, they 
suggest discrimination against the Monday Club, for the reason that Central Office 
and the leadership considered it to be extremist. In this respect, therefore, Central 
Office’s negative action was consistent with that adopted towards external 
organisations that the Conservative Party deemed potentially embarrassing.
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There were other reasons for the Conservative leadership’s negative stance towards 
the Monday Club. This included the nature of its publications and the company it 
kept. In 1966, the Monday Club published The Wreckers: Communist Disruption in 
British Trade Unions. The author was Frederic Abbott, the unsuccessful applicant to 
the Conservative Research Department. The document identified widespread 
communist infiltration, and cited the 1965 Devlin Report’s judgement that 
communists and Trotskyites had caused the recent dock strikes.263 This 
confrontational document may have found approval in sections of the Conservative 
Party, but it is unlikely to have pleased Edward Heath, who had spoken during the 
1966 General Election campaign of his belief in the need for ‘partnership, not 
confrontation’,264 in industrial relations. Moreover, in choosing Sapphire Press to 
print the document, the Monday Club again risked associating the Conservative Party 
with its proprietor, Edward Martell. Nor was Edward Martell the only, or even 
potentially most problematic person with whom the Monday Club was associated. In 
October 1966, Sir Arthur Bryant was the Monday Club’s Guest of Honour at its 
Hatfield House Conference. Andrew Roberts described Bryant as ‘a Nazi sympathiser 
and fascist fellow-traveller, who only narrowly escaped internment as a potential 
traitor in 1940’.265 Roberts exonerated those who gave Bryant an honorary lunch in 
1979 on the grounds of ignorance because they did not have access to his private 
papers.266 The same must apply to the Monday Club in 1966. Yet, it is inconceivable 
that the Conservative Party bureaucracy or Monday Club was ignorant of Bryant’s 
political sympathies. Before the Second World War, Bryant edited the party’s 
Ashridge Journal, and was an educational adviser to Central Office with close 
connections to the party chairman.267 Bryant praised Hitler and Mussolini, kept 
company with members of Mosley’s BUF, and published anti-Semitic books authored 
by future internees and justified Kristalnacht.268 One Conservative MP referred to 
Bryant’s books when he visited Central Office and warned against the party’s 
association with ‘this kind of Fascism’.269 In June 1939, another MP proclaimed in the
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House of Commons that Bryant’s fascist sympathies were well known.270 When war 
commenced, Bryant involved himself with ‘pro-peace’ extreme-right groups that 
Griffiths argued were in reality pro-Nazi271 Bryant backtracked furiously when the 
government interned his fellow-sympathisers and associates, and sought exculpation 
in producing patriotic histories that lauded Britain’s fighting spirit. It is difficult to 
understand why the Government did not intern Bryant. His connections may have 
saved him. As well as those at Central Office, Bryant’s associates included 
Conservatives with connections to the extreme right, such as Henry Drummond-Wolff 
MP, and Sir Joseph Ball of the Conservative Research Department and Truth 272 The 
government interned one Conservative MP who did not retract his views, Archibald 
Maule Ramsay MP.273 Interning Bryant would have embarrassed the Conservative 
Party further. Yet, even during the war, Bryant’s true feelings were obvious. He 
joined Kinship-in-Husbandry, a group Dan Stone identified as one of the ‘organo- 
fascist’ cultural representations of England’s nativist fascist groups 274 Bryant was the 
literary twin of A. K. Chesterton. It is not surprising that in 1963 he too campaigned
77^against coloured immigration.
The Monday Club’s desire to expand also disconcerted the Conservative leadership. 
Former Monday Club chairman Paul Bristol claimed that there was no intention of
77 (\turning the early Monday Club into a mass organisation. However, from December 
1966 to May 1967 the Monday Club debated in its monthly Newsletter whether it 
should remain a small, manageable organisation or seek growth throughout the 
country. The Monday Club chose growth and a higher profile. Central Office 
monitored events. On 2 January 1967 Central Office’s Agent in the North West, A. S. 
Gamer, reported that individuals were meeting ‘from all over Lancashire’ to discuss 
forming a Monday Club branch.277 He stated that they ‘all seemed to be very loyal to
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the Party’,278 which revealed that the loyalty and intentions of Monday Club 
sympathisers was in question. The Monday Club was also to the fore in political 
demonstrations. In January 1967, it provided two speakers and eighty stewards for a 
‘Peace with Rhodesia’ rally at Trafalgar Square that television stations broadcast.279 
In a debate in the House of Commons, MPs denounced the rally as a nasty, racist and 
squalid exercise, and referred to the 1962 ban on Fascist demonstrations at Trafalgar 
Square 280 In June, the Monday Club held a press conference that launched an ‘Action 
Fund’ appeal of £100,000 to facilitate activity throughout the country.281 At the time, 
Chairman Paul Williams felt it necessary to explain that the Monday Club ‘considered 
itself realist rather than extremist’ 282 This was a public admission that some 
perceived an association between extremism and the Monday Club. It failed to stop 
Central Office and the party leadership becoming extremely concerned about the 
Action Fund. The Party Chief Whip, William Whitelaw, reported to Heath that his 
investigations had revealed that the purpose of the Action Fund was ‘to set up the 
Monday Club on a permanent basis with office, staff, etc’. Whitelaw identified G. 
K. Young as the Monday Club member behind the Action Fund, and highlighted his 
previous employment in the Foreign Office and Security Services.284 Also noted was 
the assistance of ‘a “General Williams” formerly in our Central Office’. The 
realisation that General Williams was a Central Office pensioner provoked an 
investigation into the feasibility of using financial pressure to curtail his activities.286 
Lord Chelmer advised that that there was no such sanction, but stated that, ‘there 
surely should be in every future case’.287 Thus, Central Office was also prepared to 
use financial actions to counter the Monday Club.
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Unsurprisingly, the party bureaucracy continued to obstruct the Monday Club. On 12 
September, Monday Club member Dr. Wyndham Davies visited Sir Michael Fraser at 
Central Office. The Monday Club had asked Davies to encourage its activities in the 
universities, and therefore he asked Fraser’s permission ‘to liaise with the Universities 
Department of the Central Office’ and ‘made a tentative suggestion about getting 
some central financial help for Monday Club conferences in the universities’.288 
Fraser refused Davies’ request. He stated that he wanted to ‘maintain friendly 
relations with all the various Conservative groups -  Bow Group, PEST, Monday Club 
-  that have some membership in the universities and elsewhere’, and that therefore the 
party ‘could not favour any one of them more than the others’ 289 Fraser’s claims were 
disingenuous, for, not only did Central Office look favourably on PEST, it had also 
formed a close relationship with the Bow Group. At the same time that Davies made 
his request, Central Office granted the Bow Group exactly the kind of assistance that 
Fraser had denied to the Monday Club, and indeed much more.
In 1967, PEST was still a young organisation. Although formed in 1963, it ‘emerged 
on the scene’ only in 1965 according to the Daily Telegraph 290 During 1965, PEST 
set out its progressive credentials. It desired easier entry for immigrants and their 
assimilation, an end to the Conservative Party’s social isolation and greater social 
opportunity, an increase in economic planning and an increase in ‘comprehensive’ 
education, and it opposed Smith’s regime in Rhodesia. PEST’s views were 
diametrically opposite those of the Monday Club, a position it made clear by having 
R. A. Butler as its patron. Central Office exhibited no hostility towards PEST. 
Although Central Office was inclined to deny PEST’s request for funds and offices in 
1965,292 this was only until PEST had established itself and proved useful.293
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Moreover, PEST was aware of Central Office’s positive attitude towards it. Michael 
Spicer, PEST’s chairman, wrote to Edward du Cann on 25 May 1965, and claimed to 
be ‘well aware of how much you are in sympathy with our activities’.294 Du Cann’s 
comments to Conservative MP Anthony Barber supported Spicer’s claim. He advised 
Barber that Central Office had held a number of discussions about PEST, and 
revealed it had decided that, ‘we should try and give them limited encouragement’ 295 
By the end of 1965, PEST was solvent.296 It was an established progressive group 
when Sir Michael Fraser referred to it in 1967 to justify his refusal of Dr. Davies’ 
request. Two years later, Douglas Hurd, Head of Heath’s Private Office, wrote to 
Central Office noting that PEST had ‘recently been doing good work, particularly in 
the universities’.297 This attitude contrasted with the responses to Monday Club 
requests for assistance. The contrast with the similarly progressive Bow Group was 
much starker.
On 12 June 1967, senior Central Office officials attended a Bow Group dinner. 
Beforehand, Mr. Craig advised his colleagues at Central Office of items that the Bow 
Group wished to discuss. These included its activities, finances, party reorganisation, 
policy-making and public meetings, and thus revealed the breadth of Central Office’s 
connection with the Bow Group.298 On 13 June, the same colleagues received another 
memo from Craig. It noted the agreements reached at the dinner. These included co­
ordination of press relations, liaison about the progress of Heath’s study groups with 
the Bow Group undertaking a major policy study, the formation of a diary to facilitate 
political statements reacting to events, and the use of the Bow Group to make
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statements deemed inappropriate for shadow ministers.299 Even more interesting 
Craig’s memo also revealed that the Bow Group received an annual subvention of 
£4000 from a Colonel Hobbs, which for some reason was about to cease.300 Hobbs 
was the individual whom the Bow Group had contacted at Sir Toby Low’s 
suggestion.301 Passage of the Companies Act (1967) had made disclosure of political 
contributions obligatory, and that threatened to reveal that the Bow Group’s 
benefactor, British United Industrialists, existed for no other purpose than to channel 
funds to the Conservative Party and related organisations. It was a worrying situation 
for the Bow Group, which sought Central Office assistance at the meeting. On the 
same day that Craig circulated his colleagues, du Cann wrote to the Bow Group 
Chairman Reginald Watts, and stated that he ‘should be very pleased if we could have 
a discussion about finance in the immediate future’.302 Watts confirmed that the 
meeting they agreed for 30 June was to ‘discuss finance’, and asked du Cann if he 
was confident of reaching a solution to the Bow Group’s difficulties before the end of 
the month. It is unclear whether the Bow Group found a solution in time. Nor is du 
Cann’s role clear, for Heath replaced him with Anthony Barber in summer 1967. 
What is clear is that Central Office subsequently co-ordinated press releases with the 
Bow Group,304 and permitted the Bow Group to organise joint functions with the 
Federation of Conservative Students. Moreover, whereas Central Office frequently 
declined invitations to Monday Club functions, Party Chairman Barber actually 
hosted a dinner for senior officers of the Bow Group.306 There is no record of a 
similar event in Central Office’s Monday Club files. In contrast, a confidential Central 
Office memo of December 1967 from a Mr. Drewe stated that, ‘Long ago it was
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decided that money should be provided to them from the British United 
Industrialists’.307 Drewe does not say who had decided this, but he was aware of it. 
His comments supported the notion that Central Office was complicit in the initial 
help given to the Bow Group. Drewe also mentioned that Lord Chelmer had helped 
safeguard Bow Group funds, and protect the Conservative Party’s finances, by turning 
the British United Industrialists into an ‘unincorporated association’, and thus not
subject to the Companies Act (1967).308 The earlier investigation into former
TOOemployee’s pensions showed that Chelmer’s connection with Central Office. 
Therefore, Central Office had helped to resolve the Bow Group’s financial concerns 
at the same time as it resolved the Conservative Party’s wider concerns about its own 
revenue. This is a significant example of Central Office’s contrasting attitude towards 
the Bow Group and Monday Club.
In September 1967, the Monday Club congratulated Barber on his appointment.310 
Barber honoured du Cann’s scheduled meeting with the Monday Club on 5 October. 
At the meeting, Paul Williams advised ‘we are convinced that what is loosely called 
the Right Wing point of view has been under-represented in Party Councils in recent 
years’, and promised to write to Barber about the specific example of the
Commonwealth Council.311 On 16 October, Williams informed Barber that the
Commonwealth Council had excluded his members, and that he believed that the 
Conservative Party funded and constituted this organisation.312 Williams once more 
asked for fair treatment from an all-party organisation. A document in Central Office 
files that provided a comparison between the Commonwealth Council’s current 
constitution and its previous one proved that Williams’ claim was accurate.313 The 
constitution of the Commonwealth Council showed that the party organisation 
appointed its president and chairman. The address of the body nominally responsible
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for the Commonwealth Council, the Conservative Overseas Bureau, was the same as 
that of Central Office.314 Williams’ complaint failed. Mr. Milne at Central Office 
reported to Mr. Craig that, ‘at no time has there been any discrimination against the 
Monday Club’.315 Unfortunately, the list of those whom Milne identified as excluded 
contained prominent Monday Club members. Craig probably realised this and asked 
Milne to ‘draft a ‘safe’ letter’ to Paul Williams. A change of party chairman had not 
resulted in a more favourable attitude towards the Monday Club.
Despite Central Office obstruction, the Monday Club’s attempt to influence youth 
opinion bore fruit with conferences of university students and Young Conservatives in 
November and December respectively.317 In winter 1967, meanwhile, the Monday 
Club launched The Monday World, a magazine that provided a regular vehicle for its 
views. In the first edition, Chairman Williams protested that: ‘Critics often assume 
that the Monday Club is composed of feudal Blimps wedded to an irrelevant past. In 
fact, as will be seen from this first issue of “The Monday World”, the Club more
^ 1 0
nearly represents the attitudes, views and emotions of a modem Conservative.’ The 
Monday World frequently attacked the Conservative Opposition for its poor 
performance, which reinforced the view that the Monday Club sought to either 
transform or replace the Conservative Party. In many respects, the Monday Club 
resembled Martell’s Freedom Group, especially concerning domestic issues. On 
Rhodesia, it owed much to the League of Empire Loyalists. When it engaged in 
rallies, sought the creation of a mass movement including a youth wing, and 
highlighted fears about coloured immigration, the Monday Club operated in a manner 
similar to extreme-right parties. The Monday Club’s focus on coloured immigration 
was evident to all, as in its demand at a Caxton Hall meeting in October 1967 that the 
government impose ‘stringent limitations on immigration’.319 By the end of 1967, it 
had presented the Conservative Party with an altogether different level of concern.
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However, the Conservative Party was experienced in neutralising its extremists. In 
1962, the Conservative Government had limited the extreme-right’s appeal by 
reaching rightwards and passing the Immigration Act.320 In 1967, the same year that 
the external extreme right coalesced into the National Front and the Monday Club 
determined on growth, the Conservative Party again reached rightwards. Unlike the 
legislation of 1962, the Conservative Opposition could not neutralise the extreme 
right by legislation. Instead, it moved its political stance. It adopted a tougher stance 
on immigration and trade unions, and thus absorbed the resurgent right. A dramatic 
increase in the number of right wing motions at party conference in the years 1967- 
69, the election of known right wing MPs to parliamentary committees, and the 
selection of more Monday Club members as parliamentary candidates are evidence of 
this change and absorption. Ramsden, questioned the extent of this change, but 
acknowledged that the Monday Club played a role in it. Walker believed that the 
Monday Club deserved ‘a great deal of the credit’ for the change.322 If correct, it 
questioned the effectiveness of Central Office obstruction of the Monday Club. 
However, Seyd argued in favour of a coincidence between Monday Club activity and 
the Conservative Party’s changed political stance, based on a favourable cultural 
context.323
The emergence of the National Front probably played a part in this rightwards move 
too. The Conservative Party always carefully distanced itself from it. In November 
1969, for example, the leader of Wandsworth Conservatives Ernest Sorrie claimed 
that there was little difference between Conservative Party and National Front 
policy.324 This resulted in complaints from the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen 
and Women.325 Alderman Michael Fidler, the President of The Board of Deputies of 
British Jews, wrote to Central Office. He highlighted the National Front’s Nazi
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connections, and argued that Sorrie’s comments damaged the Conservative Party.326 
This letter raised once again for the Conservative Party the fear of being associated 
with right-wing extremism, and resulted in immediate action from Central Office. A 
Central Office Area Agent reported that Sorrie realised that he had ‘dropped an 
almighty clanger’, and suggested that Chairman Barber and Heath should co-ordinate
7^7
repudiation of Sorrie’s comments. Barber downplayed Some’s remarks as 
‘inadvertent’ and ‘not correct’, and emphasised the Conservative Party’s difference 
from the National Front when he replied to Jewish organisations.328 The absence of 
any further correspondence suggested that in this instance Central Office’s action was 
effective. However, it is doubtful that the Conservative leadership knew much of the 
National Front at that time, other than its dangerousness to the party. Heath’s 
Parliamentary Private Secretary reflected this when he advised in one ‘co-ordinated’ 
letter that, ‘Mr. Heath has no precise knowledge of the policies of the National Front 
but they are in important ways different from those of the Conservative Party’.329 Nor, 
given its poor electoral performances to date, is it probable that the National Front 
unduly concerned the Conservative Party. Therefore, despite the Conservative Party’s 
determination not to be associated with the National Front, if we are to identify any 
particular organisation as responsible for its rightward move it is the Monday Club. 
This showed that the Conservative leadership and Central Office also thought that the 
Monday Club was of a far higher calibre than other extreme-right groups, and that its 
location within the Conservative Party was more problematic. This situation made it 
difficult for the party leadership and bureaucracy to oppose the Monday Club. Any 
action against the Monday Club had to be more circumspect than that taken against 
other extreme-right groups. Therefore, when Heath moved the party in a rightwards 
direction it was both a response to the impact made by the Monday Club and a means 
of countering it. However, regardless of the role of the Monday Club or National 
Front, the person who played the most visible role in this change was the prominent 
Conservative MP, Enoch Powell.
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Always Right: The Impact o f Enoch Powell
On 20 April 1968, with the House of Commons about to debate the Race Relations 
Bill, Enoch Powell delivered arguably the most memorable post-war speech by a 
British politician. The speech contained incendiary language and apocalyptically 
warned that if coloured immigration continued it would result in ‘rivers of blood’. 
Powell echoed the concerns of extreme-right parties and the Monday Club. However, 
his comments posed greater problems for the Conservative Party than any of these 
organisations. In 1937, Powell became the youngest professor in the Commonwealth. 
In the war, he rose from a private to become the youngest brigadier in the British 
Army. He was one of the high calibre new Conservative MPs who entered parliament 
at the 1950 General Election. Thereafter, he gained a reputation as a powerful 
parliamentary performer. Powell became Financial Secretary to the Treasury in 1957 
and in 1960 Minister of Health. Moreover, Powell allied intellect and performance 
with principle. Denis Healy described Powell’s criticism of the Hola Camp atrocities 
in 1957 as one of the greatest parliamentary speeches, delivered with moral passion 
and rhetorical force. In 1958, Powell resigned from the Treasury rather than accept 
spending compromises. Powell also refused to serve in Home’s government because 
he believed Macmillan had manipulated the succession. He came a poor third in the 
1965 Conservative leadership election, but was an obvious option should Heath fall. 
The latter appointed Powell shadow Defence Secretary. Powell’s stature was far 
greater than his fellow anti-immigrant Conservative MPs. His ‘rivers of blood’ speech 
lent credibility to the extreme right.
Powell did not forward his speech to Central Office for prior approval, a failure that 
breached accepted procedure.330 This indicated that Powell was aware of Central 
Office’s power. Former Conservative MP Humphrey Berkeley denounced Powell’s 
speech as ‘the most disgraceful public utterance since the days of Sir Oswald Mosley’ 
and demanded his sacking,331 once more raising the Conservative Party’s post-war 
fear of identification with the extreme right, and fascism in particular. Heath believed
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the speech was racist and sacked Powell on 21 April. Reaction to Powell’s speech 
suggested that Heath was wise to do so. On 23 April, Midlands’ workers staged token 
strikes in support of Powell.333 The same day, London’s dockers and meat porters rose 
spontaneously and marched on parliament with slogans that proclaimed, ‘We Want 
Enoch.’334 Leading Union Movement member and life-long Mosleyite, Dan 
Harmston, was prominent amongst the marchers. Harmston later contrasted this 
spontaneity with his own inability to politicise Smithfield meat market, and thus 
showed that Powell’s potential impact was greater than Mosley’s was. By 1968, 
Mosley’s Union Movement was little more than the fan club of a discredited 
individual who was no longer even resident in Britain. The National Front was more 
prominent. On 24 April, A. K. Chesterton told The Times that, ‘What Mr. Powell has 
said does not vary in any way from our view.’ However, the editor of its regular 
publication realised that Powell had encroached upon the National Front’s political 
space. He reacted coolly and accused Powell of political opportunism.337 Yet, the 
external extreme-right generally welcomed Powell’s comments. If Powell’s 
intervention resulted in his departure from the Conservative Party, he might provide 
the external extreme right with the calibre of leadership it had lacked since the 1930s. 
How, then, did Powell impact on the recently coalesced extreme right?
Initially, Powell’s intervention appeared to increase National Front membership. John 
Bean described Powell’s speech as a catalyst for the National Front’s growth.338 The 
Times ' ‘News Team’ reported that Conservative Officials claimed to be ‘deluged with 
letters from Tories enraged because of Mr. Powell’s dismissal from the Shadow 
Cabinet and expressing interest in the Front’.339 Sykes argued that Powell’s action had 
assisted National Front recruitment and boosted its chances of joining the political 
mainstream.340 Increased membership allowed it to make organisational changes in 
autumn 1968, including the establishment of a training scheme for branch and group
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organisers.341 In December 1968, National Front members registered approval of 
Powell by marching to his home.342 Walker quoted the National Front’s organiser in 
Huddersfield claiming that, ‘Before Powell spoke, we were getting only cranks and 
perverts. After his speeches we started to attract, in a secret sort of way, the right- 
wing members of the Tory organizations.’343 In 1969, the chairman of a Huddersfield 
local Conservative Association, councillor Colin Campion, formed the British 
People’s Union, which acted as a platform for Powellite sympathisers and as a forum 
in which local Conservatives and the National Front could meet.344 Pro-Powell letters 
continued to pour into Central Office; many expressed a belief in the National Front’s 
eventual success unless the Conservative Party adopted Powell’s stance.345 Many 
National Front members and extreme-right voters saw Powell as their saviour. It 
appeared that his speech had affected the National Front positively.
However, as Walker argued, the National Front also had to avoid losing its own 
members to the Powellite wing of the Conservatives.346 Its emphasis on their 
differences with Powell in its literature is evidence that the National Front was aware 
of this possibility.347 The National Front’s regular publication, Combat, accused the 
‘so-called right-wing of the Tory Party’ of jumping on the immigration issue simply 
because it was realized “here is a vote-getter’” .348 Not all Powellite Conservative 
groups that emerged throughout the country were as attracted to the National Front as 
those in Huddersfield.349 Many stressed their Conservatism and independence, such as 
the Immigration Control Association of Mary Howarth and Joy Page.350 Even in 
Huddersfield, the local Conservative leadership exerted pressure to stop councillor 
Campion’s British People’s Union.351 The National Front felt that it was necessary to
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restore its connections with organisations such as the Racial Preservation Society, and 
bolstered its presence in areas traditionally sympathetic to the extreme right.352 
Powell’s comments had highlighted the National Front’s most obvious feature, its 
anti-immigration stance, but this did not necessarily result in any sustained influx of 
new members. John Bean claimed that the initial spurt in membership after Powell’s 
speech faded after twelve months. Instead, Powell’s comments simply reinforced 
the existing quandary posed to all extreme-right voters: whether to waste a vote by 
opting for a miniscule extreme-right party or vote Conservative. Dan Harmston 
reflected this quandary when he sought answers to the Smithfield Workers concerns 
over immigration in January 1970 from the Conservative Party Chairman, not the 
National Front. Powell’s decision to remain within the Conservative Party made 
this quandary even more acute, and thus increased the likelihood that these extreme- 
right voters would vote Conservative.
Powell’s speech had also affected the Monday Club. This was far more dangerous to 
the Conservative leadership. It risked giving an impetus to an organisation that 
represented extreme-right views within the Conservative Party and had recently 
determined on growth. If Powell decided to join the Monday Club, he could probably 
become its leading figure. In an interview with me, former Monday Club Chairman 
Jonathan Guinness stated that he shared this view, and would not have resisted 
Powell’s leadership.355 Such an outcome would threaten the leadership and split the 
Conservative Party. Events after Powell’s speech gave further cause for concern. 
When the Monday Club publicly supported Powell, Edward Heath personally justified 
his sacking. Powell accepted numerous invitations to speak at Monday Club 
events.357 In 1968, Powell was guest of honour at the Monday Club’s annual dinner, 
and told his audience that people who might otherwise remain outside the 
Conservative Party had joined it because of the Monday Club.358 These comments 
showed that the Conservative Party both attracted members and voters away from the
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extreme right, and revealed an increased presence within the Party. Nor were Powell’s 
contributions to Monday Club events solely focused on immigration. In 1968, Powell 
gave his views on defence policy at a Monday Club meeting at Westminster, and on 
economics at Norcott Court, the home of a Monday Club member.359 Powell’s 
contributions revealed that the Monday Club was not, unlike many external right- 
wing parties, a single-issue entity. At the Monday Club’s Annual General Meeting of 
April 1969, Chairman Williams announced that membership exceeded 1500.360 This 
was a 90% increase on the figure in the month before Powell’s ‘rivers of blood 
speech’.361
How could the Conservative Party combat Powell’s alliance with the Monday Club? 
The answer lay not in the problem Powell posed to the Conservative Party, but in the 
reverse. Powell operated at the heart of a paradox. The Conservative Party needed, as 
a monolithic party within a liberal democracy, to secure enough votes to achieve 
power. That required the votes of progressive Conservatives for whom anything that 
resembled extremism was anathema. Yet, the Conservative Party also contained 
extremists. The result was a heterogeneous party that contained a wide range of 
views. This allowed the Conservative Party room to manoeuvre between the centre 
and the right. The leader contained conflict by adjusting the composition of the 
ffontbench. One example came in 1966 when Heath promoted prominent Monday 
Club member Geoffrey Rippon to the shadow cabinet.362 The Monday Club’s 
divisions over Europe were well known.363 That Rippon favoured entry into Europe, 
unlike many Monday Club members, probably influenced the ardently pro-European 
Heath’s decision. The leader’s ability to act in this way also allowed the Conservative 
Party to exploit divisions amongst its extremists. For example, Powell avoided 
supporting the National Front’s call for compulsory repatriation, although Heath 
recalled that in 1968 Powell admitted at a One Nation Group dinner that he favoured 
it.364 The person to whom Powell confessed this, described by Heath as ‘incandescent’
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on hearing it, was Geoffrey Rippon.365 The result of such manoeuvres was that the 
Conservative Party both absorbed and expunged its extremists. Those unwilling to 
accept the demands of collective responsibility concomitant with holding office faced 
the dilemma of whether to stay within the party or, feeling sufficiently alienated, 
strike out on their own or join an openly extremist party. Thus, the Conservative Party 
acted negatively towards internal as well as external extremists.
In 1968, the Conservative leadership used the opportunities afforded by this paradox 
to its advantage and marginalised Powell. In September 1968, Heath announced the 
end of bi-partisan consensus, and stated that a future Conservative government would 
tighten immigration controls. It would remove Commonwealth citizens’ right of entry 
as British passport holders and reduce their status to that of aliens. This looked like a 
tougher line. Heath viewed it as a balanced approach to an intractable problem.366 
However, the policy merely talked tough on immigration. Nowhere was there a 
promise to reduce the level of immigration, let alone actual number of immigrants, or 
to impose a colour bar. Powell probably recognised this. However, Heath’s move 
presented Powell with a choice: accept this as a step in the right direction, or remain 
outside the official party line and show his true feelings over coloured immigration. 
Heath probably suspected Powell’s real views on immigration were extremer than his 
public pronouncements suggested. Powell’s support for Ulster’s Loyalists and 
opposition to Britain’s entry to the Common Market already mirrored the views of the 
National Front. Would he really identify himself further with an extreme-right party 
associated with neo-Nazism by advocating the same immigration policy? This was 
one option for Powell. The other was to hope that Heath lost the next election and, 
having proved his loyalty, challenge for the leadership. Powell remained within the 
Conservative Party. That did not mean that he ceased to criticize the leadership. At the 
party conference in 1968, he argued that whatever steps any government took to limit 
immigration, the cost to Britain would still be unacceptable.367 The following month, 
Powell stated that a West Indian or an Indian did not become an Englishman simply
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by being bom in England. This language was reminiscent of that of Hilton and the 
Tme Tories. However, unlike Hilton Powell did not offer voters an alternative party.
In early January 1969, Heath responded to Powell by making his toughest comments 
yet on immigration. He called for legislation to stop further immigration.369 The 
Conservatives’ opponents accused Heath of being, ‘in effect Powell’s Shadow 
Immigration Minister ... The policy is basically the same. The aim is the same. Only
7^0the political accent is different.’ The details suggested that this was not quite 
accurate. The Opposition demanded an end to the right of immigrants’ dependants to 
settle in Britain, and annually renewable work permits that specified an immigrant’s 
job and its duration. This was little more than administrative obfuscation on Heath’s 
part. No limits were set, no means of enforcement suggested. In contrast, evidence 
existed that Central Office really tried to marginalise Powell. The same day that Heath 
announced this apparently tougher stance, a confidential Central Office letter to 
Douglas Hurd, Head of Heath’s Private Office, revealed what motivated Heath’s 
policy on immigration. It described it as one that, ‘skillfully kept a balance between 
the liberal and the restrictionist opinions’, and that Heath would presumably want to
771continue with ‘in any public statement in the West Midlands’. The West Midlands 
was the heartland of Powell’s support, as well as many other anti-immigration 
Conservative MPs. When Duncan Sandys quickly introduced a Bill that contained
777these demands, Heath abstained, while 126 Conservatives supported it. Doubtless, 
Heath sought to avoid a damaging split. Powell, meanwhile, did not join the National 
Front. As implied by Samuel Brittan in The Spectator, one year after his explosive 
speech Powell remained a member of the Conservative Party and thus acted as a
' I H ' l  .
safety valve that vented extreme-right views and retained its support. Bnttan was 
correct. However, Heath’s moving of the party rightwards and continual spelling out 
of the options available, also countered Powell’s impact.
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The comments from wider Conservatism also showed the workings of the 
complexities of the Conservative Party’s attitude towards the extreme right. In 
September 1968, a former treasurer of the Seychelles advised the Gloucester Trades 
Council of his fears of ‘a new onslaught’ of fascism, and warned that, ‘the extreme 
right wing of the Conservative party could be following in the footsteps of Sir Oswald 
Mosley’.374 In November, the Liberal candidate in Worthing, where sanctions against 
Rhodesia were contentious,375 pointed to tensions within the local Conservative 
Association and drew similarities between previous support for Mosley and current 
support for Powell. The Liberals identified the Worthing Debating Society as the 
local Conservatives’ front organisation for their move to the right, and claimed that 
nearby Surbiton ‘had become openly Powellite’.377 These provincial comments 
associated Powell with Mosley and threatened to associate the Conservative Party 
with the extreme right. The response from some Conservative-supporting newspapers 
turned negative. The Evening Standard is London’s regional newspaper and is from
the same stable as the Daily Mail. In 1934, the Daily Mail had proclaimed ‘Hurrah for
'1 * 1 0
the Blackshirts!’ Now, the Evening Standard proclaimed that, ‘In Enoch Powell we 
always supposed we were dealing with a rational man with a background and 
assumptions common to our own. Now, with a growing sense of horror we realise we 
are not.’379 The article used phrases such as ‘cowardly’ and ‘illiterate demagogue’, 
and proceeded to liken what was happening with Powell to Mosley in the 1930s. 
Conservatism itself had raised the fear of association with the extreme right. The 
danger was obvious, and opponents quickly took advantage. Left wing publications 
pointed to the similarity between Powell’s views and the National Front and British 
Fascism.380 In December 1968, The Advertiser and Surrey County Reporter, a 
regional newspaper from the Conservative stockbroker-belt, succinctly summed up 
Powell’s problem when it stated that although many Conservatives agreed with
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Powell, loyalty to their leader resulted in them accepting policies they disagreed 
with.381 The Industrial Charter was an earlier example of this. Furthermore, the 
article continued, although Powell was ‘a man who might be prepared, in the last 
resort, to launch his own political organisation’, he would never join the National 
Front out of despair with the Conservative Party because he understood, as a 
historian, that a similar motivation on Mosley’s part had cost him his political life.
At the end of January1969, the Conservative Party’s fear of the public connecting it 
with the extreme right received satirical confirmation. Private Eye published an article 
headed ‘League of Empire Powellists’. However, the article did more than simply 
reflect a perceived similarity between Powell’s position and that of the League of 
Empire Loyalists. It also highlighted Conservative councillors’ attempts to overturn a 
ban that prohibited Colin Jordan from using Birmingham Council property,383 and 
thus associated Conservatives with an individual who from 1968 flaunted his views in 
the openly Nazi British Movement.384 Private Eye inferred that Powell’s comments on 
immigration were irresponsible. The article also referred to the emergence of other 
extreme-right anti-immigration groups. It identified a Peter Crozier as leading Action 
69 and the United National Party, and Victor Norris as heading the 5000 Group.385 By 
also mentioning Crozier’s criminal record, the prominence of Norris in the Anglo- 
Rhodesian Society, and their respective groups’ use of violence and infiltration, 
Private Eye had tacitly associated the Conservative Party with the wilder shores of the 
extreme right. Even more interesting is what the article said about how these groups 
viewed Powell. Private Eye claimed that they, and other extreme-right groups, held 
Powell ‘in deep contempt’ for remaining a member of the Conservative Party.386 It 
thereby agreed with The Advertiser and Surrey County Reporter’s view that Powell 
had limited their chances of success by failing to solve the quandary posed by the 
Conservative Party of whether to remain within its confines, or strike out with another 
party. Private Eye may have received its information second-hand rather than through
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its own investigation. However, it was a publication that usually saved its criticism for 
the political establishment and vested interests. This characteristic made its article a 
striking one and showed wide perception of the Conservative Party’s association with 
the extreme right.
Whilst Powell limited the National Front’s chances, the Conservative Party 
bureaucracy continued to work against the Monday Club. In August 1968, the Central 
Office Agent for the South-Eastern Area, A. N. Banks, forwarded a report on a 
meeting of the Surrey branch of the Monday Club. He identified platform speakers,
'ion
audience size and its attitude towards the Conservative Party leadership. At the 
same time in the North West, the Central Office Area Agent, A. S. Gamer, watched 
attempts to form a Monday Club branch in Liverpool. He reported a Monday Club 
approach for funds to a party contributor, and asked Central Office to assist him in 
‘preventing their supporters collecting money in the Constituencies’.388 This is 
consistent with the line that Central Office had adopted towards all right-wing groups 
since 1945. Mr. Webster’s response from Central Office showed exasperation at this 
inability to control the party’s own extremists: ‘I am afraid that we neither subsidise 
nor “control” the Monday Club in any way.’389 Webster explained that, ‘we cannot 
bring any pressure to bear on them with regard to their collecting funds’.390 This 
comment suggested that Webster wanted to limit the growth of unwelcome 
organisations. Webster also revealed that Central Office monitoring of the Monday 
Club went further than just Liverpool when he stated his awareness that ‘they have 
been trying to raise [money] for some time’.391 Moreover, Webster asked Gamer for 
the ‘name of the Monday Club collector in this case, just in case we have any contact 
with him in any other direction’. Gamer responded that the individual concerned 
was a ‘hot-head’ unsusceptible to Central Office pressure, and that therefore ‘I think
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we will have to let the matter drop.’393 Webster’s response is unknown, but he and 
Gamer had clearly desired to damage the Monday Club’s growth.
In September 1968, Paul Bristol resigned from the Monday Club. He was one of its 
founders. The Times explained that he had resigned ‘because he believes it to be 
taking an “extreme attitude” on race relations’.394 The catalyst for Bristol’s 
resignation was a forthcoming Monday Club pamphlet on immigration, which, The 
Times explained, ‘throws some light on the extent to which the club has attracted 
right-wing dissidents from Tory policy’.395 This comment showed that the 
leadership’s opposition to the Monday Club had not prevented it from growing. 
However, it also supported the idea that the Conservative leadership acted negatively 
on the Monday Club. Although The Times blamed previous resignations, most notably 
that of Boyd, from the Monday Club on Enoch Powell’s comments on race relations 
and immigration, Bristol revealed that Heath’s actions had played an important role 
too. Bristol, The Times reported, ‘has declared himself to be in favour of the more 
moderate view urged 10 days ago by Mr. Heath’.396 This referred to Heath’s plan to 
treat Commonwealth immigrants the same as non-EEC immigrants by removing their 
right of guaranteed entry as British passport holders,397 and showed how a limited 
move rightwards by the leadership could drive a wedge between the party’s 
extremists. The conclusion reached by The Times over Bristol’s resignation also 
showed how Heath’s positions made the Monday Club appear even more right wing. 
Using Bristol’s support for Heath’s stance as a yardstick, The Times article concluded 
that, ‘the pamphlet, which is now apparently being considered by the club executive 
for publication, must be considerably further right’.398 This showed how a minimal 
move onto its space had pushed the Monday Club into a more open revelation of its 
extremism.
The month after Bristol’s resignation, Central Office once again took an interest in the 
Monday Club’s provincial activities. However, whereas it did little in Liverpool, this
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time Central Office attempted to counter the Monday Club. Miss de Jonge, Area 
Agent in the East Midlands, reported that the Monday Club had hired Churchill 
House, home of Nottingham Conservative Association, for a meeting on 25 October 
where the guest speaker was to be Paul Biggs-Davison.3"  The use of these premises 
appeared to give official Party sanction to the Monday Club. De Jonge’s investigation 
suggested that she understood this. The individual who accepted the booking acted in 
good faith as the Monday Club ‘was never mentioned’.400 This may reveal that the 
Monday Club was also aware that by remaining anonymous it would acquire the 
image of official sanction. When de Jonge advised that there was ‘a strong movement 
afoot to stop this meeting by telling the Monday Club that the hall will after all not be 
available’,401 she showed that animosity towards the Monday Club existed amongst 
the wider Conservative Party. This attempted denial of premises contrasted markedly 
with the previous assistance given to the Bow Group. After the event, another Central 
Office Agent, P. K. Livingston, confirmed that the Monday Club had used false 
credentials in booking Churchill House. Livingston additionally claimed that one 
individual had resigned from the Young Conservatives because ‘the Party was not 
enough to the right’ and that the Monday Club had appealed for donations without 
prior approval in his area.402 One individual’s resignation hardly mattered, but the 
Monday Club’s request for donations was serious. Central Office consistently 
discouraged party members from funding the external extreme-right. It also responded 
furiously when the Monday Club sought funds from party members. Webster stated 
that, ‘This is just the sort of ammunition I need when I receive the next visitation from 
the Director of the Monday Club.’403
Concern about the Nottingham Monday Club continued into 1969. In April, 
Livingston reported that the Monday Club intended holding a rally the same day that 
Enoch Powell visited the city, and stated that the Chief Constable was incredulous at
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Nottingham Conservatives’ inability to control the Monday Club.404 The Monday 
Club was again engaged in street politics that was typical of the extreme right, but 
anathema to Conservatives, especially the leadership. The Chief Constable appeared 
to blame the Conservative Party for this agitation. The Monday Club’s acquisition of 
offices in Nottingham concerned Area Agent Livingston. He opined that, ‘It would 
seem that this club is setting up another political organisation in the city.’405 Did the 
Monday Club merely seek to influence the Conservative Party, or did its actions 
indicate the formation of a new party? Livingston believed that, ‘before long, the 
Nottingham City Conservatives will publicly disown them’.406 However, he felt this 
would not stop the Monday Club and therefore asked Webster whether someone could 
exercise pressure on the two parliamentary candidates who appeared on the Monday 
Club’s letterhead.407 Webster’s response showed just how negatively Central Office 
viewed the Monday Club: ‘It really does look as though they have gone too far this 
time and perhaps we may be able to solve the problem once and for all.’408
Livingston’s request for action bore fruit. On 1 May, one of the aforementioned 
parliamentary candidates, Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, reported the Chief Constable’s 
concerns to a Monday Club official, and warned that if it were ‘not above reproach’, 
he would reconsider sponsoring the Nottingham branch.409 However, the Nottingham 
Monday Club did not accept this meekly. Instead, a Councillor Whitehead, having 
spoken to Stewart-Smith, sought clarification from the Chief Constable. The Chief 
Constable denied saying or implying that the Monday Club was involved in street 
demonstrations or violence, and therefore Whitehead wrote to Livingston and 
provided an alternative scenario. Whitehead claimed that there had been ‘a number of 
attempts in recent months to maliciously misrepresent the Monday Club in this area’,
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and that Livingston knew this.410 Whitehead named ‘two individuals in particular’ 
who were responsible, and warned that the Monday Club’s ‘Executive Council has 
decided that any such future underhand activity shall be severely stamped upon’, and 
challenged Livingston to tell him where he had received the information about the 
Chief Constable’s views from.411 A number of interpretations of these events are 
possible, ranging from confusion to underhand activity on both sides. However, 
Central Office’s desire to counter the Monday Club was evident. Moreover, the 
Monday Club was prepared to name individuals and level accusations regarding 
Livingston’s awareness. It suspected deliberate sabotage of its interests. There is no 
evidence that Central Office denied these accusations, so it is possible that it had 
engaged in a smear campaign similar to those it had implemented against the League 
of Empire Loyalists and Martell’s organisations.
Also in 1969, the Monday Club published Who Goes Home? Attributed to G. K. 
Young, it went to the heart of the issue raised by Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech. In 
1968, Young had authored Finance and World Power: A Political Commentary, in 
which he stated, ‘No subject has been so wrapped and trapped in esoteric semantic 
obscurantism as international banking finance.’412 This sounded like a euphemism for 
Jews similar to those adopted by A. K. Chesterton. Now, Young proposed the 
repatriation of immigrants. As chairman of its ‘Action Fund’ from 1967-69, Young 
was increasingly prominent in the Monday Club. By 1969, he represented the section 
within it that accepted the consequences of Powell’s views. In 1969 especially, 
Central Office monitored the Action Fund’s money raising activities closely. Its 
Agents forwarded many copies of its appeal letter 413 They noted that potential donors 
frequently asked whether this appeal meant that the Monday Club was ‘forming 
another Party within the Party’.414 Central Office used the activities of the Action 
Fund against the Monday Club. It requested that Agents and Constituency 
Associations forward original letters of complaint, which, Central Office’s Mr.
410 Counc. A. Whitehead to Mr. Livingston, 21 June 1969. CPA CCO 3/7/33, Monday Club,
1966-1977.
411 Counc. A. Whitehead to Mr. Livingston, 21 June 1969. CPA CCO 3/7/33, Monday Club, 
1965-1977.
412 J. Fairhead, ‘Shorter Reviews’, The Monday World, Vol. 1, Issue 3, Autumn 1968, 26.
413 CPA CCO 20/43/6, Monday Club, 1969-74.
414 A. L. Stephens to Peter Horton, 26 February 1969. CPA CCO 20/43/6, Monday Club, 
1969-74.
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Webster revealed, the Party Chairman used ‘in one of his regular series of meetings’ 
with Paul Williams.415
These actions, together with the rightwards shift of the Conservative Party from 1967 
onwards, are examples of how the Conservative Party tried to marginalise its 
extremists. A similar example, albeit involving a different area of policy, was the 
resignation on 15 October of the Monday Club’s chairman, Paul Williams. Although 
Williams vaguely invoked business commitments as his reason, he also stated a wish 
to be, ‘completely free to criticise any possibility of Britain signing the Treaty of 
Rome’ 416 In this instance, the Conservative frontbench’s desire to enter the European 
Economic Community had deprived the Monday Club leadership of a valuable 
member. The issue of the EEC divided the Monday Club’s Executive and 
membership.417 The Conservative Political Centre reinforced this division in 1969 
when it published Right Angle: A philosophy for Conservatives. Pro-European 
Monday Club and Shadow Cabinet member Geoffrey Rippon authored it. No such 
approving imprimatur ever applied to G. K. Young’s offerings. Yet, these events also 
touched upon another way in which the Conservative Party limited the extreme- 
right’s fortunes. Unlike the Labour Party, the Conservative Party does not claim to be 
ideologically driven. It prefers a pragmatic handling of social change, even if initially 
resistant to such changes. The Industrial Charter is but one example of this. 
Organisations such as the One Nation Group, Bow Group and Pressure for Economic 
and Social Toryism (PEST) reflected this approach. Membership of the EEC was as 
an example of social change, just as immigration was. Therefore, the proscriptive, 
restraining attitude of the extreme right in these and other areas often clashed with the 
Conservative Party’s pragmatism. Former Conservative MP Humphrey Berkeley 
reflected this when, with Powell effectively marginalised, he rejoined the party in
1969. He identified the party’s historical role as ‘to accept the organic growth of 
society, and to bind people into one nation by mutual interdependence, while 
supporting freedom and the protection of minorities’.418
415 R. J. Webster to Mr. Mitchell, ‘Monday Club’, 30 April 1969. CPA CCO 20/43/6, Monday 
Club, 1969-74.
416 Williams Quits As Monday Club Chairman’, The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 1969.
417 Divisions confirmed by Jonathan Guinness interview, 23 May 2008.
418 Humphrey Berkeley, ‘Why I left and why I rejoined the Tory Party’, Catholic Herald, 9 
September 1969.
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A more obvious example of Conservative leadership opposition came after the 
Monday Club launched a ‘Powell for Premier’ campaign in October 1969. It 
attempted to replace progressive Conservative MPs with Powellites. The Monday 
Club had tried to secure selection of its candidates for some time. Now its strategy 
was more organised. In November 1968, Julian Critchley, a former Conservative MP, 
now a journalist, claimed that the Monday Club’s recent growth allowed it to exert a 
disproportionate power; he identified candidate selection as ‘the point at which 
pressure can best be applied’.419 Critchley implied that this new strategy resulted from 
Central Office countering the Monday Club’s attempt to influence the Conservative 
Party by the ‘gesture’ of publishing a few of its publications 420 He said that the 
Monday Club had formed ‘Constituency Liaison Committees’ to ‘encourage Monday 
Club members to join in the activities of the Conservative Party, and to advise them 
how to do so’ 421 In a letter to the editor of The Times, the Monday Club denied that it 
was a conspiracy aiming to subvert local Conservative Associations, and claimed to
AO*}be an open and loyal group whose radical views Central Office and others heeded. 
However, when it claimed to present ‘no challenge to the Conservative Party but only 
to the pseudo-intellectuals of the neo-Socialist fringe, who seek to move the Party 
away from Conservatism’,423 the Monday Club made clear that it was willing to attack 
any party member it felt fitted this description. Events in Surbiton proved that this 
included sitting MPs.
Critchley thought that the Surrey branch of the Monday Club was the most interesting 
one outside London. He highlighted Surbiton where the sitting Conservative MP, 
Nigel Fisher, had to contend with a Monday Club ‘cell’ that considered him to be left 
wing.424 The Club’s ‘Powell for Premier’ campaign of 1969 provided a credible
419 Julian Critchley, The Monday Club’s idea of ‘true conservatism”, The Times, 23 November 
1968, 8.
420 Julian Critchley, The Monday Club’s idea of ‘true conservatism”, The Times, 23 November 
1968, 8.
421 Julian Critchley, The Monday Club’s idea of ‘true conservatism”, The Times, 23 November 
1968, 8.
422 Frederick Stockwell to the Editor of The Times, 26 November 1968. CPA CCO 20/43/4, 
Monday Club, 1967-69.
423 Frederick Stockwell to the Editor of The Times, 26 November 1968. CPA CCO 20/43/4, 
Monday Club, 1967-69.
424 Julian Critchley, The Monday Club’s idea of 'true conservatism”, The Times, 23 November 
1968, 8.
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figurehead to a campaign that was already running. When Critchley stated that, ‘What 
the Monday Club really cares about is colour’,425 he revealed what he thought 
motivated the Monday Club’s campaign. In 1969, the local Monday Club attempted to 
remove Fisher. It demanded that the Conservative Association hold a secret 
referendum on Fisher’s ‘liberal views’, and presented fifty signatures for an 
extraordinary general meeting if they refused.426 The Conservative Party hierarchy 
responded by making their support for Fisher known. Shadow Cabinet members 
publicly supported Fisher, the 1922 Committee elected him to its National Executive 
for the first time, and the Party Chairman visited Surbiton427 The Times covered 
events at Surbiton with ‘A News Team Inquiry’. It described the campaign to remove 
Fisher as ‘Sustained, skilfully directed, and totally unprecedented’, and stated that it 
threw ‘a startling new light on the activities of certain members of the right-wing 
Monday Club’, amongst whom many supported Powell 428 The News Team claimed 
that Central Office and many Conservative MPs were, ‘known to be disturbed by the 
implications of this attempt ... to oust a sitting M.P.’.429 Such concern was 
understandable. Opponents would have interpreted the adoption of a new candidate as 
a victory for racists. The comments of those involved reinforced the leadership’s 
concern. Mr. E. W. Chester, a Monday Club member, thought that, ‘Integration could 
never work and the only solution was to offer coloured people the “necessary 
incentives” to leave.’430 Mr. F. S. Legg supported the Monday Club and thought he 
ought to be a member; he thought that Fisher was ‘all in favour of filling the country 
with niggers and browns’.431 Mrs. Viola Roberts openly admitted her racism and 
thought a ‘fifth column’ of coloured immigrants had infiltrated Britain, which she 
wanted to keep white.432
These views were unwelcome to the Conservative leadership. They again risked 
associating the party with the extremism usually exhibited by neo-Nazi groups. 
Central Office maintained a file on events in Surbiton and especially noted any
425 Julian Critchley, The Monday Club’s idea of ‘true conservatism”, The Times, 23 November 
1968, 8.
426 ‘Secret vote demanded on Tory MP, The Times, 25 October 1969,1.
427 Ramsden, Winds, 298.
428 ‘Right-wing move to oust Tory’, A News Team Inquiry, The Times, 25 October 1969, 6.
429 ‘Right-wing move to oust Tory’, A News Team Inquiry, The Times, 25 October 1969, 6.
430 ‘Right-wing move to oust Tory1, A News Team Inquiry, The Times, 25 October 1969,6.
431 ‘Right-wing move to oust Tory’, A News Team Inquiry, The Times, 25 October 1969, 6.
432 ‘Right-wing move to oust Tory’, A News Team Inquiry, The Times, 25 October 1969, 6.
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support for Powell.433 The leader of the campaign to remove Fisher realised the 
potential damage of the racist comments, but he failed to deny or contradict them 434 
The new Chairman of the Monday Club, George Pole, complained in a letter to the 
The Times that the News Team’s article left the impression that the Monday Club and 
its Surrey branch was ‘a group of sinister extremist conspirators’, which he stated was 
‘most misleading’.435 Pole did not condemn the racist views expressed by the Monday 
Club’s supporters. Instead, he justified their actions and, stated disingenuously that he 
was surprised that the Monday Club was ‘officially frowned on by the Conservative 
Central Office’.436 As the 1970 General Election campaign began, the Monday Club 
released a statement that denied accusations of disloyalty.437 However, the comments 
of the independent candidate who stood against Fisher suggested that Central Office 
did not agree. He complained about pressures to stand down brought to bear upon not 
only him and Powell, but the Monday Club too.438 Events in Surbiton had again 
showed that the Conservative Party’ was willingness to act against the Monday Club.
Electively Right
As the General Election approached, the extreme-right’s position was different from 
any other time after the Second World War. Although small extreme-right parties still 
existed, many had coalesced into the National Front. Fears over immigration, the 
Common Market, the economy and the ‘permissive society, provided a propitious 
context. The National Front grew and was increasingly well organised. It appeared 
capable of benefiting from dissident Conservative votes more than any other post-war 
extreme-right party had. However, the National Front faced the dilemmas of all 
extreme-right parties that competed with the Conservative Party. The Monday Club 
also possessed more credibility and operated within the political mainstream, thus 
exacerbating the National Front’s problems. Yet, the Monday Club’s existence also 
forced Heath, unlike his predecessors, to confront an organised extreme right within
433 CPA CCO 20/67/2, Surbiton -  pro-Enoch Powell Support, 1969-70.
434 ‘Right-wing move to oust Tory’, A News Team Inquiry, The Times, 25 October 1969, 6.
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the Party. The danger that the Monday Club posed to Heath’s chances of electoral 
success surfaced in a bizarre meeting in April 1970. The Market Bosworth Monday 
Club met and considered calls for the resignation from it of a Sir Wolstan and his wife 
Lady Dixie. The alleged offence was a briefing Sir Wolstan gave to a Derby news 
agency that stated that, ‘the Monday Club was run by a group of extremists’ and that 
one senior figure ‘was a henchman of Sir Oswald Mosley’.439 The first part of the 
claim went to the heart of the Conservative Party’s problem of how to deal with 
extremists within its ranks. The second part referred to prominent Monday Club 
member Jonathan Guinness. As Guinness was the son of Oswald Mosley’s wife Diana 
Mitford, this was an easy accusation to make. It raised again the possibility of 
remembering the Conservative Party’s interwar association with the extreme right.
However, the problems this growing and organised extreme right posed to Heath at 
the 1970 General Election were not as serious as they might seem at first sight. The 
Monday Club leadership made clear to Central Office that it supported ‘all official 
party candidates to the full’ and was ready to act against members who did not.440 
Therefore, no matter how distasteful Heath thought the Monday Club, its support was 
essential to winning votes on the right and could make him Prime Minister. Although 
the National Front was growing, it was miniscule compared to the Conservative Party, 
and fielded only ten candidates. These candidatures were in working-class 
constituencies, and arguably damaged the Labour Party more. Even if some 
Conservatives entertained the possibility of losing votes to the National Front, none 
other than Oswald Mosley provided the party with reassurance. On the eve of the 
1970 General Election, Mosley claimed that even though the majority of the 
electorate agreed with his views on immigration, ‘they nevertheless voted when it 
came to the point in the traditional party fashion’.441
From 1967 onwards, Heath had moved sufficiently rightwards to make Mosley’s 
prediction more probable. The climacteric of this rightward shift came in the ‘Selsdon
439 "Resign’ call to Sir Wolstan after row*, Leicester Mercury, 21 April 1970.
440 Frederick Stockwell to Anthony Barber, 20 May 1970. CPA CCO 20/43/6, Monday Club, 
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441 Mosley was also pointing out the differences between himself and Powell, saying, “We 
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White, ‘Surprise! What Mosley thinks about Powell’, Evening Standard, 18 June 1970.
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declaration’ of January 1970. Asked in private if the party was moving to the right, 
Heath responded ‘Just a bit’.442 This was quite an admission from a leader committed 
to One Nation Group principles. Heath subsequently complained that Harold Wilson 
used Selsdon to portray ‘us all as right-wing extremists’.443 Although Heath rejected 
the accusation, Wilson’s ability to level it confirmed the perception that the 
Conservative Party had moved rightwards. This was exactly the point. For, although 
the change arguably went only so far, and certainly did not extend to the kind of 
policies desired by the National Front, people believed that the Conservative Party 
had become more right wing. Gilmour, for example, noted that the press suggested 
Selsdon was a ‘sharp swerve to the right’.444 Conservative parliamentary candidate 
Norman Tebbit certainly thought so.445 A desire to limit any damage to the 
Conservative Party’s prospects by Enoch Powell’s comments had motivated Heath’s 
actions Yet the extreme right helped as much as hindered in that Powell, who had 
remained firmly within the Conservative Party, attracted votes away from the likes of 
the National Front. On Election Day, 18 June 1970, a cartoon in The Sun graphically 
illustrated this when it portrayed Heath standing on a swing that reached 3%, but 
trailing Powell on a swing that had reached 4%.446
The Sun’s message that a Conservative victory resulted from Powell’s spectacular 
intervention of 1968 may have been an exaggeration. Although trailing Labour in the 
polls during the 1970 General Election, many factors pointed towards Conservative 
victory. Heath’s House of Commons performances had improved. Labour’s inability 
to stem rising industrial unrest, notably the failure of In Place o f Strife (1969), made it 
more likely that the electorate would turn to the Conservatives. Labour’s economic 
mismanagement had dissipated much of the goodwill enjoyed in 1964. The 
embarrassment of devaluation in 1967 had shattered Wilson’s reputation and forever 
associated him with an oft-parodied and widely disbelieved claim that it ‘would not 
affect the pound in the pocket.’ In the unlikely event that electors had forgotten, the 
release of unexpectedly poor balance of payments figures in election week reminded
442 P. Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall: Britain in the Seventies, Michael Joseph, London 
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them of Labour’s poor economic performance.447 The election result, a 31 seat 
Conservative majority, was nonetheless surprising, as virtually all polls had predicted 
a Labour victory. The overall context largely explained the result, but Powell received 
the credit for it. Diane Spearman, formerly of the Conservative Research Department, 
assessed the nearly six thousand letters Powell received during and immediately after 
the election.448 Only just over 1% objected to his views. Many revealed that they 
voted Conservative because of Powell’s comments, or attributed the swing towards 
the Conservative Party to them. These letters came from across the country and 
included many social classes and occupations. From Colchester: ‘We are voting Tory 
just for you. Thank you.’449 From Cardiff: ‘We feel you brought the campaign to life 
for the Conservative Party and set us all on the road to success.’450 From Dumbarton: 
‘You have helped the Conservative cause tremendously.’451 Letters from Conservative 
Party workers added weight to the centrality of Powell’s role. Typical of this was the 
comment of one such individual in Essex who said that, ‘Our Canvassing has proved 
overwhelming support for what you are saying.’452 Defeated Labour MPs attributed 
their loss to ‘Powellism’.453 Perhaps most telling, only one letter disagreed with this 
view, and that was from a defeated Conservative candidate 454 The sixteen substantial 
Central Office files that contained correspondence about Enoch Powell’s race 
relations speeches support the breadth, depth and opinion of Spearman’s findings 455 
These letters alone did not prove Powell’s agency in Heath’s 1970 victory. However, 
subsequent research argued confidently that Powell was responsible for attracting 
over 4 million votes to the Conservative Party.456
Thus in summer 1970, a tough-minded individual took the reins of power having 
defeated a duplicitous leader. From outside the ruling establishment, this individual 
swept existing structures aside and contended with radicals’ demands within his own
447 Ramsden, Winds, 313.
448 D. Spearman, ‘Enoch Powell’s Election Letters’, in J. Wood (ed), Powell and the 1970 
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party. This was a brilliantly acted if factually flawed portrayal by Richard Harris in 
Cromwell (1970). Would Edward Heath, a lower-middle class grammar school boy, 
former Chief Whip and pilot of the unpopular Resale Price Maintenance Bill, be able 
to deal with the demands of his radicals as effectively?
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Chapter 5: ‘Heathco’ meets the extreme-right 
challenge, 1970-75
Whilst historians of Britain have often portrayed the Forties and Fifties as decades of
radical rebuilding, growth and prosperity, and the Sixties as a cultural golden age, the
Seventies have attracted a less flattering description. Christopher Booker judged that
the Seventies were a ‘sober, gloomy’ decade, little more than ‘a prolonged anti-climax
to the manic excitements of the Sixties’.1 Norman Shrapnel stated that crises became a
daily condition of life, and described the Seventies as a decade of increasing
•  2 •  *introversion when Britain developed a new insularity and withdrew into itself. Phillip 
Whitehead accepted Shrapnel’s judgement. He concluded that, ‘The Seventies will be
• 3 rf'rl •remembered for their reactive pessimism as well as their sharper conflicts.’ This 
negative view of the Seventies has persisted. In 1998, Francis Wheen argued that, ‘If 
the Sixties were a wild weekend and the Eighties were a hectic day at the office, the 
Seventies were one long Sunday evening, heavy with gloom and torpor.’4 In 2003, 
Richard Weight described this period as ‘the most dreadful of the post-war era, a 
litany of racial conflict in England, nationalist discontent in Scotland and Wales, war 
in Ireland and perpetual strikes everywhere’.5 According to Weight, ‘Many Britons 
believed that their country was sliding into anarchy and even revolution in the 
1970s.’6 In 2008, David Marquand stated that Heath became Prime Minister when the 
post-war golden age had begun ‘petering out’, capitalism had entered a ‘turbulent new 
phase’, and just after ‘autumn had set in’.7
These descriptions have weaknesses. Continuities with previous decades existed. 
Ascribing a characteristic to a decade is arbitrary. Bernstein recognised both of these 
facts when he identified economic, political and cultural strengths and weaknesses in
1 C. Booker, The Seventies: Portrait of a Decade, Allen Lane, London (1980), 3.
2 N. Shrapnel, The Seventies: Britain’s inward march, Constable, London (1980), 13.
3 Whitehead, Wall, xv.
4 F. Wheen, The Stagnant Years’, The Modem Review, March 1998, 25.
5 Weight Patriots, 475.
6 Weight, Patriots, 519.
7 Marquand, Britain, 235.
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the Seventies within an overall picture of Britain’s steady rise since 1945.8 People 
who grew up in the decade do not necessarily recognise the picture of negativity. 
Many fondly remember the popular culture that anaesthetised the gloom. The 
continued success of television programmes from the Seventies such as Fawlty 
Towers, Dad’s Army and The Two Ronnies is evidence of this nostalgia. Likewise, the 
popularity of the modem television programme Life on Mars, in which a twenty-first 
century policeman awakes in 1973 and experiences the type of policing made famous 
by the Seventies’ series The Sweeney. Nostalgia for the Seventies has even found 
expression in a proliferation of websites on the internet that hark back to the decade as 
a cultural golden age.9 Therefore, historians have re-appraised the Seventies. In 2004, 
the New Economics Foundation saw the mid-1970s as the time when Britain was at 
its happiest.10 Howard Sounes highlighted the quality and quantity of popular music, 
more socially liberal attitudes, radical humour, groundbreaking architecture, and 
popular literature and blockbuster films as evidence that showed that the Seventies 
were a ‘Brilliant Decade’.11 Similarly for Alwyn Turner, rather than being the decade 
‘that could scarcely be mentioned without condemnation, conjuring up images of 
social breakdown, power cuts, the three-day week, rampant bureaucracy and all 
powerful trade unions’, the Seventies were ‘a golden age of TV, popular fiction, low- 
tech toys and club football’.12
Yet, cultural manifestations cannot hide the serious problems of the Seventies. Glam 
rock, space-hoppers and Monty Python’s Flying Circus were simply Elastoplast 
amnesia for Britain’s most troubled post-war decade. Indeed, of all decades since the 
Second World War, the Seventies were the most propitious for extremism. The 
‘golden age’ of Britain’s post-war economy ended. Averaging 4% from 1945-70, 
inflation soared, reaching a peak of 27% in mid-decade. Unemployment increased. A 
balance of payments surplus of over £400m in 1970 became a deficit that exceeded 
£1500m by the end of 1974. When unemployment reached the totemic figure of one
8 George L. Bernstein, The Myth of Decline: The Rise of Britain Since 1945, Pimlico, London 
(2004).
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10 ‘Social Progress Stagnant as GDP Soars’, www.neweconomics.org/gen/news_mclp.aspx, 
16 March 2004.
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Schuster, London (2006), passim
12 Alwyn W. Turner, Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970s, Aurum, London (2008), ix-xx.
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million in January 1972,13 anger in the House of Commons led to the suspension of 
Prime Minister’s Question Time.14 Heath may have been unlucky to be Prime 
Minister at the time of the 1973 oil crisis, but there was a feeling that his government 
presided over an unfair economy, in which unscrupulous capitalists had enriched 
themselves whilst the hard-pressed masses paid the price for the government’s 
mistakes. In 1973, Pink Floyd parodied the acquisitiveness of capitalism and effects 
of consumerism in the track ‘Money’ on their multi-award winning album ‘Dark Side 
of the Moon’. In the same year, Heath himself memorably denounced the Lonrho 
Company, mired at the time in a tax evasion scandal that benefitted its chairman, as 
‘the unpleasant and unacceptable face of capitalism’.15 As Heath later admitted, the 
Lonrho affair was, ‘a considerable provocation’, at a time when the government was 
urging workers to moderate wage demands for the sake of the country.16 Intriguingly, 
the chairman concerned was Monday Club member Duncan Sandys.
Opportunities for the exploitation of nationalist fears also increased in the Seventies. 
This revolved around two issues: Britain’s world role, and the state of the union of the 
United Kingdom. Rapid decolonisation had ended the British Empire. The 
Commonwealth had evolved into a multi-racial entity of little political coherence in 
which Britain was little more than titular head. The only viable alternative, if Britain 
aspired to continuing world importance, appeared to be membership of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Conservative and Labour ffontbenches agreed with this 
assessment. The imposition of decimal currency on 15 February 1971 ended Britain’s 
peculiar imperial weights and measures system that dated from 791.17 The White 
Paper of July 1971 that supported Britain’s entry into the EEC stated that there would 
be no diminution of ‘essential national sovereignty’, but admitted that Britain would 
lose some of its sovereignty.18 On 1 January 1973, Britain joined the EEC. For those 
whose nationalism included imperialism, independent traditional currency and 
national institutions, the political establishment had colluded and submerged Britain
13 Daily Mirror, 21 January 1971.
14 ‘Sitting suspended: Mr Heath booed in Labour uproar on jobless: censure debate Monday’, 
The Times, 21 January 1972, 7.
15 ‘Mr Heath Calls Lonrho affair ‘the unpleasant and unacceptable face of capitalism”, The 
Times, 16 May 1973,16.
16 Heath, Life, 418.
17 Weight, Patriots, 486 -487.
18 The United Kingdom and the European Communities (1971), 8.
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in internationalism. Worse still, the integrity of the United Kingdom itself appeared to 
be threatened. In the 1970 General Election, Plaid Cymru had failed to win a single 
constituency. However, Plaid Cymru possessed a solid base of support. It secured two 
and then three seats in the General Elections of February and October 1974 
respectively and subsequently proved it was not simply a transient protest party. In 
Scotland, the Scottish National Party performed even better. It improved from one 
seat in 1970 to eleven in 1974 and virtually trebled its vote. Northern Ireland was 
even more worrying. In 1972, Heath’s government responded to the undeclared civil 
war between republicans and loyalists and suspended the Stormont Assembly. In July 
1973, the Northern Ireland Constitution Act imposed a devolved assembly that forced 
loyalists to share power with republicans. Ulster’s Loyalists viewed the Sunningdale 
Agreement of 1973 that resulted from this assembly as a sell-out that would lead to a 
united Ireland.19 Right-wing extremists on the mainland contacted Ulster’s loyalists.20 
Britain thus appeared endangered by separatist Celtic nationalism. Wilson had 
realised that this was a potential problem and had appointed a royal commission in 
1969 to examine Britain’s constitution and the governance of its constituent parts. On 
31 October 1973, the Kilbrandon Commission reported. It accepted the need for 
Welsh and Scottish devolution. Devolution already existed in Northern Ireland. 
However, England was not to have its own Assembly. The commission suggested the 
division of England into eight regions. These events inflamed the passions of those 
whose nationalism entailed the maintenance of the United Kingdom, and those for 
whom nationalism meant ‘England’.
Weak government made the growth of extremism even more likely in the Seventies. 
This was especially so during the Heath government. His party’s manifesto promised 
an end to Macmillan’s corporatism. It signalled a softening of the Conservative Party 
leadership’s attitude towards the neo-liberalism of the ‘freedom groups’ on the 
extreme right. When Heath came to power, he also promised a more business-like 
approach in which, having carefully arrived at a policy, ‘the Prime Minister and his
19 ‘Cold blast of loyalist opposition greets Mr Faulkner after Sunningdale’, and ‘Unionists 
duped at Sunningdale, Mr Paisley tells Ulster Assembly in three-hour speech’, The Times, 11 
December 1973, p. 1 and 15 December 1973,4.
20 Sykes, Radical Right, 108.
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colleagues should have the courage to stick to it’.21 This was sufficient for many 
‘freedom groups’ to lessen their activities 22 Reality, however, did not match promise 
as Heath abandoned neo-liberalism when difficulties arose. His government 
performed major policy U-tums not once, but five times. In industry, the promise to 
let so-called ‘lame duck’ industries fail ended when Heath’s government used public 
money to rescue Rolls Royce and the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. In October 1970, the 
Budget removed the apparatus of state intervention in the economy, but in 1972 the 
creation of an Industrial Development Executive and the Industry Bill reintroduced 
state interventionism. Heath’s government passed legislation to solve industrial 
unrest, then undermined and eventually abandoned it when trade unions vigorously 
opposed it. The government introduced a compulsory prices and incomes policy in an 
attempt to combat spiralling inflation, despite promises to the contrary. Finally, it 
ended the promise to reduce governmental spending when it increased public 
expenditure massively from late 1972. These U-Turns resulted in the ‘freedom right’ 
returning to prominence.
Private Eye parodied Heath as the managing director of ‘Heathco’, an incompetent 
individual who led a useless company incapable of dealing with its problems. Once 
the tough man of the Conservative Party, Prime Minister Heath was incapable of firm 
leadership, too easily forced to reverse policy when challenged. A growing genre of 
novels depicting the rise of a right-wing strong man emerged in this period. This was 
an implicit response to Heath’s weak leadership.24 They were also a reaction to a 
belief that Heath presided over an increasingly decadent society. On 17 November 
1970, the Sun’s page 3 girl appeared topless for the first time. Increased incidence of 
abortion and divorce, and the widened gap between rich and poor and young and old 
juxtaposed in a society that remained largely conservative outside London. Britain in 
the Seventies presented an image of a society that was polarised morally and 
culturally as much as it was politically. Films provided evidence of decadence for 
those who chose to interpret them thus. The release viewing of Performance (1971)
21 A Better Tomorrow (1970), 1.
22 N. Nugent, The National Association for Freedom’, in R. King and N. Nugent, Respectable 
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shocked the wife of one film executive so much that she vomited. In the same year, 
Straw Dogs depicted a violent British countryside and rape, and attracted from one 
film critic the description of ‘a fascist work of art’.25 Turner described Get Carter
a/
(1971) as ‘almost an elegy for a passing world’, wherein there was an absolute 
demarcation between villain and citizen. So intense was the reaction to A Clockwork 
Orange (1971), in which drug-taking youths engaged in rape and nihilistic 
destruction, that its producer withdrew it from viewing in 1974. These trends, and 
their cultural manifestations, continued throughout the decade, and eventually found 
their apogee in the emergence of punk music. As Shrapnel says, the Seventies were
on‘Not a decade, however you looked at it, to solace the moralists.’ Heath’s 
government seemed incapable, or unwilling, to enact any remedy for the ills of 
society. Indeed, the passage of the Misuse of Drugs Act (1971), which separated the 
classification of cannabis from harder drugs like heroin, suggested that Heath’s 
government did not intend to roll back the permissive society at all. Mary 
Whitehouse, the once ridiculed former member of Moral Rearmament and force 
behind the ‘Clean-Up TV’ campaign in the Sixties, became an influential figure. In 
1971, she led the National Festival of Light that harked back to a less morally dubious 
time. Indeed ‘harking back’ was a noticeable feature of the Seventies. Norman 
Shrapnel noticed this long before Griffin identified ‘harking back’ as an important 
element within his palingenesis theory of fascism, the core of which is fascist groups’ 
identification of a mythical ‘golden age’.28 The Seventies clearly was a decade in 
which conditions for extremism existed, not least during Heath’s government. Two of 
the main battlegrounds for this extremism, industrial unrest and immigration, are 
particularly associated with Heath’s government.
Industrial unrest was the leitmotif of Heath’s premiership. The official number of 
days lost to strikes during the Heath government, which was never less than 10 
million, exceeded any post-war decade. In 1970, the number of days lost were the 
most since the General Strike of 1926. In 1972, it more than doubled to give a figure
25 Turner, Crisis, 76.
26 Turner, Crisis, 59.
27 Shrapnel, Seventies, 16.
28 Shrapnel, Seventies, 15 and passim.
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ten times worse than when Harold Wilson became Prime Minister. Edward Heath 
used the Emergency Powers Act (1920) five times to declare a State of Emergency in 
less than four years. Governments had previously only used this act twelve times in its 
eighty-four years on the statute book. Each declaration responded to a strike. 
However, it was not simply the number and extent of strikes, but their nature that 
particularly identified Heath’s premiership with industrial unrest. During the 1972 
miners strike, television brought into people’s homes the police’s inability to stop 
intimidatory flying pickets. At Birmingham’s Saltley Coke Depot in February 1972, 
the miners’ legal use of sheer numbers defeated police efforts to block their attempted 
closure of the depot. These events also brought National Union of Mineworkers’ 
(NUM) leaders Arthur Scargill and Mick McGahey to prominence. Both men 
expressed objectives beyond merely the improvement of their members’ working 
conditions. Scargill thought Saltley proved the working class could bring the whole of 
Britain to a standstill.30 Late in 1973, at a meeting in Downing Street that attempted to 
secure an end to an NUM work-to-rule, McGahey told Heath that he sought the 
government’s downfall. This introduced into industrial relations a political objective 
in which left-wing extremists apparently sought revolutionary ends. Former Monday 
Club members confirmed Turner’s conclusion that at this time some of them 
suspected that, ‘Britain was getting close to a pre-revolutionary situation’.
However true or realistic this suspicion was, the actions of Heath’s government 
inflamed the situation and in the process added to the impression of a pre­
revolutionary Britain. In 1971, Heath’s government passed the Industrial Relations 
Act and implemented a National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) as a mechanism to 
rule on industrial disputes. Heath subsequently claimed that the motivation for this 
Act was to redress the balance of power in industry and reduce the climate of 
confrontation, and not to weaken the trade unions. This accorded with Heath’s ‘One 
Nation’ Toryism. However, as Robert Taylor argued, the minutes of the Selsdon Park 
Conference before the 1970 General Election showed that the Conservative
29 Turner, Crisis, 11.
30 Turner, Crisis, 13.
31 Whitehead, Wall, 104. Heath, Life.
32 Turner, Crisis, 13. Interviews with John Gouriet, Sir Adrian FitzGerald, Jonathan Guinness, 
Neil Hamilton and Gregory Lauder-Frost.
33 Heath, Life, 408-409.
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frontbench did intend to lessen union power.34 Moreover, as the Industrial Relations 
Act contained within it the means by which trade unions could avoid its provisions 
lawfully, it was seriously flawed legislation.35 The government’s attempts to enforce 
it made it appear vindictive, bullying, and, worst of all for any government, impotent. 
This impotence revealed itself when the government showed that it was not even 
prepared to stand by the consequences of its own legislation. In 1972, the Government 
used its own Official Solicitor to overturn the NIRC’s imprisonment of five dockers. 
This action signalled the end of the Industrial Relations Act’s effective life. Earlier in 
1972, the Government had also capitulated to the miners and awarded them a pay rise 
three times greater than that initially offered. Heath looked less like Cromwell and 
more like ‘Brave Sir Robin’ from Monty Python and the Holy Grail, inappropriately 
armed and unwilling to fight. The image of impotence extended to the rest of the 
government. When the Cabinet met in candlelight due to a power cut, it juxtaposed 
starkly with the image of vigorous mineworkers who had secured their objectives at 
Saltley by force.36 Popular culture represented the situation. In 1971, Carry On at 
Your Convenience continued the parody of unions as seen in I ’m All Right Jack 
(1959). The Strawbs criticised union power in Part o f the Union (1973). However, 
when Heath decided to take a stand against the miners he discovered that these 
representations did not reflect public sympathies. Heath responded to the miners’ 
industrial action of late 1973 and imposed a three-day working week from January 
1974. This action limited energy usage and imposed heavy penalties for non- 
compliance. It affected everybody negatively, but Heath’s action disproportionately 
hit hardest those least able to cope. These included the elderly and disabled who had 
moved into the new tower blocks that now relied on relatives to bring their shopping 
or hauled it up exhausting flights of stairs themselves.37 Heath would have done better 
to observe the messages sent by the popular culture for which he showed no interest 
before he introduced the three-day week. Although the trade union official in Carry 
On at Your Convenience, Vic Spanner, was a comedic figure, he was also prepared to 
sanction violence. The film took five years to recoup its costs and was the Carry On
34 R. Taylor, The Heath government and industrial relations: myth and reality’, in S. Ball and 
A. Seldon (eds), The Heath Government 1970-1974: A Reappraisal, Longman, London 
(1996), 168.
Taylor, ‘Heath’, 172-173.
^Turner, Crisis, 13.
37 Personal knowledge.
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team’s first flop, which suggested that the film’s target working-class audience 
disliked its negative portrayal of Spanner.38 As the February 1974 General Election 
loomed, Alf Garnett, the archetypal working-class Conservative voter, also turned his
- IQ
back on the Conservative Government and Prime Minister Heath. Many other 
working-class Conservatives probably did likewise. Thus, the three-day week had 
reinforced the existing image of governmental impotence and alienated potential 
supporters. Therefore, when Heath called a General Election one month after he had 
imposed the three-day week and asked the electorate, who governed the country, the 
elected government or the unions?, the electorate responded with a resounding ‘not 
you’.
Alf Garnett is associated in popular memory not with industrial unrest, but another 
prominent issue of the Seventies: immigration. Enoch Powell’s 1968 ‘rivers of blood’ 
speech had placed immigration firmly at the centre of British politics. Immigration 
bedevilled Heath’s leadership and government. Before the 1970 General Election, 
Heath promised to assist those immigrants that wished to return to their country of 
origin, but he also added that, ‘we are going to do everything to prevent a climate 
being created which will make them wish to leave against their own free will’.40 
Heath had made this stance explicit in the Conservatives’ General Election manifesto, 
which also included the promise of no further large-scale immigration.41 It was a 
position that contained obvious fault-lines. In 1972, two events tested these manifesto 
promises severely. In January, Bangladesh secured independence. This resulted in 
Pakistan seceding from the Commonwealth in protest. There were two consequences 
of these developments. Pakistani citizens who were resident in Britain were no longer 
British subjects. Bangladeshis who were resident in Britain became another ethnic 
minority for the extreme right to attack. Enoch Powell spotted the consequences and 
exploited them. Powell pointed out that Pakistanis were now aliens and therefore lost 
the right to vote and bring their dependents to Britain, and called for the repatriation 
of both Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Powell had created exactly the kind of negative
38 Turner, Crisis, 78-79.
39 Till Death Us Do Pari, ‘Strikes and Blackouts’, 23 January 1974 and ‘Three Day Week’, 30 
January 1974.
40 The Campaign Guide 1970 (Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1970), 469.
41 A Better Tomorrow: The Conservative Programme for the Next 5 Years (Conservative 
Central Office, 1970), 23-24.
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climate that Heath and the party leadership wished to avoid. Idi Amin’s decision to 
expel all Asians from Uganda in August caused even greater problems for Heath. The 
existence of approximately 57,000 stateless Ugandan Asians with British passports 
challenged Heath’s promise that there would be no further large-scale immigration.
Immigration posed greater problems for the Conservative Party than the mere 
questioning of the credibility of its election promises, however. Powell potentially 
provided the extreme right with charismatic leadership. He frequently commented on 
immigration, as well as other issues that troubled the Conservative Government, and 
therefore regularly reminded electors and elected that an alternative to Heath was 
available. Letters from people of all political persuasions continued to pour into 
Central Office overwhelmingly supporting Powell. This proved that the initial 
favourable response to Powell in 1968 was not a passing phenomenon. Opinion polls 
confirmed that many people supported Powell’s views. The government could not 
ignore this. However, it had to be careful how it responded because Heath faced more 
than simply a charismatic extreme-right individual. For a number of reasons, the 
extreme right was far more dangerous than at any time since 1945. Outside the 
Conservative Party, the extreme right enjoyed its period of greatest unity in the shape 
of the National Front, a party composed of racial-nationalists and imperial die-hards. 
From its creation in 1967, the National Front gained a reputation for street politics and 
violence against non-white immigrants. It dominated news coverage of extreme-right 
politics during Heath’s premiership and provided a potential repository for extreme- 
right voters. Events such as the Ugandan Asian crisis provided the National Front 
with an excuse for its activities, increased its membership and gave it an electoral 
boost. In 1973, the National Front saved its first deposit when Martin Webster secured 
16% of the vote at the West Bromwich by-election. That same year, Harold Wilson 
claimed there was a danger that Britain would ‘lurch into fascism’.42 As Weight 
argued, British Fascism enjoyed more success during Heath’s premiership ‘than 
during its original heyday in the 1930s’.43 Shrapnel agreed, describing Britain in this 
period as, ‘marching right back to the 1930s’, only this time with blacks, not Jews as 
the scapegoats.44 Fears of a resurgent fascism were understandable. Yet, its opponents
42 Turner, Crisis, 226.
43 Weight, Patriots, 537.
^Shrapnel, Seventies, 177.
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were not prepared to allow the National Front to grow without a fight. Popular culture 
rejected it. Youths took action against the National Front through ‘Rock against 
Racism’ concerts, counter-marches and the Anti-Nazi League. From Powell’s 
Wolverhampton constituency, Ambrose Slade adopted the ‘skinhead’ image of the 
late 1960s, but changed it when they realised its association with extreme-right 
violence, and subsequently became famous as simply Slade. In 1973, Pink Floyd 
lampooned the ethnocentric divisiveness at the heart of racism in the single from Dark 
Side o f the Moon, ‘Us and Them’. Therefore, if the Conservative leadership failed to 
act against the National Front it risked alienating the Party from a sizable section of 
the electorate.
Unfortunately, for the Conservative leadership, the Party’s own extreme right 
contained supporters of the National Front’s views. Connections between the Monday 
Club and National Front were public knowledge. This presented troubling 
possibilities. The number of dissident Conservatives who joined the National Front 
might increase. The Monday Club might exploit the issue of immigration to capture 
control of the Conservative Party. Most dangerously, the National Front and Monday 
Club could amalgamate, which would present a far greater challenge to the 
Conservative Party. Immigration was the issue around which such possibilities 
revolved. However, because the Monday Club was an integral part of the 
Conservative Party, the leadership could not dismiss it as easily as it had external 
extreme-right groups. The Monday Club’s growth suggested that it enjoyed 
significant support amongst Conservatives, and questioned the effectiveness of 
Central Office’s counter measures against it. Yet the Conservative leadership was 
unable and unwilling to ignore the threat posed by the Monday Club and its 
association with the National Front. This threat revolved around attitudes towards 
race. The post-1945 Conservative leadership viewed any organisation that exhibited 
racism as disreputable. It identified racism as a hallmark of fascism and Nazism, as in 
the example of the League of Empire Loyalists. This attitude was a long-standing 
consequence of the Second World War, and is evident in Central Office using its 
strongest counter measures against racist groups. The National Front was openly 
racist. The Monday Club, by focusing on the issue of immigration and associating 
with the National Front, tested the Conservative leadership’s commitment to this post- 
1945 attitude severely. Yet, even though action against the Monday Club risked
280
harming the Party, the Conservative leadership and Central Office adhered to the 
policy of countering this particular part of the extreme right. The leadership once 
more reached rightwards and introduced a new Immigration Bill, whilst refusing to 
accede totally to the extreme-right’s demands. Most striking, Central Office 
confronted the Monday Club about its connections with the National Front and 
pressurised the Club’s leadership into removing the National Front from its ranks.
Extreme-Right Reaction
The problems of the Heath government provided veterans of the extreme right with an 
opportunity to grab the limelight from the beginning. Strikes seemed extensive and 
widespread soon after Heath became prime minister. They affected many and diverse 
concerns, such as beer production, rugby league and even the Daily Mail.45 People 
considered the possibility that a General Strike was imminent three months after the 
General Election. Heath declared his readiness to meet such a challenge on television, 
and defended his government’s non-intervention in industrial disputes.46 Council 
workers struck on 29 September. Fears increased for public safety as raw sewage 
entered rivers and waste piled up.47 Arbitration resulted in an inflationary pay
Aftsettlement. Heath criticised the settlement during a Panorama interview, but his 
later argument that this award led the government to redouble efforts with those 
employers that the government could influence did not alter the view of some that 
Heath had not provided strong leadership.49 Newly elected MP Norman Tebbit 
acknowledged Heath’s criticism of the settlement, but also noticed that he kept to his 
promise to remain aloof from industrial disputes.50 In winter 1970, electricians began 
industrial action, which resulted in the first power cuts of Heath’s premiership.51 
Homes and businesses used candle light, even the House of Commons.52 The extent
45 ‘Another strike hits brewery’, The Times, 15 August 1970, 15. 'Rugby League strike to go 
on’, The Times, 28 August 1970,10. ‘Strike notice at Daily Mail’, 8 September 1970, 1.
46 ‘Mr Heath says he would be prepared to face general strike this winter1, The Times, 25 
September 1970, 1.
47 ‘Pollution spreads and schools close in council strike areas’, The Times, 6 October 1970, 2.
48 ‘Committee admits its proposals to end strike by council workmen are inflationary’, The 
Times, 6 November 1970, 4.
49 Heath, Life, 336.
“ Tebbit, Upwardly, 102.
51 ‘Electricity unions may strike to win pay claim’, The Times, 12 November 1970, 23.
“ Tebbit, Upwardly, 102.
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and nature of strikes led some to believe that extreme left were behind them. The 
unions’ response to the impending Industrial Relations Bill added fuel to this belief. 
In November, for example, British Leyland warned its workers of the dangers of such 
action after its workers walked out in protest over the Bill.53 Heath announced at 
Prime Minister’s Question Time that he would not tolerate any political strike.54 By 
27 November, Britain had experienced its worst year for strikes since the General 
Strike of 1926.55
When Heath appeared to promise in the Selsdon Programme a more free-market 
approach that included limiting trade union power, he had altered the nature of 
‘freedom’ groups’. For many of them, their ‘extremism’ amounted to little more than 
advocacy of free market economics unfettered by vested interest. It is true that 
contemporaries probably misunderstood the nature of the Selsdon programme. 
Keegan argued that it encouraged the right wing’s exaggerated view of its influence 
over the Conservative Party.56 Heath later rejected any idea that Selsdon marked his
cn
conversion to new liberal economics, and ridiculed those who thought otherwise. 
Nevertheless, Selsdon had brought such views back into the political mainstream. 
Therefore, when Heath failed to deliver this programme, he forced these groups to 
return to operating in the political space outside the Conservative Party’s right.58 It 
was during the electricians’ dispute, for example, that Edward Martell resurfaced. He 
teamed up with former Freedom Group members and formed a company called 
Modem Organisers Ltd.59 He used his non-unionised printing company to publish a 
News Special on 8 December.60 Concerns about union activity dominated the News 
Special. It claimed that recent events had justified the Freedom Group’s earlier 
warnings that failure to counter the unions would lead to politically motivated strikes, 
and particularly criticised the Heath government for refusing to intervene in the
53 ‘BLMC warning on political strikes’, The Times, 13 November 1970, 22.
54 ‘Strike action for political reasons could not be tolerated -  Prime Minister1, The Times, 27 
November 1970, 4.
55 ‘Britain’s worst year for strikes since 1926’, The Times, 27 November 1970, 1.
56 W. Keegan, Mrs Thatcher’s Economic Experiment, Penguin, Harmondsworth (1985), 27.
57 Heath, Life, 302.
58 R. King and N. Nugent (eds), Respectable Rebels: Middle Class Campaigns in Britain in 
the 1970s, Hodderand Stoughton, London (1979), esp. 76-100.
59 See 200.
60 CPA CCO 20/52/1, Edward Martell (Freedom Group), June 1965-70.
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electricians’ dispute.61 The News Special also argued that failure to promise trade 
union reform had lost the Conservative Party the 1964 General Election, whereas its 
commitment to it allowed it to return to power in 1970.62 The News Special did not 
accept that Heath’s Government had fulfilled this commitment. Under the sub­
heading ‘Let’s Have The Showdown’, the News Special stated that, ‘For all the bold 
faces they wear when they talk about the unions Mr. Heath and Mr. Carr are still 
treating them with velvet gloves. They gave way to the dockers. They gave way to the 
dustmen. It will be a grave mistake if they give way to the electricians.’ Like 
Norman Tebbit, Martell harboured concerns about the government’s approach. 
However, Martell had a drastic remedy. He inferred that the government was too 
cowardly to deal with strikers, and called for the use of troops if necessary.64
A number of reasons suggested that Martell’s comments found a receptive audience. 
Apart from Martell’s support for Donald ‘Pathfinder’ Bennett at the Nuneaton by- 
election of 1967,65 his ‘extremism’ had not usually amounted to more than advocating 
economic liberalism at a time when the Conservative Party pursued corporatist 
policies. Heath’s recent adoption of economic liberalism and trade union reform, plus 
the continued industrial unrest, should have made Martell appear credible and boost 
him politically. Yet this was not the case. Instead, the News Special was merely a 
death spasm of Martell’s political career. Martell’s financial difficulties as the 
Freedom Group collapsed substantially explained this.66 However, there were other 
explanations. The News Special was only four pages long, which compared 
unfavourably to The New Daily. This did not give an image of dynamic resurgence, or 
make Martell look capable of leading an offensive against the unions. Martell had also 
timed his attack badly. He may have been right to suspect the Government’s resolve. 
However, others who later shared Martell’s view were not yet of the same opinion. 
Tebbit later doubted Heath’s commitment to the Selsdon programme, but at this stage 
simply wanted the government to adhere to it.67 Selsdon had indeed reduced the 
‘freedom’ groups’ ‘extremism’ by bringing their objectives into the mainstream. Only
61 News Special, 8 December 1970,1.
62 News Special, 8 December 1970,1.
63 News Special, 8 December 1970, 3.
64 News Special, 8 December 1970, 3.
65 See 199.
66 See 195-200.
67 Tebbit, Upwardly, 105-6.
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after the U-Turns of 1972 proved that Heath was unable to deliver, did these groups 
return to the space outside the Conservative Party’s right. These included the Selsdon 
Group (1973), a new Middle Class Alliance (1974) and the National Association of 
Freedom (1975).68 Heath’s government had been in power for less than four months 
when the News Special appeared, and could hardly have moved more swiftly against 
the unions. Martell had voluntarily placed himself outside the political mainstream by 
acting precipitately. People were hardly likely to act on Martell’s demands when the 
government had only four days previously published the Industrial Relations Bill that 
aimed to reduce industrial unrest. Martell added poor timing to the persistent 
quandary that the Conservative party posed to all extreme-right groups: how could 
they compete with the Conservative Party? Martell’s demands were risible, especially 
as they came from a financially discredited individual.
Meanwhile, concerns over immigration provided oxygen for those extreme-right 
individuals and groups who had not totally accepted unity in the National Front. In 
August 1970, for example, the remnants of the Racial Preservation Society produced a 
bulletin that revealed deep suspicions about the new Conservative government. It 
levelled the usual extreme-right charge at a Conservative government when it stated 
that, ‘The colour has changed from pale red to surreptitious pink ... The song’s the 
same; only the tempo is different.’69 The bulletin claimed that the left dominated the 
Conservative government, and argued that, ‘For every new man of the Right elected 
there were at least three of the Tory left.’70 The bulletin also made personal attacks 
combining anger over immigration with decadence. It singled out as proof that the left 
dominated the Home Secretary, ‘the great pink creampuff Reggie Maudling’.71 The 
Racial Preservation Society levelled two charges at Maudling. He had failed to 
condemn his daughter for having children out of wedlock, which indicated Maudling 
supported the permissive society, and he had admitted nearly one hundred Kenyan 
Asians on becoming Home Secretary, which showed Maudling was complicit in the
68 W. N. Coxall, Parties and Pressure Groups, Longman, London (1986), 54. N. Nugent, The 
National Association for Freedom’, and R. King, The middle class in revolt?’, both in R. King 
and N. Nugent, Respectable Rebels: Middle Class Campaigns in Britain in the 1970s, Hodder 
and Stoughton, London (1979), passim.
69 ‘R.P.S. News Bulletin’, July/August 1970,1.
70 ‘RP.S. News Bulletin’, July/August 1970,1.
71 'RP.S. News Bulletin’, July/August 1970, 2.
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Conservative Party’s hoodwinking of the vast majority of its supporters.72 However, 
the bulletin blamed Heath for this state of affairs. It described his commitment to 
‘One Nation’ principles as, ‘quite simply, just a variation on the “melting pot” theme
73 _ ,1beloved of international collectivists of whom Heath is undoubtedly one’. The 
bulletin ended with a plea for Enoch Powell to provide the remedy: ‘So speak up 
Enoch! Put country before party and earn the eternal gratitude of all honest patriots.’74
However, like Martell the Racial Preservation Society’s position was weak. It 
criticised the government’s tougher stance on immigration as unenforceable and 
demanded repatriation.75 Like Martell’s criticism of the government’s industrial 
relations policy, this attack was premature. Heath’s government had been in power for 
barely two months. Like Martell, the Racial Preservation Society made their 
criticisms before U-turns and various crises had damaged Heath’s reputation. For the 
moment, voters did not necessarily see Heath the same way. As for Powell, what, 
exactly, did the Racial Preservation Society expect him to do? Attached to the bulletin 
was a ‘Campaign for Democratic Conservatism’ sticker that demanded ‘Powell for 
Premier’. However, Powell had never revealed any desire to leave the Conservative 
Party and lead an extreme-right party like the National Front, despite its enthusiastic 
support for him. Even Powell’s political opponents knew this. Denis Barker claimed 
in the Guardian that, ‘As Mr Powell has never indicated nor even remotely implied 
that he would act other than through the normal machinery of the Conservative Party, 
such enthusiasm is not likely to provide the non-Conservative Right with a leader big 
enough and generally acceptable enough to bring unity.’76 As there was no prospect in 
1970 of the National Front forming a government, the only way Powell could become 
premier was as leader of the Conservative Party. However, Conservative MPs elected 
the party leader, not extreme-right voters. Thus, if the Racial Preservation Society’s 
claim that left-wing MPs dominated the Conservative parliamentary party is accurate, 
then the ‘Powell for Premier’ campaign was futile. In this respect, the Conservative 
Party’s constitutional arrangements deprived the extreme right of a charismatic leader. 
The Racial Preservation Society subsequently declined and eventually merged into its
72 ‘RP.S. News Bulletin
73 'R P.S. News Bulletin
74 ‘RP.S. News Bulletin
75 ‘RP.S. News Bulletin
78 D. Barker, ‘On the patriotic frontier’, Guardian, 2 June 1972, 10.
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Chairman's own organisation, the National Democratic Party. Neither was able to 
operate successfully in political space occupied by the Conservative Party and 
National Front.
Despite limited political space extreme-right groups continued to proliferate. The 
situation in Worthing, where there had been tensions within the local Conservative 
Association over Rhodesian sanctions, was of particular note. According to one 
reporter, no less than nine far right groups in Worthing formed a ‘Patriotic Front’ that 
included the National Front, Racial Preservation Society, Anglo-Rhodesian Society 
and the Campaign for Democratic Conservatism. Major-General Richard Hilton, 
now a veteran of the extreme right-wing cause, was the President of the Worthing 
Debating Society, the Worthing Ex-Services Association and the True Tories, three 
other groups that comprised this ‘Patriotic Front’. The Worthing Debating Society 
shared the extreme-right’s traditional concerns over immigration and decadence, and 
viewed them as part of a Communist-led plan to bring Britain to the verge of a 1917- 
style revolution.79 Such views were common amongst ultra-Conservatives. However, 
when the Worthing Debating Society disseminated scurrilous poems that depicted 
immigrants eating ‘Good “PAL” to fill my tummy’,80 it expressed sentiments that 
were more in tune with Mosley’s claims that immigrants consumed Kit-E-Kat. Fear of 
Communism led the Worthing Debating Society to become involved, from July 1972, 
in the outlandish attempts of Sir Walter Walker, the former Commander-in-Chief of 
NATO’s forces in Northern Europe, to forge an organisation to resist forcibly any 
communist invasion.81 The Worthing Debating Society, and the Patriotic Front, 
reflected an increased polarisation which some thought only be remediable by a coup 
d’etat.
Proliferation of extreme right-wing movements, of which Worthing was but one 
example, was evidence of the peculiarly propitious circumstances during the 
Seventies in general and Heath’s government in particular. However, Conservative
77 See 235.
78 M. Cockerell, ‘Inside the National Front’, The Listener, 28 December 1972, 879.
79 The Worthing Debating Society’, (nd), Harvester Primary Social Sources. The Radical 
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80 England My England’, in British Library, Mic. F. 19 (5) 1975.
81 The Worthing Reveille, 1 July 1972, British Library, Mic. F. 19 (5) 1975.
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Central Office’s files do not to reflect any such proliferation. Indeed, Central Office 
activity provides an opposite image. Whereas Central Office maintained files on an 
average of twenty-two outside organisations per year between 1941 and 1965, 
thereafter the figure drops to four. Of the fifty-five groups investigated after 1965, 
only four can unarguably be termed extreme right, and one of these was the defunct 
Freedom Group of Edward Martell.82 In part, this reflected the extreme right’s 
coalescence into the National Front in 1967, which made many groups appear even 
more miniscule. Yet, size had not stopped Central Office from investigating small 
extreme-right groups such as The Right Party, Clan Briton or the Elizabethan Party. 
Most extreme-right groups prior to 1967 were, in fact, small. Nor does investigation 
of two of the remaining three files on extreme-right groups after 1965 betray any 
concern in Central Office. The file that covers the Racial Preservation Society merely 
contains its bulletins, and no Central Office comment. The file on the National Front 
is similarly sparse. One Central Office employee, for example, even revealed in 1971 
his contempt and lack of concern when he claimed that despite efforts to give an 
appearance of modernisation and respectability, ‘In the event, of course, the National 
Front has degenerated into a fairly wild but right-wing organisation.’83 Abhorrence at 
their tactics, views, difference of class and a belief that the National Front could never
oi
gain political power, fuelled this disdain. More practically, the National Front’s 
leadership was weak. Chesterton resigned in 1971 and retired to South Africa. Enoch 
Powell, described as ‘The one politician within the established parties who both 
fascinated the Front and constantly says the kind of things it wants to hear’,85 refused 
the chairmanship when Chesterton resigned.86 Thereafter, at a time when it needed to 
consolidate its position by presenting a united image, the National Front indulged in a 
bitter leadership struggle that soon gave control of the party to the neo-Nazis initially 
barred from membership in 1967. Individuals who shared this disdain for the National 
Front included high-ranking members of the Monday Club, the Conservative group 
that many thought shared its objectives. Jonathan Guinness, Monday Club chairman
82 The other three being the National Front, the Monday Club and the Racial Preservation 
Society. CPA CCO 3 Series.
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1972-1974, described the National Front leadership as, ‘very mediocre’.87 Sir Adrian 
FitzGerald was even more dismissive. He recollected the National Front’s neo-Nazi 
antecedents and the quality of people it attracted, and stated that the National Front 
had no chance of political representation and thus he always found it ‘very hard to 
take seriously’.88 These comments support the image of nonchalance garnered from 
Central Office’s files on the National Front. However, this is deceptive. For, although 
Central Office was unconcerned with the National Front per se, it was nevertheless 
alarmed about its possible impact on the Conservative Party. What fed this alarm was 
the position of the Monday Club and its connections with the National Front.
Inside the Inside Right
The official history of the Monday Club described the 1970 General Election as ‘The 
Break Through’. The Club’s representation in the House of Commons increased from 
sixteen to twenty-nine MPs, with six more joining subsequently and there were thirty- 
three members in the House of Lords.89 These figures increased the likelihood that 
Monday Club members would gain government office. Prime Minister Heath 
appointed Monday Club members to six positions.90 However, all but one was a 
junior position and none involved the sensitive issue of race and immigration. Only 
Geoffrey Rippon secured a high profile position as Minister of Technology, despite 
the views of some that he was too right-wing.91 His opposition to Powell’s position on 
immigration and advocacy of Britain’s entry into Europe, which were contrary to 
many Monday Club members’ views, made Rippon the one Monday Club member 
whose credentials Heath appreciated.92 In July 1970, Heath moved Rippon to the 
Duchy of Lancaster to take charge of the negotiations for Britain’s membership of the 
EEC.
Away from Westminster, the Monday Club grew. In November 1970, the Monday 
Club’s University Group held its fifth Annual Conference at New College, Oxford,
87 Interview with Jonathan Guinness, 23 May 2008.
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and claimed fifty-five branches by 1971.93 In March 1971, the Monday Club’s 
provincial branches showed their growth and increased organisational capability by 
holding the first National Conference of Branches at Nottingham.94 Ian Walker in the 
Sunday Telegraph thought that the Monday Club had now overtaken the Bow Group, 
and described it as, ‘undoubtedly in tune with the current mood among 
Conservatives’, and thought that ‘it is skilfully led and of wide appeal’.95
It was not necessarily ‘in tune’ with Central Office, which continued to have a close 
relationship with the Bow Group and PEST. In December 1970, the Bow Group 
furnished the Party Chairman with details of its financial situation after the Party 
Chairman advised them that he would be meeting with the Party Treasurer.96 It would 
seem that Central Office continued its positive interest in the Bow Group’s financial
0*7affairs. PEST’s archive revealed a similarly positive relationship. Considering that 
Central Office’s role reflected the leader’s views, this means that the Monday Club 
presented Heath with a credible dissident organisation from the beginning of his 
premiership, one that Central Office had already described as extreme-right wing.98
Unlike Edward Martell, the Monday Club did not precipitately condemn the
government’s stance on industrial relations. During the electricians’ dispute, the
Taunton & District Monday Club sent Heath their ‘Congratulations on your firm
stand’, and advised him to ‘Keep it up’ and ‘Don’t submit to Communist inspired 
00blackmail.’ However, when it came to immigration, the Monday Club was closer to 
the Racial Preservation Society, if not in tone, then in substance. Ranged against the 
Monday Club were those who pressurised the government to adopt a more permissive 
immigration policy. In July 1970, The Times reported the Bow Group’s launch of its 
publication, The Greatest Claim, which demanded easier entry into Britain for Asians 
in Uganda and Kenya.100 The following month, The Times’ undisclosed sources 
reported that the attitude within the government to this issue had thawed, and
93 Copping, Story, 14.
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ministers’ private hints that they would not be embarrassed at pressure being brought 
to bear on the government to relax its stance on immigration in favour of the African 
Asians.101 Attempts to enforce the Immigration Act (1968) received bad publicity.102 
In October, those Asians who held British passports took their case to the European 
Commission on Human Rights.103 In Britain, opponents of the government’s official 
position began an ‘Admit the British’ national campaign.104 The government’s 
changing attitude became more obvious. Press reports suggested that the government 
would make African Asians a special case in forthcoming immigration legislation, 
and stated that this would not result in all of the 170,000 passport holders coming to 
Britain.105 The Monday Club took this as evidence that the government intended to 
allow up to 170,000 East African Asians into Britain, and its National Executive 
Council convened and released a press statement in November. It issued a ‘strong 
warning’ that such a policy would raise racial tensions as it was contrary to the wishes 
of the people, and pointed out that it would also ‘be to go back on an election pledge 
that there would be no further large scale immigration into Britain’.106
The Monday Club voted Enoch Powell their Politician of the Year at the end of 1970 
for the second year in succession.107 Support for Heath at the 1970 General Election 
had not removed the Monday Club’s threat to create an extreme-right bloc within the 
Conservative Party that offered a viable alternative to the current leadership. 
Opposition to Heath from the internal extreme right would continue. In January 1971, 
the Monday Club reinforced differences between it and the party leadership when 
fifteen members, led by Chairman George Pole, re-established direct contacts with Ian 
Smith’s renegade government during a trip to Rhodesia and South Africa.108 On 11 
February, Enoch Powell attacked the official immigration figures.109 Four days later, 
he claimed that by 1985 coloured immigrants would total 4 million by 1985, and
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proposed ‘massive, albeit voluntary repatriation’.110 On 16 February, the Monday 
Club issued a statement that supported Powell ‘in his latest warnings about the 
growing size of the coloured population of this country and the ensuing problems we 
shall face from such a growth’, and demanded that the Government ‘must now accept 
Mr. Powell’s remedies as well as his diagnosis’.111 John Pilger noticed the Monday 
Club’s activities. In an article of 15 March billed as ‘Day one of an explosive series’, 
Pilger outlined the Monday Club’s growth and power. From 400 members in 1964, 
the Monday Club had grown to 2,100 in the national organisation and 6,000 in thirty 
and fifty-five regional and university branches respectively.112 Pilger implied that the 
Monday Club could pressurise the existing leadership severely. He claimed that one 
third of Conservative MPs supported the Monday Club, and quoted an anonymous 
Monday Club official’s boast that, ‘We are now able to bring pressure to bear in a 
number of constituencies where a member’s ideas conflict with those of true
i  i t
conservatism.’ What may have disconcerted the remaining two-thirds of 
Conservative MPs was the same official’s claim that, ‘Within ten years we, the 
party’s tail, shall wag the dog.’114
We cannot dismiss these comments as hyperbolic indiscretion happily reported by an 
opponent of the Conservative Party. Heath had not yet performed any policy U-turns. 
Pilger’s comment that the Monday Club’s Director, Frederick Stockwell, had 
identified the club with the Government’s direction revealed that the Club was willing 
to work with Heath’s government.115 However, far more worrying for the 
Conservative Party leadership was a change that Pilger identified in the composition 
of the Monday Club. In doing so, Pilger touched on another way in which the 
Conservative Party opposed the extreme right, the issue of class. Pilger described how 
five Chelsea Tories had founded the Monday Club in reaction to Macmillan’s
110 ‘Coloured population four million by 1985, Mr Powell says’, The Times, 16 February 1971, 
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decolonization policy, but argued that subsequent concentration on domestic issues 
had begun to change the Club’s character. He stated that it was no longer heavily 
influenced by Lord Salisbury, and described how Monday Club members were ‘now 
coming from the suburbs: municipal men who dream of garbage and glory and 
managerial men who see, at last, a chance of their elevation to a ruling class from 
which an absence of breeding has long excluded them’.116 Consequently, Pilger 
thought that the Monday Club in 1971 was an ‘alliance of upper class romanticism 
and middle class ambition’.117 However, the Monday Club was potentially even more 
dangerous than such an alliance seemed to suggest. For, although Jonathan Guinness 
and Adrian FitzGerald were typical of those members who dismissed the National
110
Front as politically irrelevant lower-class thugs, there existed within the Club 
sympathy for the National Front. Pilger intimated this when he quoted the Monday 
Club Chairman George Pole as joking that the National Front were people who had 
not been given enough red meat, but also stating that ‘the National Front must not be 
turned aside as of no account; they have people who are motivated by the highest 
ideals’.119 Pole’s comments showed that some members of the Monday Club and 
National Front shared views. Pole was also disdainful and did not betray any belief in 
the National Front’s importance. However, the Monday Club’s provincial branches 
had no credible vetting system and were ripe for infiltration by the National Front, or 
those sympathetic to it. The National Front’s infiltration of the Monday Club would 
increase its importance.120 Pilger highlighted this when he quoted John Ormowe, the 
twenty-five year old chairman of the Sussex Monday Club: ‘The Monday Club you 
see in London is no more than a parliamentary debating group of rather socially 
exclusive people. We in the branches are what it’s all about.’121 Ormowe also claimed 
to be a Hitler-admiring racialist.122
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A provincial Monday Club also made class-based comments later in 1971. On 27 
May, Labour overturned a 10,874 Conservative Majority at the Bromsgrove by- 
election. The Taunton & District Monday Club, once pleased by Heath’s stance 
against the electricians, blamed the Prime Minister. It claimed that Heath had shunned 
the limelight, left too much to his ministers, and enjoyed ‘a rich man’s sport in 
sailing’.123 The Conservative MP for Wells, Robert Boscawen, wrote to the Taunton 
& District branch and stated that such comments were ‘adding to the reasons why I 
am at present seriously considering not renewing my subscription and withdrawing
174my support’ from the Monday Club. Boscawen was the son of the eighth Viscount 
Falmouth and a member of the Cornish aristocracy. That Boscawen sent a copy of his 
letter to Central Office revealed that Central Office’s intelligence gathering continued 
to thrive. The correspondence between Boscawen, the Taunton & District Monday 
Club and Central Office indicated that class attitudes shaped views within the wider 
Conservative Party.
According to old-Etonian Jonathan Guinness, one common insult that National 
Monday Club members bandied about at this time was to describe someone as a
17^National Front supporter. This was not because of the political views that such an 
insult implied, but the class connotations. Actual proof of National Front membership 
would have led to automatic dismissal from the Monday Club. Sir Adrian FitzGerald, 
Monday Club founder member and old-Harrovian, confirmed that National Monday 
Club members were disdainful of the National Front and that membership of it meant 
expulsion from the Club. When asked whether members he knew treated the National 
Front with disdain, FitzGerald replied, ‘Oh Complete. I mean as soon as we knew 
somebody was in The National Front they were out.’126 Harvey Proctor, a former 
Scarborough Boys High School pupil and York University student, was one Monday 
Club member who received the insult that Guinness revealed.127 Proctor resigned as 
assistant to the Monday Club Director in November 1971 upon finding his personal
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mail opened at the club.128 Class may have played a role in Proctor’s removal. Cedric 
Gunnery, the old-Etonian who was the Club’s acting Director at the time, for some 
reason did not inform Proctor of Chairman Pole’s instructions regarding the opening 
of private mail.129 Proctor offered to serve out his month’s notice if he could open his 
own mail, but the Monday Club refused,130 which suggested that Proctor was the 
specific target of this measure. Jonathan Guinness recalled that, ‘we all thought that 
Harvey Proctor was National Front’.131 However, the fact that Proctor remained 
within the Monday Club indicated that factors other than class might have applied. 
However, the reaction to Proctor’s dismissal contained class-based comments. On 23 
November 1971, The Times reported that Proctor’s opponents within the Monday 
Club felt he was ‘getting too big for his boots’, whereas the activists who supported 
Proctor thought the Club had declined ‘into a social clique’ that did not live up to its 
reputation as ‘a right-wing pressure group’.132 Unfounded or un-provable suspicions 
over Proctor’s affiliations may have determined Pole’s actions. Alternatively, Pole 
may have doubted Proctor’s loyalty. Proctor was a protege of G. K. Young. On 24 
November, The Times Diary described reaction to Proctor’s resignation as a ‘putsch 
against George Pole, the chairman’.133 It inferred that others wanted to lead the 
Monday Club, and stated that if Pole resigned it expected unidentified ‘possible
114pretenders to come forward’. This is not a clear picture. However, this episode 
revealed the class-based barriers within the Monday Club that acted in conjunction 
with political ones to limit the extreme-right’s fortunes.
Jonathan Guinness admitted that class played a part in the Monday Club when he said 
that, ‘One of the main things that got me into the Monday Club was a feeling that my 
own class, the toffs if you like, was letting down both the party and the country.’135 
The preponderance of individuals of similar class to Guinness resulted in accusations 
that a ‘Chelsea Tea Set’ dominated the National Monday Club.136 Indeed, Guinness 
accepted that class determined some Monday Club members’ attitude: ‘the lower-
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middle people were more tolerant of the National Front. ... like it or not there was a
1 ^ 7 _.certain correlation between class and the intensity of this puli’. The problem for 
these members was that the National Monday Club, which people of Guinness’s ilk 
dominated, determined policy and not the provincial branches, where the ‘lower- 
middle people’ predominantly were. Moreover, Guinness’s perception of the Monday 
Club’s relationship with the Conservative Party made it unlikely that the sympathies 
of the lower-middle class Monday Clubbers would ever be realised if class continued 
to shape it. Guinness stated that, ‘for me the whole point of the Monday Club was that 
it was part of the Conservative Party and needed to have tolerable relations with the 
rest of the Party. This meant that adhesion to any other party had to be out. This, to 
me, was a matter of definition. Members of the Monday Club had to be a subset of the 
Conservative Party, and that was that.’ Consequently, if Chairman Pole resigned 
and ‘pretenders’ sympathetic to the National Front tried to gain control of the Monday 
Club, they would be thwarted if someone like Guinness, a friend of Pole who had
1 OQ
brought Guinness into the Club, succeeded him.
Was Guinness goodfor them?
Suspicions of extreme-right infiltration provided the background to the Monday 
Club’s 1972 leadership contest. In his Guardian expose, Dennis Barker implied that 
there were connections between the Monday Club and the Patriotic Front in 
Worthing. He stated that the Society for Individual Freedom was part of the Patriotic 
Front and named Frederick Stockwell as its Secretary.140 Stockwell was one of the 
Monday Club members Pilger had quoted.141 Barker identified a number of other 
extremists in the Patriotic Front. He named Alan Hancock, leader of the Racial 
Preservation Society, and quoted his claim that, ‘local Conservatives have used all our 
literature during the last general election’.142 Barker identified individual members of 
the National Front, David Brown of the National Democratic Party and Air Vice- 
Marshal Donald Bennett who now led an organisation called the Political Freedom
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Movement.143 In doing so, he associated the Monday Club, and hence the 
Conservative Party, with racism, fascism and neo-Nazism. Other evidence supported 
this connection. The Worthing Debating Society shared its meeting place with the 
local branch of the Monday Club, and invited prominent Monday Club and National 
Front members to address it.144 However, Barker thought that the Monday Club 
differed from these extreme-right movements in one important regard. Although they 
operated at the Conservative Party’s nebulous extremity, Barker stated that the 
Monday Club was ‘the gauge of how far radical or Patriotic Right views are 
acceptable to those who wish and intend to stay firmly within the respectable ranks of 
the established Right’.145 Barker supported his opinion by quoting Michael Woolrych, 
the Monday Club’s Director. Woolrych claimed that there was ‘no danger of the 
Monday Club becoming a para-Fascist group,’ and stated that it had ‘nothing to do 
with the National Front. We do not have any members in it. If we found them out, we 
would eject them. Generally speaking, we identify them before they get in.’146 Hence, 
Barker thought that the Monday Club determined respectability and ensured that less 
reputable elements could not join the Conservative Party through it. However, the 
proliferation of the Monday Club’s branches had made Woolrych’s views naive. The 
victor of the Monday Club’s 1972 leadership contest would have to prove whether 
Woolrych’s claims were accurate.
Jonathan Guinness, Richard Body and Tim Stroud contested the Monday Club’s 1972 
leadership election. Guinness represented the pro-EEC element within the Monday 
Club whilst Body represented those who opposed it. Tim Stroud entered the contest 
late. He was aged only twenty-eight and was little known in the Monday Club and 
stood little chance of success. Walker described Stroud as little more than a pawn in 
G. K. Young’s efforts to control the Monday Club.147 Young had served as Chairman 
of the Action Fund and thus played a leading role in the Monday Club’s expansion, 
and was the current chairman of the Economic Policy Group. His authorship of Who 
goes home? (1969), a hard-line pamphlet on immigration, placed Young on the 
extreme right of the Monday Club. Walker claimed that Young funded Stroud’s
143 D. Barker, ‘On the patriotic Front’, Guardian, 2 June 1972.
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campaign in the hope that it would draw support away from Guinness and result in 
victory for Body, a member known to have little knowledge of the Club’s
1 A S tadministration, which would leave Young free to control the Monday Club. 
Conservative Central Office remained aloof, except for one event. Stroud wrote to 
party chairman Lord Carrington. He described the Monday Club’s aims, and 
expressed his hope that Carrington would agree that they ‘do not depart from 
acceptable Conservative thinking’.149 Ian Deslandes replied on behalf of Carrington, 
and stated that ‘it would not be right for him to comment on them while the Monday 
Club’s Election for a new Chairman was in progress’.150 Mr. Webster at Central 
Office suggested this response because he believed that ‘anything sent out above your 
name might be passed round the Monday Club in support of Mr. Stroud’s 
candidature’.151 Deslandes’s letter may have simply reflected Central Office’s desire 
not to be involved in the Monday Club leadership election. However, the lack of other 
documentation concerning other contestants leaves open the possibility that Central 
Office did not want to be associated with G. K. Young.
Guinness won the election comfortably. The Monday Club announced the results on 5 
June. Newspapers portrayed it as a victory for the Right. For The Times, Guinness 
was ‘unquestionably the candidate of the right’ whose victory ‘is seen by the more 
moderate members as a triumph for the “law and order fetishists’” .152 The Sunday 
Telegraph headlined with ‘Guinness is good for them’ and revealed that Enoch 
Powell’s rivers of blood speech had sparked Guinness’s interest in politics, which 
meant that immigration would remain an important issue during his chairmanship.153 
Guinness stated that he intended to ‘keep the Tory party on the “Right” road’.154 
Guinness became chairman at a time when many in the Monday Club thought that the 
government was under attack for policy reversals and for having veered off the 
“Right” road. The Monday Club had already participated in these attacks before 
Guinness became chairman. In February and March 1972, individual Monday Club
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members voiced their concerns over picketing miners and events in Northern 
Ireland.155 These attacks continued, becoming more concerted. Less than two weeks 
after the election, the Monday Club’s Economic Policy Group, chaired by G. K. 
Young, issued a press statement that criticised the Heath government’s performance 
and recent U-tums.156 According to the Economic Policy Group, the government had 
broken its election promises to oppose further nationalisation and reduce state 
involvement in nationalised industries. Instead, the Economic Policy Group argued, 
the recent Industries Bill had reintroduced the mechanism of state intervention and the 
number of civil servants had actually grown, while failure to reduce trade union 
power had resulted in public sector wage increases and inflation higher than during 
the previous Labour government. It warned that, ‘The next election will be won 
neither on a past record of nor a future programme of neo-socialism’,157 and accused 
the government in the language typical of the extreme right. In July, John Biggs- 
Davison called for tougher action in Ulster.158 At the same time John de Vere Walker, 
chairman of the Monday Club’s Ulster Group, wrote privately to party chairman Lord 
Carrington. He denounced the government for appeasing terrorists and betraying 
loyalists, and warned Carrington that Heath’s actions threatened ‘an irrevocable split 
within the Conservative and Unionist Party’.159 When Walker received an anodyne 
and tardy reply that merely acknowledged his comments but did not address them, he 
reiterated charges of disloyalty tinged with cowardice, and described the use of 
British troops against Loyalists and working class Conservative voters in Ulster thus: 
‘Doubtless this was done in the hope of appeasing the I.R.A. and Mr. Wilson.’160 
There is no evidence in Central Office files that Carrington responded to this charge.
However, in 1972 the party leadership openly responded to the Monday Club’s 
criticism of its immigration policy. On 4 August, Idi Amin gave Asians in Uganda 
one month to leave. Heath recalled that ‘intense pressure was placed on us by the right
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wing to renege upon our political and moral obligations’.161 Enoch Powell led the 
‘intense pressure’ and denied that there was any British obligation to the Ugandan 
Asians.162 Support for Powell had resulted in the formation of ‘Powellight’, a group 
devoted to his policies. Bee Carthew, Monday Club member and Honorary Secretary 
of ‘Powellight’, was one of many who attacked Powell’s critics.163 In September at 
Central Hall, Westminster, the Monday Club held a ‘Halt Immigration Now’ meeting. 
It passed a resolution that demanded an immediate halt to all immigration, repeal of 
the Race Relations Act and the commencement of a full repatriation scheme.164 
Guinness forwarded the resolution to Heath on 16 September. The response this time 
was not neither anodyne nor tardy. Instead, Heath attacked the Monday Club’s 
resolution by letter on 20 September, and immediately released his letter as a press 
statement. Heath addressed the Monday Club’s three demands. Immigration had 
fallen, but the government would not stop it altogether as Britain had a moral and 
legal responsibility to admit some immigrants, and needed those that possessed skills 
useful to Britain.165 Nor would the government repeal the Race Relations Act, as this 
was not in the election manifesto.166 It was on the issue of repatriation that Heath 
questioned the Monday Club’s respectability most. Heath pointed out that the 
Immigration Act (1971) contained provision for voluntary repatriation. However, 
when Heath asserted that the government would not ‘tolerate any attempt to harass or 
compel them to go against their will’,167 he rejected the compulsory nature of the 
Monday Club’s proposal. Once again, Heath’s response demonstrated the persistent 
dilemma that the Conservative Party posed to all extreme-right voters of whether to 
accept its measures or look elsewhere for satisfaction. Moreover, when Heath 
witheringly stated that it had not been the Monday Club’s earlier position ‘that a 
future Conservative Government should attempt to find quibbles and excuses to
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enable it to run away from Britain’s obligations’,168 he made it clear that he was 
prepared to take on the Monday Club’s challenge, if necessary in public.
How far the Monday Club’s resolution revealed that it had become unrespectable is 
unclear. It is possible that the resolution reflected the divisions within the Monday 
Club rather than any rightwards move. Walker claimed that Monday Club member 
Harold Soref always maintained that G. K. Young had deliberately created the Halt 
Immigration Now Committee to by-pass Soref s opposition to him on the Monday 
Club’s Immigration Committee.169 Walker’s reliability is questionable, for he rarely 
attributed his information. In this instance, other evidence corroborated Walker’s 
claim. Jonathan Guinness believed that Walker’s account ‘sounds plausible’ as
17 0‘Young and Soref loathed each other’. It would seem that a personality clash played
a role in the formation of the Halt Immigration Now Campaign. However, Soref did 
not base his opposition to Young solely on personality. Walker also recounted Soref s 
claims to have opposed Young’s control of the Monday Club’s Action Fund from the 
beginning, and to have ‘issued direct warnings’ to Guinness on becoming chairman 
about this and the ‘dangers of take-over by extremists’.171 Again, Guinness confirmed 
this. He described Soref as a ‘moderating influence’ on the Monday Club’s 
Immigration Committee, and admitted that Soref ‘never stopped warning me’ about 
extremists within the Monday Club, and that, ‘In many individual instances he was 
right.’172 How much credibility Guinness gave at the time to Soref s warning is 
unclear. It is possible that people ignored his warnings because of his manner. Yet, as 
a former member of the Intelligence Corps, Soref possessed some personal credibility 
when it came to acquiring information. Soref was the person who had previously
11'Xinformed Central Office of Martell’s intentions. These considerations give credence
to Walker when he claimed that the National Front comprised approximately twenty 
per cent of the audience at the Monday Club’s Central Hall meeting, and that Soref 
‘ostentatiously refused’ to participate in a march from Central Hall that the National
168 Text of a letter from the Prime Minister to the Chairman of the Monday Club Mr Jonathan
Guinness,’ 20 September 1972,4. CPA CCO 20/43/6, Monday Club, 1969-74.
169 Walker, National Front, 127.
170 Correspondence with Jonathan Guinness, 28 June 2008.
171 Walker, National Front, 118-119.
172 Correspondence with Jonathan Guinness, 28 June 2008.
173 See 120.
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Front organised against the wishes of the Monday Club leadership.174 Guinness was 
probably also correct, therefore, when he described the Halt Immigration Campaign 
as ‘just a splitting tactic’.175 This can only refer to G. K. Young, which meant that 
Guinness led an organisation that was experiencing its own challenge from extremists.
If extremists unpalatable to the leadership were in the Monday Club, they would have 
entered predominantly via the branches. G. K. Young had played a leading role in 
creating provincial branches as head of the Monday Club’s Action Fund. This was 
dangerous. The members of the national Monday Club voted for the Club’s national 
officers. The national Monday Club vetted these members. However, as branch 
members did not vote for national officers, the national Monday Club allowed 
individual branches to act as they saw fit over membership. Jonathan Guinness 
subsequently admitted that this was rash.176 Sir Adrian FitzGerald, who had opposed 
the formation of branches, stated that thought branches attracted ‘undesirables’ who 
‘brought the club into disrepute’.177 For FitzGerald, this was an issue of control: 
‘There were branches everywhere, I mean there were branches at universities, there 
were branches in large towns, small cities, and I just don’t accept that when you start 
building membership up on that basis there’s any way that an organisation with two or 
three permanent members of staff can possibly vet membership.’178
Central Office appeared to recognise the potential danger posed by the Monday 
Club’s loose organisational control. In October 1972, the Oxford University Monday 
Club invited Lord Jellicoe to one of its functions. Described as a ‘distinctly pink’
• 170Conservative, Jellicoe was also an honorary vice-president of Pressure for 
Economic and Social Toryism (PEST). He wrote to Party Chairman Lord Carrington 
and stated that he was unsure ‘what attitude Ministers should take to invitations to 
speak at Monday Club functions’.180 This suggested that no specific policy for 
ministers to take towards the Monday Club existed. However, it did not prove that
174 Walker, National Front, 127.
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Central Office did not have one, or had begun to form one. Jellicoe made his view 
known when he stated that, ‘My natural inclination would be to turn down Monday
1SM tClub invitations for a whole host of reasons of which I need not expand.’ This
suggested that Jellicoe expected that Carrington understood to what he referred.
Jellicoe apparently also knew that different Monday Clubs possessed different
characteristics. He stated that he had found the people within the Oxford University
Monday Club to be pleasant, intelligent and possibly not in agreement with Enoch
Powell, and reasoned therefore that, it might be ‘foolish to adopt a stand-offish
attitude’ as they may wish to take themselves ‘out of the fold’.182 This comment
showed that Jellicoe realised that the Conservative Party worked on its own
extremists’ divisions. Jellicoe also stated that the Monday Club’s opponents expected
that Central Office opposed the Club, and that ‘Central Office have probably worked
out a policy line here.’183 Carrington denied that a firm policy towards the Monday
Club existed, but added ‘I think there may come a time when we shall need one, but
for the present I believe that one can only take such decisions in context.’184 No firm
policy existed towards all the other extreme-right groups investigated by Central
Office either other than that they should be investigated, which is exactly what
Central Office had done since the Monday Club was created. Carrington also revealed
why he thought a definite policy might become necessary. He stated that, ‘Between
ourselves, I would frankly not advise colleagues at this time to accept invitations from
Monday Club branches’, which showed that Carrington knew the national and
provincial Monday Club were different, a difference that he clearly did not believe
extended to the universities, which, Carrington added, were ‘in a rather different 
1situation.’ Carrington was aware of the Monday Club’s development, and its 
nature, making it unlikely that Central Office had no policy at all towards it. This 
might explain why Carrington qualified his denial of such a policy with the epithet 
‘firm’.
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Carrington’s caution may also have reflected a belief that the Monday Club, which 
once operated simply on the right of the Conservative Party, had become extreme. 
Admittedly, Central Office files revealed that it viewed the Monday Club as an 
extreme-right group from its beginning. However, this may simply reflect the political 
orientation within Central Office. Central Office’s opinion of the Monday Club did 
not surprise Sir Adrian FitzGerald. He explained it thus: ‘I think you’ve got to 
remember that there were some pretty pink Tories at that stage both in the House of 
Commons party at large and in Central Office. And I would have said the pinkest 
were in Central Office. They had a number of members of staff who really fitted into 
that Butskellist category.’186 FitzGerald therefore rejected the description ‘extreme 
right’ for the early Monday Club. However, he agreed that by 1972 the situation had 
changed: ‘I do not deny that there were some people who I would regard as extreme 
right who infiltrated the club and not only in the branches. There were one or two who 
got onto the main committee.’187 The attempted removal of Geoffrey Rippon from the 
Monday Club suggested that FitzGerald was correct. Rippon’s critics accused him of
1SS‘trying to face two ways on the question of immigration’. The national committee 
comfortably defeated them. The official record of these events stated that by
|  Q Q
December 1972 signs of a revolt by extremists were ‘apparent to all’. It described 
the revolt as ‘well financed and organised’, and stated that the rebels had acquired 
membership lists and began a campaign against the national Monday Club 
leadership.190 This was a more serious situation than mere infiltration of the branches. 
Suspicions about Monday Club collusion with extremists outside the party were 
already a matter of public record. If extremists captured the national Monday Club, it 
would present an even greater problem for the Conservative leadership. The activities 
of some Monday Club branches exacerbated this situation. They also showed that 
Central Office’s policy towards the Monday Club, if not ‘firm’ beforehand, definitely 
became so.
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On 7 December, the Conservative government faced two by elections, one at Sutton 
and Cheam, the other at Uxbridge. Both were Conservative seats. These by-elections 
would be difficult in normal circumstances as they occurred at the government’s mid­
term. Heath’s many U-turns had made them even more difficult. At Sutton and 
Cheam, the Conservatives enjoyed a comfortable 12,696 majority. The Guardian 
thought Sutton and Cheam a solidly Conservative seat in which the Liberal Party 
could only hope to come second.191 The Conservative candidate also faced an anti- 
Common Market Candidate, and a National Independent Party Candidate described
1 O'}by the Guardian as ‘a Powellite on the Market and immigration issues’. At 
Uxbridge, the Conservatives defended a less robust majority of 3,646. Four fringe 
candidates also stood. Dan Harmston, leader of the Powell-supporting Smithfield 
meat porters, represented Mosley’s virtually defunct Union Movement. Clare 
Macdonald, whom Barker identified earlier in the year as a National Front treasurer 
who attended Patriotic Front meetings in Worthing,193 represented the National 
Independence Party, whilst John Clifton was the National Front candidate. Reginald 
Simmerson, an opponent of the EEC, stood as a Democratic Conservative. The 
number of fringe candidates had increased during the Heath government. The number 
of by-elections they contested in this period exceeded the number of by-elections in 
an administration for the first time since 1945, with most candidates being 
recognisably right wing.194 Their chances of success were miniscule. Yet, they could 
limit the Conservative candidates’ chances if they attracted their potential voters. The 
Chairman’s Office within Central Office monitored these by-elections, as was normal. 
Reports from Central Office agents revealed that local Monday Club branches 
supported non-Conservative candidates.
At Sutton and Cheam, the secretary of the North Kent Monday Club stated that their 
motivation in supporting a non-Conservative candidate was dislike of the EEC rather 
than immigration, hence their support for the anti-Common Market candidate Mr.
191 M. Lake, ‘Hard Core of Conservatism’, Guardian, 29 November 1972.
192 M. Lake, ‘Hard Core of Conservatism’, Guardian, 29 November 1972.
193 D. Barker, ‘On the patriotic Fronf, Guardian, 2 June 1972.
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Frere-Smith.195 Frere-Smith’s statement that anyone who supported him thinking it 
would keep the blacks out ‘will be voting under a misapprehension’ backed-up the 
North Kent Monday Club’s claim.196 Nevertheless, Frere-Smith’s position on the EEC 
was contrary to official Conservative policy. The position of the West Middlesex 
Monday Club at the Uxbridge by-election was different. Its members supported the 
National Front candidate, and some even worked for him.197 This was even more 
dangerous. Moreover, other branches seemed willing to follow their example. Len 
Lambert, chairman of the Essex Monday Club, which at some 300 members was one 
of the largest branches, threatened that, ‘There is a strong possibility that this branch 
would support the National Front or any other right-wing candidate if, in an Essex 
election, the Conservative candidate was not following what we believe was 
Conservative policy. This feeling is general throughout the Monday Club branches, 
especially in the Midlands.’198 Typical of the post-1945 extreme-right, Lambert 
wanted the Conservative Party to stand for ‘true-Conservatism.’ The action of the two 
Monday Club branches was disloyal to the Conservative Party and confirmed the 
fears of those like FitzGerald who had opposed the creation of a branch system.
At this stage, Guinness and the national executive of the Monday Club appeared to 
prove their loyalty to the Conservative Party. Guinness suspended the West 
Middlesex Monday Club and recommended its disaffiliation and the expulsion of all 
those found to have worked for the National Front.199 On 4 December, the Monday 
Club’s National Executive met to consider events. The Times quoted a spokesman 
who claimed that the Monday Club, ‘had always expelled people who did not support 
officially adopted Conservative candidates’.200 The national executive duly disbanded 
the West Middlesex branch unanimously and insisted that its secretary, Mrs. Gillian 
Goold, resign.201 The Daily Telegraph quoted Guinness’s insistence that the Monday
195 L. Marks and D. Keys, ‘Monday Club clash over anti-Tory candidates’, Observer, 3 
December 1972.
196 L. Marks and D. Keys, ‘Monday Club clash over anti-Tory candidates’, Observer, 3 
December 1972.
197 L. Marks and D. Keys, ‘Monday Club clash over anti-Tory candidates’, Observer, 3 
December 1972.
198 L. Marks and D. Keys, ‘Monday Club clash over anti-Tory candidates’, Observer, 3 
December 1972.
199 L. Marks and D. Keys, ‘Monday Club clash over anti-Tory candidates’, Observer, 3 
December 1972.
200 ‘Monday Club will expel by-election ‘rebels”, The Times, 4 December 1972, 2.
201 ‘Monday Club branch to be disbanded’, The Times, 5 December 1972, 1.
305
Club condemned any support for non-Conservatives.202 Guinness followed up this 
action with an explicit and unequivocal circular to all Monday Club branches. It stated 
that any support for non-Conservative candidates was ‘incompatible with membership 
of the club, just as it would be incompatible with membership of a Conservative 
association or branch’.203 Guinness declared that the case for expelling anyone who 
contravened this rule was ‘irrefutable’.204 He added that the Monday Club, as a part of 
the Conservative Party, had no special rights to choose party officers, candidates, 
ministers or leader, and owed any position of influence it enjoyed to ‘a total loyalty to 
the organization’.205 Guinness and the Monday Club’s national executive had acted as 
the agent of the Conservative Party in its role as barrier to the extreme right when it 
responded to the West Middlesex Monday Club’s activities.
However, the treatment meted out to the other branches was different. The Monday 
Club’s National Executive did not take any immediate action against the North Kent 
Monday Club. Instead, it preferred to seek clarification after the North Kent Monday 
Club’s chairman, Mr. Deverell Stone, claimed that the individuals concerned had 
acted privately. The Essex Monday Club also appeared to escape any punishment. 
Their respective offences probably explained this difference. The West Middlesex 
Monday Club had openly supported the National Front candidate, an offence that 
Guinness described as ‘an open and shut one’.207 Guinness cannot explain why the 
national executive did not treat the North Kent Monday Club immediately in the same 
manner.208 However, Frere-Smith was not a National Front candidate. Therefore, 
unlike the National Front candidate, his candidature brought no obvious link to 
fascism or neo-Nazism with which to concern the Monday Club’s National Executive. 
Len Lambert had threatened to support National Front candidates on behalf of the 
Essex Monday Club. However, he was only one individual and there was no actual 
evidence that he carried out his threat. Therefore, it was proof of a National Front 
connection, and consequently with Nazism, which put Uxbridge beyond the pale.
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Guinness’s comments supported the idea that the Monday Club took a harder line 
with the West Middlesex Monday Club when he warned them that, ‘They can appeal 
but we are not going to forgive them. Working for a National Front candidate is 
unacceptable.’209
Mrs. Goold of the West Middlesex Monday Club swiftly joined the National Front, 
which confirms that the Monday Club had acted as the Conservative Party’s agent in 
blocking the extreme right. Its action had forced Goold to leave the comfort of a 
successful political monolith for the cold reality of the National Front’s miniscule 
chances. Nevertheless, the equivocal treatment of the different Monday Club branches 
left room for doubt about the National Executive’s desire to purge extremists within 
the Club. This would have worried the Conservative Party. Disbandment of the West 
Middlesex Monday Club had not stopped the media from reporting the Monday 
Club’s connections with extremists. For example, later in December The Listener 
carried an article based on a recent BBC Midweek documentary. It quoted a West 
Middlesex Monday Club member who said that they only disagreed with the National 
Front over whether to send Asians ‘back by boat or in boxes’.210 This kept recent 
events at Uxbridge fresh in the public’s mind. The article also prominently noted that 
former Conservatives were in the National Front, such as John O’Brien. The Listener 
mentioned O’ Brien’s support for Enoch Powell, and described him as, ‘for 20 years a 
pillar of the Shrewsbury Conservative Association’. It also noted that O’ Brien had 
left the Conservative Party and eventually succeeded A. K. Chesterton as chairman of 
the National Front.212 O’ Brien was an example of how the Conservative Party 
alienated extreme-right individuals. The Listener also identified Monday Club 
member Oliver Gilbert as the Patriotic Front’s liaison officer in Worthing and as the 
National Front’s local organiser.213 It also noted that Gilbert was a member of the 
Worthing Conservative Association, where he had tried to oust the Conservative MP 
Terrence Higgins for ‘not being right-wing enough’.214 Gilbert reinforced the notion 
that the Conservative Party and the fascist, neo-Nazi extreme right were linked. The
209 R. Summerscales, ‘Monday Club Ban Branch’, Daily Telegraph, 5 December 1972.
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article reminded its readers of the type of person with whom the Conservative Party 
associated with via the Monday Club when it resurrected the Nazi past and
A l e
paramilitary proclivities of the National Front’s John Tyndall. It also quoted 
Chesterton’s comments when he retired that: ‘Two percent of the members of the 
National Front are really evil men -  so evil that I placed intelligence agents to work 
exploring their backgrounds, with results so appalling that I felt obliged to entrust the 
documents to the vaults of a bank. Some of these men are at present placed close to 
the centre of things.’216 No legitimate political party desired association with such 
individuals or the party that included them. Therefore, could Jonathan Guinness 
maintain the Monday Club’s position as a barrier to the National Front, or would it 
increasingly become the gateway for further infiltration of the Conservative Party? 
The Listener’s portrayal of Guinness probably did not inspire confidence within 
Central Office. It described him as a political naif who admitted that he was ‘not 
experienced in fringe-type politics’ 217 In the wake of the by elections at Uxbridge and 
Sutton and Cheam, Central Office proceeded to construct the ‘firm policy’ towards 
the Monday Club that Carrington previously claimed was absent.
A by-election at Lincoln expected early in 1973 provided Central Office with the 
opportunity to implement its policy against the Monday Club. Lincoln’s pro-EEC 
Labour MP had resigned his seat to fight against his own party’s anti-EEC stance. 
Labour defended its majority of 4750 with an official candidate, which meant that the 
Conservative government had an unexpected chance of a rare by-election gain. The 
Times described the Conservative Party as seeing these developments as ‘an excellent 
chance of gaining from the Labour split’, and reported that Central Office had made 
‘urgent calls’ to the local Conservative leaders, who had not even picked a candidate, 
and told them to ‘get on with it’.218 Within Central Office, Chris Patten informed 
chairman Lord Carrington on 20 November that he was concerned that one of the two 
candidates short-listed by the Lincoln Conservative Association was Jonathan 
Guinness. Patten stated that, ‘The disadvantages of the selection of Guinness (quite 
apart from the fact that it would not be very easy to win the seat with him) are
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numerous and obvious.’219 What, exactly, did Patten mean? Guinness made comments 
that embarrassed the Conservative leadership. He stated a preference for gassing over 
hanging and advocated leaving razor blades in convicted murderers’ cells so they 
could do the decent thing.220 Guinness’s comments earned him the nickname ‘old 
razor blades’. They also highlighted the Conservative Party’s divisions over capital 
punishment. However, as they occurred four months later than Patten’s letter to 
Carrington, Guinness’s comments cannot explain Patten’s concerns. Patten may have 
suspected that Guinness was likely to make gaffes, but he made no mention of them. 
The other feasible possibilities for Patten’s comments are Guinness’s connection with 
pre-war fascism or his leadership of the Monday Club. A connection with pre-war 
fascism was easy to make because Guinness was Oswald Mosley’s stepson. This was 
a barely credible accusation as Guinness was not Mosley’s blood relative, and had 
played no part in active politics until the late 1960s when Mosley’s political career 
was long over. However, the Monday Club was a much different prospect. Guinness’s 
victory at Lincoln would add electoral credibility to an organisation that recent events 
and reports had indicated strongly contained extremists, an organisation that operated 
within the Conservative Party. In this respect, Patten had acted in accord with Central 
Office’s stance towards potentially embarrassing connections since the Second World 
War. Unfortunately, for Central Office, the Lincoln Conservatives selected Guinness 
as their official candidate on 23 November.221 Central Office files proved that it was 
concerned at such an outcome. Political opponents also were in no doubt about the 
root cause of the Conservative leadership’s concern. The Manchester Evening News 
pointed to the power of the Monday Club as responsible for Guinness’s selection, and 
stated that, ‘It was the organisational ability of this “party within a party” -  plus the 
undoubted talents of Mr Guinness himself -  that gave the Tory leadership and Mr 
Heath the shock of having Mr Guinness as their standard-bearer.’222 Central Office 
responded by acting in accord with its consistent post-1945 policy of blocking the 
extreme right.
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On 30 November, Guinness provided Central Office with the opportunity to 
implement its policy. According to Guinness, the Conservative Party’s 1972 
Conference Handbook listed the Vice President of the National Advisory Committee 
of the Federation of Conservative Students (FCS) as the Chairman of the Bow Group. 
Guinness expressed to Lord Carrington his delight at seeing ‘another group within the 
Conservative party’ gain official party recognition, and requested that the FCS afford 
the Monday Club similar treatment as, ‘we feel we are entitled to it, having more 
members than the Bow Group, and with 140 full members who are students, almost 
certainly more students’. This was the persistent complaint that the Conservative 
Party organisation barred Monday Club members from offices within the party. If 
Monday Club members had been aware of reaction within Central Office to 
Guinness’s complaint, their suspicions would have increased. The FCS was under 
progressive leadership at this stage, and had joined with the Young Conservatives to 
defeat Enoch Powell’s resolution at the 1972 Party Conference that attacked the Heath 
Government’s decision to admit the Ugandan Asians.224 So incensed was one Young 
Conservative, Anthony Reed-Herbert, that he resigned after the conference and joined 
the National Front,225 which was another example of the Conservative Party alienating 
its own members. Like the Young Conservatives, but unlike the Monday Club, the 
FCS was effectively part of the Conservative Party’s approved organisation. Chris 
Patten sought advice from the FCS on how to respond to Guinness’s complaint226 
The National Secretary of the FCS, John Bowis, replied that Guinness would not 
welcome it if Carrington interfered in Monday Club elections and suggested that 
Patten tell Guinness to approach the FCS directly if the Monday Club wanted 
representation on it.227 However, Bowis also intimated strongly that any such 
approach would fail because the Monday Club had never shown any interest in the
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FCS, 228 and had not even provided them with a copy of their recent publication on 
Higher Education.229 On 18 December, Carrington responded to Guinness and used 
Bowis’ comments, but also invited him to arrange a mutually convenient time to 
discuss the Lincoln By-Election.230 Coming from the Party chairman, Carrington’s 
invitation to a Conservative Party candidate was in reality a command.
Before the meeting with Guinness on 10 January, Patten wrote an eight-point plan 
detailing the line Carrington was to adopt. After the meeting, Patten wrote another 
note recording Carrington’s conversation with Guinness for Central Office’s Monday 
Club file. Comparing these documents revealed that Carrington implemented Patten’s 
plan closely. Both documents claimed that the loss of Sutton and Cheam had resulted 
in Carrington wishing to take a closer look at all by-elections before any campaign
O'X 1started, and that was why Carrington had asked Guinness to meet him. The lack of 
similar meetings in the Chairman’s by-election files for other contests does not 
disprove this claim, but it does question it. Both documents expressed concern that 
extremists might take over Guinness’s campaign, and result in voters deserting the 
Conservative Party.233 Yet who were these extremists? Patten noted that Guinness 
reassured Carrington in their meeting that he would not invite Powell to speak, and 
that ‘A number of extreme Monday Club supporters would have some difficulty in 
getting up to Lincolnshire and others like Harvey Proctor he hoped to exclude.’234 
This showed that Central Office viewed Powell as an extremist and that Guinness was 
aware of this view. It also showed that Guinness thought that there were extremists 
within the Monday Club, including Proctor, too. Guinness believed that Powell’s 
possible involvement in the by-election was Central Office’s main concern at this
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meeting.235 However, although the earlier document mentioned Powell, it suggested 
that Carrington should do nothing more than ascertain what Guinness had to say about 
this possibility.236 There is no mention of what response Carrington should make to 
whatever information Guinness imparted. There is no mention of Harvey Proctor 
either. However, when Patten turned to the Monday Club’s role in general, he 
revealed the real objects of Central Office concerns. Patten advised Carrington to say 
that although he personally had never been a member of any pressure group or lobby 
within the Conservative Party, there was room for such organisations provided that 
any disagreements ‘were subordinated to the general objectives of supporting the 
Party and furthering its interests’.237 He thus urged Carrington to imply that the 
Monday Club was disloyal to the Conservative Party, which Carrington did. 
Patten’s comments made it plain that Carrington could infer this because of the 
Monday Club’s connections with the National Front and other extreme-right 
organisations. He suggested that Carrington should claim to be ‘disturbed by some 
indications that the Monday Club has been increasingly concerned with attacking 
Government and the official Party line rather than supporting it’, and advised 
Carrington to use the Uxbridge by-election as the ‘most notorious example’ of it.239 
Furthermore, Patten stated that whilst Carrington should acknowledge Guinness’s 
firm action against the West Middlesex Monday Club, he should also say to Guinness 
that he was ‘not convinced that this is the only example where this sort of thing has 
happened’,240 and provided Carrington with an example. Carrington duly expressed to 
Guinness his concern at ‘reports of Monday Club support for National Front 
candidates at by-elections and of prominent Monday Club supporters speaking at 
meetings organised by bodies like the British Campaign to Stop Immigration which 
had fought against the Conservative Party in Parliamentary and local elections’.241
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The loss of Sutton and Cheam was a pretext that enabled Central Office to implement 
it plan to confront Guinness with its concerns about the Monday Club and the 
National Front. The National Front had not even contested Sutton and Cheam. It had 
contested Uxbridge, which was the example that Patten advised Carrington to use 
against the Monday Club. However, the meeting with Guinness delivered much more 
than Central Office concerns. Both documents revealed explicitly that Central Office 
believed the National Front had infiltrated the Monday Club. Carrington raised this 
concern with Guinness and stated that, ‘He wondered to what extent the Monday Club 
had been infiltrated from the extreme right.’242 Any such infiltration was an 
intolerable situation for the Conservative Party leadership, and for a Central Office 
that had worked consistently to avoid association with the extreme right from 1945 
onwards. Patten advised Carrington to inform Guinness of his intention to take ‘a very 
firm line from now on, especially as we get closer to the next Election, with those 
who seem more interested in pursuing political vendettas than in helping widen 
support for the Conservative Government and Conservative policies’ 243 Guinness 
replied that he was willing to pass on to Central Office the names of anyone suspected 
of infiltration, but refused to participate in ‘hounding’ members of the Monday 
Club.244 Carrington replied that ‘if anybody was to take responsibility for removing 
extremists from the Monday Club then it had to be Mr. Guinness’.245 Guinness 
recalled that the meeting was cordial, but admitted that his main desire at the meeting 
was to be the party’s candidate at Lincoln.246 No matter how cordially delivered, 
Carrington had made it clear that it was Guinness’s duty to remove extremists from 
the Monday Club. However, one other feature of this meeting was not cordial. Patten 
advised Carrington to warn Guinness that the involvement of extremists made it 
difficult for the ‘Party Organisation and for your colleagues to give their whole­
hearted and committed support to Guinness in Lincoln both during the Election
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campaign and in the longer term’.247 This was an astonishing threat for Central Office 
to make to a candidate selected by the local Conservative Associations. Nevertheless, 
Carrington delivered it unequivocally.248 This threat contrasted sharply with 
Guinness’s own circular to Monday Club members that stressed the requirement of 
loyalty to the Conservative Party.249 When Carrington threatened not to support an 
officially adopted candidate in a contest in which a Labour Party division had 
presented the Conservative party with an opportunity for victory, he revealed that 
Central Office was even prepared to accept electoral defeat rather than countenance 
extreme-right infiltration.
The day after Patten recorded the meeting with Guinness, an article in The Times 
reported Conservative Party managers’ fears about extremist infiltration. The tone and 
content indicated strongly that these ‘managers’ were the source of the report. The 
article identified the Monday Club as one of two sources of trouble, and stated that 
party managers had asked, ‘whether something drastic needs to be done to check the 
mischief that is feared’. One possible remedy suggested in the article was ‘that 
before long the Conservative candidates’ list will be purged of a few members of the 
Monday Club whose loyalties to the Conservative Party and Mr Heath come under 
question’.251 This threat targeted aspiring candidates, especially as it was Central 
Office and the party leadership who would do any questioning. The reporter also 
seemed to know that it was the Monday Club leadership’s responsibility for purging 
its extremists, and was aware that ‘Senior Conservatives’ believed ‘that the Monday 
Club is dangerously vulnerable to infiltration from the undemocratic right-wing
AM
extreme of politics’. There were also comments that reflected Carrington’s views 
on membership of groups within the Conservative. For example, the article admitted 
that the Monday Club’s organisation and promotion in no way ‘differed from the 
methods of the Bow Group and PEST’, although interestingly it described PEST as
247 C. Patten to The Chairman cc. Rt. Hon Jim Prior, ‘Meeting With Jonathan Guinness’, 9 
January 1973, Point 4. CPA CCO 20/55/59, Lincoln Dec. 1972 -  March 1973.
248 C. Patten to The Chairman cc. Rt. Hon Jim Prior, ‘Meeting With Jonathan Guinness’, 9 
January 1973, Point 3. CPA CCO 20/55/59, Lincoln Dec. 1972 -  March 1973.
249 See 312.
250 ‘Curbing critics on the Tory right wing’, The Times, 15 January 1973,13.
251 ‘Curbing critics on the Tory right wing’, The Times, 15 January 1973, 13.
252 ‘Curbing critics on the Tory right wing’, The Times, 15 January 1973, 13.
314
having more backbenchers and Ministers.253 However, the article stated that doubts 
about the Monday Club’s loyalty after recent by-elections set the Monday Club apart 
from these groups. It claimed that, ‘Party managers are therefore watching the 
Monday Club anxiously’, and whilst the loyalty of most members was undoubted, 
these managers ‘still feel it necessary to ask whether the club may not be at risk of 
being used by extremists to do Mr Heath and the Government serious harm’.254 There 
was even a threat of ‘circumstances in which Ministers and backbenchers might come 
under persuasion to end their association with the club’.255 There was some support 
for Guinness’s claim that Powell was Central Office’s main concern at their meeting. 
However, the article limited its comments on Powell to his criticisms of the 
Government and mention of his power-base in the crucial West Midlands 
constituencies, and described the similarities and differences between him and the 
Monday Club. The Monday Club was the subject of approximately three quarters of 
the article. The article also mirrored the record of Carrington’s meeting with Jonathan 
Guinness closely, indicating that Central Office were the ‘party managers’ either 
directly or indirectly behind it. If so, Central Office had ensured that Carrington’s 
message to Guinness reached a much wider audience.
Whilst Guinness recollected the cordiality of his meeting with Carrington, his reaction 
to the article in The Times was scathing. He was bewildered as to how the reporter 
‘gets the idea those he describes as “Conservative party managers” think Mr Heath’s 
Government is damaged by the Monday Club’.256 He added that the Monday Club 
was able to voice concerns that the leadership was sometimes unable to, and admitted 
that it was sometimes necessary to criticise government policy, but also warned 
against any witch-hunt, which would question the party leadership’s ‘credentials as 
Conservatives’. Guinness was not the only senior Monday Club member who 
responded. Sam Swerling, the author of two Monday Club publications, retorted: ‘If 
there is any mischief in the Conservative Party which needs to eradicated, as is 
suggested, it lies in the small but growing coterie of self-effacing liberals who have 
infiltrated the party at all levels, particularly in the Young Conservative movement.
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That is where the real danger to Conservatism lies.’258 Nor did the wider Monday 
Club cease its criticism of the Conservative Party, or Government. In his capacity as 
Honorary Secretary of the Provincial Council of Monday Club Branches, the Essex 
Monday Club Chairman Len Lambert requested on 2 February that Central Office 
included the Monday Club in future party diaries ‘as a Conservative political 
organisation’.259 This was once more the complaint that the party organisation denied 
the Monday Club official recognition whilst granting it to others like the Bow Group. 
Central Office replied that it had, ‘no intention, or reason’ to change current 
practice.260 On 24 March 1973, the Monday Club passed a resolution that criticised 
the Government’s White Paper on Ulster.261 Carrington rejected it by telling Guinness 
witheringly that, ‘There is a responsibility on everyone of good-will to try and make 
these proposals work rather than to stir up old fears and antagonisms.’ Carrington’s 
meeting with Guinness had not stopped the Monday Club’s attacks on the 
government. In the event, Guinness failed to win the Lincoln by-election on 1 March 
and finished a poor third nearly three times further behind the victor than the previous 
Conservative candidate. The following day Chris Patten wrote confidentially to 
Carrington and outlined what the party’s position about this outcome should be. He 
cited the presence of three Cabinet Ministers and other junior ministers in the Lincoln 
campaign, and claimed that therefore, Guinness’s chairmanship of the Monday Club 
‘made no difference to the support we gave him’.263 Patten’s claim is justifiable. Once 
Guinness had provided assurances about the campaign, Central Office could hardly 
refuse to support him. Yet, if Patten meant to convey Central Office’s total support for 
Guinness, his comments were disingenuous. Any support for Guinness was, as the 
meeting of 10 January shows, conditional.
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One month after the Lincoln by-election, evidence appeared of a campaign against the 
Monday Club by the ‘self-effacing liberals’ within the Conservative Party. Late in 
March, the Monday Club’s Halt Immigration Now Campaign, led by G. K. Young, 
launched a national petition that sought one million signatures in support of ‘an end to 
all “tropical immigration” and the institution of an effective repatriation policy’. On 
2 April, the Bow Group attacked the petition. It argued that it would harm race 
relations, and that the HINC could only achieve its objectives ‘if accompanied by 
intimidation’.265 Here, the Bow Group pinpointed the violent element inherent in all 
repatriation schemes, regardless of claims to the contrary. The following day, PEST 
joined this criticism in the press. It described the Monday Club’s position on 
immigration and repatriation as ‘rabid extremism’ and ‘emotional bigotry’, in which 
the word ‘effective’ was synonymous with ‘compulsory’, PEST called on ministers 
Rippon, Amery and Goodhew to resign from the Club.266 On the same day, PEST sent 
a letter to all its university branches and urged them to start a letter writing campaign 
against the Monday Club’s anti-immigration campaign.267 Like the Bow Group letter, 
PEST’s intervention was an example of how progressives in the Conservative Party 
countered right-wing extremists. Both groups were recipients of notably better 
treatment from Central Office than the Monday Club, which added weight to the 
notion of a concerted attack on the extreme right. However, what probably 
disconcerted the Monday Club leadership even more than this attack by its 
Conservative opponents was an attack by opponents from within the Club. This 
proved to be the decisive test of the Monday Club leadership’s claim that the Club 
was subordinate to the Conservative Party. When it passed this test, the Monday Club 
also proved that it was the Conservative Party’s gatekeeper against the extreme right.
The revolt within the Monday Club became public knowledge in the same month that 
PEST and the Bow Group attacked the HINC’s immigration policy. The leadership 
had known of a campaign against it within the Monday Club since December 1972.268 
Now that the campaign was in the open, three Club members who were also MPs 
wrote to the Daily Telegraph in April and referred to the ‘disloyal and disruptive
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propaganda by a political “mafia” in certain branches of the Club and in the Executive 
itself.269 If their claims were correct, extremist infiltration of the Monday Club went 
further than the provincial branches. Sir Adrian FitzGerald corroborated that by this 
time one or two right-wing extremists had indeed managed to join the Monday Club’s 
national executive.270 The person who led the challenge to Guinness was the one 
extremist that FitzGerald identified: G. K. Young. As chairman of the Club’s Action 
Fund, Young was largely responsible for the Monday Club’s growth, especially the 
formation of branches. Young was also prominent in the Monday Club’s stance on 
immigration, first as chairman of the Immigration Committee and then leader of the 
Halt Immigration Now Campaign. Thus, Young was at the forefront of the populist 
issue that his supporters argued was responsible for the Monday Club’s huge increase 
in publicity. Moreover, as a merchant banker with Kleinwort Benson, Young had 
the personal wealth to fund campaigns, as in Stroud’s 1972 leadership challenge and 
the HINC, and probably had the financial connections to fund much more. Therefore, 
Guinness faced a formidable opponent.
The campaign was acrimonious, with accusations of underhand activity. All Monday 
Club members received anonymous broadsheets that used a fictitious address, and a 
letter with Guinness’s forged signature. This revealed that somebody had acquired the 
Monday Club’s membership list illegally, and resulted in the Club’s National 
Executive asking Scotland Yard to investigate.272 The Monday Club leadership 
vaguely blamed right-wing extremists 273 However, the Guardian reported that the 
Monday Club had called in the police because it believed that ‘its offices have been 
infiltrated by a supporter of the extreme Right who has used its membership list in an 
effort to discredit the chairman, Mr Jonathan Guinness, in his campaign for re- 
election’.274 An anonymous document stated that ‘shadowy figures’ controlled the 
Monday Club, and claimed that connections between individual members and 
extreme-right groups continued, with fascists and neo-Nazis still ‘very close to the
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heart of the Club and its leaders’, despite recent expulsions.275 This may have been an 
attack on Young, whom the document described as the ‘single most powerful political 
figure in the Monday Club’ 276 However, whether the purpose was to smear Young is 
unclear. Guinness explicitly rejected any involvement by the Monday Club 
leadership, and stated that, ‘I don’t think we ever discovered who was responsible for 
that pamphlet.’277 Powell’s involvement is extremely unlikely. He showed no interest 
in the contest probably because by 1973, as Guinness believed, it had become 
‘increasingly clear that his agenda was simply to dish Heath’.278 This was not the 
behaviour of a putative leader of a new, credible extreme-right political force.
In the event, Guinness defeated Young comfortably by 625 votes to 455 in April. The 
Times announced the result, and thought that Guinness’s success meant ‘that the 
“moderates” have won the first stage of their campaign against more extreme right 
wingers’. 279 In one year, Guinness had gone from being the champion of the right to 
leader of the moderates! Despite its qualifications, The Times’ comment confirmed 
that Guinness had acted as the Conservative Party’s blocking agent against the 
extreme right. However, The Times was only partly accurate when it described 
Guinness’s victory as the first stage of a campaign against the extreme right. Guinness 
had already commenced it when he expelled the West Middlesex Monday Club in 
December 1972. Carrington had added impetus to the campaign when he threatened 
Guinness in January 1973, which ‘party managers’ then reinforced in the press. 
However, what ensured the success of this ‘campaign’ was the actions of the Monday 
Club’s own MPs and many of its members. For, as The Times also reported, many 
Monday Club MPs had ‘let it be known privately that they would resign if Mr Young 
and his faction came out on top’, whilst many members had supported Guinness 
‘because they believed he would be firmly against reported infiltration by National 
Front members’.280 Therefore, Guinness’s victory was also the culmination of 
pressure applied by, and the votes of, Monday Club members who opposed the 
extreme right. The final stage of the campaign came when Guinness finished what he
275 Anon., The Monday Club: A Danger to British Democracy, (nd), 2.
276 Anon., The Monday Club: A Danger to British Democracy, (nd), 11.
277 Correspondence with Jonathan Guinness, 28 June 2008.
278 Correspondence with Jonathan Guinness, 28 June 2008.
279 ‘Mr Guinness is re-elected chairman of the Monday Club’, The Times, 30 April 1973, 2.
280 ‘Mr Guinness is re-elected chairman of the Monday Club’, The Times, 30 April 1973, 2.
319
started. In June, Guinness expelled Young supporter Len Lambert from the National 
Monday Club because he invited John Tyndall of the National Front to address the 
Essex Monday Club.281 When Lambert tried to use his membership of the Essex
'jo'y
Monday Club to counter the expulsion, Guinness disaffiliated the whole branch. 
Guinness also oversaw the expulsion of fifty extremists from the national Monday 
Club in July, and dismissed them by saying that the ‘old, solid members of the club 
have finally lost patience with this disruptive minority’.283 The expelled rebels 
retorted that Guinness was a weak chairman who had acted under orders from Lord 
Carrington. They claimed that, ‘Lord Carrington is known to have told Mr Guinness 
when he was adopted as the Conservative candidate at Lincoln that under no 
circumstances were the “wild men on the right of the club” to go to Lincoln to canvas 
for their chairman.’284 The rebels were correct, but all this proved, apart from 
Carrington’s role, is that Guinness agreed with the Conservative Party chairman in the 
need to remove extremists from the Monday Club. Guinness maintained his position, 
and defeated two further attempts to remove him in 1973.285
Guinness’s chairmanship damaged the ambitions of those who saw the Monday Club 
as a vehicle for the extreme right severely. Young swiftly resigned. In 1974, he 
formed his own extreme-right group, Tory Action, and subsequently wrote for the
• <)o/:anti-Semitic Liverpool Newsletter. Others also left. Many joined the National Front. 
However, these events had also damaged the Monday Club. Expulsions and infighting 
undermined its credibility. In August, The Journal o f Commerce described the 
Monday Club as having disintegrated, which left a need for ‘an effective right-wing 
pressure group within the Conservative Party’.287 Several correspondents at the Daily 
Telegraph turned on the Monday Club, and claimed that they no longer understood
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what its role was.288 Walker claimed that only ten MPs retained membership, whilst 
the national membership figure stood at 1800. These are suspiciously round figures, 
and a lack of attribution calls Walker’s claims into question. Nevertheless, a 
significant fall in Monday Club membership is believable. Copping stated that a, 
‘much reduced and impoverished Monday Club set about re-building its strength’.289 
This contrasted markedly with the Monday Club’s confidence in 1970. According to 
Copping, some members closest to events thought that all the Monday Club’s troubles 
were, ‘a pre-conceived conspiracy by ill-disposed persons who had infiltrated the
Q^A
Club for the purpose of wrecking it’. Jonathan Guinness appeared to accept this 
view in 1973 when he stated he was certain ‘that the disruption was too systematic not 
to have been planned’ 291 Yet, to whom did this refer? The National Front denied any 
involvement to Walker, and claimed that such activity was in any case unnecessary as 
Monday Club defections were inevitable. Walker’s acceptance of the National 
Front’s claims at face value weakens his account, but the lack of any similar 
accusation in Copping’s official account suggested that Walker was correct. Instead, 
immediately after he after posed the question of culpability, Copping implied the guilt 
of ‘a main instigator of the troubles’ who soon ‘gave indications of Communist 
sympathies’ and campaigned against the Conservatives in the February 1974 General 
Election. Copping did not name the individual. However, the only person ever 
identified by Copping as being at the forefront of the Monday Club rebellion was G. 
K. Young. This had led Monday Club members to wonder who exactly G. K. Young 
was.
Some investigators have portrayed G. K. Young as a sinister extreme-right figure. 
Typical is N. Toczek, who identified Young’s involvement in many extreme-right 
movements.294 However, these accounts often attempt merely to prove the nastiness 
of the right wing, and sometimes rely on questionable evidence and conspiracy 
theory. For example, when Toczek focused on proving that Young engineered the 
extreme right’s takeover of the Conservative Party with Thatcher’s leadership, he
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failed to consider the Conservative Party’s impact on the extreme right. Consequently, 
Toczek overly relied on ‘guilt by association’. He implied Guinness’s extremism 
because his mother had married Oswald Mosley, and Margaret Thatcher’s extremism 
because her ‘close personal associate’ Nicholas Ridley ‘lived in the same block of 
flats’ as two fascist activists.295 Such a method is inadequate. A better approach is to 
examine the known facts about Young, the impact this had on events he was involved 
in, and the opinion of contemporaries. Young was a merchant banker with Kleinwort 
Benson. Therefore, he probably did have the personal wealth to fund campaigns, as in 
Stroud’s 1972 leadership challenge and the HINC. This meant that Young possessed 
the financial resources with which to challenge Guinness. Also verifiable is Young’s 
previous membership of the Labour Party, his employment on the left wing Glasgow 
Herald and subsequent diplomatic career. Young’s involvement with the intelligence 
community is equally well known. Young possessed, as a former deputy head of MI6 
and thus involved in intelligence activities for a substantial period, the experience and 
knowledge to run the type of dirty tricks campaign witnessed in the 1973 Monday 
Club leadership challenge. This made the Monday Club’s decision to call in the police 
over the forged letter that purported to come from Guinness more interesting. The 
person responsible for the forgery used a letterhead that closely resembled that of the 
Market Bosworth Monday Club of which Guinness was a member. Therefore, the 
culprit was also capable of acquiring private documents. Young was also adept at the 
subtle response, as seen in his reply to Guinness’s accusation that Young’s supporters 
were behind the forgery. When Young stated that, ‘I thought it was vintage Guinness, 
an exact account of Jonathan’s views. I was surprised to learn it was a forgery’,296 he 
gave the impression of ignorance yet still smeared Guinness.
These details and actions resulted in some contemporaries wondering what motivated 
Young. The most remarkable accusation came from John Gouriet, who was a new 
recruit to the Monday Club in 1973. Gouriet identified Young as one of the dubious 
characters ‘hanging around’ a British political establishment that he believed 
communists had deeply penetrated 297 Gouriet recalled that he was not alone in 
thinking Young ‘might be a member of the Cambridge Group, along with Philby and
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Burgess, Maclean and Blunt’, and that there was ‘certainly circumstantial evidence to 
suggest he could have been the fifth man’.298 He also included Conservative Central 
Office in his theory of a communist conspiracy, describing it as, ‘deeply penetrated, 
deeply infiltrated’.299 Therefore, Gouriet implied that Young had attempted to destroy 
the Monday Club as some minor part in a wider communist plot for world 
domination, and that Central Office accepted or directed his activity. If Gouriet is 
correct, then Central Office definitely blocked the extreme right, although not to 
protect the Conservative Party. However, the absence of any evidence that 
corroborated Gouriet’s opinion leaves it stuck in the realms of conspiracy theory 
alongside Toczek. This is not to deny the possibility that Young was a communist 
agent. After his 1973 victory, Guinness inferred it when he said of the leadership 
challenge that, ‘He had a sneaking suspicion that the minority was Communist- 
run.’300 There is no doubt that Young ran the 1973 challenge to Guinness. Recently, 
Guinness described Young as ‘Sinister’,301 but remained unsure about his role and 
motives. Asked if he thought Young was hying to wreck the Monday Club, Guinness 
answered: ‘Wreck it or control it? If he was going to control it, what did he want to 
control it for? God knows, there were those who said he was trying to wreck it. That 
was said, but all sorts of things were said ... So he might have just been out to wreck 
it, but from what point of view, Communist? I don’t know.’ However, although 
Guinness considered the possibility that Central Office supported Young in the 
Monday Club leadership election, he believed they would have preferred him to 
Young. Sir Adrian FitzGerald’s recollections chimed with Guinness’s comments. 
He also wondered which part of the political spectrum Young was in, but opted for 
the extreme right rather than extreme left and stated, ‘I think he was extreme right.’304 
FitzGerald believed Young was ‘a racialist with a capital R’, and added that if Young 
had secured the chairmanship, ‘I would have walked straight out as would others.’305 
Here, FitzGerald confirmed the unwillingness of many Conservatives to allow the 
extreme right to succeed. When it comes to Young’s motives, FitzGerald too remains
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perplexed: ‘I wish I knew. I really don’t know. He must have known what he wanted 
to do. But I just don’t know.’306 As for Central Office’s opinion of Young, FitzGerald 
too is unsure, but believed that, ‘In purely political terms everything should indicate 
that they’d be very concerned about him,’ and that therefore they would have 
supported Guinness.307
On balance, and saving contradictory evidence, the most feasible interpretation is that 
Young operated on the extreme right and probably intended to use the Monday Club 
to form a larger political bloc that included the National Front. With this, Young 
could challenge the Conservative Party. Walker referred to a Sunday Telegraph 
investigation into a meeting between Young and the National Front’ John Tyndall, but 
accepted Martin Webster’s denial that this took place. Yet, Webster only demed 
that a specific meeting occurred. Guinness believed that Young probably was in
OAQ
contact with the National Front. Therefore, in this scenario Central Office probably 
viewed Guinness as the lesser of two evils, and, having ensured that Guinness 
understood its position, refrained from involvement in the leadership contest and 
happily watched the Monday Club tear itself apart. The lack of any comment at all 
about the Monday Club’s 1973-leadership contest within Central Office’s files 
supports this theory. There is also more tangible evidence. Walker recounted that 
when Guinness had brought the Monday Club under control, Carrington said to him, 
‘Well done that, getting it under control.’310 Guinness confirmed this account and 
pithily paraphrased Carrington’s viewpoint as being, ‘if the bloody thing must exist 
let it be under respectable leadership’.311 This interpretation also fitted Central 
Office’s consistent refrain that the extreme-right after the Second World War simply 
was not respectable.
Therefore, despite the troubles that beset it, Heath’s Government by 1974 had 
effectively marginalised the Monday Club. It had done this by moving closer to the 
Monday Club on issues such as immigration, but also by threatening its leadership.
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By doing so, it minimised the most likely avenue for embarrassing connections with 
the extreme right since the Second World War. This assured that any associations 
with the National Front would not be a significant issue in the February 1974 General 
Election. However, it would be difficult to assess what impact this action had on the 
outcome of that contest. The electorate was probably more concerned about increased 
inflation and unemployment. Five ‘states of emergency’ and five major policy u-tums 
probably weighed heavier on voters minds than the Conservative Party’s shadowy 
connections. Nor, unlike the General Election of 1970, did the Conservative Party in 
1974 benefit from the electoral appeal of Enoch Powell. Powell resigned from the 
Conservative Party just before the General Election.312 He elected to stand instead for 
the Ulster Unionists. Until the Sunningdale Agreement, the Ulster Unionists were the 
political associates of the Conservative ‘and Unionist Party’. Thus, Powell proved his 
commitment to his personal perception of Conservatism. There is no evidence that 
Powell contemplated taking over the National Front seriously. Nor did Powell even 
advocate a vote for the extreme right on the mainland. Instead, Powell announced his 
postal vote for the Labour Party, based on what he saw as their opposition to 
membership of the EEC, and called on the electorate to do likewise. Therefore, for 
Powell the principle and logic of an argument overrode any desire to be leader of a 
political party other than the Conservative Party: that and the desire to harm Heath.
There is some evidence that Central Office minimised the prospects of Powellites 
before the contest. The neo-Conservative American Institute for Public Policy 
Research published A. Ranney’s analysis of the 1974 General Election. Ranney’s 
article identified Central Office’s increased control of candidate selection via changed 
bureaucratic procedures that allowed it to veto selection of Powellite candidates. If 
correct, this supported Guinness’s perception that Central Office was more concerned 
about Powell’s impact than the Monday Club. However, the evidence however is not 
strong. Ranney based his article on a single Sunday Times article.313 It also lacked any 
corroboration. For example, Ranney stated that the vice-chairman at Central Office 
passed a ‘Word’ to local Conservative Associations on the unsuitability of specific
3 1 2 ‘Exit Enoch Powell, lonely fighter, The Times, 8 February 1974, 2.
313 M. Bowen, ‘Crushing the Right Wing’, Sunday Times, 17 February 1974,18.
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Powellite candidates.314 This sounded similar to the claims of Edward Martell’s 
associate, Donald Johnson MP.315 It is feasible that Central Office officials operated 
this way, but this claim remains unproved without evidence that supports it. The 
examples Ranney cited also weakened his claim. The three Powellites that Ranney 
identified as vetoed by Central Office aimed to contest Labour controlled 
constituencies.316 As Powell attracted voters who had never previously voted 
Conservative, it is possible that these candidates would secure unexpected victories. 
However, the wider context of economic crises and industrial unrest weakened this 
argument. So, too, does Ranney’s admittance that Central Office approved twenty- 
four other Powellites.317 As Ranney does not identify any of these approved 
Powellites, it is impossible to conclude whether these individuals had already secured 
nomination, or were even MPs already. The theft of the Powellight membership list 
shortly after a Conservative Party conference exacerbated this difficulty. Ranney also 
quoted Sir Richard Webster’s claim in the Sunday Times that Central Office had, ‘no 
policy to exclude Right-Wing candidates, Powellites, or Monday Clubbers’.318 A 
number of facts suggested Webster was not being wholly accurate. These were the 
long-standing general policy of investigating the extreme right, the exclusion of 
Monday Club members from the party’s organisations, and written evidence of a 
policy to counter the danger posed by the Monday Club composed before Carrington 
summoned Guinness to Central Office. These considerations question Webster’s 
claim severely. On the other hand, if Webster’s claim reflected Central Office’s belief 
that it had contained the threat posed by the Monday Club, Enoch Powell and the 
extreme right, it was accurate apart from the fact that the remit that empowered 
Central Office to investigate the extreme right remained in force.
The results of the February 1974 General Election indicated that the extreme right 
was indeed contained. The electorate did not turn to it. The most successful of the 
extreme-right parties was the National Front. It polled a miserly 0.2% of the vote.
A. Ranney, ‘Selecting the Candidates’, in Howard R. Penniman (ed.), Britain At The Polls: 
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This result justified the opinion of those Conservatives who dismissed the National 
Front’s electoral prospects, and indicated that when it saved its deposit at the West 
Bromwich by-election of 1973 it would probably be the National Front’s political 
apogee. Other extreme-right parties fared even worse. The National Independence 
Party, which by 1974 included the former National Front chairman John O’ Brien 
alongside Donald ‘Pathfinder’ Bennet, lost its deposit at Tottenham. The National 
Democratic Party, the political manifestation of the Racial Preservation Society, fared 
even worse at Ipswich. The British Movement of former League of Empire Loyalist 
Colin Jordan, which was the most overt neo-Nazi Party, attracted less than one 
thousand votes. In contrast, the Conservative Party retained nearly 38% of the vote, 
and won the popular vote in a contest that provided no party with an overall majority. 
This proved that even in the most propitious circumstances since the Second World 
War, the extreme right was unable to capitalise. However, with fewer seats than the 
Labour Party Heath was unable to forge a coalition with the Liberals and therefore 
resigned. Harold Wilson formed a minority government. Commentators expected 
Wilson to seek another General Election soon, to provide a majority government. Yet, 
the extreme right fared little better when Wilson went to the country in October 1974. 
At 0.4% of the vote, the National Front’s performance proved Adrian FitzGerald’s 
view that they were ‘a pretty good joke’.319 Former ‘Independent Conservatives’, 
many opposed to entry into the EEC, banded together as the United Democratic Party, 
but its fourteen candidates attracted an average of less than 400 votes. With twenty 
fewer seats and a drop of nearly one and a half million votes, the October 1974 
General Election was also a personal disaster for Edward Heath. The Conservative 
Party was not prepared to accept the continuing leadership of an individual beaten at 
three of the previous four General Elections. It removed Heath and on 11 February 
1975 installed Margaret Thatcher as leader.
319 Interview with Sir Adrian FitzGerald, 20 May 2008.
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CONCLUSION: KEEPING IT RIGHT
The Second World War ended the Conservative Party’s sanguine attitude towards 
indigenous fascism and extreme-right movements. Association with right-wing 
extremism was no longer acceptable. Consequently, the Conservative Party after 1945 
adopted a refractory attitude towards the extreme right. However, avoiding 
connections with extremism was not easy. A title that included labels such as 
‘Fascist’, Nazi’ and ‘National Socialist’ was no longer acceptable for political 
movements. Very few groups or individuals identified themselves with these pariah 
terms and ideologies in the way that the National Socialist Movement (1962) did. No 
organisation that carried such a title appeared in the Conservative Party Archive as 
one of the outside organisations investigated by Central Office. The same is true of 
groups tainted by internment as possible collaborators with Nazi Germany. There is 
no file on Mosley’s Union Movement or the British People’s Party in the 
Conservative Party Archive, although in these cases the rudimentary nature of Central 
Office’s intelligence gathering may also play a role. There is one reference to an open 
National Socialist, Colin Jordan, but it is superficial and reveals that Central Office 
was eager to avoid any association, no matter how tangential, with him. Either the 
Conservative Party shredded their files on these groups or, more likely, it simply 
avoided any official contact with them whatsoever.
Many groups doubtless eschewed their interwar positions or conveniently forgot 
them. This included those that had sympathised with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. 
Admittedly, not all of the pre-war extreme-right groups were fascist or Nazi. Some 
were ultra-Conservatives who wanted nothing to do with groups involved in mass 
politics and which contained lower middle and working-class people. However, these 
were fine distinctions, and ultra-Conservatives in Europe had allied with fascism and 
Nazism. It was unlikely, therefore, that the British electorate would distinguish 
between various strands of the extreme right. However, these pre-war extreme-right 
groups had unarguably contained Conservatives. This was a matter of public record. 
After the Second World War, these connections were an embarrassment to the
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Conservative Party. The Conservative Party did not want the public reminding of 
these associations, and it could not afford any recurrence of them. Therefore, the 
Conservative Party had to find ways to identify and investigate extreme-right groups 
so that it could achieve these objectives.
The answer was to investigate the extreme right. The main response was bureaucratic. 
Initially the Conservative Party used what remained intact of the party bureaucracy 
after the Second World War to gather intelligence. The party leadership soon 
reinvigorated the party machine. This included increasing the number of Central 
Office Agents, which had an impact on intelligence gathering. Additionally, Central 
Office used an existing ad hoc committee to formalise intelligence gathering within its 
Voluntary Organisations Section in 1948. This department’s terms of reference 
mandated the monitoring of extreme-right groups and, if necessary, the taking of 
action against them. In this, Central Office and its Area Agents played a prominent 
role. A substantial part of the files in the ‘Outside Organisations’ section of the 
Conservative Party Archive consists of information sent by Area Agents, or their 
requests for information on certain groups or individuals. However, Central Office’s 
intelligence gathering went beyond passively receiving the literature of extreme-right 
groups. At times, Central Office was proactive. Its representatives posed as 
disinterested members of the public to ascertain the nature of some extreme-right 
groups, as in the case of the Guild of Good Neighbours. They also attended extreme- 
right groups’ meetings. On one occasion, Central Office officers infiltrated an 
extreme-right group. However, not all information emanated from the party 
bureaucracy. Wider Conservatism played a role too. Conservative MPs forwarded 
extreme-right literature, or advised Central Office of events and rumours in their 
constituencies. Party members and contacts in business provided information. 
Sometimes, the information and intelligence was superficial and short-lived, which 
usually reflected the small size of the group concerned. This was the case with the 
Right Party. At other times the forwarding of information resulted in correspondence 
that lasted years. Central Office commissioned reports on some extreme-right groups. 
These, too, varied in size. Reports on The New Crusade and New Reform Party 
consisted of a few pages, whilst those on the People’s League for the Defence of 
Freedom, Middle Class Alliance, League of Empire Loyalists, Elizabethan Party and
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Freedom Group were more extensive. Regardless of the nature and extent of its 
investigation into these groups, Central Office obstructed or blocked them all.
The degree of Central Office’s response varied. These variations usually reflected 
Central Office’s opinion of an organisation’s nature. A minimally hostile response by 
Central Office was to suggest that an organisation’s members would have more 
chance of success if they pursued their objectives with the Conservative Party and not 
an outside organisation. Another was to warn individuals not to fund a group because 
that would reduce contributions to the Conservative Party. Central Office adopted this 
stance towards organisations that it identified as predominantly mainstream 
Conservative and therefore as posing little threat to the Party, as in the examples of 
the Middle Class Union and Middle Class Alliance. Central Office adopted a slightly 
different minimally obstructive response to those groups with which it had an 
unofficial relationship, but wished to avoid becoming public knowledge. These 
groups operated outside the political mainstream, yet possessed views or objectives 
with which many Conservatives agreed, or methods that the Conservative party found 
difficult to employ. AIMS and Drake’s Drum, for example, advocated policies that 
many Conservatives agreed with. However, their policies were inexpedient in the 
contemporary climate. The Conservative Party may have signalled acceptance of 
Labour’s political programme by producing the Industrial Charter, but there was no 
large-scale rejection of this programme when the Conservatives regained office in 
1951. Therefore, too close a connection with such groups would lay the Conservative 
Party open to charges of hypocrisy. However, both of these groups attempted to 
convey their argument in areas that seemed beyond the reach of the Conservative 
Party. If successful, it would make it possible for the Conservative party leadership to 
put forward policies that its membership favoured without angering an electorate that 
had so overwhelmingly welcomed Labour’s policies in 1945. Consequently, Central 
Office only minimally obstructed these groups. Frequently this amounted to little 
more than Central Office instructing Area Agents to deny any connection, and 
ensuring that these groups denied any connection with the Conservative Party. Denial 
of association with a group whose objectives or methods could benefit the 
Conservative Party might also include action to ensure that Conservatives ceased 
involvement with a group, as occurred with the Workers’ Forum. Groups whose
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‘extremism’ amounted to no more than a Conservative reaction to a new paradigm 
usually attracted only these limited counter measures.
Sometimes, Central Office’s view of these ‘Conservative’ groups hardened. Initially, 
Conservatives shared platforms with the British Housewives League. However, when 
Central Office considered the British Housewives League’s response to the Labour 
Government too extreme, it explicitly denied any connection with it, and consistently 
thereafter refused to assist it. Likewise, Central Office came to view the Society for 
Individual Freedom as an extreme-right organisation, and consequently it discouraged 
Conservatives from joining it. The same applied to Common Cause. Central Office 
was initially unconcerned about Common Cause. It therefore merely discouraged 
Conservative Officials from joining it, but saw no reason why individual 
Conservatives should not. As Central Office increasingly became aware that Common 
Cause contained an extreme potential, it dispatched officials to attend its meetings and 
warned Conservatives not to join it. It is also possible that identification of a group as 
‘extreme’ was conditional on the harm that it could do to the Conservative Party. For 
example, Central Office was wary of the Fighting Fund for Freedom, probably due to 
its involvement in ‘anti-alien’ campaigns, but it only explicitly identified it as an 
extreme-right organisation after a right-wing Conservative MP resigned from it.
Nevertheless, the common thread that applied to increased blocking activity was 
Central Office’s perception that a group was ‘extreme right wing’. This perception 
also applied when Central Office’s attitude was apparent from the beginning without 
it necessarily explicitly identifying the group as an extreme-right one. The New 
Reform Party is one example. Central Office advised its Area Agents to warn 
Conservatives against any connection with the New Reform Party because it believed 
that it was a bigoted, sectarian movement. The New Reform Party’s ultra- 
Protestantism placed it beyond the non-confessional Conservative Party, as did its 
anti-trade union rhetoric. Thus, even though there was no obvious connection between 
the New Reform Party and fascism, Central Office viewed its opinions as ones that 
divided society in extreme-right terms and consequently wanted nothing to do with it.
Central Office could also appear to modify its attitude towards an extreme-right 
movement, as seen in its relationship with Edward Martell’s groups. Central Office
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was particularly active against Martell’s Peoples League for the Defence of Freedom. 
It formed a Committee of Investigation, and advised that the Conservative Party as a 
whole should not have any connection with the PLDF. This was not the limit of 
Central Office’s action against Martell and the PLDF. It refused Martell’s offer of a 
joint candidature to defeat Labour at the East Ham by-election in 1957. Central Office 
also observed the PLDF’s meetings during the East Ham by-election campaign, 
ensured that Cabinet Ministers were present during it, recruited an individual for 
‘intelligence duties’ in the constituency, and was prepared to smear Martell with 
accusations of fascism to limit his chances. Central Office continued to try to harm 
Martell’s chances six years later in a by-election that the Conservatives were not even 
contesting. The Conservative Party did not contest the 1963 Bristol South East by- 
election because it did not believe that Tony Benn should have to forfeit his seat on 
becoming a peer. The Party and Central Office advised Conservatives to abstain. 
However, as Martell was standing as a ‘National Fellowship Conservative’ in an 
attempt to attract the Conservative vote, this instruction also limited Martell’s chances 
of success. The negative comments of local Conservative officials showed that 
Central Office wanted to stop Martell from taking advantage of the Conservative 
Party’s absence. Nevertheless, Central Office did enter into a relationship with 
Martell’s Freedom Group. During the 1964 General Election, Central Office accepted 
Martell’s offer of assistance, especially his attempt to unseat Labour leader Harold 
Wilson. Thereafter, Central Office reverted to a more negative stance. It denied any 
association with Martell and monitored closely his involvement with the National 
Party.
These changes of attitude merely reflected different contexts. The PLDF’s fierce anti­
unionism placed it firmly to the right of the Macmillan Government and made it 
attractive to Conservatives who believed that the Conservative Party had accepted the 
Labour programme without a fight. This explained Central Office’s action at East 
Ham and Bristol. Likewise, Home’s acquisition of the Conservative Party leadership 
in 1963 explained Central Office’s co-operation at the 1964 General Election. Home 
was a recognised right-winger, which made Martell’s Freedom Group appear to be 
less outside the political mainstream. A desire to avoid association with Martell’s 
financial difficulties ostensibly explained Central Office’s reversion to a more 
negative stance after the 1964 General Election. Nevertheless, it is probably not
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coincidental that this occurred after Home’s replacement by the more progressive 
Heath. Neither is it surprising that Central Office monitored Martell’s involvement 
with the National Party. In supporting the National Party, Martell had continued his 
rightwards journey, leaving ‘freedom right’ organisations for an overtly anti­
immigrant extreme-right one at a time when immigration was an increasingly difficult 
political phenomenon. However, regardless of changes, at no time did Central Office 
collaborate unconditionally with Martell. The heavy qualification of its co-operation 
during the 1964 General Election suggested that this was a temporary situation and 
reflected Home’s leadership. In reality, therefore, Central Office consistently 
countered Martell’s groups.
There is no such ambiguity, however, when it came to groups or individuals capable 
of being associated with the wilder forms of the extremism, especially Fascism or 
Nazism. Central Offices attitude towards these groups never deviated. Central Office 
was always careful to identify anti-Semitism or Nazism in groups that it investigated, 
such as in the examples of The Guild of Good Neighbours and The New Crusade. 
When Central Office discovered that the anti-Semitic L. N. Tomlinson of Clan Briton 
was a Conservative Party member, it abruptly ended its correspondence with him. 
Andrew Fountaine’s anti-Semitism caused Central Office to withdraw official party 
support from him. Discovery of BUF antecedents led Central Office to take further 
action against the founder of the Right Party. Central Office’s knowledge of BUF 
membership was probably the factor in its decision to block John Chamley’s attempts 
to become a Conservative MP or local councillor. Additionally, Central Office 
explicitly identified the miniscule Elizabethan Party as fascist when it warned all 
Conservative MPs, candidates, constituency and area agents to have nothing to do 
with it
The most obvious example of a perception of fascism by Central Office involved the 
League of Empire Loyalists, a 1950s reaction to decolonization. Here, Central Office 
did not act alone, as wider Conservatism contributed to thwarting this greater threat 
from the extreme right. Aware of some members’ BUF antecedents, Central Office 
commissioned a report, which concluded that the League of Empire Loyalists was 
fascist and anti-Semitic. Central Office advised Conservative MPs, candidates and 
party officials of this conclusion. Some of these individuals repeated this accusation
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in the press. Central Office introduced more vigorous vetting of party membership 
applications to block League of Empire Loyalist supporters from joining the 
Conservative Party. It also sought the identities of party members already within the 
LEL, some of whom subsequently left the Conservative Party. It was made clear that 
membership of the League of Empire Loyalists was incompatible with Conservative 
Party membership. Meanwhile, the League of Empire Loyalists’ leader complained of 
a wider campaign to ostracise its members. Considering the presence of Conservatives 
in the League of Empire Loyalists, and the milieu of this campaign, it is likely that 
ordinary Conservatives were hostile to what many viewed as a fascist re-emergence. 
The League of Empire Loyalists’ attempt to gain political recognition allowed Central 
Office to infer its fascism and orchestrate denigration of it by using the Conservative- 
supporting Daily Telegraph. League of Empire Loyalists’ disruption of Conservative 
Party events met increasingly stiff resistance from local Conservative Association 
officials, culminating in their violent removal from the Party Conference at Blackpool 
in 1958. The Conservative Party leadership cut the ground away from the League of 
Empire Loyalists anti-immigrant stance by introducing the Immigration Bill in 1961. 
This applied also to the neo-Nazi or racial nationalist groups splintering from the 
League of Empire Loyalists from 1958, including the True Tories of Richard Hilton 
and those variously associated with John Bean, Colin Jordan, John Tyndall and 
Andrew Fountaine. From a peak in 1958, the League of Empire Loyalists declined, 
whilst its splinter groups made no impact. The Conservative Party’s actions played a 
significant role in their failure.
Decolonization provided the impetus for the emergence of the Monday Club in 1961, 
an equally, if not more troubling development than the LEL as its members were 
unarguably Conservative Party members. Unsure of its nature, Central Office initially 
dismissed the Monday Club as an example of youthful exuberance. However, 
concluding it was an extreme-right organisation Central Office attempted to hinder its 
growth. It ordered Young Conservatives to cease all contacts with the Monday Club 
and denied it financial, or any other assistance. As in Martell’s case, a temporary 
thawing of Central Office’s attitude coincided with Home’s leadership. After Home’s 
departure in July 1965, however, Central Office’s attitude became even more 
negative. An unattributed Daily Telegraph report of ministerial criticism in November 
1965 indicated that the new leadership disapproved of the Monday Club. From 1965
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onwards, Monday Club complaints of prejudice by the party bureaucracy increased. 
Over the following two years, the Monday Club identified discrimination from 
Conservative organisations and in their omission from the party’s policy study groups. 
Central Office correspondence confirms the Monday Club’s accusation.
Central Office’s counter measures against the Monday Club continued in the pivotal 
years of 1967 and 1968. In early 1967, the external extreme right coalesced into the 
National Front. At this stage, however, Central Office exhibited no concerns over the 
National Front, dismissing it as an irrelevant amalgamation of discredited fascists like 
Chesterton and former members of the League of Empire Loyalists. The Monday 
Club’s decision to become a mass movement in June 1967 was a different matter. The 
Conservative Party could not tolerate a potential threat to take it over from within, or 
the possibility of a credible party forming to its right. The activity engendered by the 
Monday Club’s decision reflects the Conservative Party’s concern. The Chief Whip 
became involved in investigating the Monday Club’s activities from July 1967. 
Central Office considered the extraordinary possibility of harming one of its former 
employees’ pension and restricting the activities of its future pensioners. It denied the 
Monday Club fair access to the Universities Department within Central Office, and 
dismissed its claims of discrimination by other ‘all-party’ groups such as the 
Conservative Overseas Bureau.
On 20 April 1968, Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech transformed the extreme 
right. The Monday Club or the National Front now had a potential leader. From this 
moment onwards, the Conservative Party leadership opposed the extreme right even 
more determinedly. Heath’s immediate sacking of Powell was an obvious, if limited 
attempt to limit his appeal. More effective was a rightwards move in the party’s 
political programme. Commenced in 1967, this rightwards move continued with 
legislative measures and policy statements designed to attract Powell’s potential 
supporters without ever acceding to all of his demands. At the same time, Central 
Office continued thwarting the Monday Club. Area Agents monitored the Monday 
Club’s fund raising activities and requested help from Central Office to counter it. 
Central Office organised the collation of complaints to counter the Monday Club 
chairman’s frequent allegations of bias. Senior Conservatives supported an incumbent
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MP when faced with a local Monday Club campaign to deselect him. Meanwhile, the 
Conservative Party denied any connection with the National Front.
Such was the success in constraining Powell and his supporters within Conservatism, 
that the Conservative Party scored an unexpected victory at the 1970 General 
Election. However, although Powell’s threat never materialised, a growing realisation 
of an increasing connection between the extreme right outside and within the party 
became a source of serious concern. The ‘freedom right’ still existed in the likes of 
the Society for Individual Freedom and AIMS, but these groups remained peripheral. 
The freedom right possessed no charismatic figures. Martell had long since left the 
freedom right behind, and no organisation had yet appeared that was capable of 
uniting the freedom right. This left the field clear for the National Front, a nationalist- 
racist organisation possessing antecedents, policies and behaviour that marked it in 
many eyes as a fascist or neo-Nazi party. This was as intolerable as any connection 
with the League of Empire Loyalists. Indeed it was more so, because most of the 
openly neo-Nazis who left the League of Empire Loyalists were by now in the 
National Front, whilst the internal group with which it was connected, the Monday 
Club, was no longer a rudimentary organisation but a developed and growing entity 
capable of challenging the Conservative Party. This dangerous situation was the most 
serious test of the Conservative Party’s determination to block the extreme right after 
the Second World War. The Conservative bureaucracy did not deviate from the 
mandate given to the Voluntary Organisation Department in 1948. Nor did the party 
leadership remain idle. Heath’s government neutralised the Monday Club’s appeal by 
moving towards it areas such as the economy, trade unions and immigration, whilst in 
public it attacked the Monday Club’s objectives. In January 1973, Central Office 
formulated a policy threatening not to support the Monday Club chairman’s by- 
election campaign unless he removed extremists. Desiring this support, the Monday 
Club chairman complied, turning the Monday Club into another Central Office 
agency of refraction against the extreme right.
From 1945-75, the Conservative Party leadership, and Central Office especially, 
consistently blocked the extreme right. It did so by implementing counter measures 
against the extreme right, and sometimes by adopting some of its themes. This was an 
institutionalised policy. The policy’s objective was avoidance of embarrassing or
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inexpedient associations. The level of blocking correlated to the perceived degree of 
extremism and threat posed. The Conservative Party bureaucracy implemented this 
policy not only to external extremists, but also to its own extreme-right, the 
Conservative Monday Club. Contrasting with this was a favourable attitude towards 
progressive groups such as the One Nation Group, Bow Group and PEST. The effect 
of this policy was the limitation of space to the extreme right and attraction of its 
potential voters. At the same time, the Conservative Party sloughed off individuals, 
forcing them to operate without the comforts provided by a monolithic, powerful and 
successful mainstream party. Extreme-right voters constantly faced the dilemma of 
whether it was worth voting for any party other than the Conservative Party, whilst 
extreme-right parties persistently faced the dilemma of whether they could make any 
electoral impact. From 1945-75, the extreme right failed abjectly to win political 
representation, its highlight being one saved deposit at a 1973 by-election. The 
extreme-right’s failure indicates that the Conservative Party’s policy was successful.
After 1975, the Conservative Party continued this policy. The Conservative Party met 
the challenge of a resurgent ‘freedom right’, particularly in the shape of the National 
Association for Freedom, by adopting many of its policies in its 1979 General 
Election manifesto. The Conservative Party marginalised the National Front further. 
In January 1978, Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher commented on Granada 
TV’s World in Action that ‘people are really rather afraid that this country might be 
rather swamped by people with a different culture’.1 This was a premeditated 
statement. Thatcher’s further comments in the interview make clear this was an 
appeal to the National Front’s potential voters. The National Front interpreted 
Thatcher’s comments this way. Accusing her of simply uttering ‘cunning phrases 
which SOUND anti-immigration at first hearing but which on closer study do not 
commit a future Conservative government to take ANY action to halt immigration,’ 
the National Front warned the electorate that the Conservative Party had pulled off 
this ‘trick’ before. The National Front recognised that the Conservative Party was 
again reaching rightwards and attacked its immigration policy as a fraud up to the
1 TV Interview for Granada World in Action (“rather swamped”), 27 January 1978. 
www.margaretthatcher.org.
2 ‘Immigration: Tories Re-issue 1970 Vote-Catch Swindle’, National Front News, March 1978, 
1.
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General Election.3 However, there was little that the National Front could do to 
counter the Conservative Party’s election manifesto promise of a British Nationality 
Act offering a tougher stance on immigration. At the 1979 General Election, all 303 
National Front candidates lost their deposits, gaining 0.61% of the total vote.4 The 
National Front blamed the Conservative Party, accusing it of stealing National Front 
polices and supporters.5 Implementing the British Nationality Act (1981), which 
provided stricter immigration criteria without acceding to the National Front’s 
demands, probably helped the Conservative Party retain these voters and contributed 
to the National Front demise in the early 1980s.
The purged Monday Club welcomed Thatcher’s leadership as promising ‘a return to 
Conservatism.’6 Whilst in opposition, Thatcher appointed Lord Thomeycroft party 
chairman at Central Office. As the Chancellor who resigned in 1958 when 
Macmillan’s Cabinet refused to cut government spending sufficiently, Thomeycroft 
was more in tune with Monday Club thinking. This was a much-changed party 
machine, reflected in Sir Victor Raikes’ February 1977 comment to Thomeycroft that 
the Monday Club ‘has deep loyalty to our leader and our relations with you as 
Chairman of the Party are very happy’.7 In government, Thatcher absorbed much of 
the Monday Club’s objectives. Economic policy, anti-trade union legislation and a 
tough anti-Soviet Union stance were but some of the areas agreeable to the Monday 
Club, whilst the British Nationality Act (1981) went as far as moderate Monday 
Clubbers ever went. Economically liberal, yet socially authoritarian, Thatcher’s three 
governments were amenable to the Monday Club. After Thatcher’s removal, the 
Conservative Party entered into a prolonged internecine struggle revolving ostensibly 
around whether to maintain ‘Thatcherism’, or present a more progressive, tolerant 
image. Bitterly divided, the Conservative Party lost the 1997 General Election by a 
landslide to a reformed ‘New Labour’ that accepted much of Thatcherism but 
promised to heal the social divisions it caused. This appealed to an electorate still
3 For example, ‘Unveiled: The great Tory damp squib’, ‘"Tories? We Don’t Hate Them -  We 
Despise Them”’, ‘Labour-Tories Agree: “Black Immigration Must Continue”’, National Front 
News, May 1978,1.
4 www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk.htm.
5 Thatcher The Betrayer1, National Front News, October 1979, 1. Tory Betrayals Are N.F. 
Opportunities’, National Front News, October 1979, 2.
6 Copping, Crisis, 22.
7 Sir Victor Raikes, KBE, to The Rt. Hon. Lord Thomeycroft, CH. CPA CCO 3/7/33, Monday 
Club, 1965-77.
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coming to terms with the economic restructuring that had damaged communities in 
the 1980s, and with a younger generation more amenable to an increasingly 
cosmopolitan society and the European Union.
As in 1945, therefore, the Conservative Party at the end of the twentieth century faced 
a new paradigm. Unable to resolve their divisions, the Conservative Party lost the 
next two elections in 2001 and 2005. In quick succession, William Hague, Iain 
Duncan Smith and Michael Howard joined Austen Chamberlain as the only 
Conservative leaders since 1900 who failed to become Prime Minister. The 
Conservative Party, realising as always the pragmatic need to adapt to society’s 
changes, found itself increasingly at odds with the Monday Club’s intolerant positions 
on race and immigration. The Monday Club’s call for voluntary repatriation, placing 
it once more on the extreme right, was no longer acceptable. In October 2001, the 
Conservative leader instructed three MPs to leave the Monday Club, and the Shadow 
Chancellor declared that, ‘There is no room for extremist views in the Conservative
O
Party.’ Two weeks later, the leader suspended the Monday Club from the 
Conservative Party.9 In May 2002, the Monday Club expressed its desire to re­
establish links with the Conservative Party,10 and belief in a quick return to the Tory 
fold.11 However, the Monday Club remains estranged from the Conservative Party. 
When this research commenced, Central Office’s guardian of the Conservative Party 
Archive advised that ‘The modem day Monday Club is not an organisation that we 
wish to be affiliated or associated with’ and that he considered it an ‘unpleasant 
organisation’.12 Together with the party’s actions after 1975, these comments show 
that the Conservative leadership and bureaucracy continues and maintains the 
negative, refractory role that blocked the extreme right in the period 1945-75.
8 ‘Tory MPs resign from far-right club’, BBC News, 7 October 2001.
9 Tories cut Monday Club link over race policies’, Guardian, 19 October 2001.
10 ‘Right-wing club appeals for Tory return’, BBC News, 10 May 2002.
11 ‘Monday Club predicts a quick return to Tory fold’, The Independent, 11 May 2002.
12 Personal communication, 12 December 2005.
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